Villegas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO DIVISION

DANIEL VILLEGAS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

v. §

§

CITY OF EL PASO; §

YVONNE WHITAKER, §

In her capacity as the Executor of Decedent § EP-15-CV-00386-DCG

Alfonso Marquez’s Estate; §

CARLOS ORTEGA; §

SCOTT GRAVES; §

RAY SANCHEZ; and §

UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES OF THE §

CITY OF EL PASO, §

§

Defendants. §

ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING MOTION TO SEVER AND PARTIALLY

GRANTING MOTION TO BIFURCATE

Before the Court are (1) Plaintiff Daniel Villegas’s Renewed Motion to Sever1 and (2)

Defendant City of El Paso’s Opposed Renewed Motion to Bifurcate.2 After considering the

parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Sever

IN PART and GRANTS the Motion to Bifurcate IN PART.

1 Pl.’s Mot. Sever, ECF No. 482. Defendants oppose this motion. See Defs.’ Resp. Mot. Sever,

ECF No. 485.

2 City Mot. Bifurcate, ECF No. 484. Plaintiff opposes this motion, see generally Pl.’s Resp. City

Mot. Bifurcate, ECF No. 487; the other Defendants join the motion, see City Mot. Bifurcate, at 3.

All page citations in this Order refer to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s CM/ECF

system, rather than the cited document’s internal pagination.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The England and Lazo murder investigations and Plaintiff’s claims

This case revolves around the El Paso Police Department’s investigations of the 1993

murders of Robert England and Armando Lazo, for which Plaintiff was initially convicted and

later acquitted.3 Plaintiff alleges that, in connection with two investigations, various City of El

Paso (the “City”) police officers violated his constitutional rights by suppressing evidence,

fabricating evidence, and coercing false confessions.4

The first investigation took place before Plaintiff’s convictions in 1995 (the “First

Investigation”). That investigation involved Defendants Alfonso Marquez,5 Carlos Ortega, and

Scott Graves, who were officers with the El Paso Police Department. In connection with the

First Investigation, Plaintiff alleges that:

- Defendant Marquez fabricated several witness statements;6 suppressed taped witness

interviews and confessions;7 and coerced Plaintiff into a false confession;8

- Defendant Ortega fabricated Plaintiff’s witness statement and coerced Plaintiff into a

false confession;9 and

3 See generally 3d Am. Compl., ECF No. 153.

4 Id.

5 Alfonso Marquez died while this case was pending. See Suggestion Death Marquez, ECF No.

421. The Court therefore substituted Yvonne Whitaker, the executor of Marquez’s estate, in Marquez’s

place as a named defendant. See Order Grant Mot. Substitute Whitaker, ECF No. 457. Any references to

Whitaker in this Order refer to Whitaker in her capacity as executor of Marquez’s estate.

6 See 3d Am. Compl., ¶¶ 42, 50, 63.

7 See id. ¶¶ 113–14.

8 See id. ¶¶ 87–88.

9 See id.

- Defendant Graves fabricated multiple witness statements.10

According to Plaintiff, the officers’ misconduct during the First Investigation ultimately led to

his indictment, convictions, and nearly twenty years in prison for crimes that he did not

commit.11 Plaintiff further alleges that each officer’s misconduct was attributable to the City’s

tolerance of dishonesty and failure to supervise.12

The second investigation took place after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals vacated13

Plaintiff’s convictions in December 2013 (the “Second Investigation”). Plaintiff alleges that a

different El Paso Police Department officer—Defendant Ray Sanchez—fabricated another

witness statement, which was used against Plaintiff in a retrial.14 Like with the First

Investigation, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sanchez’s misconduct was attributable to the

City’s tolerance of dishonesty and failure to supervise.15

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Marquez, Ortega, or Graves played any role in

the Second Investigation. Likewise, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Sanchez played any

role in the First Investigation. The temporal relationship between Plaintiff’s claims and

Defendants can therefore be charted as follows:

10 See id. ¶¶ 42, 50.

11 See generally id.

12 Id. See also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (allowing

municipalities to “be sued directly under § 1983 . . . [where] the action that is alleged to be

unconstitutional implements or executes a policy . . . officially adopted and promulgated by [the

municipalities’] officers”); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

13 See generally 3d Am. Compl.

14 See id. ¶¶ 130–58.

15 See id. ¶¶ 167–85. Only Plaintiff’s failure to supervise and tolerance of dishonesty claims

remain against the City. See generally Order re City Mot. Summary J., ECF No. 473.

