Helwig

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SUSAN HELWIG,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-01916

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

DANIEL J. MYERS, PH.D., and

MISERICORDIA UNIVERSITY,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Susan Helwig (“Helwig”) initiated this action by filing a complaint on

December 2, 2022. (Doc. 1). Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by

Defendants Daniel J. Myers, Ph.D. (“Myers”) and Misericordia University (“Misericordia”)

(together “Defendants”). (Doc. 42). For the reasons provided herein, Defendants’ motion will

be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. 42).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following background is taken from Defendants’ statement of material facts and

Helwig’s response thereto1 (Doc. 43; Doc. 58). Misericordia is a not-for-profit private

university in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 43, ¶ 2; Doc. 58, ¶ 2). Misericordia hired

Myers as President of Misericordia effective July 1, 2021, and he is the current President of

Misericordia. (Doc. 48, ¶ 3, 20; Doc. 53, ¶ 3, 20). In or about 1999, Misericordia hired Helwig,

1 Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the Court accepts as true all undisputed material facts

supported by the record. Where the record evinces a disputed fact, the Court will take notice.

The facts have been taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party with respect to

the motion.

a woman born in 1960, for the position of Vice President of University Advancement. (Doc.

43, ¶¶ 1, 9; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 1, 9). Helwig served as the Vice President of University Advancement

at Misericordia until March 9, 2022. (Doc. 43, ¶ 157, 9; Doc. 58, ¶ 157). At all times, Helwig

was an at-will employee of Misericordia, meaning Misericordia reserved the right to terminate

Helwig “for lawful reasons at any time, with or without cause, and with or without notice.”

(Doc. 43, ¶¶ 11-12; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 11-12). As Vice President of University Advancement, Helwig

reported to Myers, who reported to the Board of Trustees (the “Board”). (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 13, 102;

Doc. 58, ¶¶ 13, 102).

Helwig was diagnosed with skin cancer on December 27, 2021. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 27-28;

Doc. 58, ¶¶ 27-28). Helwig underwent a melanoma lesion excision on February 7, 2022. (Doc.

43, ¶¶ 29-30; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 29-30). Defendants assert that Helwig did not tell anybody at

Misericordia about her cancer diagnosis, except her assistant, Wendy Ferrara (“Ferrara”).

(Doc. 43, ¶ 32). Helwig contends that she disclosed her skin cancer diagnosis to both Ferrara

and Pamela Parsnik (“Parsnik”), Director of Human Resources and Title IX Coordinator for

Misericordia University, on February 16, 2022. (Doc. 58, ¶ 32). While Defendants assert that

Myers was not aware of Helwig’s skin cancer diagnosis, Helwig counters that Myers may

have learned of Helwig’s diagnosis and need for FMLA leave from Parsnik. (Doc. 43, ¶ 33-

35; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 33-35).

Myers testified that after he became the President of Misericordia in 2021, a series of

incidents occurred in which Myers and Helwig did not see eye-to-eye. (Doc. 43, ¶ 39; Doc.

58, ¶ 39). Defendants consider this series of incidents to be “performance deficiencies” by

Helwig. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 39-40). Helwig denies the characterization her performance as deficient

because Myers never disciplined Helwig for any reason nor put her on any sort of performance

improvement plan. (Doc. 58, ¶¶ 39-40). However, it is undisputed that Helwig acknowledged

that Myers spoke to her about such performance issues in her communications with Larry

Pellegrini (“Pellegrini”), the Associate Vice President of University Advancement at

Misericordia. (Doc. 43, ¶ 41; Doc. 58, ¶ 41).

The first in these series of incidents involved a dispute over corporate sponsorship

banners for display at Misericordia. (Doc. 43, ¶ 42). Helwig does not characterize the

corporate sponsorship banner communications as a dispute. (Doc. 58, ¶ 42). The second

incident involved Helwig failing to conform with Myers’ instructions when presenting to the

Board of Trustees. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 51-58; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 51-58). Myers told Helwig to take out the

references to the short staffing in her report because the Board was already aware of the issue;

however, when it came time for Helwig to submit the report to the Board, Helwig refused to

remove all references to staffing issues. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 52-53, 55). Myers testified that he “okayed

[Helwig’s report] under duress because we were out of time.” (Doc. 43, ¶ 57). Helwig counters

that her version of the report was okayed by Myers on February 1, 2022, ten days before she

reported to the Board. (Doc. 58, ¶ 51). The third incident involved Helwig’s allegedly

contentious relationship with the Board. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 59-63; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 59-63). Myers

testified that the Board chair, Dr. Debora Smith-Mileski (“Smith-Mileski”) and Helwig

disagreed about a letter University Advancement drafted regarding the Misericordia gala

because Smith-Mileski wanted to focus on gratitude, and Helwig wanted to use the gala as a

vehicle for solicitation of donations. (Doc. 43; ¶ 60). Helwig denies that she and Smith-Mileski

were “at odds,” adding that she explained to Smith-Mileski that the letter was soliciting

corporate sponsorships, not soliciting donors invited as part of their giving. (Doc. 58, ¶ 60).

The fourth incident involved an email Helwig sent to Smith-Mileski on February 7,

2022, which Helwig describes as her “line in the sand” and Defendants classify as “the straw

that broke the camel’s back.” (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 64-81; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 64-81). On February 7, 2022,

without prior notice to Myers, Helwig sent an email to Smith-Mileski with a copy to Myers

stating,

I know it is meant to be funny, but it has happened often enough now that it

has become uncomfortable (and feels like less of a joke), I ask that my name

not be mentioned in a negative way at Board meetings re: Trustees making gifts.

I am happy to be helpful in any way needed, but it really is not the role of the

Vice President of Advancement to solicit Trustees or the President. Best

practices suggest that Trustees be solicited by their peers. I will join in the visit,

or provide the necessary information (whichever is preferred), but I no longer

want to be relied on to solicit Trustees at the 11th hour -- nor do I think I should

continue to obsess about whether it is getting done.

Since the elimination of the Marketing and Development Committee, I have

become the person chasing down an increasing number of Trustees by phone,

email, and text at their homes and offices for the last few months of the fiscal

year, trying to get Board giving to the 100% needed for us to be successful with

other constituents. It's beyond uncomfortable, and as I sense it is turning into a

professional negative, I request things go back to the way best practices suggest

they be done.

Thank you for your understanding.

(Doc. 43, ¶ 64; Doc. 58, ¶ 64).

Helwig forwarded the above email to Pellegrini stating, “I drew my line in the sand.

Hopefully this will help.” (Doc. 43, ¶ 65). Helwig does not controvert this fact but adds that

in the conclusion of the February 7, 2022 email to Smith-Mileski, Helwig expressed that

Smith-Mileksi’s statement about her made her “uncomfortable” because she is mentioned in

a “negative light,” and indicates that “this dialogue influences [Helwig’s] willingness to help

Smith-Mileski.” (Doc. 58, ¶ 65). Helwig sent the above email on the same day she underwent

excision surgery for the melanoma on her leg. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 29-30; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 29-30).

At 3:05 a.m. on February 8, 2022, after seeing Helwig’s email to Smith-Mileski, Myers

emailed Helwig stating, “Your tone in this message to Deb is completely inappropriate. We

need to talk about this immediately. Let me know when you are free today.” (Doc. 43, ¶ 66).

Plaintiff denies this fact, asserting that she was never questioned under oath about Myers’

February 8, 2022, email. (Doc. 58, ¶ 66). Myers further testified that the solicitation of Board

members was a “sore issue for Deb and it is possible to interpret [Helwig’s email] as jabbing

her about the issue,” and that he was embarrassed by Helwig’s email to Smith-Mileski. (Doc.

43, ¶ 67). Helwig denies this fact, adding that Myers’ testimony is just his perception about

how Smith-Mileski might have felt after receiving the February 7, 2022 email. (Doc. 58, ¶ 67).

However, it is undisputed that Smith-Mileski described the email as “jabbing” and Helwig’s

tone as “punitive.” (Doc. 43, ¶ 67, 71-72; Doc. 58, ¶ 67).

At 3:11 a.m. on February 8, 2022, Myers emailed Smith-Mileski apologizing for

Helwig’s February 7th email to Smith-Mileski and noted that he “will be working to correct

[Helwig’s recent behavior] in one way or another.” (Doc. 43, ¶ 69; Doc. 58, ¶ 69). At 6:31

p.m. on February 8, 2022, Myers contacted his executive coach, Dr. Tom Flynn (“Flynn”), a

retired university president and professional advisor, who the Board retained to aid Dr. Myers

in his first year as President. (Doc. 43, ¶ 76; Doc. 58, ¶ 76). On February 9, 2022, Flynn replied

to Myers stating in relevant part,

[I]t is outrageous that [Helwig] sent the email she did and even worse that she

did this without talking with you. The substance and tone are way over the top.

Disrespectful to you, as much as to Deb. Not appropriate for me from afar to

make a firm judgement, but I dont [sic] see this situation as salvageable. Beyond

the relation with Deb, [Helwig] has absolutely broken trust with you. I do think

you need to decide this week the next steps.

(Doc. 43, ¶ 79; Doc. 58, ¶ 79).

After receiving input from Flynn, Myers began networking with Flynn and consultants

to find a replacement for Helwig and for an assessment of the University Advancement office.

(Doc. 43, ¶ 81). Helwig disputes this fact, asserting, without citation to the record, that Myers

had not decided to terminate her until March 2022. (Doc. 58, ¶ 81). On February 15, 2022, at

Myers’ request, Parsnik, Director of Human Resources, provided Myers with information

regarding Helwig’s employment history in an email with the subject line “Resignation and

General Release.” (Doc. 43, ¶ 83). Helwig denies this fact, asserting that Parsnik provided

Helwig’s employment history to Myer because Parsnik believed “he let [Helwig] go.” (Doc.

59, ¶ 83). Myers testified that he made the decision to terminate Helwig on or around

February 15, 2022, which Helwig denies, asserting that Myers did not provide her with a draft

resignation and general release agreement until March 3, 2022. (Doc. 43, ¶ 82; Doc. 58, ¶ 82).

On February 16, 2022, Myers met with Helwig informing her that he intended to

terminate her employment and asking her how she wished to characterize her departure. (Doc.

43, ¶ 91). Myers testified that Helwig suggested she “retire” from Misericordia and requested

two weeks off to consider the characterization of her departure. (Doc. 43, ¶ 92). Helwig denies

that Myers informed her of his plan to terminate her and denies suggesting retiring from

Misericordia. (Doc. 58, ¶ 91). Helwig also denies that her two-week leave was to consider the

characterization of her departure, asserting that her sick leave was to “think and for her to

receive medical treatment.” (Doc. 58, ¶ 93). At 3:30 p.m. on February 16, 2022, following the

meeting with Myers, Helwig sent Parsnik an email stating in relevant part,

It didn’t go well. In my view, he is looking for a reason. He said the board told

him to evaluate all his administrators and that he could have asked for our

resignations on Day 1. He asked me if I was going to resign. I told him I was

planning on retiring from the place. He asked me when that would be (which I

know is illegal). I said I don’t know. He is saying he doesn’t trust me because I

emailed Debbie. I told him I have always directly talked to the board. I asked

him for two weeks sick leave as a reprieve for both of us to think. Plus I have

been trying to find a period to get this treatment for skin cancer (I am only

sharing that with you) that must be done every day for two weeks. I called

yesterday and they said I could start tomorrow. . .

(Doc. 43, ¶ 95; Doc. 58, ¶ 95).

It is undisputed that Helwig did not inform Myers that she had any health issues prior to

February 16, 2022. (Doc. 43, ¶ 96; Doc. 58, ¶ 96). However, Myers contends that he was not

informed of or aware of any disability or medical condition Helwig may have had on February

16, 2022. (Doc. 43, ¶ 97). While Helwig asserts, unsupported by the record, that she advised

Myers during their February 16, 2022 meeting, that she had a medical condition that needed

treatment requiring up to four weeks off. (Doc. 58, ¶ 97).

On February 17, 2022, Myers approved Helwig’s time off request for two weeks and

set a meeting for February 28, 2022, following Helwig’s requested return date of February 25,

2022. (Doc. 43, ¶ 104). During Helwig’s two week leave, Myers prepared for Helwig’s

departure by requesting that Parsnik and Mark Van Etten (“Van Etten”), Vice President of

Finance and Administration at Misericordia, prepare a proposed separation agreement for

Helwig. (Doc. 43, ¶ 106). Helwig does not controvert this fact but adds that by February 28,

2022, Myers did not know if he would execute the separation agreement. (Doc. 58, ¶ 106).

On February 23, 2022, Myers emailed Van Etten and Parsnik stating in relevant part, “I have

a meeting scheduled with Sue on Monday at Noon. I will need to have a proposed separation

agreement by then. I do not yet know if we will execute it, but we need to be prepared.” (Doc.

43, ¶ 109; Doc. 58, ¶ 109).

On February 28, 2022, Myers first contacted Dr. Tanya Easton (“Easton”), a woman

born in 1957, who was later hired as the interim and then permanent Vice President for

University Advancement. (Doc. 43, ¶ 110, 164). Helwig denies this fact, asserting that Myers’

first contact with Easton was on March 2, 2022, with the message, “Sorry for the slow reply.

I’d love to talk soon…” (Doc. 58, ¶ 110). Myers testified that he also met with Helwig on

February 28, 2022, in which he reaffirmed his decision to terminate Helwig and asked for her

input on how she wished to portray her departure. (Doc. 43, ¶ 112). Helwig denies this fact,

asserting that Myers notified Van Etten and Parsnik of his decision to terminate Helwig on

March 2, 2022, and advised Helwig that she was going to be terminated on March 3, 2022.

(Doc. 43, ¶ 112). The meeting on February 28, 2022, lasted only thirty minutes because Myers

had another meeting to attend, so Myers requested a follow up meeting with Helwig for the

following day. (Doc. 43, ¶ 115; Doc. 58, ¶ 115). Helwig took sick days on March 1 and March

2, 2022, and proposed reconvening March 3, 2022, which Myers agreed to. (Doc. 43, ¶ 118;

Doc. 58, ¶ 118).

On March 1, 2022, Helwig sent the following message to Pellegrini,

He is going to let me go, Larry. He doesn't trust me because of the email to

Debbie. He also didn't like that I didn't take the staff shortage stuff out of my

board report after he agreed that we needed more staff, and that I brought back

up the banners for the corporate sponsorship program after it was decided it

wouldn't be done. Those were his examples.

(Doc. 43, ¶ 120; Doc. 58, ¶ 120).

On March 1, 2022, Helwig also sent an email to Myers, edited by Pellegrini, to demonstrate

her commitment to Misericordia. (Doc. 43, ¶ 121; Doc. 58, ¶ 121). Helwig testified that she

wrote the email with Pellegrini because they “had heard that [Myers] was interviewing other

people for [her] job.” (Doc. 43, ¶ 122; Doc. 58, ¶ 122).

On March 3, 2022, Helwig submitted a return to work note from her doctor dated

March 2, 2022, that read, “Please allow Susan to come to the office to work as required but

work remotely as needed. She may also need to take time off as needed for a healing surgical

site on the left leg.” (Doc. 43, ¶ 126; Doc. 58, ¶ 126). Remote work was available to Helwig

as a matter of course, and all her requests for sick days were granted. (Doc. 43, ¶ 128-29; Doc.

58, ¶ 128). Helwig notes that she was unable to take certain sick days or FMLA leave because

she was “abruptly terminated” by Myers. (Doc. 58, ¶ 129). Also on March 3, 2022, Myers

and Helwig met again, and Myers presented Helwig with a proposed Resignation and General

Release Agreement. (Doc. 43, ¶ 130; Doc. 58, ¶ 130). It is undisputed that Myers invited

Helwig’s negotiation with respect to the proposed agreement; however, Helwig denies that

Myers asked her how she wanted her departure phrased to the community. (Doc. 43, ¶ 133-

35; Doc. 58, ¶ 133-35).

On March 4, 2022, Myers’ Chief of Staff, James Roberts sent Myers a first draft of the

announcement of Helwig’s departure. (Doc. 43, ¶ 137). Helwig notes that the draft was a “first

draft of a possible announcement.” (Doc. 58, ¶ 137). Also on March 4, Myers first met with

Easton via Zoom to discuss the interim Vice President of University Advancement position.

(Doc. 43, ¶ 138; Doc. 58, ¶ 138). Later that day, Helwig emailed Myers requesting that the

follow-up meeting be postponed until she can confer with her lawyer. (Doc. 43, ¶ 139; Doc.

58, ¶ 139). Myers scheduled the follow up meeting for March 8, at 11:00 a.m. (Doc. 43, ¶ 140;

Doc. 58, ¶ 140).

In the interim, on March 7, 2022, Myers coordinated the logistics of offering Easton

the interim Vice President of University Advancement role. (Doc. 43, ¶ 141). Helwig notes

that it was unusual that by March 7, Human Resources did not have an application or resume

from Easton. (Doc. 58, ¶ 141). On the same day, Helwig submitted a request to complete

FMLA paperwork to Dr. Cassondra Ellison. (Doc. 43, ¶ 142; Doc. 58, ¶ 142). On March 8,

2022, Helwig sent an additional request to complete FMLA paperwork to Dr. Karl Luxardo,

who scheduled an appointment for March 10, 2022. (Doc. 43, ¶ 143, 145; Doc. 58, ¶ 143,

145). On March 8, 2022, Helwig also emailed Myers that she needed to take a sick day,

indicating continued medical complications and further delaying their follow-up meeting.

(Doc. 43, ¶ 144; Doc 58, ¶ 144). In response, Myers requested Helwig call him that day for

some information. (Doc. 43, ¶ 146; Doc. 58, ¶ 146). Rather than calling, Helwig emailed

Myers to following day, indicating that she needed additional sick days for March 9 and

March 10 and would provide a doctor’s note after meeting with her doctor on March 10. (Doc.

43, ¶ 147; Doc. 58, ¶ 147). Myers replied via email on March 9, 2022, stating in relevant part,

The information I need is whether or not, as you suggested in our most recent

meeting, you are going to “retire.” I need to know if that is how you would like

your departure understood because I am going to make an announcement

tomorrow and I need to know whether or not to say you are “retiring.”

As for the provisions you mention below [in Plaintiff’s previous email], I await

your counterproposal, as I said in our meeting.

(Doc. 43, ¶ 148, Doc. 58, ¶ 148).

Helwig notes that she never suggested retirement. (Doc. 58, ¶ 148).

Before responding to Myers, Helwig sent an email to Parsnik, advising her of Helwig’s

intent to submit paperwork for FMLA leave. (Doc. 43, ¶ 149; Doc. 58, ¶ 149). Then Helwig

responded to Myers, informing him that an announcement of her retirement would be

premature, and that she retained counsel relative to the separation agreement Myers presented

her on March 3, 2022. (Doc. 43, ¶ 151; Doc. 58, ¶ 151). Myers replied to Helwig and her

counsel, informing them that Helwig is an at-will employee who is terminated effective March

9, 2022, that Myers will announce Helwig’s departure on March 10, 2022, and that he looks

forward to their counter proposal regarding the separation agreement. (Doc. 43, ¶ 154; Doc.

58, ¶ 154). Defendants contend Helwig never provided a counterproposal; however, Helwig

asserts that she sent a counter proposal on March 22, 2022, to counsel for Misericordia. (Doc.

43, ¶ 155; Doc. 58, ¶ 155). Helwig testified that her last effective date of employment was

March 9, 2022. (Doc. 43, ¶ 157; Doc. 58, ¶ 157).

In the evening of March 9, 2022, Myers sent the announcement of Helwig’s departure

to the Executive Committee of the Board, and the communication cascade to other members

of Misericordia continued into the morning of March 10, 2022. (Doc. 43, ¶ 156; Doc. 58, ¶

156). On March 10, 2022, at 5:16 p.m., Helwig submitted FMLA paperwork to Misericordia’s

Human Resources department via facsimile, which were filled out by Helwig on March 8 and

completed by her physician on March 10. (Doc. 43, ¶ 158-59; Doc. 58, ¶ 158-59).

Helwig filed a complaint on December 12, 2022, alleging eight counts under state and

federal law. (Doc. 1). Count I alleges Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) by discriminating, harassing, and creating a hostile work environment against

Helwig on the basis of her disability. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 12-88). Count II alleges that Defendants

violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) by terminating Helwig because of her

gender. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 89-99). Count III alleges Defendants violated the Age Discrimination and

Employment Act (“ADEA”) by terminating Helwig because of her age. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 100-07).

Count IV alleges Defendants violated the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) by

terminating Helwig while she was in the process of submitting FMLA paperwork. (Doc. 1, ¶¶

108-23). Count V alleges that Defendants created a hostile work environment by subjecting

Helwig to harassment based upon her disability and gender. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 124-28). Count VI

alleges Defendants violated the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) by

discriminating against Helwig based on her disabilities, age, and gender. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 129-36).

Count VII alleges retaliation under the ADA, ADEA, PHRA, and FMLA by terminating

Helwig due to her taking intermittent time off for medical appointments and needing

additional leave due to her medical condition. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 137-46). Count VIII alleges

defamation based on Myers’ false statement that Helwig was “terminated effectively

immediately,” which insinuates from Misericordia’s policies that Helwig committed

significant wrongdoing, such as fraud, theft, or misappropriation of funds. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 147-

58).

On May 16, 2025, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment along with

corresponding exhibits, a statement of facts, and a brief in support. (Doc. 42; Doc. 43; Doc.

44). On June 23, 2025, Helwig filed a brief in opposition, a response to statement of facts, and

corresponding exhibits. (Doc. 57; Doc. 58). On July 11, 2025, Defendants filed a reply brief.

(Doc. 62).

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be

granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary

judgment motion, all inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the

non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir.

1994). However, a party opposing a summary judgment motion must comply with Local Rule

56.1, which specifically directs the oppositional party to submit a “statement of the material

facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required [to be filed

by the movant], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried”; if the

nonmovant fails to do so, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served

by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted.” See M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.

A federal court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to make credibility

determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

Rather, the court must simply “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249.

The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute

of any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes

such a showing, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits or declarations,

answers to interrogatories, or the like to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to

a genuine issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant must produce

evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case, which it bears the burden

of proving at trial, because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

323. Furthermore, mere conclusory allegations and self-serving testimony, whether made in

the complaint or a sworn statement, cannot be used to obtain or avoid summary judgment

when uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence of record. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife

Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Thomas v. Delaware State Univ., 626 F. App’x 384, 389

n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential) (“[U]nsupported deposition testimony, which is

contradicted by the record, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd.

v. FES, 301 F.3d 83, 95 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[The plaintiff’s] testimony. . . amounts to an

unsupported, conclusory assertion, which we have held is inadequate to satisfy the movant’s

burden of proof on summary judgment”).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment on six bases. First, Defendants aver that the

Court should grant summary judgment on all claims against Myers individually, asserting

that an individual cannot be held liable on federal discrimination or defamation claims as a

matter of law. (Doc. 44, at 6, 8-9).2 Defendants then posit that the Court should grant

summary judgment on Helwig’s federal discrimination claims against Misericordia because

Helwig fails to present a prima facie case of age, gender, or disability discrimination under

the ADEA, Title VII, and ADA respectively. (Doc. 44, at 10, 14). Defendants next argue that

the Court should grant summary judgment on Helwig’s retaliation claims because Helwig

fails to present a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, ADEA, PHRA, and FMLA

2 The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Counts I, II, and

III against Myers because Helwig agrees to withdraw those claims. (Doc. 57, at 12).

Regarding Helwig’s defamation claims against Myers, the Court finds that Helwig may state

a defamation claim against Myers individually because he is not a high public official. See

Paparo v. Borough of Yeadon, 714 F. Supp. 3d 529, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (finding Pennsylvania

law only protects individual defendants from tort liability if they are a high public official

whose actionable behavior was made in the course of their official duties); see also Aldorasi v.

Crossroads Hospitality and Management Co., LLC, 344 F. Supp. 3d 814, 822 (E.D. Pa. 2018)

(finding that under Pennsylvania law, an individual is not relieved of liability when a

corporation is vicariously or secondarily liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior).

However, as discussed in Section H supra, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on Helwig’s defamation claims.

nor can they show that the Defendants proffered reason’s for Helwig’s termination are

pretextual. (Doc. 44, at 19, 22). Defendants then aver that the Court should grant summary

judgment on Helwig’s claims of harassment and hostile work environment because she fails

to present a prima facie case of harassment and hostile work environment under Title VII and

the ADA. (Doc. 44, at 27, 29). Defendants also contend that this Court should grant summary

judgment on Helwig’s claim for FMLA failure to notify because Helwig did not request

FMLA leave until after her discharge was recommended by Myers. (Doc. 44, at 30-31).

Finally, Defendants move for summary judgment on Helwig’s defamation claim under

Pennsylvania law because Helwig fails to present a prima facie case of defamation under

Pennsylvania law, and Defendants have the absolute defense of truth against the defamation

claim. (Doc. 44, at 33-34).

A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS TO HELWIG’S GENDER

DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS.

In Counts II and VI, Helwig alleges claims of gender discrimination under Title VII

and the PHRA against Misericordia. (Doc 1, ¶¶ 89-99, 129-36).3 Defendants assert that

Helwig cannot show age or gender discrimination because she was replaced by Easton, a

“highly qualified woman who is slightly older than [Helwig].” (Doc. 44, at 16). Helwig avers

that there was a double standard in treatment between male and female employees at

Misericordia. (Doc. 57, at 28-30). Helwig asserts that there was a well-known “Old Boys’

Club” at Misericordia that permitted younger, male employees to communicate directly with

3 Pennsylvania courts generally interpret the PHRA in accordance with its federal

counterparts. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). Because Title VII is

coextensive to the PHRA, the Court will address the merits of Helwig’s PHRA discrimination

claims under Title VII. Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105; Bushra v. Main Line Health, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 3d

164, 171 (E.D. Pa. 2023).

the board and meet regularly with Myers. (Doc. 57, at 29-30). Helwig further avers that she

never received a vote of no confidence in her 22 years of employment, when male vice

presidents have. (Doc. 57, at 31).

Title VII discrimination claims are analyzed through the McDonnell Douglas burden

shifting standard under which Helwig must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999).4 If the plaintiff meets her initial

burden to establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Jones, 198 F.3d at 410. If the

employer satisfies this second step, the burden returns to the plaintiff to show “by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the employer’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason was pretextual.” Jones, 198 F.3d at 410.

a. Helwig Establishes a Prima Facie Case of Gender Discrimination.

