Thomas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

RICHARD THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM & ORDER

23-CV-01271 (HG) (JAM)

AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC,

AMAZON.COM INC, and ANDREW R.

JASSY,

Defendants.

HECTOR GONZALEZ, United States District Judge:

On January 21, 2025, I granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint

(“AC”), finding that pro se Plaintiff failed to state a federal claim upon which relief could be

granted and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. See

Thomas v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, No. 23-cv-01271, 2025 WL 253276, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.

21, 2025) (Dismissal Order). The Clerk of Court entered judgment against Plaintiff and closed

this case on January 28, 2025. ECF No. 70 (Judgment).1 That same day, Plaintiff filed a motion

to disqualify me from the matter and for a new trial or amended judgment, see ECF No. 69 (First

Disqualification Motion), which I denied, see January 29, 2025, Text Order.

Plaintiff has now filed a second disqualification motion, seeking: (i) my recusal from this

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.

Constitution; (ii) relief from the Judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); and

1 Unless otherwise indicated, when quoting cases and Plaintiff’s motion, the Court omits

all internal quotation marks, alteration marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations. The Court

refers to the pages assigned by the Electronic Case Files system (“ECF”).

(iii) reassignment to a different judge. See ECF No. 71 at 2, 11 (Second Disqualification Motion,

“Mot.”). For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

DISCUSSION

I. Disqualification Under § 455

Plaintiff moves to disqualify me from this action under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(4).

See Mot. at 3–5. He claims that I have a “financial interest” in Defendant Amazon.com Services

LLC because he reviewed my 2024 annual judiciary financial disclosure report and saw that I

disclosed having, inter alia: (i) a capital account with my former firm, Dechert LLP (“Dechert”),

who Plaintiff mistakenly believes to represent Amazon in an unrelated matter; and (ii) shares in a

Vanguard index fund that holds Amazon stock within the fund. See id. Plaintiff also claims that

Dechert’s purported “representation of Amazon” in that unrelated matter “creates the appearance

of favoritism or bias.” See id.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United

States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” A judge shall also disqualify himself where “[h]e knows that he, individually or as

a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the

subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be

substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4). Under the

Second Circuit’s “reasonable observer” test, § 455 recusal is appropriate where the judge has:

(i) expressed a personal bias concerning the outcome of the case at issue; (ii) a direct personal or

fiduciary interest in the outcome of the case; or (iii) had contemporaneous extrajudicial contact

with someone who has personal knowledge of outcome-determinative facts in the case. See

Green v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 04-cv-05144, 2005 WL 8178956, at *2

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2005), aff’d, 343 F. App’x 712 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v.

Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992)).

“There is as much obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself when there is no

occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is.” United States v. Oluwafemi,

883 F. Supp. 885, 890–91 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121, 124 (2d

Cir. 1968). “Remote, contingent, or speculative interests do not constitute grounds for

disqualification.” Id. And “there exists a strong presumption of a judge’s impartiality which

may only be overcome by adequate proof to the contrary.” Wiltshire v. Williams, No. 10-cv-

6947, 2012 WL 899383, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2012). “Therefore, the moving party bears a

substantial burden to show that disqualification is proper.” Oluwafemi, 883 F. Supp. at 891

(citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir. 1988)).

A. The Motion is Untimely

“It is well-settled that a party must raise its claim of a district court’s disqualification at

the earliest possible moment after obtaining knowledge of facts demonstrating the basis for such

a claim. . . . [A] movant may not hold back and wait, hedging its bets against the eventual

outcome.” Apple v. Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 333–34 (2d Cir. 1987).

“Postjudgment recusal motions are not a means to allow parties to withhold recusal motions

pending a favorable resolution of their disputes on the merits and then, if necessary, invoke

section 455 in order to have the merits reconsidered.” Blake v. Potter, No. 03-cv-743, 2010 WL

4536974, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010).

Plaintiff’s motion—made eight months after Judgment was entered and the case was

closed—is untimely. See id. (“The Second Circuit has established that a motion for recusal made

after the entry of judgment is presumed untimely.”) (citing Apple, 829 F.2d at 333). Plaintiff

offers no explanation for his failure to raise the issue sooner. He only states that he “recently

identified the Dechert LLP capital account” and “was not aware” of it when he made his First

Disqualification Motion. Mot. at 4. Yet this information has been publicly disclosed since 2023.

And he says nothing of his failure to timely raise his other purported financial interest or

impartiality concerns.

B. Recusal Is Not Warranted

In any event, Plaintiff’s motion is meritless. “Disqualification is not required on the basis

of remote, contingent, indirect or speculative interests.” United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d

442, 451 (2d Cir. 1996).

Starting with his arguments under § 455(b)(4), neither the capital account with my former

firm nor my index fund investments constitute a “financial interest” in Defendant or any other

interest that could be affected by the outcome of this proceeding. A capital account does not

create a “financial interest” in any of the firm’s clients. Likewise, my index fund investments are

expressly excluded from the class of financial interests requiring recusal, as I do not participate

in the management of any funds that hold Amazon as a stock. See § 455(d)(4)(i) (“Ownership in

a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a ‘financial interest’ in such

securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund[.]”). Thus, recusal is not

warranted.

Plaintiff also argues for disqualification under § 455(a), claiming that my “financial tie to

Dechert LLP,” combined with his mistaken belief that Dechert represents Amazon in another,

unrelated matter, “creates the appearance of favoritism or bias.” Mot. at 5. Yet this alleged

interest is also too “remote, contingent, indirect or speculative” to warrant disqualification. See

Thompson, 76 F.3d at 451.

The matter to which Plaintiff refers is Amazon.com Services LLC v. National Labor

Relations Board, No. 24-50761 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2024). A review of that docket and the exhibit

Plaintiff attaches to his motion reveals that Dechert does not even represent Amazon. See ECF

No. 71 at 16 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit A). Dechert represents the United States Chamber of Commerce

and filed an amicus curiae brief on its behalf. Dechert’s filing of an amicus curiae brief on

behalf of an unrelated party, in an unrelated matter, makes the connection Plaintiff advances too

attenuated to meet his “substantial” burden to overcome the “strong presumption of a judge’s

impartiality[.]” See Oluwafemi, 883 F. Supp. at 891; Wiltshire, 2012 WL 899383, at *6.

Even if Plaintiff was correct and Dechert represented Amazon in an unrelated matter, that

connection would still be too remote and indirect to warrant disqualification. See Thompson, 76

F.3d at 451. “There are a number of recusal cases involving judges’ former law firms, and it is

rare that recusal is granted based only on a question of impartiality because of the judge’s former

affiliation.” Loc. 338, RWDSU v. Trade Fair Supermarkets, 455 F. Supp. 2d 143, 144 (E.D.N.Y.

2006); see also Faulkner v. National Geographic Soc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d,

409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005) (recusal not required where judge once represented the defendant in

an unrelated matter while the judge was a practicing lawyer, even though his former law firm

colleague had been a member of the defendant’s board while they were associated in practice);

United States v. Hild, No. 23-6136, 2025 WL 2924205, at *3 (2d Cir. Oct. 15, 2025) (recusal not

required where judge’s husband is currently a partner at the law firm representing victims in the

case, but her husband is not personally involved in the representation). Here too, recusal would

be unwarranted.

* * *

In short, Plaintiff’s motion for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 is both untimely

and meritless.2

II. Relief from Judgment Under Rule 60(b)

Next, Plaintiff moves to vacate the Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). See Mot. at

5. He claims that I harbor “bias or prejudice” toward him. See id. at 6. Plaintiff argues that I:

(i) sua sponte denied him in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status; (ii) “always favored the defendant

Amazon” in my decisions in this action; and (iii) “presented false statements” in my Dismissal

Order. See id. at 7. None of his arguments warrants relief.

Rule 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for certain enumerated

reasons. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)–(6). Rule 60(b) is “a mechanism for extraordinary judicial

relief invoked only if the moving party demonstrates exceptional circumstances.” Ruotolo v.

City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Indeed, “for such a motion to succeed the

movant must present highly convincing evidence in support of the motion, show good cause for

the failure to act sooner, and show that no undue hardship will be imposed on the non-moving

party as a result.” Whiddon v. Buzzfeed, Inc., No. 22-cv-4696, 2022 WL 17632593, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2022) (citing Kotlicky v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 817 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir.

1987)). “The decision whether to grant a party’s Rule 60(b) motion is committed to the sound

discretion of the district court.” Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2012). “A Rule 60(b)

2 Plaintiff’s motion for disqualification under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the

U.S. Constitution also fails. “Under the Due Process Clause, ‘a judge must recuse himself when

he has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in a case.’” Residents & Fams. United to

Save Our Adult Homes v. Zucker, No. 16-cv-1683, 2017 WL 5641043, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22,

2017) (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009)). However,

“where a movant’s claim of bias under Section 455 fails on the merits and does not mandate

recusal, recusal is likewise unwarranted under the Due Process Clause.” Id.

motion is properly denied where it seeks only to relitigate issues already decided.” Djenasevic v.

New York, No. 17-cv-6366, 2019 WL 2330854, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2019).

Rule 60(b)(6) “‘only applies if the reasons offered for relief from judgment are not

covered under the more specific provisions of Rule 60(b)(1)–(5).’” Gustavia Home, LLC v.

Hoyer, No. 16-cv-4015, 2022 WL 875096, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2022) (quoting Warren v.

Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also ISC Holding AG v. Nobel Biocare Fin. AG,

688 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only available if Rules 60(b)(1) through

(5) do not apply[.]”).

A. Denying IFP Status for Appeal

Plaintiff takes issue with my inclusion of the following language in the Dismissal Order,

Thomas, 2025 WL 253276, at *15, and a prior Order denying his motion for a preliminary

injunction, ECF No. 58:

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from

this Order would not be taken in good faith; therefore, in forma pauperis status

is denied for purposes of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.

438, 444–45 (1962).

See Mot. at 6. Because Plaintiff did not move for IFP status, he claims that I “maliciously”

included this language, “discriminating” against him because he is Black, and “prejudging” that

he “is poor and can’t afford an appeal.” Id. “Judge Gonzalez’s totalitarian and prejudicial

actions were used to maliciously place a barrier or wall around the Eastern District of New York,

and bar or ban the plaintiff from exercising his constitutional rights, and his New York City and

New York State Human Rights, and other city, state, and federal rights.” Id. Plaintiff goes on to

state that the “prejudicial action was also used as a threat or coercion to prevent or stop” him

“from appealing and exposing the astronomical number of errors by Judge Gonzalez.” Id. at 6–

7.

Even where a pro se plaintiff has not requested to proceed IFP, district courts throughout

this circuit include this language in orders from which an appeal would be frivolous, to obviate

the need for district court judges to make a separate ruling on IFP after a case has been

dismissed. See, e.g., Burton v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 738 F. Supp. 3d 272, 282 (E.D.N.Y.

2024) (“Although Plaintiff paid the filing fee to commence this action, the Court certifies

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good

faith and therefore denies in forma pauperis status for the purpose of an appeal.”); see also Lewis

v. N. Gen. Hosp., No. 06-cv-4909, 2024 WL 55047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2024) (“[I]f an

appeal is frivolous it is not taken in good faith.”). Plaintiff’s hasty conjecture that this standard

procedural language “discriminates” against him or “prejudges” him is misguided.

Moreover, this language does not prevent Plaintiff from filing a notice of appeal or

seeking IFP status from the Court of Appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5); see also, e.g.,

Mamot v. Bd. of Regents, No. 08-cv-1451, 2008 WL 3851692, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2008)

(“Certification by a district court that an appeal would not be taken in good faith does not

foreclose the litigant’s right to request in forma pauperis status on appeal.”).

B. “False Statements” and Favoritism

Next, Plaintiff claims that my decisions “throughout this entire case . . . always favored

the defendant Amazon” and that I “presented false statements” in the Dismissal Order. Mot. at

7. Setting aside that I already addressed these arguments in denying the First Disqualification

Motion, see January 29, 2025, Text Order, his allegations are unsupported by the record and

amount to disagreements with my judicial opinions. “A ‘mere disagreement with the district

court’s underlying judgment does not present extraordinary circumstances’ justifying relief under

Rule 60(b)(6), and Rule 60(b)(6) is not a mechanism to appeal a judgment with which a party

disagrees.” In re OpenAI, Inc., Copyright Infringement Litig., No. 24-cv-01514, 2025 WL

1707564, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (quoting Green v. Phillips, 374 F. App’x 86, 89 (2d

Cir. 2010)).

* * *

In short, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden under Rule 60(b) to present “highly convincing

evidence” of “exceptional circumstances” warranting vacatur of the Judgment. See, e.g., Simon

v. United States, No. 12-cv-5209, 2020 WL 832887, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2020) (“Indeed,

relief under Rule 60(b) is only warranted if the movant presents ‘highly convincing’ evidence

that show extraordinary circumstances that merit relief.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s second motion seeking to disqualify me and

vacate the judgment in this case, see ECF No. 71, is DENIED. The Court certifies, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith;

therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purposes of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United

States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy

of this Order to pro se Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Hector Gonzalez

HECTOR GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

January 12, 2026