Amaya-Velis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CARLOS RENE AMAYA-VELIS, ) Case No. 4:26-cv-73

)

Petitioner, )

) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

v. )

) Magistrate Judge

KEVIN RAYCRAFT, Director of the ) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

Detroit Field Office, U.S. )

Immigration and Customs )

Enforcement, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Carlos Amaya-Velis, a nearly 21-year-old native and citizen of

El Salvador illegally present in the United States since arriving as an unaccompanied

minor in 2022, has been in immigration detention since August 6, 2025. He petitions

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons,

the Court DISMISSES the petition WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

According to Petitioner, Mr. Amaya-Velis, who will turn 21 years old next

month, entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor on February 19, 2022

when he was 17. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 19, PageID #5–6.) In February 2024, U.S. Citizenship

and Immigration Services granted Mr. Amaya-Velis special immigrant juvenile

status and deferred action, which allowed him to obtain work authorization and

delayed his removal until 2028. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 28 & 45, PageID #2, #7 & #13; ECF No. 1-1,

PageID #51.) After graduating from high school in New Jersey (ECF No. 1, ¶ 29,

PageID #7), Mr. Amaya-Velis moved to Ohio where he lived with family while

working (ECF No. 1-1, PageID #84). In connection with a raid on AZZ Galvanizing

in Canton, Ohio on August 6, 2025, Mr. Amaya-Velis was arrested and has been held

in immigration custody since at a jail in Youngstown, Ohio. (Id., ¶¶ 2, 4 & 20, PageID

#2 & #6.) He has no criminal history. (Id., ¶ 30, PageID #8.)

After Immigration and Customs Enforcement initiated removal proceedings,

Mr. Amaya-Velis applied for asylum and withholding of removal. (Id., ¶¶ 33 & 34,

PageID #9.) On December 11, 2025, he sought a bond redetermination hearing before

an immigration judge who, on January 8, 2026, determined that he lacked

jurisdiction to conduct the hearing because Mr. Amaya-Velis is subject to mandatory

detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Id., ¶ 35; ECF No. 1-1, PageID #153.)

Then, Petitioner sought habeas relief in federal court, arguing that an appeal to the

Board of Immigration Appeals would be futile. (Id., ¶ 36, PageID #9–10.) Petitioner

bases this argument on the Board’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N

Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (Id., ¶¶ 36 & 64, PageID #9–10 & 17.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 13, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) He alleges that his detention violates:

(1) the Immigration and Nationality Act; (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment; and (3) the ruling of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of

California, which certified a nationwide class of individuals who, like Mr. Amaya-

Velis, are held without bond pending determinations of removal then granted partial

summary judgment in favor of the class. (Id., ¶¶ 103–18, PageID #33–35.)

ANALYSIS

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, a court shall forthwith issue a writ or order the

respondent to show cause why a writ should not issue, “unless it appears from the

application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled” to a writ of habeas

corpus. This statute requires an initial screening of a petition. See Alexander v.

Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). At this stage of

the proceedings, a court accepts as true the allegations in the petition and construes

them in favor of the petitioner. Id. “If it plainly appears from the petition and any

attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the

judge must dismiss the petition.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

(applicable to petitions under Section 2241 through Rule 1(b)).

I. Jurisdiction

Section 2241(c)(3) extends the availability of the writ of habeas corpus to

persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United

States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) provides that no court has jurisdiction to review any

immigration matter except as provided by statute: “Notwithstanding any other

provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any

other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall

have jurisdiction to review” immigration cases.

As relevant here, judicial review is available in two circumstances. First, a

final order of removal is subject to judicial review by “the court of appeals for the

judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings,” not the

district court. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2); see also id. § 1252(b)(9). This provision does not

apply here.

Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves the ability to petition for a writ of

habeas corpus to raise a constitutional issue. In such a case, however, Congress

significantly limited judicial review and the ability of courts to engage in fact-finding:

no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of

title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, . . . or by any other

provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order [a

final order of removal] or such questions of law or fact [those involving

interpretation and application of statutory provisions, arising from any

action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United

States].

