Hurtado

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROBERTO HURTADO,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-844-NJR

DEE DEE BROOKHART, ASSISTANT

WARDEN JENNINGS, JEREMIAH

BROWN, ASSISTANT WARDEN

WILLIAMS, and MAJOR HENTON,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

Plaintiff Roberto Hurtado, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who

is currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this action for

deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint,

Hurtado alleges that as an inmate in administrative detention he was denied out-of-cell

recreation. He asserts claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any

portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is

immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

Hurtado is currently at Lawrence Correctional Center and assigned to

administrative detention (Doc. 1, p. 7). As an inmate in administrative detention, Hurtado

alleges that he should be afforded the same out-of-cell opportunities as those in general

population (Id.). See also 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.690(f). But since January 7, 2022, he has

not received the same out-of-cell opportunities. Hurtado alleges that he is confined to his

cell 24 hours a day, five days per week, behind a steel door with only a small food port

(Id. at p. 8). He is unable to attend religious services, educational programs, vocational

training, or mental health programming (Id.). He is limited to non-contact in-person visits

for two hours and has no access to indoor recreation or exercise equipment. When he is

removed from his cell, he is subjected to both hand and leg restraints (Id.). He only

receives four hours of outdoor recreational exercise per week in a single man cage that

Hurtado contends is the size of a dog kennel. He has no access to exercise equipment or

a toilet while in the cage (Id.).

Hurtado contends that these conditions are significantly different than those

afforded in general population. Inmates in general population have access to a “day

room” for two hours every day and receive access to both outdoor and indoor recreation

with access to exercise equipment for more than five hours per week (Doc. 1, p. 9). They

also have access to various religious, educational, and mental health services and

programs (Id.). Inmates in general population also are allowed “contact” visits seven

times per month for four hours each (Id.). Hurtado contends that the failure of officials to

provide him with five hours of out-of-cell recreation and/or exercise opportunities

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment (Id. at p. 14).

Hurtado has informed numerous officials about his lack of access and the arbitrary

treatment of those in administrative detention (Doc. 1, p. 9). He informed Brookhart,

Jennings, Brown, and Henton on numerous occasions between 2022 and 2025, but they

simply acknowledged the problem and the violation of state law without seeking to

resolve the issue (Id. at p. 10). On April 21, 2022, Hurtado filed a formal grievance about

his out-of-cell opportunities (Id.). In an email response, Jennings conceded that the prison

was not meeting out-of-cell requirements for its seriously mentally ill population housed

in administrative detention. Jennings noted that they hoped to meet the requirements

once the yards and programs were up and running (Id. at pp. 10, 22). Hurtado pursued

the grievance with the grievance officer who affirmed the grievance in his favor (Id. at

p. 11). Brookhart concurred with the findings and recommendations of the grievance

officer (Id.). On March 7, 2023, Hurtado appealed the grievance to the Administrative

Review Board (“ARB”), despite receiving a favorable ruling by the grievance officer.

Hurtado contends that he appealed the grievance to ensure compliance because he had

not yet received his requested relief (Id.). The ARB returned the grievance noting that

Hurtado had received an affirmative finding by the facility and there was no justification

for further consideration (Id.).

Hurtado alleges that he spoke with all of the defendants about his grievance and

always reminded them that he was not receiving proper out-of-cell time (Doc. 1, p. 12).

He informed them that his mental health was deteriorating due to the lack of access to

activities and exercise (Id.). Hurtado notes that he suffers from numerous mental health

issues including chronic anxiety, depression, and extreme isolation (Id.). The lack of

exercise opportunities increases his anxiety and depression (Id. at pp. 12-13). The lack of

out-of-cell time also affects his physical conditions as he suffers from back and neck

ailments and requires exercise equipment to help accommodate those injuries (Id. at

p. 13). Hurtado alleges that when he spoke to each defendant about the subject matter set

forth in his grievances, he always informed them of the mental and physical effect on him

(Id.).

Preliminary Dismissals

To the extent Hurtado identifies officials Piper, Puckett, Ochs, and John Does in

his statement of claim, he fails to include them in his case caption. In order to be a party

in the case, a plaintiff must identify them in the case caption. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a);

Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005). Because Hurtado fails to

identify these individuals as defendants, any potential claim against them is

DISMISSED without prejudice.

Further, to the extent Hurtado alleges that his lack of access outside of his cell

violates 730 ILCS § 5/3-7-2(c), Hurtado fails to state a claim. The statute regulating the

Illinois Department of Corrections does not create a private cause of action. Ambrose v.

Godinez, 510 F. App’x 470, 471 (7th Cir. 2013). See also Ashley v. Snyder, 316 Ill.App.3d 1252,

250 Ill.Dec. 900, 739 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“Prison regulations ... were never

intended to confer rights on inmates ... Instead, Illinois DOC regulations, as well as the

Unified Code, were designed to provide guidance to prison officials in the administration

of prisons.”). Any alleged claim under state statute is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following

counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim

against Brookhart, Brown, Jennings, Henton, and Williams

for denying Hurtado at least five hours a week of out-of-cell

recreation/exercise opportunities.

Count 2: Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against

Brookhart, Brown, Jennings, Henton, and Williams for

denying Hurtado the same out-of-cell activities and

opportunities as those afforded to general population.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered

dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard.1

Count 1

“Lack of exercise may rise to a constitutional violation in extreme and prolonged

situations where movement is denied to the point that the inmate’s health is threatened.”

Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996). “[T]here is a significant difference

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face”).

between a lack of outdoor recreation and an inability to exercise.” Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d

304, 313 (7th Cir. 2015). An inmate may state an Eighth Amendment claim when he is

entirely barred from recreation or provided with little opportunity for movement.

See Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1432 (inmate stated a claim when he was denied recreation for

seven weeks and often limited to one hour out of his cell every two weeks). Turley v.

Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2013) (frequent lockdowns of substantial periods of

time which denied plaintiff all access to recreational opportunities); Delaney v. DeTella,

256 F.3d 679, 84-85 (7th Cir. 2001) (six month denial states a claim; a strong likelihood of

injury is present after 90 days). Repeated short-term denials of exercise privileges may

also amount to a constitutional violation. Turley, 729 F.3d at 652-53 (plaintiff stated Eighth

Amendment claim where cumulative effect of repeated lockdowns deprived him of yard

privileges, and cell was too small for physical activity).

Although Hurtado contends that he was denied as much access out of his cell as

inmates in general population, he acknowledges that he received four hours of out-of-

cell activities per week. He does not allege that he was denied all access to the yard or

out-of-cell activities. Vasquez v. Braemer, 586 F. App’x 224, 228 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Allowing

inmates only two showers and four hours of outside recreation each week does not

violate the Eighth Amendment.”); Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1988)

(upholding injunctive relief requiring five hours of exercise per week). He also fails to

allege that he was unable to exercise in his cell. Thus, Hurtado fails to state a claim

regarding his lack of out-of-cell activities while in administrative detention.

Count 2

As to Hurtado’s claim in Count 2, the Equal Protection Clause guards against state

action that treats a person poorly because of a suspect classification, such as sex, national

origin, race, or religion, or because the person exercised a fundamental right. Abcarian v.

McDonald, 617 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2010). Hurtado fails to allege that he was a member of a

protected class. But even absent a fundamental right or membership in a suspect class,

equal protection requires that a classification resulting “in unequal treatment bear some

rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” French v. Heyne, 547 F.2d 994, 997

(1976) (citing Wojick v. Levitt, 513 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1975)). Flynn v. Thatcher, 819 F.3d 990,

991 (7th Cir. 2016). Hurtado argues that the unequal treatment he experienced in

administrative detention is not based on a legitimate penological interest because, per the

administrative code, administrative detention is to be treated the same as general

population. He further argues that there was no basis for treating the unit differently and

he points to grievances where officials acknowledged that they were not following the

requirements for administrative detention. Hurtado also alleges that he spoke to

Brookhart, Jennings, Brown, and Henton, as well as wrote grievances that Jennings

responded to, acknowledging the problem. At this stage, Hurtado states a viable equal

protection claim against these officials. Hurtado fails, however, to allege that Williams

was personally involved in the treatment of inmates in administrative detention or that

Hurtado made Williams aware of his concerns. He only states in conclusory fashion that

Williams violated his rights (Doc. 1, p. 14). Because he fails to allege that Williams was

personally involved, any claim against Williams is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Count 1 is DISMISSED without prejudice. Count 2

shall proceed against Dee Dee Brookhart, Jeremiah Brown, Assistant Warden Jennings,

and Major Henton, but is DISMISSED without prejudice as to Assistant Warden

Williams.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Dee Dee Brookhart, Jeremiah Brown,

Assistant Warden Jennings, and Major Henton: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and

Request to Waive Service of a Summons) and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this

Memorandum and Order to each defendant’s place of employment as identified by

Hurtado. If a defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form

6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take

appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require

that defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Hurtado,

the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the

address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained

in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merit Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Hurtado, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(£)(2)(A).

Finally, Hurtado is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 15, 2026

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

United States District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of

your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been

achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your

Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the

defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all

the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing

important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to

wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.

Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically

directed to do so.