Suri

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DUSTIN E. SURI,

Plaintiff, Case No. 25 cv 3955

v. Honorable Sunil R. Harjani

TOM DART, in his capacity as Cook County

Sheriff, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Background

Plaintiff Dustin E. Suri was arrested in March 2023 and detained by the Cook County

Department of Corrections (CCDOC). In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims

pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 against CCDOC, Sheriff Tom Dart in his

official capacity, various named CCDOC employees, including Correctional Officer Chavez, and

“Unknown Employees” about multiple assaults he experienced in jail, as well as the failure to

provide him prescription medication and Kosher meals. CCDOC, Sheriff Dart, and Officer

Chavez, the only defendants who have appeared thus far, move to dismiss the complaint pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because CCDOC is not a proper defendant, the motion

is granted as to CCDOC. In addition, because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege municipal

liability against Sheriff Dart, the motion is granted as to Sheriff Dart. Finally, the motion is granted

in part and denied in part as to Officer Chavez. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a failure-to-protect

claim against Officer Chavez, but all other claims against Officer Chavez are dismissed.

Legal Standard

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief

may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This pleading standard does not necessarily

require a complaint to contain detailed factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, “[a]

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true all factual

allegations in the complaint and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Heredia v. Capital

Management Services, L.P., 942 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 2019).

Discussion

For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court assumes the truth of the allegations in the

complaint.1 Plaintiff was arrested in March 2023 and detained in a CCDOC detention facility.2 [2]

¶ 1. During the intake process, Plaintiff informed CCDOC employees that he was homosexual and

feared for his safety. Id. ¶¶ 2, 13. Although Plaintiff asked for solitary confinement, he was not

placed there. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14. On March 29, 2023, a gang member called Plaintiff a slur and punched

him in the face, which broke his nose. Id. ¶ 15. Defendant Officer Chavez witnessed the incident,

did nothing, and told Plaintiff he saw the attack but that he wasn’t going to do anything about it.

¶¶ 15, 53. Plaintiff was attacked two more times, and those incidents were witnessed by other

correctional officers. Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Chavez and other unknown

correctional officers “not only failed to stop these three attacks but on information and belief also

encouraged the assaults against him because of his sexual orientation.” Id. ¶ 18. According to

Plaintiff, “CCDOC Defendant Officers, including Defendant Officer Chavez, made it very clear

that when inmates wanted to beat someone up they should take them to the bathroom because there

were no cameras.” Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff alleges that “Cook County failed to adequately train, supervise

and investigate its employees, violating his right to be free from physical and sexual assault while

incarcerated.” Id. ¶ 48. In addition to the claims regarding the assaults, Plaintiff alleges that he

requested Kosher meals but was “denied Kosher food for part of his time in detention,” despite

repeated requests and grievances. Id. ¶¶ 37, 38, 43. Plaintiff also alleges that he has multiple serious

medical conditions for which he takes prescription medication, but he did not receive the

medication and experienced withdrawal symptoms. Id. ¶¶ 39, 40.

Claims Against CCDOC

Defendants argue that the CCDOC must be dismissed as a defendant because it is not a

separate legal entity capable of being sued and only exists within the Office of the Sheriff.

Plaintiff’s response to this argument is a mere two sentences and contains no case law. Plaintiff’s

entire argument is: “As a subdivision in the [Sheriff’s] Office, the Cook County Department of

Corrections is an appropriate entity under the authority of Sheriff Dart and must remain in the case

as a defendant.” [21] at 6. This perfunctory, undeveloped, and unsupported argument need not be

considered by the Court. See, e.g., Gold v. Wolpert, 876 F.2d 1327, 1332 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Such

perfunctory and underdeveloped assertions hardly constitute an ‘argument,’ and will not be

considered.”). But in any event, Defendants are correct that the CCDOC is not a proper defendant.

See Castillo v. Cook Cnty. Mail Room Dep’t, 990 F.2d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The Cook County

Department of Corrections is not a suable entity.”). CCDOC is dismissed as a defendant.

1 The complaint contains only one count against all the Defendants. For ease of reference, the Court refers to the

various types of allegations against each of the Defendants as “claims.”

2 The complaint does not allege where Plaintiff was housed. The parties do not appear to dispute that Plaintiff was in

pretrial detention, as he was incarcerated shortly after arrest, and there is no mention of a conviction.

Claims Against Sheriff Dart

Turning to the claims against Sheriff Dart, the complaint alleges that “Cook County” failed

to “adequately train, supervise, and investigate” its employees, which violated Plaintiff’s right “to

be free from physical and sexual assault while incarcerated.” The Court construes these allegations

as the basis of Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Sheriff Dart.3 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has

failed to adequately plead such a claim against Sheriff Dart because the allegations “establish

nothing more than a single set of circumstances particular to Plaintiff.” [15] at 6. In response,

Plaintiff doesn’t dispute that he relies only on his own experience. Plaintiff argues that he has

sufficiently stated a claim against Sheriff Dart because he has alleged that “despite him reporting

incidents of sexual abuse against him to various officers, there was a widespread disregard of his

complaints” and he “was deprived of appropriate investigations regarding his complaints, and he

never received any recourse despite multiple inquiries, indicating the lack of response was a

‘custom’ of the Cook County Department of Corrections” [21] at 2.

In general, to plead a Monell claim, “a plaintiff must plead that one of the following caused

constitutional injury: “(1) the enforcement of an express policy of the [municipality], (2) a

widespread practice that is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with

the force of law, or (3) a person with final policymaking authority.” Mack v. City of Chicago, 2020

WL 7027649, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2020) (quoting Wragg v. Vill. of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464,

467 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Cook County failed to adequately train, supervise

and investigate its employees, violating his right to be free from physical and sexual assault while

incarcerated” and that “Cook County’s failure to adequately train and supervise amounted to

deliberate indifference to the fact that inaction would obviously result in the violation of Mr. Suri’s

and other non-heterosexual inmates right to be free from physical and sexual assault while

incarcerated.” ¶¶ 48, 49.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead a Monell claim because he only alleges facts

related to his own personal experience. In White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2016),

the Seventh Circuit addressed this issue. There, the plaintiff alleged that he was arrested in

violation of the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment and prosecuted maliciously. The

plaintiff also brought a Monell claim against the City of Chicago and alleged that police officers

had a practice of seeking arrest warrants using a deficient standard complaint form, and that he

was arrested as a result of this custom. Id. at 840–41. The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s

Monell claim on the pleadings, reasoning that the plaintiff’s claim was “based upon the sole

allegation that [the individual officer defendant] acted in accordance with a widespread practice of

the police department of the City of Chicago when seeking a warrant,” which was insufficient to

state a Monell claim. Id. 843. The Seventh Circuit found that this conclusion was an error (albeit

a harmless one). Id. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that there is not a heightened pleading standard

for cases involving municipal liability. Id. at 843–44. The court concluded:

3 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

Together with the individual claim against [the officer defendant] and the standard

printed form that does not require specific factual support for an application for an

arrest warrant, this allegation was enough to satisfy the ‘short and plain statement

of the claim’ requirement of Rule 8(a)(2). White was not required to identify every

other or even one other individual who had been arrested pursuant to a warrant

obtained through the complained-of process.

Id. at 844. District courts’ interpretations of White have been mixed. Some courts have interpreted

White to mean that Monell allegations that are limited to the plaintiff’s experience are sufficient to

survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Zavala v. Damon, 2018 WL 3438945, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July

17, 2018) (“[A] plaintiff may rely solely on his own experience to state a Monell claim rather than

having to plead examples of other individuals’ experiences.”); Williams v. City of Chicago, 2017

WL 3169065, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2017) (noting that post-White courts have denied motions

to dismiss “premised on arguments that the complaint does not contain allegations beyond those

relating to the plaintiff.”). Others have found that this interpretation is too broad, since the Seventh

Circuit in White referenced other allegations in the complaint about the use of a standard form in

connection with the plaintiff’s allegations about his own experience. See, e.g., Eichelkraut v.

Jungles, 2022 WL 103708, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2022) (“The court did not declare that personal

experience alone was sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage in all cases.”); Anderson v. Allen,

2020 WL 5891406, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2020) (“The key pleaded fact in White that saved that

plaintiff was that that case’s officer used a boilerplate arrest warrant form that was standard issue

by CPD.”).

The Court agrees with the latter interpretation. The Seventh Circuit in White found that the

plaintiff’s claim survived Rule 8 not only because of the plaintiff’s individual claim against the

officer, but because he also alleged that there is a standard form that was used by the police

department. The court specifically stated that the plaintiff’s allegation of a widespread practice

“[t]ogether with the individual claim . . . and the standard printed form that does not require

specific factual support for an application for an arrest warrant” was sufficient to satisfy Rule 8.

829 F.3d at 844 (emphasis added). From this plain language, the court did not say that the plaintiff’s

personal experience alone was sufficient. The use of the standard printed form constituted a custom

or practice widely used by that police department that may have caused the constitutional violation,

thus satisfying the pleading requirements for a Monell claim. And as another district court aptly

noted, this interpretation is consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s prior conclusion that “where

direct evidence of a governmental entity having engaged in improper conduct is available, ‘then

the drawing of an inference from a series of bad acts by subordinate officers is not required.’”

Eichelkraut, 2022 WL 103708, at *7 (quoting Jackson v. Marion Cty., 66 F.3d 151, 152–53 (7th

Cir. 1995)) (emphasis in original).

Thus, the issue is whether, pursuant to White, Plaintiff alleged enough in connection with

his personal experience to state a Monell claim. The Court finds that he did not. Here, there are no

factual allegations of a policy, custom, or practice of failing to respond to or prevent sexual

assaults. There is only a conclusory allegation that Cook County failed to train and supervise its

employees, which caused plaintiff’s sexual assaults. See ¶¶ 48, 49. Plaintiff does not allege any

facts to suggest that the training provided to CCDOC employees is insufficient – there are no facts

regarding CCDOC’s employee training at all.

Further, while Plaintiff makes allegations about various CCDOC policies, he does not

allege those policies are insufficient. Instead, the allegations highlight CCDOC’s “zero tolerance”

policy for sexual assault and policy of responding to complaints, which have no bearing on

employee training or on whether CCDOC has a practice of ignoring complaints of inmate-on-

inmate assaults, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff only alleges in

a conclusory manner on “information and belief” that Cook County “failed to adequately train,

supervise and investigate employees.” [2] at 16. Plaintiff also alleges various facts about reports

and news articles related to alleged wrongdoings at CCDOC, see id. ¶ 34, but none of the alleged

facts are about inmate-on-inmate assaults or CCDOC’s response to inmate-on-inmate assaults.

The allegations are therefore unlike the allegations in White, where the plaintiff alleged his

personal experience plus allegations that the City of Chicago used a standard form that could

constitute a custom, practice, or policy. The allegations are insufficient to state a claim against

Sheriff Dart in his official capacity.4 The motion to dismiss is granted as to Sheriff Dart.5

Claims Against Officer Chavez

As to the claims against Officer Chavez, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not sufficiently

alleged his personal involvement in any of the alleged constitutional violations. This is true for the

allegations that Plaintiff was not provided Kosher meals or his prescription medication. There are

no factual allegations that Officer Chavez was involved in either of these situations, so to the extent

Plaintiff brought claims against Officer Chavez based on those allegations, he has failed to

plausibly allege them. See Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 530–31 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To state a

claim under § 1983 . . . [the plaintiff] must allege that [the defendants] were personally involved

in the deprivation of his due process rights.”). However, there are factual allegations directed to

Officer Chavez related to one of the attacks on Plaintiff. Whether these allegations are sufficient

to state either a failure-to-protect claim or a medical care claim is addressed below.

A. Failure-to-Protect Claim

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, jail officials have a duty to

“protect pre-trial detainees from violence.” Fisher v. Lovejoy, 414 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff alleges a failure-to-protect claim against Officer Chavez because Plaintiff was allegedly

4 Having come to this conclusion, the Court does not address Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to allege an

underlying constitutional violation.

5 It is not entirely clear whether Plaintiff intended to bring a Monell claim against Sheriff Dart for the failure to provide

him Kosher meals and the denial of his prescription medications, and his response brief doesn’t illuminate. Plaintiff

does not so much as allege that these failures are the result of a policy, custom, or practice, even in a conclusory

manner, so to the extent he intended to bring Monell claims against Sheriff Dart based on these allegations, he failed

to do so and those are also dismissed.

punched in the nose by another inmate, and Officer Chavez witnessed the incident but did nothing.

Defendant argues that the allegations are insufficient because Plaintiff fails to allege that Officer

Chavez knew or had reason to know about Plaintiff’s risk of harm.

The Seventh Circuit has adopted the objective unreasonableness standard set out in

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) for claims involving conditions of confinement for

pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, including failure-to-protect claims. See

Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We therefore hold that Kingsley’s

objective inquiry applies to all Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims brought

by pretrial detainees.”). Under this standard, a plaintiff “challenging the conditions of his pretrial

detention need show only that a defendant’s conduct was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Kemp v.

Fulton Cnty., 27 F.4th 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2022). To state a failure-to-protect claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee such as Plaintiff must allege that:

(1) the defendant made an intentional decision regarding the conditions of the

plaintiff’s confinement; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of

suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures

to abate the risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have

appreciated the high degree of risk involved, making the consequences of the

defendant’s inaction obvious; and (4) the defendant, by not taking such measures,

caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

Thomas v. Dart, 39 F.4th 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2022). “The third element requires an allegation that a

specific defendant was on notice of a serious risk of harm to the detainee. Put another way, it must

be plausibly alleged that a reasonable officer in a defendant’s circumstances would have

appreciated the high degree of risk the detainee was facing.” Id. (cleaned up). However, the

“specific risk a reasonable officer would appreciate need not be uniquely associated with the

plaintiff or his attacker.” Id. at 842. “The risk can be based on a victim’s particular vulnerability

(even though the identity of the assailant is not known before the attack), or it can be based on an

assailant’s predatory nature (even though the identity of the victim is not known before the attack).”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest that Officer Chavez knew that the

assailant had a violent background. However, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Chavez failed to stop

the attack and “on information and belief also encouraged the assaults against him because of his

sexual orientation.” [2] ¶ 18. Taking this allegation as true, the complaint alleges that Officer

Chavez was aware of Plaintiff’s sexual orientation and that he was going to be assaulted. Further,

assuming the allegation is true, Officer Chavez would have acted in an “objectively unreasonable”

course of conduct by encouraging an assault against a pretrial detainee because of the detainee’s

sexual orientation. See Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that a prison

official who “effectively condones [an] attack by allowing it to happen” violates the Eighth

Amendment); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A guard who stands and

watches while another guard beats a prisoner violates the Constitution.”). Based on this, although

the allegations are sparse, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged just enough to state a

failure-to-protect claim against Officer Chavez.

B. Medical Care Claim

The same conclusion cannot be made for Plaintiff’s medical care claim against Officer

Chavez. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Chavez failed to provide him medical care after the assault

despite having a duty to do so. As noted above, because Plaintiff’s claims occurred when he was a

pretrial detainee, his medical care claim must be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and is

“subject only to the objective unreasonableness inquiry identified in Kingsley.” Miranda v. Cnty.

of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018). To state a claim for inadequate medical care, a pretrial

detainee must allege:

(1) there was an objectively serious medical need; (2) the defendant committed a

volitional act concerning the [plaintiff’s] medical need; (3) that act was objectively

unreasonable under the circumstances in terms of responding to the [plaintiff’s]

medical need; and (4) the defendant acts purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even

recklessly with respect to the risk of harm.

Gonzalez v. McHenry Cnty., Illinois, 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks

omitted). More recently, the Seventh Circuit has clarified that “a pretrial detainee in a medical care

case need not prove a defendant’s subjective awareness of the risk of harm to prevail on a

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim.” Pittman by & through Hamilton v. Madison Cnty.,

Illinois, 108 F.4th 561, 570 (7th Cir. 2024), reh’g denied, 2024 WL 3889635 (7th Cir. Aug. 21,

2024), and cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1154, 220 L. Ed. 2d 443 (2025). “Instead, the proper inquiry

turns on whether a reasonable officer in the defendant’s shoes would have recognized that the

plaintiff was seriously ill or injured and thus needed medical care.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that after he was punched in the nose by another inmate, Officer Chavez

“left him bleeding on the floor” and that Plaintiff took care of his own bloody nose and returned

to his bunk. See [2] ¶ 53. In his briefing, Plaintiff emphasizes that Officer Chavez did not direct

Plaintiff to the infirmary. Even assuming these facts are true and viewing them in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, there are insufficient facts to raise a plausible inference that Officer Chavez’s

actions were in violation of the Constitution. The factual allegations are scant. For example, the

complaint doesn’t allege that Plaintiff even requested medical treatment from Officer Chavez,

despite them having had a conversation after the assault. While the Court does not doubt that a

broken nose can present a serious medical need, there are no facts to suggest that Plaintiff needed

medical treatment after he was punched in the nose or that a reasonable officer would have

recognized that Plaintiff needed medical care. For these reasons, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged

that Officer Chavez acted in an objectively unreasonable manner by not providing medical

treatment or referring Plaintiff for treatment after he was assaulted.

Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants argue that Officer Chavez and the “Unknown Officers” are entitled to

qualified immunity because there was no constitutional violation, and if there was, “Plaintiff has

failed to establish their state of mind, intent, or even awareness of any alleged constitutional

violations.” [15] at 15. When it comes to qualified immunity, “[a] prison official is immune from

suit if the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the violation, and

thus a reasonable officer would not have known that his conduct was unlawful.” Mitchell v. Kallas,

895 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 2018). A court must “assess the case at the right level of specificity,”

but “this particularity requirement does not go so far as to mandate a mirror-image precedent from

the Supreme Court or [the Seventh Circuit].” Id.

The only claim that survives against Officer Chavez is the failure-to-protect claim. At this

stage, the Court declines to find that Officer Chavez is entitled to qualified immunity for this claim.

The right to be protected from inmate-on-inmate violence was clearly established at the time of

the complained-of events and has been clearly established for decades. See, e.g., Mayoral v.

Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Because officials have taken away virtually all of a

prisoner’s ability to protect himself, the Constitution imposes on officials the duty to protect those

in their charge from harm from other prisoners.”); Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.

2005) (“There can be no debate that [the right to be free from deliberate indifference to rape and

assault] was clearly established at the time.”); Kemp, 27 F.4th at 494 (“Incarcerated people have a

clearly established right to be free from physical harm inflicted by others in the institution.”). The

Court notes that the allegations against Officer Chavez must be developed during discovery to

determine whether Officer Chavez violated this clearly established right. See Roldan v. Stroud, 52

F.4th 335, 339 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that the facts essential to a qualified immunity defense

“typically emerge during discovery”). As the Seventh Circuit has noted, “the motion-to-dismiss

stage is rarely ‘the most suitable procedural setting to determine whether an official is qualifiedly

immune.’” Id. (quoting Hanson v. LeVan, 967 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2020)). Thus, Defendant

Officer Chavez may reassert the qualified immunity defense at summary judgment.

Leave to Amend

Plaintiff requests the opportunity to amend his complaint. The Court briefly recounts the

procedural posture of this case. Plaintiff originally brought this case pro se, alleging various claims

against other defendants. The case was docketed as case number 1:24-cv-07213. After the Court

appointed counsel for Plaintiff, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in that case asserting claims

against the same original defendants and adding the defendants in this case. Plaintiff then moved

to sever the claims against the defendants in this case, which was granted after a telephonic hearing.

See [131]. Plaintiff was directed to file new complaints in each case. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the

operative complaint in this case, [2], which was docketed as case number 1:25-cv-03955. The

moving Defendants then filed the motion to dismiss at issue.

The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly cautioned that “a plaintiff whose original complaint has

been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) should be given at least one opportunity to try to amend her

complaint[.]” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d

510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Reilly v. Will Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 142 F.4th 924, 929 (7th Cir.

2025) (“In the usual course, a plaintiff whose complaint has been dismissed at the pleading stage

should be given at least one opportunity to amend.”). Although the operative complaint is an

amended complaint, this is the first time Plaintiff’s claims have been challenged on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. Thus, the dismissed claims are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is given leave to

amend his claims if he can do so consistent with his obligations under Rule 11. In particular,

Plaintiff’s counsel has a duty to ensure that: (1) the complaint is not brought for an improper

purpose, (2) it includes claims that are not frivolous, and (3) the factual contentions will have

evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [15] is granted in part and

denied in part. CCDOC is dismissed as a defendant. The failure-to-protect claim against Officer

Chavez may proceed, but all other claims against him as well as the Monel/ claim against Sheriff

Dart are dismissed. Plaintiff is given leave to amend the complaint within 14 days if he can do so

consistent with Rule 11.

SO ORDERED. fk

Dated: January 14, 2026 Ke ‘ 7

Sunil R. Harjani

United States District Judge