To establish a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination, a plaintiff must generally

demonstrate that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the

position; (3) she suffered from some form of adverse employment action; and (4) those actions

were taken under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”

4 This standard was first established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, in which the Court held that when analyzing discriminatory hiring

claims, courts first must consider whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case that an

employer’s decision not to hire them was discriminatory. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), holding

modified by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993). The Court further

found that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to

propose a non-discriminatory reason for its decision not to hire the plaintiff. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03. The Court concluded that if the employer establishes a non-

discriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to

establish that the employer’s proposed non-discriminatory reason is pretextual or

“discriminatory in its application.” McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 807.

Kimes v. Univ. of Scranton, 126 F. Supp. 3d 477, 494 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Jones, 198 F.3d at

410-11). The analysis centers around whether the employer treats “some people less favorably

than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Furnco Constr. Corp.

v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). A plaintiff must also show some “causal nexus between

[her] membership in a protected class and the [adverse] decision.” Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

352 F.3d 789, 789 (3d Cir. 2003). Therefore, to show sex discrimination under Title VII, a

plaintiff must show that her gender was a “determinative factor” in the adverse employment

action. Kimes, 126 F.3d at 494 (citing Watson v. SEPTA, 207 F.3d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2000)). An

inference of unlawful discrimination can arise when a similarly situated colleague outside of

the plaintiff’s protected class receives more favorable treatment from an employer. Peake v.

Pennsylvania State Police, 644 F. App'x 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential); McCormick

v. Allegheny Valley Sch., No. 06-3332, 2008 WL 355617, at *10-*12 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2008); see

also Qin v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 474 (3d Cir. 2024). Employees are similarly situated

when they have similar responsibilities and are held to similar standards. Oakley v. Orthopaedic

Associates of Allentown, Ltd., 742 F. Supp. 2d 601, 608 (E.D. Pa. 2010).

The parties agree that Helwig is a woman whose termination was an adverse

employment action. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 1, 154; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 1, 154). Accordingly, the parties do not

dispute that Helwig meets the first and third elements of a prima facie case of employment

discrimination. See Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State System of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d

535, 539 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding gender is a protected class under Title VII); see also Burlington

Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (finding significant change in employment

status such as termination constitutes an adverse employment action). It is also undisputed

that Helwig held her position at Misericordia for twenty-two years, and thus, she was qualified

for the position. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 9, 107; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 9, 107); see Barthold v. Briarleaf Nursing &

Convalescent Ctr. Nursing Home, No. 13-2463, 2014 WL 2921534, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2014)

(citing Chapman v. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts., 233 F. App’x 141, 143 (3d Cir. 2007)) (“An

extended period of employment in a particular position gives rise to an inference that a

plaintiff was objectively qualified for that position.”).

Regarding the fourth element of a prima facie case, those actions giving rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination, Helwig satisfies this prong by showing that similarly

situated colleagues outside her protected class received more favorable treatment. See Peake,

644 F. App'x at 151; see also McCormick, 2008 WL 355617, at *10-*12. Helwig points to

evidence in the record that Van Etten, the Vice President of Finance and David Rehm

(“Rehm”), Vice President of Academic Affairs, were permitted to communicate directly with

the board and have regular meetings with Myers. (Doc. 43-2, at 32; Doc. 43-5, at 24-25; Doc.

57, at 28-29). Myers testified that Van Etten was not disciplined or terminated when he

included material in Board Reports that Myers had not approved, when the same action is

one of the series of events that Defendants assert led to Helwig’s termination. (Doc. 43-2, at

32; Doc. 57, at 29; Doc. 43, ¶¶ 51-58). Van Etten testified that, even though he and Rehm are

at the same level as Helwig, Myers sought out Van Etten and Rehm for university-wide

information unrelated to their roles at Miseriocordia. (Doc. 43-5, at 24-25; Doc. 57, at 28-29).

Van Etten also testified that both he and Helwig were considered difficult to work with at

Misericordia. (Doc. 43-5, at 24; Doc. 57, at 28). Rehm and Van Etten are both Vice Presidents

of Misericordia departments who report to Myers, so they are at the similarly situated to

Helwig. See Oakley, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 608. Accordingly, Helwig has pointed evidence of

similarly situated employees receiving more favorable treatment giving rise to an inference of

unlawful discrimination as to make a prima facie case of gender discrimination. See Qin v.

Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 474 (3d Cir. 2024) (finding an inference of discrimination where

plaintiff was fired for poor performance, while their colleague with the same position,

supervisor, and performance reviews was promoted).

b. Defendants Provide a Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason for Helwig’s

Termination.

As Helwig has met her initial burden establishing a prima facie case of gender

discrimination, the burden shifts to Misericordia to offer a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d

403, 412 (3d Cir. 1999). “[T]he defendant’s burden at this stage is relatively light and . . . it is

satisfied if the defendant articulates a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action.”

Johnson v. Keebler-Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 214 F. App’x 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2007) (examining

Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Defendants submit that the parties do not dispute that Helwig was an at-will employee

and that Smith-Mileski found Helwig’s February 7th email to be “jabbing” and “punitive.”

(Doc. 43, ¶¶ 67, 71-72; Doc. 58, ¶ 67, 71-72; Doc. 44, at 26-27; Doc. 62, at 15-17). Misericordia

also avers that the parties do not dispute that Myers’ executive coach suggested deciding next

steps because, with the February 7th email, Helwig had “absolutely broken trust” with Myers.

(Doc. 43, ¶ 79; Doc. 58, ¶ 79; Doc. 44, at 29; Doc. 62, at 32-33). While Helwig, Van Etten,

and Rehm are similarly situated employees, Misericordia has offered that Helwig’s

termination was not only based on the series of incidents with Myers, but also because of

Helwig’s “drawing a line in the sand” in sending an inappropriate email to the Chair of the

Board of Trustee’s, which her similarly situated colleagues did not do. (Doc. 45, ¶ 65; Doc.

58, ¶ 65; Doc. 44, at 26-27; Doc. 62, at 32-33).

c. Helwig Fails to Present Evidence that Defendants’ Legitimate, Non-

Discriminatory Reasons for Her Termination Are Pretext.

As Misericordia demonstrated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

termination, the burden returns to Helwig to show by a preponderance of the evidence that

Defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Willis v. UPMC Child.’s Hosp. of

Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 654 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426

(3d Cir. 2013)). A plaintiff “must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which

a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate

reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a

motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action.” Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d

702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted); see also Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759,

764 (3d Cir. 1994). Providing evidence of positive performance reviews is insufficient to show

that the proffered non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was pretext.

Trapani v. Greatwide Logistics Servs., LLC, 487 Fed. Appx. 21, 24-25 (3d Cir. 2012).

Helwig contends that Defendants’ assertion that she had a poor performance and was

not trustworthy is not credible because Helwig has twenty-two years of favorable performance

reviews, and she recently completed a campaign that exceeded fundraising goals. (Doc. 57,

at 42-43). To show pretext, Helwig points to the same evidence she used to show prima facie

discrimination, that Van Etten was similarly situated to Helwig but received superior

treatment. (Doc. 43-2, at 32; Doc. 43-5, at 24-25; Doc. 57, at 30). Helwig also offers that in

her twenty-two years of employment, she never received a vote of no confidence, when two

other male Vice Presidents received votes of no confidence by faculty and continue to be

employed. (Doc. 43-5, at 35-36; Doc. 57 at 30-31). Defendants counter that the Vice

Presidents who received votes of no confidence were in academic positions, and Helwig was

never subject to a faculty confidence vote because her role was unrelated to faculty. (Doc. 43-

2, at 37; Doc. 43-5, at 18, 36; Doc. 43-6, at 23-24; Doc. 62 at 19 n. 14). Regardless of whether

Helwig was subject to a faculty confidence vote, evidence of positive performance reviews is

insufficient to show pretext. Trapani, 487 Fed. Appx. 21, 24-25 (3d Cir. 2012). Therefore,

viewing the record in the light most favorable to Helwig, there is no genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether Misericordia’s proffered reasons for terminating Helwig are

pretextual. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Helwig’s claims of

sex discrimination in Counts II and VI against Defendants is GRANTED. (Doc. 42).

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS TO HELWIG’S AGE DISCRIMINATION

CLAIMS.

In Counts III and VI, Helwig alleges claims of age discrimination under the ADEA

and PHRA against Misericordia. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 100-07, 129-36).5 Defendants assert that Helwig

cannot show age or gender discrimination because she was replaced by Easton, a “highly

qualified woman who is slightly older than [Helwig].” (Doc. 44, at 16). Helwig counters that

Myers sought to replace her with an individual who is “of a younger mindset and more in-

line with his style.” (Doc. 57, at 21). Helwig also asserts that Myers was unaware of the age

of Easton when hiring her as the interim Vice President of University Advancement. (Doc.