First Investigation Claims Second Investigation Claims

Defendant Marquez

Defendant Graves Defendant Sanchez

Defendant Ortega The City

The City

The parties have litigated this case for nearly a decade.16 Discovery is complete,17 and

the Court has ruled on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.18

On September 22, 2025, Defendant Sanchez appealed the Court’s denial of summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s Second Investigation fabrication of evidence claim.19 None of the other

Defendants appealed the Court’s summary judgment orders—the only issues standing between

the non-Sanchez claims and trial are several pending motions to exclude expert testimony.20

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Sever

Plaintiff now moves the Court to sever his claims against Defendant Sanchez from the

rest of his claims.21 The catalyst for Plaintiff’s motion is Defendant Sanchez’s appeal.22 That

appeal challenges the Court’s determination that qualified immunity does not bar Plaintiff’s

16 See Compl. (filed December 17, 2015).

17 See 3d Am. Scheduling Order, ECF No. 249, at 2–3 (November 28, 2022 deadline for fact

discovery; January 13, 2023 deadline for expert discovery).

18 See Order re Officers’ Mot. Summary J., ECF No. 472; Order re City Mot. Summary J.

19 Sanchez Notice Appeal Order re Officers’ Mot. Summary J., ECF No. 477.

20 See, e.g., November 7, 2025 Order, ECF No. 488 (discussing status of pending motions to

exclude expert testimony).

21 See Pl.’s Mot. Sever.

22 See Sanchez Notice Appeal Order re Officers’ Mot. Summary J.

fabrication of evidence claim against Defendant Sanchez.23 If the Court were to wait for the

Fifth Circuit to resolve the appeal before holding a trial on Plaintiff’s claims against the other

Defendants, that would further delay the resolution of Plaintiff’s nearly ten-year-old

constitutional claims.

Plaintiff argues, however, that severing his claims would facilitate their prompt

resolution.24 Plaintiff further argues that factual and temporal differences between the First and

Second Investigations provide a meaningful avenue to sever claims without impairing judicial

economy or risking inconsistent verdicts.25

Defendants disagree, contending that the two investigations arise out of the same series of

transactions and occurrences and contemplate common questions of fact and law.26 Thus,

Defendants argue, severing Plaintiff’s claims would result in inefficiency, evidentiary overlap,

and a risk of inconsistent verdicts.27

C. The City’s Motion to Bifurcate

At the same time, the City seeks to bifurcate Plaintiff’s Monell claims from claims

against the defendant-officers. The City argues that Plaintiff’s Monell claims lend themselves to

bifurcation because they depend on a finding that one or more of the defendant-officers violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.28 Thus, a determination that no constitutional violation occurred

23 Id.

24 See generally Pl.’s Mot. Sever; Pl.’s Reply Mot. Sever, ECF No. 486.

25 Id.

26 See generally Defs.’ Resp. Mot. Sever.

27 Id.

28 City Mot. Bifurcate, at 4–7.

in a first trial would obviate the need for a second, more expansive trial on Plaintiff’s Monell

claims.29 The City further argues that the differing standards and evidentiary requirements

between Monell and individual claims would risk jury confusion and prejudice Defendants if the

claims were tried together.30 For these reasons, the City advocates for trying the claims against

defendant-officers first.31

Plaintiff in opposition argues that separate trials would be unnecessarily duplicative and

inconvenient,32 some Monell claims will require adjudication regardless of individual liability

findings,33 and a single trial would not prejudice defendants.34 Should the Court order separate

trials, Plaintiff argues that the Monell claims should proceed first.35

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“[D]istrict courts have the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms

with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.”36 Whether to sever or

bifurcate claims are matters within the sole discretion of the district court.37 “An abuse of

discretion exists only when there is definite and firm conviction that the [district court]

29 Id.

30 City Mot. Bifurcate, at 7–8.

31 Id. at 6.

32 Pl.’s Resp. City Mot. Bifurcate, at 3–4, 7–12.

33 Id. at 4–7.

34 Id. at 12–13.

35 Id. at 13–14.

36 Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016) (citing cases).

