Hale

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TERRELL HALE, No. 4:25-CV-01242

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

J. GREENE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JANUARY 14, 2026

Plaintiff Terrell Hale filed the instant pro se civil rights lawsuit alleging

constitutional violations by prison officials at the Federal Correctional Institution,

Allenwood Low (FCI Allenwood Low), in White Deer, Pennsylvania. He asserts

claims for money damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), primarily alleging that prison officials

were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Because Hale fails to

state a claim for relief and granting leave to amend would be futile, the Court will

dismiss this Bivens action with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2025, Hale lodged the instant civil rights lawsuit in this Court.1 At

that time, Hale was incarcerated at FCI Allenwood Low,2 and filed this action

1 Doc. 1.

pursuant to Bivens v. Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.3

Hale has since been transferred and is currently incarcerated in FCI Ashland,

located in Ashland, Kentucky.4

In his lawsuit, Hale recounted a host of complaints regarding several

unrelated incidents by different FCI Allenwood Low officials. He first alleged that

Physician’s Assistant J. Stoltz “refused to help [him] with his complaints”

regarding lack of sleep by declining to perform a sleep study, changing his mental

health medication doses “without informing him,” calling him derogatory names

like “fat,” and failing to properly diagnose his “sleep-wake disorder(s) pursuant to

the DSM-V.”5

Hale next alleged that mailroom clerk B. Stroble failed to comply with

certain BOP policies concerning incoming legal mail. He asserted that Stroble

improperly opened his legal mail and copied its contents, refusing to let Hale sign

for it.6 He further averred that Stroble waited two weeks to notify him of his

incoming legal mail, “causing unnecessary hurdles” in his legal proceedings.7

Hale then alleged that case manager Ms. Getz “made derogatory remarks” to

him, telling him to “suck a dick” when he attempted to discuss his possibilities of

3 See id.

4 See Doc. 16.

5 Doc. 1 at 3-4.

6 Id. at 4.

7 Id.

Second Chance Act placement.8 When Hale reported this conduct to the Warden,

Getz allegedly retaliated against him by placing him in “refusal status” for the

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP), which negatively affected his

ability to earn credits under the First Step Act, phone credits, and a $50 incentive

for completing 500 programming hours.9 Hale also alleged that Getz further

retaliated by intentionally miscalculating his finances in an effort to improperly

increase his IFRP payments.10

In his fourth claim, Hale alleged that psychiatrist Dr. S. Antonucci provided

deficient mental health care. He claimed that Dr. Antonucci improperly changed

Hale’s mental health diagnosis, declined to see him on several occasions when he

was having suicidal thoughts, gave him “self[-]care treatment” and internet

printouts from various websites instead of appropriate clinical advice, and would

log a full hour of treatment but only provide 30 minutes of care.11

Finally, Hale alleged that Dr. C. Schmidt, the “Drug Abuse Program

Coordinator,” also provided deficient mental health care. He claimed that Dr.

Schmidt refused to speak with him on several occasions even though he was aware

of Hale’s mental health diagnoses, kicked him out of a psychology program, put

him in program refusal status when Hale refused to return to the program, and

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 4-5.

retaliated against him when he challenged Dr. Schmidt’s refusal-status designation

by putting him in the Special Housing Unit through a fraudulent incident report.12

Hale additionally alleged that Warden J. Greene knew of the deficient

medical care and “did nothing about . . . the unlawful acts of his staff.”13 He thus

appears to contend that Warden Greene is equally responsible for the purportedly

unconstitutional medical treatment.

As reflected above, Hale’s complaint primarily concerns what he believes to

be constitutionally deficient medical care at FCI Allenwood Low. His claims

against Warden Greene, PA Stoltz, Dr. Antonucci, and Dr. Schmidt are therefore

properly joined together in the same lawsuit, as they concern the same “series of

transactions or occurrences” and contain a “question of law” that is common to all

four Defendants.14

As the Court previously determined, however, Hale’s unrelated claims

against Stroble and Getz do not provide a basis for permissive joinder. The

allegations underlying his Bivens claims against Stroble and Getz are not part of

the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences”

underlying his medical care claims, nor is there a “question of law or fact common

12 Id. at 5.

13 Id. at 6.

14 See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2) (discussing requirements for permissive joinder of defendants).

to all defendants” such that these claims and defendants could be permissively

joined together in one action.15

Accordingly, the Court gave Hale the option of voluntarily dismissing his

claims against Stroble and Getz or severing the instant case into three separate

Bivens actions.16 Hale chose severance,17 and thus the only remaining claims in

this case are the Bivens claims against Warden Greene, PA Stoltz, Dr. Antonucci,

and Dr. Schmidt. Because Hale’s claims represent an extension of Bivens and that

extension is not warranted, the Court will dismiss Hale’s complaint with prejudice.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.18 One

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted[.]”19 This language closely tracks Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).20

15 See id.

16 See Doc. 10 at 4-5.

17 See Doc. 11.

18 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

19 Id. § 1915A(b)(1).

20 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”21 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.22 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.23

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.24 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”25 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.26 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

21 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

22 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

23 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

24 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

25 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

26 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”27

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”28

Because Hale proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed and

his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”29 This is particularly true when the

pro se litigant, like Hale, is incarcerated.30

III. DISCUSSION

Upon review of the remaining claims in Hale’s complaint, it is clear that

dismissal is required. Hale’s Eighth Amendment medical indifference claims31

represent an extension of Bivens, and that extension is not warranted under the

present circumstances.