57, at 21).

A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA to

survive summary judgment. Willis v. UPMC Child.’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d

5 Pennsylvania courts generally interpret the PHRA in accordance with its federal

counterparts. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). Because the ADEA is

coextensive to the PHRA, the Court will address the merits of Helwig’s PHRA discrimination

claims under the ADEA. Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105; Colwell v. RiteAid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 500 n.3

(3d Cir. 2010).

Cir. 2015). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff

must show that “(1) [she] is at least 40 years old; (2) [she] suffered an adverse employment

decision; (3) [she] was qualified for the position in question; and (4) [she] was ultimately

replaced by another employee who was sufficiently younger so as to support an inference of

a discriminatory motive.” Willis, 808 F.3d at 644. A discriminatory inference cannot be drawn

under the ADEA when one worker is replaced with an insignificantly younger worker.

O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996); see Willis, 808 F.3d at 644

(requiring plaintiff to show she was “ultimately replaced by another employee who was

sufficiently younger so as to support an inference of discriminatory motive”). If the plaintiff

successfully establishes a prima facie case creating an inference of discrimination, the burden

shifts to the employer who must “articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the

adverse action.” Willis, 808 F.3d at 644 (quoting Jones, 198 F.3d at 412). If the employer

satisfies this second step, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show “by a preponderance

of the evidence, that the employer’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was

pretextual.” Willis, 808 F.3d at 644-45 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Burton, 707 F.3d at 426).

It is undisputed that Helwig is over 40 years old and that she suffered an adverse

employment decision. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 1, 154; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 1, 154); see Burlington Indus., Inc., 524

U.S. at 761 (finding significant change in employment status such as termination constitutes

an adverse employment action). It is also undisputed that Helwig held her position at

Misericordia for twenty-two years, and thus, she was qualified for the position. (Doc. 43, ¶¶

9, 107; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 9, 107); see Barthold, 2014 WL 2921534, at *3 (citing Chapman, 233 F.

App’x at 143) (“An extended period of employment in a particular position gives rise to an

inference that a plaintiff was objectively qualified for that position.”). However, Helwig

cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because it is undisputed that she was

ultimately replaced by Easton, who is older than Helwig. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 1, 163; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 1,

163); O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 313 (holding a discriminatory inference cannot be drawn under

the ADEA when one worker is replaced with an insignificantly younger worker); Willis, 808

F.3d at 644 (finding same). Therefore, with all evidence construed on favor of Helwig, a

reasonable jury could not find that Helwig was terminated because of her age. Accordingly,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Helwig’s claims of age discrimination in

Counts III and VI against Defendants is GRANTED. (Doc. 42).

C. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS TO HELWIG’S DISABILITY

DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS.

In Count I, Helwig alleges disability discrimination and harassment based on her

disability resulting in a hostile work environment. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 12-88). In Count VI, Helwig

alleges disability discrimination under the PHRA. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 12-88, 129-36).6 Defendants

argue that Helwig is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because the record fails to

demonstrate any evidence that Helwig suffered any limits on her major life activities. (Doc.

44, at 17-18). Helwig counters that she is a member of a protected class because she suffered

from cancer and underwent cancer treatment at all relevant times, which impacted her daily

life activities, such as her ability to work. (Doc. 57, at 32).

To survive summary judgment on the ADA discrimination claim, Helwig must first

establish a prima facie case by showing that “(1) [she] is a disabled person within the meaning

6 Pennsylvania courts generally interpret the PHRA in accordance with its federal

counterparts. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). Because the ADA is

coextensive to the PHRA, the Court will address the merits of Helwig’s PHRA discrimination

claims under the ADA. Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105; Abadi v. Target Corp., No. 23-1050, 2023 WL

4045373, at *3 (3d Cir. June 16, 2023).

of the ADA; (2) [she] is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with

or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) [she] has suffered an

otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Gaul v. Lucent Tech.,

Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998); Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S.A., 440 F.3d 604, 611

(3d Cir. 2006); see also Woods v. AstraZeneca Pharm., L.P., 659 F. Supp. 3d 512, 544 (M.D. Pa.

2023) (citing Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating

a prima facie case of hostile work environment under the ADA requires plaintiff to show she

is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA). The parties dispute whether Helwig

has made a showing that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. (Doc. 44, at 18-20;

Doc. 57, at 32).

To meet the definition of disabled under the ADA, a plaintiff must have “(A) a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities

of the individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) [be] regarded as having such an

impairment.” Alston v. Park Pleasant, Inc., 679 F. App'x 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2017)

(nonprecedential) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). Major life activities include “caring for

oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,

bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and

working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a). The operation of normal bodily functions, such as a

functioning immune system and normal cell growth, also constitute major life activities under

the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”). Alston, 679 F. App'x at 171-72 (citing 42

U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)).

However, to show a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether a medical

diagnosis limits a major life activity, a plaintiff must perform an individualized assessment,

evidencing specific facts as to why plaintiff’s disability substantially limits a major life activity,

even when the limitation seems self-explanatory. Alston, 679 F. App'x at 172 (citing Albertson’s

Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999)). Even though cancer will qualify as a disabling

disability in most cases, an individual assessment is nevertheless necessary to determine

whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity or body function. Alston, 679

F. App'x at 172; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). It is insufficient to merely state that cancer

qualifies as a disability. See Alston, 679 F. App'x at 172; see also Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,

527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999) (holding that while individuals with monocular vision easily meet

the ADA’s definition of disability, they nevertheless must “prove a disability by offering

evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth

perception and visual field, is substantial”); see also Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 501-

02 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding same). Additionally, showing a record of cancer diagnosis is

insufficient to meet this burden. See Lloyd v. Washington & Jefferson College, 288 Fed. Appx. 786,

788 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 1996)) (finding a

record of impairment is insufficient to show disability under the ADA without evidence of

substantial limitation on a major life activity).

Helwig fails to specify how her melanoma limited one or more of her life activities,

only that cancer substantially limits a major life activity “on its face” according to regulations

implementing the ADAAA. (Doc. 1, ¶ 15–16; Doc. 57, at 25); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). When

deposed, Helwig failed to articulate a limited major life activity, stating only that the surgery

to remove her melanoma left a “big hole” in her leg that she had to keep clean. (Doc. 43-1, at

18-19; Doc. 57, at 25); see Alston, 679 Fed. App’x at 172–73 (holding plaintiff failed to show

disability under the ADA because she averred she was not substantially limited in any major

life activity at her deposition); see also Albertson's, Inc., 527 U.S. at 567 (holding that while

individuals with monocular vision easily meet the ADA’s definition of disability, they

nevertheless must “prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in

terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual field, is substantial”).

Helwig provides medical records from her cancer treatment that specify that her postoperative

care consists of cleaning and dressing her wound daily. (Doc. 436-37; Doc. 57, at 25). See

Lloyd, 288 Fed. Appx. at 788 (citing Kelly, 94 F.3d at 108) (finding a record of impairment is

insufficient to show disability under the ADA without evidence of substantial limitation on a

major life activity). Helwig also provides FMLA paperwork dated March 10, 2022, which

states that Helwig had multiple wounds that were healing and that she was unable to focus

due to pain. (Doc. 46-34, at 5; Doc. 57 at 25). However, the FMLA paperwork was filled and

signed the day after Helwig’s last day of employment at Misericordia. (Doc. 46-34, at 5; Doc.

43, at 157; Doc. 58, at 157).

Helwig fails to provide even minimal evidence that her cancer diagnosis substantially

limited any major life activity at all times relevant to this litigation. 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(j)(1)(iv); see Alston, 679 Fed. App’x at 172–73; see Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 567; see also

Lloyd, 288 Fed. Appx. at 788 (citations omitted). Therefore, there is no genuine issue of

disability discrimination or harassment for trial, and Defendants’ motion for summary

judgement on Counts I and VI is GRANTED. (Doc. 42).

D. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS TO HELWIG’S ADA, ADEA, AND

PHRA RETALIATION CLAIMS.

In Count VII, Helwig alleges retaliation under the ADA, ADEA, and PHRA. (Doc.

1, ¶¶ 137-46). 7 Defendants contend that Helwig’s termination preceded her alleged protected

activity, so she cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. (Doc. 44, at 23). Helwig

counters that her termination was subsequent to or contemporaneous with Helwig’s protected

activity, sufficient to establish retaliation. (Doc. 57, at 36).

Retaliation claims are analyzed through the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting

standard under which Helwig must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Krouse v. Am.

Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating McDonnell Douglas burden shifting

standard applies to ADA retaliation claims); Faslod v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 188-89 (3d Cir.

2005) (stating McDonnell Douglas burden shifting standard applies to ADEA and PHRA

retaliation claims). If the plaintiff meets their initial burden to establish a prima facie case, the

burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse

employment action. Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500-01; Faslod, 409 F.3d at 188. If the employer meets

this minimal burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must point to evidence that

the employer’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reason is pretextual. Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500-01;

Faslod, 409 F.3d at 188.

7 Pennsylvania courts generally interpret the PHRA in accordance with its federal

counterparts. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). Because the ADA, ADEA,

and PHRA are generally coextensive, the Court will address the merits of Helwig’s PHRA

retaliation claim under the ADA and ADEA. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296,

306 (3d Cir. 1999); Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105; Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 788,

790-91 (M.D. Pa. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 283 F.3d 561 (3d Cir. 2002). Additionally,

Helwig appears to assert a retaliation claim under Title VII for the first time in her brief in

opposition. (Doc. 57). As Helwig did not include a Title VII retaliation claim in her complaint,

the Court does not need to consider an additional claim raised for the first time in her briefing.

Holland v. Simon Property Grp., Inc., 495 Fed. App’x. 270, 273 n. 4 (“The District Court

correctly declined to consider claims of retaliation asserted for the first time in [plaintiff’s]

summary judgment opposition brief.”); see also Treaster v. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., No

4:09-CV-632, 2010 WL 2606481, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (finding same).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, Helwig must show “(1)

protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or

contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between

the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.” Krouse., 126 F.3d at 500.

Under the ADA, protected activity includes requesting sick leave and requesting an

accommodation for a disability. Jones v. Serv. Elec. Cable TV, Inc., 809 Fed. Appx. 105, 110 (3d

Cir. 2020) (finding sick leave constitutes protected activity under ADA); Sowell v. Kelly Services,

Inc., 139 F. Supp. 3d 684, 702 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (finding requests for accommodation are

protected activity under the ADA). Unlike discrimination claims, retaliation claims do not

require a plaintiff to prove they have a disability, but that they requested an accommodation

in good faith. Barber v. Subway, 131 F. Supp. 3d 321, 329 (M.D. Pa. 2015). ADA retaliation

for requests for accommodation arises when the employer fails to reasonably accommodate

the employee. Barber, 131 F. Supp. at 330.

Helwig engaged in ADA protected activity by requesting sick leave and

accommodations when she returned to work. (Doc. 43-1, at 122, 156; Doc. 43-2, at 12; Doc.

57 at 45); Jones, 809 Fed. Appx. at 110; Sowell, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 702. The parties agree that

Helwig’s termination from Misericordia was an adverse employment action. (Doc. 43, ¶ 154;

Doc. 58, ¶ 154). However, Helwig cannot show that her sick leave and accommodation

requests were causally related to her adverse employment activity because it is undisputed

that Defendants approved every one of Helwig’s sick leave requests at all relevant times to

this litigation, and the parties agree that Helwig was entitled to and not denied her requested

accommodation of working from home. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 128-29; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 128-29); see Barber,

131 F. Supp. at 330 (finding retaliation for requests for accommodation for a disability arise

when an employer fails to reasonably accommodate an employee). Accordingly, Helwig fails

to show a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA. Defendants’ motion for summary

judgement on Helwig’s claims of ADA, ADEA, and PHRA retaliation in Count VII is

GRANTED. (Doc. 42).8

E. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS TO HELWIG’S FMLA RETALIATION

CLAIM.

In Count VII, Helwig also alleges retaliation under the FMLA. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 137-46).

Defendants contend that Helwig’s termination preceded her alleged protected activity, so she

cannot establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation. (Doc. 44, at 23). Helwig counters

that her termination was subsequent to or contemporaneous with Helwig’s protected activity,

sufficient to establish FMLA retaliation. (Doc. 57, at 36).

FMLA retaliation claims are analyzed through the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting

standard under which Helwig must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Lichtenstein

v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301-02 (3d Cir. 2012). If the plaintiff meets her

initial burden to establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show a

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d

at 302. If the employer meets this minimal burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who

must point to evidence that the employer’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reason is pretextual.

Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302.

a. Helwig Establishes a Prima Facie Case of FMLA Retaliation.

8 Helwig also fails to show an exercise of protected activity under the ADEA. The record

shows no evidence that Helwig made any complaints related to age discrimination at

Misericordia. Nor does Helwig provide any evidence that she engaged in protected activity

under the ADEA. (Doc. 57, at 35-37). Therefore, Helwig fails to show a prima facie case of

retaliation under the ADEA.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA, Helwig must show that

“(1) she invoked her right to FMLA-qualifying leave, (2) she suffered an adverse employment

decision, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to her invocation of rights.”

Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 301-02. To invoke a right to FMLA-qualifying leave, “employees

must provide adequate notice to their employer about their need to take leave.” Lichtenstein,

691 F.3d at 303 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)). As discussed fully in Section F supra, notice

to an employer arises either when an employee requests FMLA leave or “when the employer

acquires knowledge that an employee’s leave may be for an FMLA-qualifying reason.” 29

C.F.R. § 825.300(b)(1); Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 303-04 (“The [FMLA] regulations clearly

envision situations where an employee can satisfy her notice obligation without providing

enough detailed information for the employer to know if FMLA actually applies.”). To

establish causation, temporal proximity between the protected activity and the termination is

sufficient to establish a causal link between invoking a right under the FMLA and an adverse

employment decision. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997); Budhun v.

Reading Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 258 (3d Cir. 2014). Evidence that an employee was

terminated within a week of engaging in protected FMLA activity is sufficient to establish

causation. See Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 307 (noting that an employee being “terminated. . .

just seven days after she invoked her right to FMLA leave” establishes causation).

Helwig shows that she engaged in protected activity under the FMLA by notifying

Parsnik of her intention to take FMLA leave. (Doc. 43-6, at 116, Doc. 57, at 36-37);

Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 301-02 (finding notice to an employer about taking leave constitutes

protected activity for FMLA retaliation). Helwig may also have been engaged in protected

activity under the FMLA when she submitted her doctor’s note upon return from sick leave,

which disclosed information about Helwig’s leg operation. (Doc. 43-1, at 122); see Lichtenstein,

691 F.3d at 303-04 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a)) (“where the employer does not have

sufficient information about the reason for an employee's use of leave, the employer should

inquire further of the employee. . . to ascertain whether leave is potentially FMLA-

qualifying”). The parties dispute whether Helwig was terminated before or after engaging in

such FMLA protected activity. (Doc. 43, ¶ 82; Doc. 58, ¶ 82). The parties also dispute whether

Helwig’s termination was causally related to her intention to apply for FMLA leave. (Doc.

44, at 22-23; Doc. 57, at 26-37).

The parties agree that by March 9, 2022, Helwig already had notice of her termination.

(Doc. 43, ¶¶ 130-32; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 130-32; Doc. 43-1, at 29; Doc. 43-2, at 56-57; Doc. 46-17, at

4-9). Therefore, Helwig’s notice to Parsnik that she was planning to submit paperwork for

FMLA leave occurred after Helwig suffered adverse employment action. See Alkins v. Boeing,

826 Fed. Appx. 172, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (finding a third-party

administrator’s decision to award plaintiff leave after he had already been fired in no way

reflects a decision by the employer to retaliate against plaintiff for requesting leave). However,

there is dispute of fact as to whether Myers decided to terminate Helwig before she took a

two-week sick leave from February 16th to 28th and returned with a doctor’s note indicating

that she had a procedure done on her leg. (Doc. 43-1, at 55, 122, 162-63).

Myers testified that he made the decision to terminate Helwig around February 15,

2022, and he informed Helwig that he intended to terminate her employment during their

February 16, 2022 meeting before she went on leave. (Doc. 43-2, at 51-52). Helwig contends

that Myers did not notify her of his intent to terminate her until he gave Helwig a proposed

Resignation and General Release Agreement on March 3, 2022, after she submitted the

doctor’s note that disclosed her leg operation. (Doc. 43-1, at 29, 122; Doc. 43-2, at 56-57; Doc.

46-17, at 4-9, Doc. 58, ¶ 81). Taking inferences in favor of Helwig, providing Helwig with

termination notice on the same day she submitted a doctor’s note putting Misericordia on

notice of Helwig’s potential need for FMLA leave creates an inference of causal connection

between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action. See Woodson,

109, F.3d at 920 (“temporal proximity between the protected activity and the termination is

sufficient to establish a causal link”); see also Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d 294, 307 (finding that

evidence that an employer terminated an employee within a week of her requesting FMLA

established a causative link). Accordingly, Helwig demonstrates dispute of facts which could

lead a reasonable jury to find prima facie FMLA retaliation.

b. Defendants Provide a Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason for

Helwig’s Termination.

With Helwig’s showing of prima facie retaliation under the FMLA, the burden shifts

to Defendants to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action. Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302. “[T]he defendant’s burden at this stage is relatively light

and . . . it is satisfied if the defendant articulates a legitimate reason for the adverse

employment action.” Johnson v. Keebler-Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 214 F. App’x 239, 242 (3d Cir.