Id. § 1252(b)(9). This statute encompasses challenges to the decision to seek removal

and the decision to detain an alien in the first place. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583

U.S. 281, 294 (2018); see also Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402 (2019). Significantly,

Congress specifically divested courts of jurisdiction to review bond determinations

and other discretionary determinations pending removal. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

As Petitioner notes (ECF No. 1, ¶ 51, PageID #14–15), determinations of bond

or detention are discretionary, even under administrative policy in effect until the

middle of 2025. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). For this reason, the Court finds that Congress

has not conferred jurisdiction on federal district courts to interpret or apply Section

1225 or Section 1226 of the INA. Divesting federal district courts of jurisdiction over

such determinations makes sense. After all, Congress created an administrative

process intended to act quickly (though in practice its actions have been anything

but) in a field requiring specialized knowledge generally outside the experience of the

inferior federal courts.

I.A. Split of Authority in the Inferior Courts

Notwithstanding the sharp jurisdictional limits in Section 1252, federal

district courts have scarcely noticed that the statute exists. That is odd. In every

other civil case, federal judges routinely invoke the maxim that federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction possessing only the jurisdiction that Congress gives

them pursuant to the Constitution.

Whatever the reason judges in the inferior courts have skirted analysis of the

jurisdictional limits of Section 1252, they have taken competing approaches to

whether petitioners are entitled to a bond hearing pending removal. The majority of

courts agree with Petitioner that such a hearing is warranted. See, e.g., Rodriguez v.

Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-

11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *9 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); Paredes Padillia v. Galovich,

et al., No. 25-cv-863, 2025 WL 3251446, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2025); Diaz-

Villatoro v. Larose, et al., No. 25-cv-3087, 2025 WL 3251377, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21,

2025). However, at least three courts have taken a contrary position, agreeing with

the Administration’s reading of the statute. See, e.g., Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-

cv-00168, 2025 WL 3131942, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); Vargas Lopez v. Trump,

No. 8:25CV526, 2025 WL 2780351, at *9 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); Chavez v. Noem,

No. 3:25-cv-02325, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025).

In the Court’s view, both approaches are mistaken. The statutory framework

provides a limited role for district courts to review a habeas petition in the

immigration context not concerning a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

That is, Section 1252 preserves the ability of district courts to review a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus regarding a constitutional issue. Id. For example, such claims

might challenge the conditions of confinement or what amounts to indefinite

detention. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (recognizing the

serious constitutional concerns of indefinite detention following a final order of

removal); but see Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297 (finding no statutory right to periodic

bond hearings for aliens detained during the pendency of removal proceedings).

Outside of such limited and narrow constitutional claims, which Petitioner

does not raise, other constitutional challenges quickly implicate and often become

entwined with interpretation and implementation of the statutory framework and its

associated procedures. Such is the case with Petitioner’s claims here. Indeed, his

first cause of action asserts a violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. And,

taken as a whole, his petition pursues that issue to a far greater degree than it

outlines a claimed due-process violation. There might well be good reason for that.

In the immigration context, Congress has broad discretion to determine what process

is due. See, e.g. Department of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107

(2020); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 309 (1993). Put another way, a constitutional

challenge to detention pending removal and entitlement to a bond hearing collapse

into analysis of the statutory and regulatory regime—whether, for example, Section

1226(a) entitles an alien to bond pending removal or whether Section 1225(b)

authorizes the government to detain an alien. Congress has made clear that district

courts lack the jurisdiction to make such determinations, even on a habeas petition

under Section 2241. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). As the Supreme Court has long

recognized, these statutory provisions aim “at protecting the Executive’s discretion

from the courts—indeed, that can fairly be said to be the[ir] theme.” Reno v.

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999).

Nonetheless, the federal district courts that have considered the issues raised

in the petition have not hesitated to wade into interpretation of a statutory scheme

where Congress has made clear they have little, if any, place. The Court fails to see

how it has jurisdiction to consider the petition.