37 See Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994) (severance); First Tex.

Sav. Ass'n v. Reliance Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 1171, 1174 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) (bifurcation).

committed clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant

factors.”38

In determining whether to sever claims, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 21

require courts to consider factual and legal overlap, prejudice, delay, judicial economy, and

fundamental fairness.39 “If a claim is severed out of a suit, it proceeds as a discrete, independent

action with its own pleadings, discovery, trial, judgment, and appeal.”40

Similarly, Rule 42(b) permits courts to bifurcate and order separate trials “in furtherance

of convenience and to avoid prejudice or, when separate trials will be conducive to expedition

and economy.”41 Unlike severance, however, bifurcation typically results in separate trials but a

single judgment.42

“Separation of issues . . . is not the usual course that should be followed,”43 and “the

burden is on the party seeking separate trials to prove that separation is necessary.”44

38 Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1293 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation modified).

39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a), 21; Acevedo v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 521

(5th Cir. 2010); see also Applewhite v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing

cases).

See also Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 431 (5th Cir. 2022) (laying out five factors for

determining whether to sever claims).

40 Rule v. Bexar Cnty. Sheriff, No. SA-00-CA-847 (IV), 2002 WL 1492269, at *2 (W.D. Tex.

Apr. 4, 2002) (first citing Allied Elevator, Inc. v. E. Tex. State Bank, 965 F.2d 34, 36 (5th Cir. 1992); and

then citing Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1519 (10th Cir. 1991)).

41 See W. Silver Recycling, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. EP-04-CA-0440-KC, 2006 WL

8434057, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2006) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b)).

42 McDaniel v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 987 F.2d 298, 304 n.19 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing 9 WRIGHT

& MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2387 (Rev ed. 1971)).

43 McDaniel, 987 F.2d at 304 (5th Cir. 1993).

44 See M-I LLC v. FPUSA, LLC, No. 5:15-CV-406-DAE, 2021 WL 8946454, at *3 (W.D. Tex.

Feb. 3, 2021) (citation modified).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant Sanchez’s appeal does not divest the Court of jurisdiction over the rest of

Plaintiff’s claims

Although the Parties do not raise the issue, the Court finds it appropriate to first address

whether Defendant Sanchez’s appeal divests the Court of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims

against the other Defendants.

“The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance.”45 Where a

defendant appeals a court’s denial of qualified immunity, that defendant is (at least temporarily)

freed from the burdens of litigating the claims involved on appeal.46 Thus—having appealed the

Court’s denial of qualified immunity bearing on Plaintiff’s lone remaining claim against him—

Defendant Sanchez is freed from the burdens of litigating this case while the Fifth Circuit hears

the appeal.

Whether Plaintiff may proceed on his claims against the other Defendants, however, is a

different issue. Qualified immunity is “a right to immunity from certain claims, not from

litigation in general.”47 A defendant-officer raising a qualified immunity defense does not

automatically demand a global stay of claims brought against other defendants.48

45 Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).

46 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525–26 (1985); Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133

(5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

47 Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312 (1996) (emphasis in original).

48 See Ramirez v. Escajeda, No. EP-17-CV-00193-DCG, 2022 WL 1744454, at *1 (W.D. Tex.

May 31, 2022); see also Engel v. Buchan, No. 10 C 3288, 2011 WL 13151374, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 8,

2011) (citing Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58).

Rather, the appeal only divests the Court of jurisdiction over the aspects of the case

“involved in the appeal.”49 Factual overlap does not necessarily draw claims into the scope of

the appeal.50 The inquiry instead asks whether claims are “legally distinct.”51 “When a claim

not on appeal is legally distinct from one that is, the claim not on appeal can proceed before the

district court.”52

Defendant Sanchez appeals the Court’s denial of his qualified immunity defense.53 This

defense contemplates whether his conduct during the Second Investigation (1) violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights;54 and/or (2) was “objectively unreasonable in light of clearly

established law.”55 This analysis does not consider whether—two decades earlier—the other

defendant-officers violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights or acted objectively unreasonable in

light of clearly established law. Nor does it impact whether Plaintiff may hold the City liable

under Monell for the other defendant-officers’ conduct.56 The claims stemming from the First

Investigation are legally distinct.

49 Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58.

50 Alice L. v. Dusek, 492 F.3d 563, 565 (5th Cir. 2007)).

51 Id.

52 See Escajeda, 2022 WL 1744454, at *1 (citing Alice L., 492 F.3d at 565).

53 See Sanchez Notice App.

54 See Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 2020).

55 See Cantrell v. City of Murphy, 666 F.3d 911, 921 (5th Cir. 2012); Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d

337, 346–47 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

56 To hold a municipality liable under Monell, a plaintiff must establish (among other things) that

a constitutional violation occurred. Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).

So too is the Monell claim stemming from the Second Investigation. The Monell analysis

focuses in part on whether there was a violation of a constitutional right.57 Defendant Sanchez’s

alleged conduct is, of course, central to that question in connection with the Second

Investigation.58 But “[w]hile a district court cannot proceed on that question with respect to a

plaintiff's claim against a defendant-officer during the pendency of the officer's appeal, a district

court may proceed with respect to that question as it applies to a plaintiff's Monell claim.”59

“Those claims are legally distinct.”60

The Court therefore concludes that it retains jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against

the City and Defendants Whitaker, Graves, and Ortega while the Fifth Circuit hears Defendant

Sanchez’s appeal.

B. The Court will bifurcate both Second Investigation claims from the First

Investigation claims

1. Bifurcation is better suited to these circumstances

Having determined that it retains jurisdiction, the Court now turns to the Motion to Sever.

The Court is concerned that severing claims into an independent action would create unnecessary

logistical hurdles. For example, doing so would require the Court to independently determine

which portions of various pending motions61 apply to which case. Moreover, despite the claims

57 See, e.g., Ratliff v. Aransas County, 948 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020).

58 See Harris v. City of Balch Springs, 33 F. Supp. 3d 730, 733 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“[E]ven if the

Fifth Circuit were to grant [the officer] qualified immunity . . . he would necessarily be required to testify

on behalf of the City.”).

59 Escajeda, 2022 WL 1744454, at *2 (citation modified) (first citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526;

and then citing Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1998)).

60 Id.

61 See, e.g., November 7, 2025 Order (discussing status of pending motions to exclude expert

testimony).

being near trial ready, the Court would also need to consider whether and how the parties should

replead in the severed action.

At bottom, Plaintiff wants to try his claims as soon as possible.62 Bifurcating Plaintiff’s

claims would accomplish this goal with much less complication. Indeed, bifurcation would

allow Plaintiff to proceed with other claims while Defendant Sanchez’s appeal is still pending.

And—if justified by the circumstances—Rule 54(b) would permit the Court to enter final

judgment after the resolution of those claims.63

Keeping Plaintiff’s claims under the same umbrella presents the most efficient and

expedient avenue to resolve this case.64 The Court will therefore consider Plaintiff’s motion

under Rule 42(b) rather than Rule 21.65

2. The Court will bifurcate Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Sanchez from the

First Investigation claims

Convenience, efficiency, economy, and prejudice govern the Court’s analysis under Rule

42(b).66 The Court will begin with the first three factors.

62 See generally Pl.’s Mot. Sever.

63 See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (district court “may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more,

but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for

delay”).

64 Dietz, 579 U.S. at 47 (2016) (“[D]istrict courts have the inherent authority

to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of

cases.” (citing cases)).

65 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b); see also Sims v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir.

1996) (district court has “broad discretion in managing [its] docket”); Saxion v. Titan-C-Mfg., Inc., 86

F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[Rule 42] clearly suggests that a court may bifurcate a trial on its own

motion.”).

The Court also notes that many of the Parties’ arguments for or against severance are equally

applicable to bifurcation. See supra Section II.

66 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).

On the one hand, each claim traces its roots to the City’s investigation of Plaintiff’s

role—or, more aptly, his lack thereof—in the England and Lazo murders. The claims will

inevitably share common facts. And, given that Plaintiff has asserted a fabrication of evidence

claim against each of the defendant-officers, those claims and their associated Monell claims will

present common issues of law. These considerations would support trying the First and Second

Investigation claims together.

On the other hand, the First and Second Investigations were separated by over 20 years

and involved entirely different officers.67 Whether Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated

during the First Investigation does not answer that question with respect to the Second

Investigation, or vice versa. The investigations yielded different results—whereas Plaintiff was

convicted following the First Investigation, he was acquitted following the Second Investigation.

And, finally, the Fifth Circuit’s determination of Defendant Sanchez’s appeal may obviate the

need to even try the Second Investigation claims.68 Trying the claims together could therefore

prove minimally more convenient, efficient, or economical.

Because these factors cut both ways, they do not support deviating from the “usual

course” of trying claims together.69

67 Compare 3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–118 (First Investigation) with id. ¶¶ 130–158 (Second

Investigation). See also Pl.’s Reply Mot. Sever, at 4 (“[T]he claims against Defendant Sanchez arise from

a distinct, later transaction in which none of the primary Defendant Officers participated.”).

68 If the Fifth Circuit determines that Plaintiff will be unable to show that Defendant Sanchez’s

conduct violated a constitutional right, the related Monell claim may also fail. This is because Monell

requires plaintiffs to establish a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Valle, 613 F.3d at 541–42.

69 See McDaniel, 987 F.2d at 304.

Prejudice, however, does support such a deviation.70 The passage of time looms large in

this case. Whereas courts recognize the passage of years as prejudicial,71 the events that set this

case into motion took place over three decades ago.72 Since Plaintiff filed his original

complaint, this case has seen several judges, a retrial of the criminal case,73 a global pandemic,

the death of a party,74 and multiple rounds of appeals.75 Each has played a role in the nearly ten

years Plaintiff has spent waiting for his day in court, and the latest appeal threatens to add (at

minimum) months more of delay.76

The interest in resolving Plaintiff’s claims far outweighs whatever marginal efficiencies

may be gained by trying the claims together. “Delaying trial would increase the danger of

70 See Sims v. City of Jasper, 117 F.4th 283, 290 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing 9A WRIGHT

& MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2392 (3d ed. 2024)) (“Avoiding prejudice, though,

seems to be given heightened weight, at least to the extent it is necessary to reverse an order to

bifurcate.”).

71 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707 (1997) (noting prejudicial effect of loss of evidence

where six years had passed since complained-of conduct); Rhoten v. Stroman, No. 1:16-CV-00648, 2020

WL 3545661, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 30, 2020) (“[The passage of six years] could significantly impact the

likelihood of witnesses to be able to recall specific details from the event.”).

72 See generally 3d Am. Compl.

73 See, e.g., Order Adopting R. & R., ECF No. 68 (staying case while Plaintiff stood trial for third

time in connection with England and Lazo murders).

74 See Suggestion Death Marquez.

75 See, e.g., Sanchez Notice Appeal Order re Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 198; Sanchez Notice Appeal

Order re Officers’ Mot. Summary J.

76 For the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2025, the median time from filing a notice of

appeal with the Fifth Circuit to disposition was 8.4 months. See U.S. Court of Appeals – Judicial

Caseload Profile,

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/fcms_na_appprofile0630.2025.pdf (last visited

December 5, 2025).

Defendant Sanchez’s opening appellate brief is not due until January 5, 2026. See Villegas v.

Sanchez, No. 25-50800, ECF No. 18 (5th Cir. 2025). The appeal will not be fully briefed or heard until

even later.

prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability of witnesses to recall

specific facts, or the possible death of [another] party.”77 Conversely, Defendants will not be

prejudiced if the Court severs the claims.78 If anything, severing the claims would actually

eliminate risk of confusion between Defendant Sanchez and the other defendant-officers’ alleged

conduct.79

These circumstances would weigh strongly in favor of bifurcating any case, but

especially where, as here, the claims present constitutional issues.80 The Court will therefore

bifurcate Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Sanchez from the First Investigation claims.

3. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Sanchez will proceed with the Monell claim

stemming from the Second Investigation

The Court now turns to the Monell claim stemming from Defendant Sanchez’s alleged

conduct during the Second Investigation. As discussed above, this claim is legally distinct from

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Sanchez.81 Thus, the Court retains jurisdiction to move

forward with the Second Investigation Monell claim.

Still, while it retains jurisdiction, the Court believes a cautious approach is appropriate.

“[A]t times, the Fifth Circuit analyzes denials of qualified immunity by first addressing the

77 Clinton, 520 U.S. at 707.

78 Contra Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Mot. Sever, at 6.

79 Cf. City Mot. Bifurcate, at 7–8; City Reply Mot. Bifurcate, ECF No. 489, at 3 (“It seems

obvious that the City and the Defendant Officers will be prejudiced by the introduction of evidence not

directly related to the specific facts of this case, which is more prejudicial that probative and may sway

the jury as to each Defendants’ independent liability obligations.”).

80 See Rhoten, 2020 WL 3545661, at *4 (“[T]he public interest disfavors the grant of a stay where

it would hinder the speedy adjudication of constitutional claims.” (citation modified)).

81 See supra at 10.

question of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.”82 While

the parties have yet to brief the issues on Defendant Sanchez’s appeal, the Fifth Circuit’s

eventual analysis could affect the viability of Plaintiff’s corresponding Monell claim.

The Court also finds it prudent to keep the Second Investigation claims together from a

case management sense.83 The Court’s decision to bifurcate Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant

Sanchez provides two options for how to proceed with Second Investigation Monell claim:

(1) Lump it in with the First Investigation claims, which do not contemplate Defendant

Sanchez’s conduct; or

(2) Keep it with the corresponding claim against Defendant Sanchez.

The Court finds the latter option far preferable to the former.

For these reasons, the Court will bifurcate both Second Investigation claims from the

First Investigation claims. Both Second Investigation claims will be stayed pending the outcome

of Defendant Sanchez’s appeal.84

82 Escajeda, 2022 WL 1744454, at *2 (citation modified).

83 See Dietz, 579 U.S. at 47 (“[D]istrict courts have the inherent authority to manage their dockets

and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” (citing cases)).

84 Doe v. City of Austin, No. 22-CV-299, 2022 WL 4234954, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 14,

2022) (“A district court has ‘broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its

own docket.’”) (quoting Clinton, 520 U.S. at 706)).

C. The Court will bifurcate trial of the First Investigation claims

1. Plaintiff’s claims against the defendant-officers stemming from the First

Investigation85 will be tried separately from their corresponding Monell claims

The Court now turns the City’s Motion to Bifurcate. Once again, convenience,

efficiency, economy, and prejudice govern the Court’s analysis.86

As noted above, there is a high degree of overlap between Plaintiff’s Monell and

defendant-officer claims.87 The claims stem from the same investigation, require testimony from

many of the same witnesses, and concern similar legal issues. A single, unitary trial could

provide an efficient means of resolving Plaintiff’s First Investigation claims without the need for

duplicative evidence or multiple trial settings.

Conversely, the City argues that because each claim requires a finding that a

constitutional violation occurred, trying the defendant-officer claims first could obviate the need

for a protracted presentation of evidence on Monell-specific issues.88

Plaintiff disagrees with the City, arguing that his Monell claims require a trial regardless

of the outcome his claims against the defendant-officers.89 The Court acknowledges that “a

finding of no individual liability should not automatically result in judgment of no liability for

85 The Court reserves ruling on whether to bifurcate trial on the stayed Second Investigation

claims.

86 See City of Jasper, 117 F.4th at 290.

87 See supra at 10.

88 For example, evidence of an “official policy or custom” that was the moving force behind the

alleged constitutional violation. See Valle, 613 F.3d at 541–42 (quoting Pineda, 291 F.3d at 328).

89 Pl.’s Resp. City Mot. Bifurcate at 3–7.

the municipality.”90 But that does not mean that the outcome of the first trial cannot result in a

judgment of no liability against the City. “[E]ven though a dismissal of all claims against

individual officer-defendants should not result in automatic dismissals of municipal-liability

claims, a finding of no Constitutional deprivation should.”91 Were the Court to bifurcate the

First Investigation claims, a finding that Plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional rights would

eliminate the need for a second trial.

Of course, the Court cannot forecast how a jury will find or, resultingly, whether

bifurcated proceedings would prove more convenient, efficient, or economical. The Court

therefore finds that these considerations do not support deviating from the usual course of trying

claims together.92

Again, though, the prejudice consideration does support such a deviation.93

“Monell liability claims inherently require plaintiffs to provide evidence of other officers’

wrongful acts.”94 Thus, trying the claims together would require a jury to determine whether the

90 See Cook v. City of Dallas, No. 3:12-CV-3788-P, 2016 WL 11258075, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar.

15, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Cook v. Hopkins, 795 F. App’x 906 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation modified); see also

Pl.’s Resp. City Mot. Bifurcate, at 4.

91 Cook, 2016 WL 11258075, at *3 (citing cases).

92 See City of Jasper, 117 F.4th at 290–91 (agreeing that convenience, expedition, and economy

weighed against bifurcation where liability determination could obviate need for damages trial).

The Court notes that City of Jasper involved a request to bifurcate liability from damages rather

than some claims from other claims. See generally id. The Fifth Circuit’s discussion suggests that where,

as here, a “trial of one claim [c]ould preclude the need to try another claim,” expedition and economy

may support bifurcation. Id. at 290–91. Regardless, the Court finds that prejudice consideration, alone,

supports bifurcation. Infra at 17–19.

93 See supra note 70.

94 Sanchez v. Gomez, No. EP-17-CV-133-PRM, 2020 WL 919160, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26,

2020).

defendant-officers violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights after hearing evidence of similar but

unrelated incidents of police misconduct.

The City argues that jurors may (1) confuse which standards or evidence apply to a given

claim95 and (2) conflate the actions of other officers from unrelated incidents with the defendant-

officers’ actions in this case.96 These concerns—though present to some degree in any § 1983

case involving claims against both individuals and municipalities—are especially noteworthy

here. As the Court previously observed, the Monell evidence that Plaintiff seeks to introduce

includes incidents of “flagrant or severe conduct.” 97 This evidence, “if proven, could be

upsetting for any juror.”98

The defendant-officers “should not have to defend [their] own actions in fear that [they]

will be held liable for the wrongful actions of others.”99 In many cases, “less drastic measures,

such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.”100 This, however,

is not many cases. The existing procedural safeguards are insufficient to combat the especially

high risk of prejudice associated with introducing Monell evidence in a unitary trial.

95 See City Mot. Bifurcate, at 7–8.

96 See id.; City Reply Mot. Bifurcate, at 3–4.

97 See Order re City Mot. Summary J., at 18–20.

98 See Sanchez, 2020 WL 919160, at *1; see also Dixon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 990 F.2d 1440,

1443 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding abuse of discretion where jury was exposed to “inflammatory” and “highly

prejudicial” evidence relevant or admissible as to one claim but not as to other claims that could have

been bifurcated).

99 See Ramirez v. Escajeda, No. 3:17-CV-00193, 2021 WL 3778306, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 20,

2021); see also Sanchez, 2020 WL 919160, at *1.

100 Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993) (citation modified).

The Court therefore finds it appropriate to bifurcate Plaintiff’s claims against the City

from his claims against the defendant-officers.

2. The First Investigation claims will proceed in two stages before the same jury

Having determined that bifurcation is appropriate, the Court now turns to how to proceed

with the bifurcated claims. The City advocates for a two-stage, same jury proceeding—as was

advanced by the Texas Supreme Court in Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel.101 Though

typically used when bifurcating liability and damages proceedings,102 courts also use two-stage,

same jury bifurcation in § 1983 cases.103 Under this approach, the first trial would be confined

to Plaintiff’s claims against the defendant-officers. If the jury returns a verdict that Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights were violated, the same jury would then hear Plaintiff’s Monell claims

against the City.

The Court agrees that the Moriel-style approach is suitable here. This approach not only

mitigates Plaintiff’s concerns relative to duplicative evidence or inconsistent verdicts,104 but it

also enhances the potential benefits associated with bifurcation. “[A] single trial, divided into

two phases, to the same jury will avoid prejudice to either party, enhance the ability of the jury to

101 See Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 29–30 (Tex. 1994).

102 See, e.g., Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 29–30; United Healthcare Servs. Inc. v. Synergen Health

LLC, No. 3:20-CV-0301-X, 2023 WL 6471701, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2023).

103 See, e.g., Avalos v. City of Corpus Christi, No. C.A. C-05-159, 2006 WL 696495, at *2 (S.D.

Tex. Mar. 16, 2006); Cox v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. CIV.A. 12-306-SDD-SC, 2014 WL 5465803, at *2

(M.D. La. Oct. 28, 2014).

104 See Pl.’s Resp. City Mot. Bifurcate, at 10–12.

focus on the issues in front of it, and potentially increase efficiency to the extent the second

phase proves unnecessary.”105

The Court also agrees that Plaintiff’s claims against the defendant-officers should

proceed first. Allowing the jury to hear Monell evidence before turning to claims against the

defendant-officers would defeat the purpose of bifurcating the First Investigation claims in the

first place. Moreover, though the issue of whether a constitutional violation occurred is common

among all claims, the Monell claims are much broader in scope. This is because Monell requires

Plaintiff to make a host of showings that have little or no impact on the claims against the

defendant-officers.106 Proceeding with the Monell claims first would therefore add little

convenience, efficiency, or economy even if the jury’s findings obviated the need for a

subsequent trial.

For these reasons, the Court will bifurcate trial of the First Investigation claims into two

stages. Plaintiff’s claims against the defendant-officers will be tried first. If the jury returns a

verdict that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated, the same jury will hear Plaintiff’s

corresponding claims against the City.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court therefore enters the following orders:

1. It is HEREBY ORDERED that “Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Sever” (ECF No.

482) is GRANTED IN PART. Both of Plaintiff’s claims stemming from the Second

105 Transparent Energy, LLC v. Premiere Mktg., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-3022-BT, 2021 WL

6200910, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2021) (citing Alfwear, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. 2:17-

cv-00476, 2018 WL 6592728, at *1 (D. Utah Dec. 14, 2018)).

106 See Henderson v. Harris County, 51 F.4th 125, 130 (5th Cir. 2022) (a Monell plaintiff must

show that “(1) the city failed to . . . supervise the officers involved; (2) there is a causal connection

between the alleged failure to supervise . . . and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the

failure to . . . supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights”).

Investigation are hereby BIFURCATED from Plaintiffs claims stemming from the

First Investigation.

2. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims stemming from the Second

Investigation shall be STAYED pending the resolution of Defendant Sanchez’s

appeal. That stay will AUTOMATICALLY LIFT on the day the Fifth Circuit

releases its opinion in Villegas v. Sanchez, No. 25-50800 (Sth Cir. 2025).

3. It is FURTHER ORDERED that “Defendant City of El Paso’s Opposed Renewed

Motion to Bifurcate” (ECF No. 484) is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff's claims

against Defendants Whitaker, Ortega, and Graves are hereby BIFURCATED from

Plaintiff's corresponding Monell claims stemming from the First Investigation. The

Court reserves ruling on whether to bifurcate the claims stemming from the Second

Investigation.

4. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Whitaker,

Ortega, and Graves—including the issue of whether Plaintiff was deprived of his

constitutional rights during the First Investigation—shall be TRIED FIRST.

5. It is FURTHER ORDERED that if the jury returns a verdict that Plaintiff's

constitutional rights were violated in connection with the First Investigation, then

Plaintiff's corresponding Monell claims against the City shall be TRIED SECOND

before the same jury.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 9th day of December 2025.

SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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