2007) (examining Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1997). Defendants

contend that Plaintiff was not fired for giving notice that she may need FMLA leave but for a

series of incidents which culminated in the February 7th email to Smith-Mileski. (Doc. 43-1,

at 147; Doc. 43, ¶¶ 42-55; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 42-55; Doc. 44, at 26-27). Defendants argue that Helwig

knew the nondiscriminatory reasons she was let go, providing Helwig’s March 1, 2022,

correspondence Pellini, in which Helwig cites sending the February 7th email to Smith-

Mileski, failing to remove the staff shortage from the board report, and bringing the corporate

sponsorship banners back up as reasons why Myers was planning to let her go. (Doc. 43-7, at

33, 56-57). Defendants also provide that it is undisputed that Helwig was an at-will employee

subject to termination “for lawful reasons at any time, with or without cause, and with or

without notice. (Doc. 43, ¶ 131; Doc. 58, ¶ 131).

c. Helwig Fails to Present Evidence that Defendants’ Legitimate, Non-

Discriminatory Reasons for Her Termination Are Pretext.

As Defendants demonstrated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

termination, the burden shifts back to the Helwig to show by a preponderance of the evidence,

that Defendants’ proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Willis v. UPMC

Child.’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 654 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707

F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013). A plaintiff “must point to some evidence, direct or

circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's

articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more

likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action.” Tomasso v.

Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted); see also Fuentes v.

Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). Providing evidence of positive performance reviews

is insufficient to show that the proffered non-discriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action was pretext. Trapani v. Greatwide Logistics Services, LLC, 487 Fed. Appx.

21, 24-25 (3d Cir. 2012)

To show that Defendants’ offered reason for the adverse employment action was

pretextual, Helwig provides that Defendants’ assertion that she had a poor performance and

was not trustworthy is not credible because Helwig has twenty-two years of favorable

performance reviews, and she recently completed a campaign that exceeded fundraising goals.

(Doc. 57, at 42-43). Like with her sex discrimination claim, Section A supra, Helwig does not

provide any evidence that Myers’ mistrust in her based on her email to the Chair of the Board

of Trustees was pretextual for FMLA retaliation. (Doc. 57, at 35-37). Helwig only provides,

without citation to the record, that Defendants’ decision to terminate Helwig within twenty-

four hours of advising that she sought FMLA leave was “highly suspicious.” (Doc. 57, at 36).

However, the record reflects that it is undisputed that Helwig was informed of her last day of

employment before she first notified Parsnik of her intent to take FMLA leave. (Doc. 43, ¶

148, 149; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 148-49). Therefore, viewing the record in the light most favorable to

Helwig, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants’ proffered

reasons for terminating Helwig are pretextual. See Trapani, 487 Fed. Appx. 21, 24-25 (3d Cir.

2012) (finding evidence of positive performance reviews insufficient to show pretext); see also

Alkins v. Boeing, 826 Fed. Appx. 172, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (finding a third-

party administrator’s decision to award plaintiff leave after he had already been fired in no

way reflects a decision by the employer to retaliate against plaintiff for requesting leave).

Therefore, Defendants motion for summary judgement on Helwig’s FMLA retaliation claim

in Count VII is GRANTED. (Doc. 42).

F. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS TO HELWIG’S HARASSMENT AND

HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS.

In Count V, Helwig asserts claims of harassment based on her gender resulting in a

hostile work environment. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 124-28). Defendants contend that Helwig cannot show

gender-based harassment because she has not demonstrated that she was discriminated

against based on her sex. (Doc. 44, at 32). Defendants also aver that Myers’ conduct could

not reasonably be considered severely or pervasively discriminatory. (Doc. 44, at 32). Helwig

counters that her complaints to Parsnik of gender discrimination at Misericordia and others’

complaints of an “Old Boy’s Club” at Misericordia are substantial evidence such that a

reasonable jury could find harassment and a hostile work environment. (Doc. 57, at 48-49).

Title VII prohibits sexual harassment that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the conditions of [the plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.”

Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank,

FSB v. Vinson, 447 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). To state a prima facie case of hostile work environment

under Title VII, Helwig must show, “(1) [she] suffered intentional discrimination [in a work

environment] because of [her] sex; (2) this discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the

discrimination detrimentally affected [her]; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect

a reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat

superior liability.” Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting

Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990)). “The first four elements establish

a hostile work environment, and the fifth element determines employer liability.” Mandel, 706

F.3d at 167. To determine whether a work environment is hostile, courts look at “all the

circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it

is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; an whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Moody v. Atl. City Bd. Of Educ.,

870 F.3d 206, 215 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-

71 (2001)); see also Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 604 F. 2d 853, 863 (3d Cir. 1990)

(“Hostile work environment harassment claims must demonstrate a continuous period of

harassment.”). Title VII protects against harassment based on discrimination against a

protected class only and does not extend relief for general workplace harassment or strained

supervisor-employer relationships. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81

(1998); Ismail v. McDermott Int’l Inc., No. 3:19-cv-1305, 2024 WL 1094685, at *5-*6 (M.D. Pa.

2024).

While Helwig fails to allege specific facts showing harassment in her complaint, in her

deposition, she alleges two specific actions constituting harassment: (1) Myers repeatedly

bringing up the February 7th email sent to Smith-Mileski, and (2) Myers’ requests that Helwig

meet with him to discuss the terms of her departure from Misericordia. (Doc. 43-1, at 54-55;

Doc. 44, at 30-31). Neither of these specific acts describe “frequent, physically threatening, of

humiliating harassment.” See Ismail v. McDermott Int’l Inc., No. 3:19-cv-1305, 2024 WL

1094685, at *5-*6 (M.D. Pa. 2024) (finding a series of emails and meetings criticizing

employee’s work performance did not constitute a hostile work environment under Title VII).

Additionally, Myers only discussed the February 7th email with Helwig when it was sent and

when discussing Helwig’s termination in the following weeks. (Doc. 44, at 32; Doc. 43, ¶¶ 66,

73, 90-94, 112-117, 130-135, 146-148, 154; Doc. 58, ¶¶ 73, 90-94, 112-117, 130-135, 146-148,

154). The frequency and severity of Myers conduct towards Helwig is more indicative of a

strained supervisor-employer relationship than a hostile work environment. See Ismail, 2024

WL 1094685, at *5-*6; see also Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 604 F. 2d 853, 863 (3d Cir.

1990) (“Hostile work environment harassment claims must demonstrate a continuous period

of harassment.”). Taking all inferences in favor of Helwig, there is no genuine dispute of

material fact for trial as to whether Misericordia was a hostile work environment. Therefore,

Defendants motion for summary judgement on Helwig’s claim of gender-based harassment

constituting a hostile work environment in Count V is GRANTED. (Doc. 42).

G. MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HELWIG’S

FMLA CLAIMS.

a. Material Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment on Helwig’s FMLA

Failure to Notify Claim.

In Count IV, Helwig alleges that Misericordia failed to provide her with the required

notices to employees who may need leave for their own serious health condition as required

under the FMLA. (Doc. 1, ¶ 117). Defendants argue that Helwig did not provide Misericordia

with notice of her intent to take FMLA leave until she had already been terminated. (Doc. 44,

at 36-37). Helwig contends that Misericordia failed to provide her with notice of her rights

under FMLA when she took a two-week sick leave in February 2022 and again when Helwig

emailed Human Resources her intention to submit FMLA leave paperwork on March 9, 2022,

her last effective date of employment. (Doc. 57, at 45).

The FMLA allows eligible employees to take job-protected, unpaid leave in certain

circumstances, including when an “employee’s own serious health condition makes the

employee unable to perform the functions of his or her job.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.100(a);

Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 391 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2021). To ensure workers

are aware of FMLA protections, covered employers are required to give several types of

FMLA notice provisions to their employees. 29 C.R.F. § 825.300. The parties dispute whether

Misericordia provided Helwig with eligibility notice as required by the FMLA. (Doc. 44, at

36-37; Doc. 57, at 45). Eligibility notice arises when an employee requests FMLA leave or

“when the employer acquires knowledge that an employee’s leave may be for an FMLA-

qualifying reason.” 29 C.R.F. § 825.300(b)(1); Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 303-04. In such

circumstances, the employer must notify the employee of her eligibility to take FMLA leave

within five business days of the employee’s request or “when the employer acquires

knowledge that an employee’s leave may be for an FMLA qualifying reason.” 29 C.R.F. §

825.300(b)(1). In conjunction with eligibility notice, an employer must provide the employee

with notice of her rights and responsibilities, which must be in writing. 29 C.R.F. § 825.300(c).

The employee, not the employer begins the process of obtaining FMLA leave by either

explicitly stating a need to take FMLA leave or providing facts and circumstances suggesting

to the employer that leave is needed. 29 C.R.F. § 825.301(b). To suggest leave is needed, an

employee may need to share private information with their employer such the diagnosis of a

particular condition. Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 303. Calling out sick without providing more

information will not be considered sufficient notice to trigger an employer’s obligations under

the Act. 29 C.R.F. § 825.303(b); see also Wilson v. Kuhn’s Quality Foods, No. 05-511, 2006 WL

2709384, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2006) (citing Collins v. NTN-Bower Corp., 272 F.3d

1006, 1009 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding an employee’s reference to being sick does not suggest to

the employer that FMLA could be applicable).

