Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WESTERN DIVISION

No. 5:22-cv-459-BO-RJ

OVIS MATAMOROS CANALES, )

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

OPW FUELING COMPONENTS LLC,

Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s appeal [DE 194]; [DE 199] of United

States Magistrate Judge Robert T. Numbers, II’s February 18, 2025, orders [DE 187]; [DE 188];

[DE 190]; [DE 191]; [DE 192]. Plaintiff contemporaneously moved [DE 195] to stay two of those

orders [DE 188]; [DE 191] pending her appeal. Defendant responded [DE 203] and plaintiff replied

[DE 211]. Also before the Court are defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees [DE 197] related to the

parties’ motions to compel, to which plaintiff responded [DE 205], and defendant’s motion for

sanctions against third parties [DE 214], to which plaintiff responded [DE 216]. Finally, the Court

considers plaintiff’s unopposed motion to transfer trial venue [DE 256]. In this posture, the motions

are ripe for ruling. For the reasons that follow, the motions are denied, except for plaintiff’s appeal

[DE 199] which is denied in part and granted to the extent it seeks to reverse Judge Numbers’

award of attorneys’ fees to defendant.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Canales alleges his former employer, defendant OP W Fueling Components LLC,

did not properly compensate him for the overtime that he spent washing up and applying personal

protective equipment (PPE) before and after his shifts and mandated lunch breaks. On October 28,

2021, plaintiff was involved in a workplace accident which injured a fellow worker. During the

internal investigation, plaintiff maintained that his managers condoned the unsafe practices which

resulted in his coworker’s injury. After the investigation, defendant terminated plaintiff's

employment. Plaintiff filed this suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the North Carolina Wage

and Hour Act, and for unlawful retaliation under the North Carolina Retaliatory Employment

Discrimination Act.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Appeal of United States Magistrate Judge Numbers’ Orders [DE 194]; [DE 199]

On February 18, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Robert T. Numbers, II signed

several orders, denying plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s motion to compel [DE 187],

granting defendant’s motion to compel [DE 188], denying plaintiff’s motion to quash subpoenas

to his current and former employers [DE 190], denying plaintiff’s motion to compel [DE 191], and

denying plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the scheduling order and clarify the scope of Phase J

discovery [DE 192].

A district court permits a magistrate judge to hear and decide any “pretrial matter not

dispositive of a party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The court must “consider timely

objections and modify or set aside any part of [a magistrate judge’s] order that is clearly erroneous

or is contrary to law.” Jd. "A factual finding is clearly erroneous when [a court is] ‘left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."" TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d

186, 196 (4th Cir. 2009). “Contrary to law” indicates plenary review of legal conclusions.

Stonecrest Partners, LLC v. Bank of Hampton Roads, 770 F. Supp. 2c. 778, 782 (E.D.N.C. 2011).

Greater deference, however, is accorded to magistrate judges’ decisions on discovery’ and

scheduling disputes. See, e.g., In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 267 F.R.D. 466, 470 (E.D. Va. 2010)

("Indeed, the fact-specific character of most discovery disputes and the discretionary standard for

resolution of discovery disputes under the Federal Rules suggest that magistrate judges ordinarily

have ample discretionary latitude in disposition of those matters.").

a. Discovery

Most of plaintiff’s numerous objections to Judge Numbers’ February 18, 2025, orders can

be reduced to one major complaint: the orders are erroneous because they allowed defendant to

resist all class-wide discovery, effectively denying plaintiff any discovery on putative class

information. The Court recently denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of its order denying

class certification, rejecting the contention that plaintiff had been completely deprived of class-

wide discovery. Plaintiff’s appeal of Judge Numbers’ orders is moot to the extent that it concerns

the class-wide scope of discovery or the substance of the parties’ discovery requests and motions

to compel.

Plaintiff also appeals Judge Number’s order [DE 190] denying plaintiff’s motion to quash

subpoenas seeking documents from plaintiff’s current and former employers. The Court affirms

Judge Numbers’ denial of plaintiff's motion to quash. However, the Court considers plaintiff's

argument in favor of his motion to quash below, in the context of defendant’s motion to compel

the employers’ responses to those discovery requests.

b. Attorneys’ Fees

When a court grants in part and denies in part a party’s motion to compel, the court “may,

after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for thie motion.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C). “When the Court grants in part and denies in part a motion to compel, Rule

37 authorizes (but does not generally require) the Court to ‘apportion the reasonablie expenses for

the motion.’” Walls v. Ford Motor Co., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184063, *48. Athough defendant

substantially prevailed on its motion to compel, the Court exercises its discretion under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C) not to apportion the expenses incurred in litigating defendant’s motion to

compel. To the extent Judge Numbers’ order [DE 188] entitled defendant to attorneys’ fees, the

order is reversed, and the parties will bear their own costs.

II. Defendant’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [DE 197]

Judge Numbers’ February 18 orders denied plaintiff’s motion to compel and granted

defendant’s motion to compel in part. As discussed above, the Court will not award attorneys’ fees

for defendant’s motion to compel. The remaining issue is plaintiff's motion to compel. Judge

Numbers’ February 18 orders instructed the parties to meet and confer on the issue of apportioning

attorneys’ fees related to plaintiff’s motion to compel. Judge Numbers instructed that if the parties

cannot agree on the apportionment, defendant must move for an award of expenses, and plaintiff’s

response may discuss why the exceptions provided in Rule 37(a)(5)(B) apply. [DE 191]. Defendant

moved to be awarded its attorneys’ fees related to the motion, and plaintiff responded.

When a motion to compel is denied, the court “must, after giving an opportunity to be

heard, require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party or deponent who

opposed the motion its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney’s

fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B). The court may not, however, award attorney’s fees “if the motion

was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” /d. Those

prohibitions to an award of attorney’s fees also apply to subsection 37(a)(5)(C), which controls

motions to compel that are granted in part and denied in part.” See Flame S.A. v. Indus. Carriers,

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136422, *8.

The Fourth Circuit defines a legal position as “substantially justified” where the party

opposing the discovery request has a “reasonable basis in law and fact.” Raynor v. GS4 Secure

Sols. (USA) Inc., 327 F. Supp. 3d 925, 948 (W.D.N.C. 2018), aff'd, 805 F. App’x 170 (4th Cir.

2020). Plaintiff purports his opposition to defendant’s contention interrogatories was substantially

justified because contention interrogatories are best used later in discovery. “Since interrogatories

involving mixed questions of law and fact may create disputes between the parties which are best

resolved after much or all of the other discovery has been completed, the court is expressly

authorized to defer an answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, advisory committee’s note (1970 amendment).

While Judge Numbers found it was appropriate for plaintiff to respond to the interrogatories

despite the early stage of discovery, plaintiff was substantially justified in his reliance on the

Court’s authority to defer an answer. Weyerhauser Co. v. Daniel Int’l Corp., No. 4:23-CV-45-FL-

KS, 2024 WL 3262609, at *7 (E.D.N.C. July 1, 2024) (engaging in a legitimate dispute over the

sequence of discovery constitutes a “substantial justification”). Finding plaintiff’s opposition to

defendant’s contention interrogatories substantially justified, the Court declines to award

defendant attorneys’ fees.

III. Defendant’s Motion to Compel and for Sanctions against Third-Parties PCX Holding,

LLC and King’s Transportation, LLC [DE 214]

After Judge Numbers denied plaintiff’s motion to quash the subpoenas seeking documents

from plaintiff’s former and current employers, defendant served PCX Holding, LLC and King’s

Transportation, LLC with copies of Judge Numbers’ order. Neither entity responded. Defendant

moved to compel their responses and for sanctions. [DE 214].

Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs subpoenas issued to third parties.

In response to such a subpoena, a nonparty may file a motion to quésh pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

45(c)(3)(A) or oppose a motion to compel production of the subpoenaed documents pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B). Rule 45 adopts the standard codified in Rule 26, which allows for

discovery of any matter “not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party” when

the discovery request “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

However, simply because "requested information is discoverable under Rule 26

does not mean that discovery must be had." Rule 26(b)(2) provides that a district

court may limit discovery if it concludes that "(i) the discovery sought is

unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source

that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking

discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the

information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery

outweighs its likely benefit."

Schaaf v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 233 F.R.D. 451, 453 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (cleaned up, internal

citations omitted).

While Judge Numbers determined that defendant’s subpoenas to PCX and King’s were not

so facially inadequate that they must be quashed, the Court is not persuaded that defendant is now

entitled to an order enforcing compliance. Plaintiff asks the Court to consider the negative

consequences that could result in the subpoenas’ enforcement, including plaintiff’s exposure to a

risk of retaliation and wrongful termination. Given that the subpoenas are broad, and the proposed

discovery’s burden on plaintiff outweighs its likely benefit, the Court denies defendant’s motion

to compel and for sanctions.

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer Trial Venue

Plaintiff moved, unopposed, to transfer the venue of the trial in this matter from Elizabeth

City, North Carolina, to Raleigh, North Carolina.

The «cour: begins itts analysis with the statute creating this cout, 28 U.S.C. § 113. It

divides North Carolina into three districts by countties (or portions thereof) andl

designates the cities where court for the district shall be held. 28 US. § 113.

Unlike with some other states, the statute does not also create divisions for each

district or require court for a specified division to be held at a certain location. Cf.

id. § 115 (dividing the Northern District of Ohio into two divisions and specifying

the cities where court for each division shall be held). Rather, court wthin the

Eastern District of North Carolina can be held at any of seven cities, “Elizabeth

—______-—-City, Fayetteville, Greenville, New Bern, Raleigh, Wilmington, and Wilson.” Id. §

113(a). Because the statute creating this district specifies where court may be held

within the district, there is no statutory right to trial within a division or at a

particular city. See United States v. Harman, 349 F.2d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 1965)

(holding trial was properly held in a city different from city where indictment was

returned in a state where statute divides state into districts and does not divide

districts into divisions); Thomas v. Babb, No. 5:10-CV-52-BO, 2015 WL 1275393,

at *2 (E.D.N.C. March 19, 2015) (denying the defendants’ request to move trial

from Elizabeth City to Raleigh and recognizing “[t]he court may exercise discretion

to designate one of the statutory locations as a place of trial, even though the case

was filed in another location” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

McKiver v. Murphy-Brown LLC, No. 7:14-CV-180-BR, 2018 WL 10322918, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Feb.

16, 2018). The request to transfer venue is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs emergency motion to stay United States Magistrate

Judge Robert T. Numbers, II’s orders [DE 195] is DENIED as MOOT. Defendant’s motion for

attorneys’ fees [DE 197] is DENIED. Defendant’s motion to compel and for sanctions against third

parties PXC Holding, LLC and King’s Transportation, LLC [DE 214] is DENIED. The motion to

transfer trial venue [DE 256] is DENIED. Plaintiff’s appeal of Judge Numbers’ decisions [DE 199]

is GRANTED IN PART. To the extent Judge Numbers awarded defendant attorneys’ fees for the

cost of litigating its motion to compel, that order [DE 188] is REVERSED IN PART. Judge

Numbers’ other orders [DE 187]; [DE 190]; [DE 191]; [DE 192] are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED, this_/9 day of January 2026.

T INCE W. BOYLE *

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE