Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Wilfred L. Anderson, M.D.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-1325

V. Judge Michael H. Watson

State of Ohio, ef ai., Magistrate Judge Vascura

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Wilfred L. Anderson, M.D. (“Plaintiff”), proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, sues the State of Ohio and the Ohio State Medical Board under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Compl., ECF No. 4.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was convicted of a misdemeanor in 1997

in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Compl. 2, ECF No. 4. Plaintiff

appealed the conviction in the Ohio courts to no avail. /d. 5. The conviction led to

the revocation of Plaintiff's medical license in 1998. /d. □□ 4.

The Magistrate Judge performed an initial screen of the Complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R’),

recommending that the Court dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. R&R, ECF No. 3. Specifically, the R&R concludes that the State of

Ohio and the Ohio State Medical Board are entitled to sovereign immunity and that

the claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. (citing Rooker v. Fidelity

Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983)).

Plaintiff objects to the R&R. Obj., ECF No. 5.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), the Court reviews de novo

those portions of the R&R to which Plaintiff objects. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The

Court can accept, reject, or modify the recommendation; receive further evidence; or

return the matter to the Magistrate Judge. /d.

On objection, Plaintiff contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine cannot bar

his § 1983 claims because the underlying state-court conviction was “a legal nullity

and thus incapable of triggering a jurisdictional bar.” Obj. 1, ECF No. 5. Further,

Plaintiff argues that the “fraud on the court” exception to the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine applies here. /d. at 3. Plaintiff ends by requesting the opportunity to amend

his Complaint to sue officials, in their official capacities, for prospective injunctive

relief. Id. at 4.

Problems pervade Plaintiff's Complaint and require dismissal; his objections

are meritless.

First, Plaintiff sues only the State and an agency of the State. Compl., ECF

No. 4. Both the State of Ohio and the Ohio State Medical Board are entitled to

sovereign immunity on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, whether for injunctive relief or

monetary damages. E.g., U.S. Const. amend. XI; Begun v. Ohio State Med. Bd.,

No. 88-3845, 1989 WL 34047, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 29, 1989) (concluding that the

Ohio State Medical Board was a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity).

In apparent concession of this point, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the

Complaint to sue certain officials, in their official capacities, for prospective injunctive

relief, invoking the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity. Obj. 4, ECF

Case No. 2:25-cv-1325 Page 2 of 5

No. 5; see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Leave to amend is DENIED,

however, because amendment would be futile.

Amendment clearly would not save Plaintiffs claims for money damages.

See Compl. at Prayer for Relief, ECF No. 4 (seeking “compensatory damages,

exemplary and punitive damages, costs, and any other relief the Court deems just

and equitable”). And to the extent expungement of his conviction could be

characterized as prospective relief, those claims are barred by other, independent

factors. But see Spencer v. Gasper, No. 1:21-cv-653, 2022 WL 883893, at “1 (W.D.

Mich. Mar. 25, 2022) (“Although Plaintiff says that he seeks only prospective relief as

to the effect, he is really seeking retrospective relief to invalidate his prior

conviction.”).

First, despite Plaintiff's protestations to the contrary, his claims are barred by

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as the crux of his argument is that the state court

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his criminal case (or that other prosecutorial

misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel invalidates his conviction) and that

this Court should vacate the conviction. Compl. at Prayer for Relief, ECF No. 4; see

Doe v. Nessel, No. 23-2097, 2025 WL 1707689, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 2025) ("To the

extent Brown asks to undo the state court's judgment of conviction in his criminal

case, Rooker-Feldman bars his federal claims.”); Kerr v. Pollex, No. 22-3993, 2023

WL 8358798, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2023) (“Because Kerr sought to challenge

state-court judgments rendered before he filed the current action, the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine barred the district court from exercising jurisdiction over his claims

seeking a declaration that his state-court criminal judgments were void ab initio.”).

Case No. 2:25-cv-1325 Page 3 of 5

He is not simply seeking to hold a party liable for fraud without disturbing the state-

court judgment; his goal is to invalidate the state-court judgment. This renders

Plaintiff's claims precisely within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Moreover, his claims are Heck’ barred because, if meritorious, they would

directly undermine the validity of his conviction. E.g., Nesse/, 2025 WL 1707689, at

*2 (‘Brown's § 1983 claims, to the extent they can be deciphered, are premised on

the alleged illegality of his prosecution and conviction . . . . Success on these claims

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.” (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted)); Kerr, 2023 WL 8358798, at *3 (“Kerr attacks the validity of his

state-court criminal judgments, and he does not allege that they have been

reversed, expunged, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question in a

federal writ of habeas corpus.”); Gasper, 2022 WL 883893, at *2 (“Regardless of

how Plaintiff phrases his legal claims in this case, the remedy that he seeks is to

have this Court invalidate his 2001 conviction and/or necessarily imply that the. . .

conviction was wrongful. This requested relief is barred by Heck.” (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted)). And this cannot be the lawsuit that declares

Petitioner’s conviction invalid (i.e., removes the Heck bar) because “claims for

injunctive relief challenging the fact of a conviction fall within the core of habeas

corpus and are thus not cognizable when brought pursuant to § 1983." Smith v.

Lincoln, No. 24-1035, 2024 WL 5338140, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 18, 2024) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

1 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Case No. 2:25-cv-1325 Page 4 of 5

Finally, to the extent sovereign immunity, Rooker-Feldman, or Heck would not

bar any proposed claims, the statute of limitations would almost certainly bar them,

as the latest date mentioned in the Complaint is 1998. E.g., Rasawehr v. Grey, No.

24-3322, 2025 WL 1639164, at *2 (6th Cir. June 10, 2025) (“There is a two-year

statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Ohio. The limitations period begins to run

when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his

or her injury has occurred.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Plaintiff's Complaint indicates that he knew about all pertinent actions by 1998, and

he offers no explanation for the nearly thirty-year delay in bringing suit.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED, and leave to amend is

DENIED. The Court ADOPTS the R&R and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

the Complaint. The Clerk shall TERMINATE this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED. . / | ff Abin

ICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. 2:25-cv-1325 Page 5 of 5