On March 9, 2022, when Helwig notified Misericordia of her intent to submit FMLA

paperwork, Misericordia did not need to provide Helwig with eligibility notice because it is

undisputed that March 9th was Helwig’s last effective day of employment, and entitlement to

FMLA benefits end when employment ends. (Doc. 43, ¶ 157; Doc. 58, ¶ 157; Doc. 43-6, at

116); 29 C.F.R. § 825.102; Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 401 (3d Cir.

2007) (“to assert a claim of interference, an employee must show that [she] was entitled to

benefits under the FMLA”). However, on March 3, 2022, when Helwig submitted the return

to work note from her doctor, the disclosure of her leg operation in the note may have

provided sufficient notice to trigger Misericordia’s obligations under 29 C.R.F. § 825.301(b).

(Doc. 43, ¶ 126; Doc. 58, ¶ 126); 29 C.R.F. § 825.300(b)(1); Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 303

(finding an employee need not provide every detail necessary for the employer to verify if the

FMLA applies). Therefore, there is a material dispute of fact for trial as to whether, notice of

Helwig’s leg operation triggered Misericordia’s notice obligations under the FMLA.

Accordingly, Defendants motion for summary judgment on Helwig’s FMLA failure to notify

claim in Count IV is DENIED. (Doc. 42).

b. Material Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment on Helwig’s FMLA

Interference Claim.

In Count IV Helwig alleges that Myers and Misericordia intentionally interfered with

Helwig’s rights under the FMLA when they terminated her employment. (Doc. 1, ¶ 118).

Defendants assert that Helwig was aware that her last day was imminent at the time of her

notice to Misericordia, and that she had already been terminated at the time she submitted

her FMLA paperwork. (Doc. 62, at 26). Helwig contends that although Myers may have been

unaware of Helwig’s heath condition and FMLA request, he consulted with Parsnik who did

have such knowledge. (Doc. 57, at 46).

To survive a motion for summary judgment on an FMLA interference claim, a plaintiff

must present evidence establishing that:

(1) she was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the defendant was an

employer subject to the FMLA’s requirements; (3) the plaintiff was entitled to

FMLA leave; (4) the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant of her intention to

take FMLA leave; and (5) the plaintiff was denied benefits to which she was

entitled under the FMLA.

Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Johnson v. Cnty. Coll.

Of Allegheny Cnty., 566 F. Supp. 2d 405, 446 (W.D. Pa. 2008).

The parties dispute the third, fourth, and fifth elements. (Doc. 57, at 45-47; Doc. 62, at 25-

26). As Helwig’s notice requirements are fully explained in Section G, subsection a supra, the

Court will focus on the third and fifth elements of the FMLA interference claim.

An employee’ entitlement to FMLA leave is limited by 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B),

which provides that an employee is not entitled to a right, benefit, or position that she would

not “have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave.” Atchson v. Sears, 666 F. Supp.

2d 477, 488-89 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Yandrisevitz v. H.T. Lyons, Inc., No. 08-1444, 2009 WL

2195139, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2009) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B)). Accordingly,

“[a]n employee lawfully may be dismissed preventing [her] from exercising [her] statutory

rights to FMLA leave or reinstatement, but only if the dismissal would have occurred

regardless of the employee’s request for or taking of FMLA leave.” Atchson v. Sears, 666 F.

Supp. 2d 477, 489 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting Moorer v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Sys., 398 F.3d

469, 488 (6th Cir. 2005)). Additionally, “[n]o FMLA violation occurs where an employer has

already decided to terminate the employee before the employee requests FMLA leave.”

Reinhardt v. Mineral Techs. Inc., No. 05-4203, 2006 WL 4050695, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 27,

2006); see Champion v. Spencer Gifts, LLC, No. 08-CV-689, 2009 WL 3131461, at *6 (D.N.J.

Sept. 24, 2009).

The parties dispute whether Myers decided to terminate Helwig before their initial

meeting about the February 7th email on February 16, 2022, or at the March 3, 2022 meeting

where Myers presented Helwig with a draft separation agreement. (Doc. 43, ¶ 82; Doc. 58, ¶

82). Defendants contend that Myers notified Helwig of her termination on February 16, while

Helwig contends that Myers first notified her of her termination on March 3. (Doc. 43-1, at

29; Doc. 43-2, at 51-52, 56-57; Doc. 46-17, at 4-9, Doc. 58, ¶ 81). Therefore, Helwig was not

denied FMLA leave or benefits to which she was entitled when she gave notice of her intent

to submit FMLA paperwork on March 9, 2022, because there is undisputed evidence that

Myers made the decision to terminate her, at the latest, six days earlier. (Doc. 43, ¶ 130; Doc.

58, ¶ 130, Doc. 43-1, at 29; Doc. 43-2, at 56-57; Doc. 46-17, at 4-9); see Atchinson v. Sears, 666

F. Supp. 2d 477, 489 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (holding plaintiff’s interference claim fails because of

evidence that employer made the decision to terminate the plaintiff weeks before he requested

FMLA leave). However, as discussed fully in Section G, subsection a supra, Helwig may have

provided adequate notice to Misericordia of her need for FMLA leave when she submitted

her doctor’s note and disclosed her leg operation after returning from medical leave on March

3, 2022. (Doc. 43-1, at 122). Given the dispute of material fact regarding the date Helwig was

notified of her termination, a reasonable jury making inferences in favor of Helwig, could find

that Defendants interfered with Helwig’s rights under the FMLA. Accordingly, Defendants

motion for summary judgment on Helwig’s FMLA interference claim in Count IV is

DENIED. (Doc. 42).

H. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS TO HELWIG’S DEFAMATION CLAIM.

In Count VII, Helwig alleges a claim of defamation against Myers for allegedly telling

the Misericordia community that Helwig had been “terminated effective immediately.” (Doc.

1, ¶¶ 147-58). Defendants assert that Myers has the absolute defense of truth because Helwig

did leave Misericordia effective immediately on March 9, 2022 as reflected in the

communications to the Misericordia community. (Doc. 44, at 37). Helwig counters that

Myers’ choice of words in his communications led members of the Misericordia community

to believe that she was terminated for bad acts as referenced in the Misericordia Separation

from Employment Policy. (Doc. 57, at 16).

A defamatory statement under Pennsylvania law is one that “tends to harm another’s

reputation by lowering [her] in the eyes of the community or by deterring third persons from

dealing or associating with [her].” Fort Washington Resources, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 354, 364-65

(E.D. Pa. 1994); Mun. Revenue Serv., Inc. v. Xspand, Inc., 700 F. Supp.2d 692, 706 (M.D. Pa.

2010). Under Pennsylvania law, a claim for defamation includes the following elements, “(1)

the defamatory nature of the communication; (2) its publication by the defendant; (3) its

application to the plaintiff; (4) the understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning;

(5) the understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff; (6) special

harm resulting to the plaintiff from publication; and (7) abuse of conditionally privileged

occasion.” Mun. Revenue Serv., Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 692, 706 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Moore v.

Cobb-Nettleton, 889 A.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)). Pennsylvania law provides that

truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim. Emekekwue v. Offer, 26 F. Supp. 3d 348,

352 (M.D. Pa. 2014). To determine whether a statement is substantially true, “the test is

whether the [alleged] libel as published would have a different effect on the mind of the reader

from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.” Dunlap v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc.,

448 A.2d 6, 15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 2014).

On March 9, 2022, continuing into the morning of March 10, 2022, Myers issued a

series of announcements to the Misericordia community which stated, in relevant part, “I

write to inform you that Sue Helwig, Vice President of University Advancement, is leaving

Misericordia University, effective immediately.” (Doc. 43-3, at 28-29). It is undisputed that

Helwig’s last effective day of employment was March 9, 2022, and thus, Myers’ statements

that Helwig was leaving Misericordia were truthful. (Doc. 43, ¶ 157; Doc. 58, ¶ 157).

Therefore, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to defamation because Myers’

statements to the Misericordia community were truthful. See Emekekwue, 26 F. Supp. 3d at

352 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (finding truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim under

Pennsylvania law). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Helwig’s

claim of defamation in Count VII is GRANTED. (Doc. 42).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. 42). Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to Counts I,

II, II, and VI. Helwig’s claims of age discrimination, sex discrimination, and disability

discrimination and harassment are DISMISSED. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to

Count VII. Helwig’s claims of ADA, ADEA, PHRA, and FMLA retaliation are

DISMISSED. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to Count V. Helwig’s claims of

harassment and hostile work environment are DISMISSED. Defendants’ motion is DENIED

as to Counts IV of FMLA failure to notify and FMLA interference. Finally, Defendants’

motion is GRANTED as to Count VII. Helwig’s claims of defamation are DISMISSED.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: January 15, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick ____

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge