Randall

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SHAWN RANDALL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-1130-RJD

C/O ROBERT GEARHART, LT.

DALLAS, SGT. WOODLEY, JACOB

GUETERSLOH, KEVIN REICHERT,

SANDY WALKER, ANTHONY WILLS,

ANTHONY B. JONES, ANGELA

LOCKE, C/O CHANDLER, C/O HEINS,

C/O BAKER, C/O CHOATE, C/O

FARRAR, C/O BENT, MS. SALGER,

MS. PHILLIPS, C/O FALASTER, C/O

MCCLANAHAN,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Shawn Randall, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who

is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action for

deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Randall’s original

complaint alleging First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against officials at

Menard was dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim (Docs. 1, 12). He was

granted leave to file an amended pleading. In his Amended Complaint (Doc. 13), Randall

again alleges that his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

during disciplinary proceedings at Menard.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Amended

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to

screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Amended Complaint

On August 15, 2024, internal affairs officers Lieutenant (“Lt.”) Dallas and Sergeant

(“Sgt.”) Woodley conducted a shakedown of Randall’s cell resulting in Randall and his

cellmate both being placed in restrictive housing (Doc. 13, p. 12). Both inmates were

issued a disciplinary ticket for drugs and drug paraphernalia (Id.). On August 16, 2024,

Randall received the ticket but contends that there was no mention of any paper found

in his cell (Id.). He alleges that Dallas and Woodley failed to include in the ticket that they

found a phonebook containing ID cards believed to have synthetic cannabinoids on them

(Id. at p. 69). As a result of the ticket failing to include this information, Randall contends

that he was unable to prepare a defense (Id.). On August 20, 2024, he went before

adjustment committee members Sandy L. Walker and Anthony B. Jones for a disciplinary

hearing (Id. at p. 12). Randall pled not guilty. The following day he was released from

1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Amended Complaint in light of Plaintiff’s consent to the

full jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge, and the limited consent by the Illinois Department of

Corrections and the medical providers, to the exercise of Magistrate Judge jurisdiction as set forth

in the Memoranda of Understanding between this Court and these entities.

restrictive housing because the adjustment committee found Randall not guilty of the

charges due to his cellmate pleading guilty to the charges (Id.).

On September 24, 2024, Randall received another disciplinary report for drugs and

drug paraphernalia from internal affairs officer Robert W. Gearhart (Doc. 13, p. 12).

Randall was placed back in restrictive housing. Randall alleges that the ticket was for the

same infraction he was previously found not guilty on (Id. at p. 13). The following day,

Randall wrote several request slips to Sandy Walker, Anthony Jones, Anthony Wills,

Kevin Reichert, Woodley, and Dallas informing them that he had already received a

disciplinary ticket for this infraction and previously found not guilty (Id.). Randall

believes this second ticket constituted double jeopardy (Id.).

On October 1, 2024, Randall again went before adjustment committee members

Sandy Walker and Anthony Jones for a disciplinary hearing (Doc. 13, p. 13). He informed

the officials that he sent them request slips about the prior disciplinary ticket (Id.). He also

noted that the original shakedown slip failed to note that a phonebook and drugs were

found during the search (Id.). He pled not guilty to the disciplinary ticket. On October 1,

2024, he wrote a grievance regarding the disciplinary ticket, indicating his belief that the

ticket amounted to double jeopardy (Id. at p. 14). On October 2, 2024, Randall learned

from his gallery officer that he was found guilty of the charge and received six months in

segregation (Id.).

On October 18, 2024, Randall wrote a request slip to Anthony Wills and Mr.

McClanahan requesting yard/recreation time. He also submitted a request slip to Ms.

Salger and Ms. Phillips requesting a one-on-one mental health appointment due to his

inability to leave his cell (Doc. 13, p. 14). Randall alleges that he was having trouble with

his mental health due to his inability to leave the cell for yard or recreation (Id.). On

November 19, 2024, he again wrote a grievance about the second disciplinary ticket (Id.).

He noted that he believed the lab report indicated the substance found was not synthetic

cannabinoids and he should be let out of segregation (Id.).

On December 18, 2024, he again wrote to Anthony Wills and Mr. McClanahan

requesting out of cell time on the yard, informing them that he had not been let out of his

cell since October 18, 2024 (Doc. 13, p. 15). He submitted another request to Ms. Salger

and Ms. Phillips for a one-on-one or group meeting for his mental health (Id.). He

indicated that he did not feel comfortable discussing his mental health when mental

health staff made rounds through the unit because they were accompanied by guards

(Id.).

On January 8, 2025, Anthony Wills signed off on placing Randall on mail watch.

The following day, Angela Lock signed and confirmed the order placing Randall on mail

scan (Doc. 13, p. 15). Upon learning of his placement on mail watch and mail scan,

Randall wrote Anthony Wills, Sandy Walker, and Anthony B. Jones explaining that he

should not be on mail watch because he was not guilty of the disciplinary ticket (Id.). He

again noted that his cellmate pled guilty to the charge (Id.). He never heard back from the

officials. On January 20, 2025, he submitted a grievance about his mail.

On February 25, 2025, he wrote another grievance about numerous issues

including staff conduct, medical treatment, and his access to the yard (Doc. 13, p. 16).

Randall noted in the grievance that he asked every correctional officer on his gallery daily

to access the yard and each time the officers responded that it was not up to them whether

yard was allowed on a certain day. Randall identifies Officer Heins, Choate, Farrar,

Baker, Bent, and Chandler as correctional officers he routinely spoke to about his ability

to access the yard on a certain day (Id.). He also informed the grievance officer that he

asked Ms. Salger and Ms. Phillips during their daily rounds for access to mental health

services and yard (Id. at pp. 16, 71). On March 2, 2025, he submitted another request slip

directed to Ms. Salger and Ms. Phillips requesting mental health services (Id.).

Preliminary Dismissals

In addition to claiming that his due process rights were violated by the issuance

of a second disciplinary ticket, Randall alleges that Robert W. Gearhart issued the second

disciplinary ticket in retaliation for Randall being found not guilty on the first ticket. In

order to state a viable retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he engaged in

protected activity, “suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity,” and the “First

Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the

deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014). But Randall fails to

point to any protected activity that he was participating in that led to the disciplinary

ticket. He merely alleges that Gearhart was upset at Randall being found not guilty on

the original charge. Because he fails to point to any protected activity, any retaliation

claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Further, to the extent Randall takes issue with the change in how he received mail

as a result of the disciplinary ticket, Randall also fails to state a claim. Restrictions on an

inmate’s mail are protected by the First Amendment. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th

Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). However, “the legitimate governmental interest in the

order and security of penal institutions justifies the imposition of certain restraints on

inmate correspondence.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-13 (1974). For incoming

mail, a court will uphold regulations or actions restricting inmate mail if they are

“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89

(1987). Here, Randall acknowledges that he was placed on mail scan because he was

found guilty of the drug charge regarding synthetic cannabinoids on small pieces of

paper. Although Randall disputes whether he was guilty of that charge, the prison clearly

has a penological interest in preventing drugs from entering the prison. Further, there are

no allegations suggesting that Randall is prohibited from accessing his mail, he has just

been placed on “mail scan status,” a process that Randall fails to explain in his pleading.

Thus, Randall’s claim against Anthony Wills and Angela Locke regarding his placement

on mail scan is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court designates the

following counts:

Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Lt.

Dallas, Sgt. Woodley, Robert Gearhart, Sandy Walker,

Anthony Jones, Anthony Wills, and Kevin Reichert for

finding him guilty on a disciplinary ticket for which he had

previously been found innocent.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim

against Anthony Wills, McClanahan, Officer Heins, Choate,

Farrar, Baker, Bent, and Chandler for denying Randall

access to the yard while in segregation.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to mental

health needs claim against Salger and Phillips for failing to

provide him with mental health care while in segregation.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be

considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly

pleading standard.2

Count 1

At issue in this case are two disciplinary tickets issued by officials related to the

drugs allegedly found in Randall’s cell on August 15, 2024. Randall alleges that the first

ticket, issued by Lt. Dallas and Sgt. Woodley, failed to include information about the

supposed items and drugs found in his cell. Randall contends that the failure to include

the information in the ticket left him unable to prepare a proper defense. But an inmate’s

liberty interests are protected by the Due Process Clause only insofar as a deprivation of

the interest at issue would impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

Here, Randall acknowledges that he was found not guilty on the first ticket and did not

serve any time in segregation. There are simply no allegations suggesting that he suffered

an atypical and significant hardship that entitled him to due process protections.

2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face”).

Randall was found guilty on the second disciplinary ticket and served six months

in segregation. His extensive stay in segregation could implicate a protected liberty

interest. Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2015). As to this second ticket,

Randall mostly focuses his claim on the fact that he was charged a second time for the

same infraction. He repeatedly states that he was subject to double jeopardy as a result

of the second ticket (Doc. 13, p. 13). But double jeopardy principles do not apply in the

disciplinary context. Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1996) (“an acquittal in an

earlier prison disciplinary hearing is no bar to a subsequent hearing to consider the very

same charge”). Thus, he cannot maintain a due process claim merely on the fact he was

allegedly charged a second time for the infraction after being found not guilty on the first

ticket. To the extent that Randall alleges that he informed Sandy Walker, Anthony Jones,

Anthony Wills, Kevin Reichert, Woodley, and Dallas about the double jeopardy issue, he

fails to state a claim.

Randall also disputes that he had proper notice of the charges in this second ticket,

arguing that his initial shakedown slip failed to include the phone book and drugs, nor

did it note that items were sent to a lab (Doc. 13, pp. 13, 69). In situations where an inmate

complains about discipline in which he received segregation but not the loss of good-time

credit, the disciplinary proceedings are subject to an informal due process inquiry.

Informal due process requires only that an inmate is provided (1) notice of the reasons

for his placement in segregation, and (2) an opportunity to present his views in a written

statement of hearing. Ealy Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 965-66 (7th Cir. 2024). Here, Randall

acknowledges that he received notice of the disciplinary ticket. His attached grievance

responses indicate that the disciplinary ticket noted the ID sized pieces of paper found in

an address book on the bottom bunk, the bunk that Randall was known to have resided

in at the time (Doc. 13, p. 41). The pieces of paper field tested for synthetic cannabinoids

and were sent out for further testing (Id.). Thus, Randall’s exhibits demonstrate that he

received notice of the charges. He also acknowledges that he wrote to numerous

individuals before the hearing about the charges and presented his arguments at the

disciplinary hearing. He alleges that he informed Sandy Walker and Anthony Jones that

the ticket lacked information regarding the phone book and drugs, or that the items were

sent to a lab (Doc. 13, p. 13). Thus, Randall received his entitled process and his due

process claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Counts 2

As to Randall’s claims in Count 2, he alleges that he was never let out of his cell

for yard during the entire time he was in segregation. In order to state a claim for

unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he

suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation, and (2) the defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to his conditions of confinement. Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir.

2008). Randall alleges that he wrote several request slips to Wills and McClanahan

informing them that he was not being let out of his cell for any reason. He attaches several

of those request slips to his Amended Complaint. The slips indicate that he needs exercise

due to his medical issues, but correctional officers informed him that other officials were

cancelling yard access for the unit (Doc. 13, pp. 24-27). Randall alleges that Wills and

McClanahan ignored his requests for yard. At this stage, Randall adequately alleges a

deliberate indifference claim against Wills and McClanahan for his lack of access to the

yard.

But Randall fails to state a claim against Officers Heins, Choate, Farrar, Baker,

Bent, and Chandler. He merely alleges that he spoke to them “every day” asking them

about his access to the yard. But he fails to indicate the date he spoke with each,

individual officer, the details of those conversations, or each officer’s specific response.

Although Randall contends that each officer “made it out to be a joke”, he fails to indicate

any officer’s specific response other than that it was not their decision. Further, there is

no indication that any of the officers were aware of Randall’s specific need for the yard

given his alleged medical conditions. Thus, Randall fails to state a claim against any of

the correctional officers listed in his Amended Complaint.

Count 3

To successfully state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to

medical needs, a plaintiff must plead that he suffered from “an objectively serious

medical condition” and that a “state official was deliberately… indifferent” to that

condition. See Giles v. Godinez, 914 F. 3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019). Here, Randall alleges

that he submitted requests to Salger and Phillips, as well as spoke to them, asking for

mental health care but they ignored his requests. At this early stage, Randall states a claim

against Salger and Phillips.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Count 1 is DISMISSED without prejudice. Count 2

shall proceed against Anthony Wills and McClanahan but is DISMISSED without

prejudice as to Officers Heins, Choate, Farrar, Baker, Bent, and Chandler. Count 3 shall

proceed against Salger and Phillips. All other claims and defendants are DISMISSED

without prejudice.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Anthony Wills, McClanahan, Salger, and

Phillips: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons)

and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these

forms, a copy of the Amended Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each

defendant’s place of employment as identified by Randall. If a defendant fails to sign and

return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the

date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service

on that defendant, and the Court will require that defendant to pay the full costs of formal

service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Randall,

the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the

address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained

in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section

1997e(g). Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to

the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.

Because Randall’s claims involve his mental healthcare, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to enter the Court’s standard HIPAA Qualified Protective Order.

If judgment is rendered against Randall, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).

Finally, Randall is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 14, 2026

/s/ Reona J. Daly

REONA J. DALY

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of

your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Amended Complaint. After service has

been achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your

Amended Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to

receive the defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more.

When all the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order

containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions,

to give the defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions

filed before defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless

specifically directed to do so.