A. Bivens Claims

In 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, “even absent

statutory authorization, it would enforce a damages remedy” to compensate

individuals who experienced violations by federal officers of the Fourth

27 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

29 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

30 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

31 To the extent that Hale’s complaint can be construed as raising a First Amendment retaliation

claim against one or more of the remaining Defendants, any such claim is foreclosed by settled

law. In 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States explicitly held that “there is no Bivens

cause of action for [a] First Amendment retaliation claim.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482,

498-99 (2022).

Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.32

Subsequently, the Court extended the Bivens cause of action in two cases involving

other types of constitutional violations. First, in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,

248-49 (1979), the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

provided an implied damages remedy to an administrative assistant claiming that a

Congressman had discriminated against her based on gender. Next, the Court

concluded that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment implied a cause of action for damages against federal prison officials

who had failed to provide adequate medical treatment to an asthmatic inmate.33

“These three cases—Bivens, Davis, and Carlson—represent the only instances in

which the Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the

Constitution itself.”34

Over the years that followed, the Supreme Court has “consistently refused to

expand Bivens actions beyond these three specific contexts.”35 The Supreme Court

has specifically noted that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’

judicial activity.”36

32 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130-31 (2017); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.

33 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 n.1 (1980).

34 Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 131; see also Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492 (2022).

35 Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 318 (3d Cir. 2020).

36 Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 135 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).

In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court provided a “restrictive, two-step framework

for courts to follow when analyzing Bivens claims.”37 First, courts must determine

whether the case presents a “new context,” i.e., if it is “different in a meaningful

way from previous Bivens cases decided by [the Supreme] Court.”38 The Supreme

Court has defined “new context” broadly,39 explaining that “even a modest

[Bivens] extension is still an extension.”40 A Bivens claim “may arise in a new

context even if it is based on the same constitutional provision as a claim in a case

in which a damages remedy was previously recognized.”41

If the case presents a new context, courts must then consider whether special

factors counsel against extending the Bivens remedy.42 If so, the court must reject

the requested extension.43 The Supreme Court has clarified that courts are required

“to ask whether ‘the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress’ to

weigh the costs and benefits of a damages action.”44 If the court “ha[s] reason to

pause before applying Bivens in a new context or to a new class of defendants,”

then special factors counseling hesitation exist.45 There may be many special

factors, but two are “particularly weighty: the availability of an alternative

37 Mack, 968 F.3d at 317.

38 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 139).

39 See id.

40 Abassi, 582 U.S. at 147.

41 Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 103 (2020).

42 See Mack, 968 F.3d at 317 (citing Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 136).

43 See id. (citing Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102).

44 Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492).

45 Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102.

remedial structure and separation-of-powers concerns.”46 Indeed, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the existence of an alternative

remedial structure—like the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy

Program (ARP)—is a “special factor” that can create a new context at step one of

the two-step analysis.47

Hale’s Eighth Amendment medical indifference claims present a new

context and special factors counsel against extending the Bivens remedy here.

First, although Hale is asserting an Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim,

like the claim raised in Carlson, his facts present a new context. In Carlson, an

inmate’s family sued federal prison officials, alleging the inmate had died from a

treatable asthma attack after medical providers failed to give him competent

medical attention for eight hours, administered contraindicated drugs that made his

asthma attack more severe, and substantially delayed his transfer to an outside

hospital.48 The plaintiff in Carlson further alleged that the federal officials’

deficient medical care was motivated in part by racial animus.49

46 Mack, 968 F.3d at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted).

47 See Muniz v. United States, 149 F.4th 256, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2025); Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th

311, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2024). But see Muniz, 149 F.4th at 266-67 (Restrepo, J., concurring)

(disagreeing with approach taken in Kalu v. Spaulding and observing that Seventh, Ninth, and

Tenth Circuits consider “alternative remedial structures” only at step two, not as part of step

one, which better aligns with the Supreme Court’s approach in Egbert and Goldey v. Fields,

606 U.S. 942 (2025)).

48 See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16 n.1.

49 See id.

Hale, on the contrary, asserts that FCI Allenwood Low medical providers—

among other shortcomings—failed to perform a sleep study, changed his mental

health medications and diagnoses without informing him, failed to properly

diagnose his sleep disorder, declined to see him when he was having suicidal

ideations, and mismanaged his psychology programming. Clearly, the facts in

Carlson bear little resemblance to the facts of the case at bar, thus presenting a new

Bivens context. Moreover, even if Hale’s ailments, injuries, deficient-treatment

allegations, and targeted defendants were identical to those in Carlson, the

availability of the BOP’s administrative remedy program—which was not in

existence when Carlson was considered by the Supreme Court—creates a new

Bivens context here.50

The second step in the Bivens analysis asks whether special factors counsel

against extending the Bivens remedy. The Court answers this question in the

affirmative. Specifically, a Bivens extension is unwarranted here primarily

because there are multiple alternative remedies available.

As the Third Circuit has repeatedly noted, the availability of the BOP’s

administrative remedy program often provides an alternative to a federal Bivens

lawsuit.51 Through the administrative remedy process, federal prisoners “can alert

50 See Muniz, 149 F.4th at 263-64; Kalu, 113 F.4th at 327-28.

51 See Muniz, 149 F.4th at 264-65; Dongarra v. Smith, 27 F.4th 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2022); Mack,

968 F.3d at 320-21.

the BOP to unconstitutional officer conduct and policies and prevent such

constitutional violations from recurring.”52 And even if Hale’s attempts to resolve

his medical care disputes through the administrative process were ultimately

unsuccessful, he had access to at least “some redress,” and therefore the Court

finds—as in Mack—that the BOP’s administrative remedy program offers a

“convincing reason” to refrain from extending Bivens to claims like those raised by

Hale.53

Additionally, the possibility of relief under the FTCA—“a statutory scheme

for torts committed by federal officers”—“weighs against inferring a new cause of

action” under Bivens.54 That remains true even if the FTCA fails to “provide the

exact same kind of relief Bivens would.”55 In this case, Hale could have asserted

(and may still be able to assert) state-law medical malpractice claims against the

FCI Allenwood Low medical providers through the FTCA.56

52 Mack, 968 F.3d at 321.

53 See id. (citations omitted); see also Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 137 (“[I]f there is an alternative

remedial structure present in a certain case, that alone may limit the power of the Judiciary to

infer a new Bivens cause of action.”); Muniz, 149 F.4th at 265 (“At bottom, Muniz’s Bivens

claim fails because an alternative remedy existed and was made available to him.”).

54 Oliva v. Nivar, 973 F.3d 438, 443-44 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d

1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2018); Jones v. Bradley, No. 4:21-CV-00026, 2023 WL 2088430, at *3

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2023) (Brann, C.J.) (noting that alternative remedy provided by FTCA

counsels against Bivens extension); Oliveras v. Basile, 440 F. Supp. 3d 365, 373 (S.D.N.Y.

2020) (collecting cases).

55 Oliva, 973 F.3d at 444 (citing Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 129 (2012)); see also Xi v.

Haugen, 68 F.4th 824, 837 (3d Cir. 2023) (noting that “an alternative remedy need not provide

‘complete relief’ or be as ‘effective as an individual damages remedy’ to foreclose Bivens

relief” (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 493, 498)).

56 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 79 F.4th 312, 315 (3d Cir. 2023) (discussing FTCA claim of

medical malpractice under Pennsylvania law raised by detainee in federal detention center).

In sum, Hale’s Eighth Amendment claims would extend Bivens to a new

context, yet special factors counsel against such an extension. The Court will

therefore dismiss Hale’s individual-capacity Bivens claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

B. Official Capacity Claims

Hale purports to sue all federal officers in their individual and official

capacities.57 However, a suit against a federal officer in his or her official capacity

is akin to a suit against the United States itself.58 Such suits are barred by

sovereign immunity—and thus lack subject matter jurisdiction—unless the United

States has expressly waived its immunity and consented to be sued.59 Hale has not

alleged or shown that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity for

Bivens claims, and thus he has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction for any

official capacity Bivens claim asserted against Defendants.60 Those claims,

therefore, must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) for seeking monetary

relief from an immune defendant and under Section 1915A(b)(1) as legally

frivolous.

57 See Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 6.

58 See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 395-96 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,

538 (1980)).

59 See Treasurer of N.J., 684 F.3d at 395-96.

60 See Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 130 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986); Tucker v. Sec. Health &

Human Servs., 588 F. App’x 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential).

C. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”61 Here, leave to amend will be denied

as futile.62 Hale seeks an extension of Bivens that is both judicially disfavored and

unwarranted under the circumstances. His official capacity claims, moreover, are

legally frivolous, as the United States is plainly immune from his Bivens claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court is constrained to dismiss with prejudice

Hale’s complaint against Warden Greene, PA Stoltz, Dr. Antonucci, and Dr.

Schmidt pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because he fails to plausibly state an

individual-capacity claim for relief and because his official capacity claims are

legally frivolous. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

61 Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.

62 See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (“‘Futility’ means that the complaint,

as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” (citation omitted));

Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1431 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he district court may properly deny

leave to amend where the amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss.”).