I.B. Exhaustion

Out of an abundance of caution, if the Court is mistaken in its read of the

interplay between Section 1252 and Section 2241, the Court proceeds. If vested with

jurisdiction, the familiar principles of habeas practice and procedure apply. In light

of the congressional limitations on jurisdiction, prudential principles of exhaustion

counsel that a petitioner pursue his administrative remedies to a final judgment from

the Board of Immigration Appeals before seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Because

of the expertise that the Board of Immigration Appeals and the immigration courts

more generally have in the statutory and administrative regime governing the

admission and removal of foreigners, “‘many of the purposes for requiring exhaustion’

may be served by permitting agency review in the first instance.” Ba v. Director of

Detroit Field Off., No. 4:25-cv-02208, 2025 WL 2977712, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22,

2025) (quoting Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-

01621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)); see also Beharry v.

Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the benefits of limiting judicial

interference in agency affairs in the immigration context).

I.B.1. Prudential Exhaustion

“When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court

ordinarily should either dismiss the [habeas] petition without prejudice or stay the

proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is

excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations

omitted). In Leonardo, the petitioner pursued habeas review of the Immigration

Court’s adverse bond determination before he appealed to the Board of Immigration

Appeals. Id. The Ninth Circuit determined that filing a habeas petition in federal

district court was improper because the petitioner “should have exhausted

administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district

court to review the IJ’s decision.” Id. (citing Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814,

819 (9th Cir. 2003)).

The Sixth Circuit has endorsed this procedure for challenging bond

determinations, albeit in a short, unpublished order. See Rabi v. Sessions, No. 19-

3249, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19661, at *1–2 (6th Cir. July 16, 2018) (citing Leonardo,

646 F.3d at 1160); see also Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (applying

the Ninth Circuit’s test for prudential exhaustion). Previously, the Court has done

so as well. See Tecum Pastor v. Director of Detroit Field Off., U.S. Immigr. & Customs

Enf’t, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. 4: 25-cv-2761, 2025 WL 3746495, at *3 (N.D. Ohio

2025); Monroy Villalta v. Greene, 794 F. Supp. 3d 528, 530 (N.D. Ohio 2025); Laguna

Espinoza v. Director of Detroit Field Off., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 4:25-cv-

02107, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2025); Ba, 2025 WL 2977712, at *2.

In this case, Mr. Amaya-Velis has available to him an appeal to the Board of

Immigration Appeals. As in Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160, prudential principles of

exhaustion counsel that Petitioner pursue his administrative remedies to a final

judgment from the Board of Immigration Appeals before seeking a writ of habeas

corpus. In his petition, count one alleges violation of the Immigration and Nationality

Act. Though styled as a Fifth Amendment due process claim, count two also invites

review of process due under the statute and its associated procedures. Further,

Petitioner seeks review of the application and interpretation of Matter of Yajure

Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In other words, any determination regarding

detention here turns on interpretation and application of the governing removal

regime.

In the first instance, such review should proceed before the Board of

Immigration Appeals to “apply its experience and expertise without judicial

interference.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009) (abrogated on other

grounds); see also Rojas-Garcia , 39 F.3d at 819 (acknowledging that a “petitioner

must exhaust administrative remedies before raising the constitutional claims in a

habeas petition when those claims are reviewable by the BIA on appeal”); Monroy

Villalta, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 531; Laguna Espinoza, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2; Ba, 2025

WL 2977712, at *2.

I.B.2. Futility

Petitioner argues that an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals would

be time consuming and futile in light of Matter of Yajure Hurtado. But courts in this

Circuit have determined that even where there is a “high probability of denial” of a

petitioner’s appeal of an Immigration Judge’s bond decision, such a probability “does

not weigh in favor of waiving exhaustion.” Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114,

at *11. Indeed, the Attorney General remains free to exercise her discretion to use

an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals to change or modify the policy about

which Petitioner complains.

In Hernandez Torrealba, the petitioner sought relief from the exhaustion

requirement based on a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the

denial of bond. But the court was “not certain how the BIA will rule on Petitioner’s

appeal given the particular circumstances of her case, and it would be presumptuous

of this Court to simply assume that the BIA will rule against Petitioner.” Id. So too

here. Petitioner presents relevant background of Mr. Amaya-Velis that appears

particularly sympathetic. For this reason, his case might well prove to be one in

which the agency changes or refines its policy announced in Matter of Yajure Hurtado

through agency adjudication. That prerogative belongs in the first instance to the

agency, which also has the knowledge and ability and to adopt policies that are more

tailored to the statutory scheme it is tasked with implementing in a way that courts

are not. For example, it might decide that special immigrant juvenile status or

deferred action might implicate bond considerations that other classes of cases do not.

“[M]many of the purposes for requiring exhaustion’ may be served by

permitting agency review in the first instance.’” Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL

2444114, at *11 (quoting Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62). Indeed, courts outside this Circuit

acknowledge that the purposes of requiring exhaustion in the immigration context

“include protecting the authority of administrative agencies, limiting interference in

agency affairs, developing the factual record to make judicial review more efficient,

and resolving issues to render judicial review unnecessary.” Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62

(citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992); McKart v. United States, 395

U.S. 185, 193–95 (1969)). In any event, the Court has no jurisdiction to review the

decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Hurtado. That authority rests, if

anywhere, with the Sixth Circuit. For these reasons, the Court cannot say that

exhaustion is futile or a waste of time or that prudential reasons apply for excusing

it. Nor does requiring prudential exhaustion “create[] hardship for hardship’s sake,”

as Petitioner suggests. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 100, PageID #32.) To the contrary, it promotes

judicial restraint, separates the powers and proper roles of the agency and the courts

in the administrative regime Congress created, and reserves judicial review from

decisions of the agency for the Sixth Circuit (something that no petitioner, to the

Court’s knowledge, has yet availed himself of).

II. Nationwide Class

Finally, Petitioner argues that Respondents hold Petitioner without a bond

hearing although he is a member of a certified class in which another district court

granted relief. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 81, PageID #22–23.) Specifically, Petitioner maintains

that “Petitioner’s custody decisions are bound by the class-wide declaratory relief

entered” in a class action in the Central District of California. (Id.) In Bautista v.

Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), the

Central District of California granted declaratory relief to a nationwide class of

noncitizens, holding that Matter of Yajure Hurtado unlawfully violates the INA.

(ECF No. 1, ¶ 101, PageID #32.) Based on this ruling, Petitioner alleges that

immigration judges are in violation of the INA and that the ruling applies to

Mr. Amaya-Velis, entitling him to a bond hearing. (Id.; ECF No. 1-1, PageID #153.)

Importantly, the ruling in the Central District of California began with the filing of a

habeas petition. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 2670875, at

*1 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2025).

“[I]t is doubtful that class relief may be obtained in a habeas proceeding.”

A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 606 U.S. 91, 107 (2025) (Alito, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court

has “never so held, and it is highly questionable whether it is permitted.” Id. “[T]he

class action device is uniquely ‘ill-suited’ for habeas proceedings . . . which often turn

on individualized and fact specific determinations regarding the confinement of a

specific prisoner.” Id. at 109 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 296 (1969)).

Although the Supreme Court has addressed class challenges to “vindicate notice

rights” under the Alien Enemies Act seeking habeas relief, it has not determined

whether such relief is appropriate in any other context. Id. at 97 n.1. The Court

doubts it is and fails to see how the Central District of California can issue relief to a

nationwide class of habeas petitioners under Rule 23(b)(2). After all, courts issue

writs of habeas corpus to the person having custody over a petitioner. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2242. And the warden having custody over Mr. Amaya-Velis was not before the

Central District of California.

In any event, the Court is not bound by the Central District of California’s

ruling, and it declines to honor its approach or afford it any persuasive authority. “A

decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different

judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different

case.” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (quoting 18 J. Moore et al.,

Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.02[1][d] (3d ed. 2011)). In count three, Petitioner

requests relief pursuant to the Central District of California’s ruling (ECF No. 1,

¶ 112–18, PageID #34–35), but that ruling offers him no relief and does not bind the

Court in any event. Even Petitioner does not believe his own argument. If he did,

then his remedy lies in the Central District of California, and he would have sought

relief there. His decision not to do so speaks volumes about the legal validity of that

class certification order.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition but if it had

jurisdiction would require exhaustion as a prudential matter. Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 14, 2026

J. Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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