The opinion
Filed 1/16/26 P. v. Rincon CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052416
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. Nos. SS170304B,
SS170575A)
v.
MIGUEL RINCON
Defendant and Appellant.
In May 2018, after defendant Miguel Rincon was restored to competency at a state
hospital, he pleaded no contest in two separate cases to second degree robbery (Pen.
Code1, § 211) and second degree commercial burglary (§ 459). The trial court suspended
imposition of sentence and granted Rincon three years of probation with various terms
and conditions. In 2020, after Rincon violated his probation on two separate occasions,
the trial court terminated probation after the second violation and sentenced Rincon to
three years eight months in state prison.
After Rincon appealed, a different panel of this court reversed and remanded for
the trial court to make an eligibility determination for mental health diversion under
section 1001.36. (People v. Rincon (Aug. 5, 2022, H048331 [nonpub. opn.].)2 Following
remand, Rincon filed a motion for mental health diversion under sections 1001.35 and
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We previously granted Rincon’s request for judicial notice of the record in case
No. H048331 on May 14, 2025.
1001.36. On May 30, 2024, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Rincon’s
motion.
On appeal, Rincon contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for mental health diversion because substantial evidence did not support the
court’s conclusion that his mental illnesses were not a significant factor in the
commission of the underlying offenses. The Attorney General concedes that the trial
court relied on an erroneous standard of proof, and the matter should be conditionally
remanded for the trial court to properly determine Rincon’s eligibility for mental health
diversion.
We conclude that Rincon is entitled to a conditional limited remand for
consideration of his eligibility and suitability for mental health diversion. We therefore
reverse and remand with directions.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background3
1. Offenses in Case No. SS170304B
On February 19, 2017, Officer Francisco Maldonado of the Salinas Police
Department was dispatched to investigate a theft at a Safeway store. The dispatch report
also advised that the two suspects involved in the theft had last been seen throwing
bottles at a vehicle located near the rear of the store. On his arrival, Maldonado spoke
with victim V.V., who stated that she observed the suspects each holding a case of beer
and attempting to walk out of the store without paying. She followed and yelled at them
to stop and put the beer down, at which point one of the suspects, later identified as
Fernando Moncada, reached behind his back as though he had a gun, and said “You
want to get shot?” As V.V. attempted to lock the front doors, the second suspect (later
3 We derive the relevant factual background from the police reports for each
underlying incident, which Rincon also quotes from in his opening brief.
2
identified as Rincon) approached her with his sweatshirt up in an attempt to conceal his
face and said, “Let’s shoot this bitch up.” V.V. walked further back into the store, and
Rincon followed her until she threw a flower vase in his direction, at which point Rincon
walked out of the store. ~(1CT 137)~ V.V. told Maldonado that she was in fear of her
life and felt like Rincon and the other suspect were going to shoot her.
Upon reviewing surveillance video footage, Maldonado observed two Hispanic
males behaving in the manner described by V.V. Another officer later reported that he
had located Rincon and Moncada, who matched the suspects’ descriptions, at the rear of
the store. Both men were taken into custody, and Maldonado located two cases of beer
near where the suspects had been initially located. V.V. positively identified Rincon and
Moncada as the two suspects who had robbed the store and threatened to shoot her.
Following his arrest, Rincon agreed to talk to Maldonado after being read his
Miranda rights. Rincon indicated that he and Moncada had been drinking beer at a
nearby park and decided to get some more after they ran out. He indicated they were
just being “stupid” and not thinking. When Maldonado asked if Rincon had any
intentions of paying for the beer, Rincon indicated that it was “too late” for that now.
He also did not appear to recall threatening V.V., including threatening to shoot her, and
stated that he “only called her a bitch.”
2. Offenses in Case No. SS170575A
On April 9, 2017, Officer Ian Parsons of the Salinas Police Department responded
to a report of an armed robbery that had just taken place at a 7-Eleven store. After
arriving on scene, Parsons spoke to the store clerk, who stated that two Hispanic males
with their shirts pulled up over their faces had entered the store and shown him (the clerk)
a handgun. The first suspect, who was taller and spoke English, told the clerk to “[g]ive
[him] the money,” reached into the pocket of his sweatshirt, and exposed just enough of
the grip of a handgun for the clerk to see and be threatened by it. The second suspect,
who was shorter, was carrying a handgun in his waistband, and similarly raised his
3
waistband high enough to show the clerk the gun grip. After the clerk opened the first of
two cash registers, the first suspect began to take money out, while the second suspect
grabbed multiple packages of cigarettes. Once the first register was emptied, the clerk
was struck in the back of the head by what felt like a gun. The two suspects then took the
money from the second register and left the business.
While Parsons was en route to the 7-Eleven store, he was advised that deputies
from the Monterey County Sheriff’s Department had conducted a vehicle stop involving
the robbery suspects. Rincon was identified as the driver of the vehicle. A search of the
vehicle revealed two replica firearms, packages of cigarettes and individually wrapped
cigars, and dollar bills in various denominations that matched the clerk’s description of
the bills taken from the register.
Parsons later spoke to Rincon, who indicated he was drunk and “buzzing” and did
not remember much of anything. Rincon stated that he had been drinking alcohol at a
party that evening and subsequently dropped his girlfriend off somewhere, then observed
emergency lights behind him. However, the second suspect, Antonio Martinez,
confirmed that he and Rincon had entered the 7-Eleven store and taken cigarettes without
paying.
B. Procedural History4
1. Charges and Initial Sentence
On February 21, 2017, the Monterey County District Attorney’s Office filed a
felony complaint in case No. SS170304B, charging Rincon with second degree robbery
(§ 211; count 1); second degree commercial burglary (§ 459; count 2); and criminal
threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 3). On April 11, 2017, a second felony complaint was
filed in case No. SS170575A, charging Rincon with second degree robbery (§ 211; count
4 We draw some portions of the procedural background from this court’s prior
opinion in People v. Rincon, supra, H048331.
4
1); the complaint further alleged that Rincon committed the offense while released on
bail or his own recognizance in case No. SS170304B (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)). The
complaint was later amended to add a charge of second degree commercial burglary
(count 2; § 459), which also included an allegation that Rincon committed the offense
while released on bail or his own recognizance (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)).
In August 2017, after a doubt was raised as to Rincon’s competency, he was found
not competent to stand trial and committed to Metropolitan State Hospital in November
2017. Rincon was subsequently restored to competence in April 2018. On May 29,
2018, Rincon agreed to plead no contest to one count of second degree robbery in case
No. SS170304B, and one count of second degree commercial robbery in case No.
SS170575A, on the condition that he would be granted probation. On June 28, 2018, the
trial court suspended imposition of sentence, and in accord with the plea agreement,
granted Rincon three years of probation.
2. Violation of Probation Proceedings and First Appeal
In 2019, the probation department filed two separate petitions alleging that Rincon
had violated his probation. After finding both violations to be true, on June 18, 2020, the
trial court terminated probation and sentenced Rincon to a total term of three years and
eight months in prison on both cases.
Rincon appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating his probation and by not considering his suitability for mental health
diversion. (People v. Rincon, supra, H048331.) While the Attorney General argued the
court had not abused its discretion in terminating probation, the Attorney General
conceded that Rincon was entitled to a conditional limited remand for the trial court to
consider his eligibility for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. (People v.
Rincon, supra, H048331.) A different panel of this court subsequently conditionally
reversed Rincon’s sentence and remanded the matter to the trial court for an eligibility
determination under section 1001.36. (People v. Rincon, supra, H048331.)
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3. Mental Health Diversion Proceedings
a. Mental Health Diversion Application and Opposition
Following remand, on February 1, 2023, Rincon filed a request for mental health
diversion pursuant to sections 1001.35 and 1001.36. Rincon, who was 18 years old in
2017, argued that he had not received any mental health treatment prior to the offenses
and was therefore struggling to manage his mental health disorders at the time. Rincon
noted that after he was evaluated in 2017, both evaluating psychologists concluded that
he was not competent to stand trial and suffered from “paranoid delusions, had
disorganized and paranoid thoughts, had delusional ideations, insisted that he was being
followed by Russian spies, and believed that vegans and mechanics were trying to kill
him.” Rincon further indicated that after he was restored to competency, he gained
significant insight into his mental health condition and the need for treatment, and he was
therefore an appropriate candidate for mental health diversion. In addition, Rincon
asserted that he met the eligibility requirements as follows: (1) he had been diagnosed
with qualifying conditions, namely, schizoaffective disorder; (2) because his mental
health disorder was present at the time of the offense, the court was required under the
current version of section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), to find that his mental health order
played a significant role in the commission of the charged offense; (3) his mental health
symptoms motivating his criminal behavior would respond to treatment; and (4) he did
not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
In opposition, the People argued that Rincon did not meet the eligibility
requirements for mental health diversion because his mental health disorder did not play
a significant role in the charged offense. The People noted that Rincon was not
diagnosed until after he was charged with the offenses and demonstrated no symptoms at
the time of the offense. In addition, because Rincon made statements to police and
probation officers reflecting that he had planned and carried out the offenses, the People
contended that such facts constituted clear and convincing evidence that his disorder had
6
“nothing to do” with the offenses. The People further argued that based on his conduct
towards the victims in the offenses, as well as his continued dangerous behavior as
evidenced by his probation violations, Rincon posed an unreasonable risk to public safety
if he were to be released for treatment in the community. Finally, the People claimed that
Rincon had demonstrated a lack of effort to improve his mental health, based on his
history of not complying with the recommendations of medical professionals regarding
his mental health treatment and concerns.
b. Psychological Evaluation Report
Clinical psychologist Dr. Carolyn Murphy conducted a psychological evaluation
of Rincon in August 2023. Dr. Murphy had previously conducted an evaluation of
Rincon in August 2017, where she concluded that he was not competent to stand trial. In
her 2023 evaluation, Dr. Murphy indicated that Rincon was a dual-diagnosis client and
suffered from schizoaffective disorder, severe alcohol use disorder, moderate cannabis
use disorder, and moderate stimulant use disorder. Dr. Murphy also indicated that
following the offenses in 2017, Rincon was reportedly psychotic and remained so in the
months afterwards while in treatment, and harbored “delusional ideation” about his
criminal conduct. Although several months passed between the time of the offenses and
his competency evaluation, Dr. Murphy found it most likely that Rincon was psychotic at
the time of the offenses based on: (1) the amount of time it took for Rincon to be restored
to competency; (2) the nature of his symptoms; and (3) the likelihood that Rincon’s
psychosis had emerged approximately a year prior.
c. Hearing and Ruling
On March 14, 2024, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Rincon’s mental
health diversion motion, where it heard testimony from Dr. Murphy on Rincon’s behalf.
Dr. Murphy confirmed that based on her interviews with Rincon in 2023, he suffered
from schizoaffective disorder, as well as patterns of substance abuse that needed to be
addressed concurrently with his mental health treatment. While Dr. Murphy indicated
7
that her review of the 2017 police reports did not reveal any particular signs consistent
with Rincon’s mental health condition, Rincon’s subsequent evaluation and statements
reflected that his mental illness was “actively influencing his thinking, perception, and
judgement at the time of the crime given what we know of this illness and how it affects a
person.” Dr. Murphy also noted that at the time of both offenses, Rincon had been
consuming alcohol and was intoxicated, which would affect his thinking, behavior, and
impulse control. Murphy further testified that individuals with active, untreated
schizoaffective disorder – such as Rincon – would have distorted and impaired thinking,
reality, testing, and decision making. She therefore concluded that while there was no
“specific smoking gun,” there were a combination of factors that would serve to
significantly impair Rincon’s decision making and impulse control at the time of the
offenses.
On April 30, 2024, the court heard argument from both parties. Rincon’s counsel
argued that Rincon’s condition had developed over a number of years, and his mental
state in 2017 clearly reflected that he was symptomatic, particularly since he was found
to be incompetent at the time. Counsel further argued that Rincon’s schizophrenia and
alcohol use disorder both played a “central and undeniable” role in the commission of the
offenses, and Rincon would therefore benefit significantly from diversion and treatment
in the community. In opposition, the People argued that there was substantial evidence
demonstrating that Rincon’s mental health disorder was not a contributing factor to the
offenses. With respect to the February 2017 offense, the People claimed that Rincon told
the police that he “wasn’t thinking,” and pointed to Dr. Murphy’s testimony that she did
not find anything in the report that was consistent with Rincon’s schizophrenic disorder.
The People also expressed concern with Rincon’s willingness to continue in treatment
and follow through with his treatment plan, based on prior statements he had made
demonstrating an unwillingness to do so.
8
In response, Rincon’s counsel argued that under section 1001.36, because he had
demonstrated a valid mental health diagnosis that existed at the time of the offense, the
burden shifted to the People to disprove or rebut, through clear and convincing evidence,
that there was an insufficient nexus between Rincon’s condition and his criminal conduct.
Counsel contended that the People had not met this burden of proof because they failed to
present sufficient evidence demonstrating that Rincon’s schizophrenic disorder or alcohol
use disorder did not contribute or motivate his conduct. Counsel further argued that per
Dr. Murphy’s testimony, one of the most common symptoms of Rincon’s disorder was
impetuous behavior, which would have been exacerbated by his intoxication; therefore,
all of these disorders “acted in conjunction to produce this misconduct.”
On May 30, 2024, the trial court issued an order denying Rincon’s motion for
mental health diversion. In making its ruling, the court noted the threshold eligibility and
suitability requirements under section 1001.36, and indicated that “[b]ecause the ability
to participate in diversion is not a matter of statutory right, but a matter of discretion with
the court, the defendant carries the burden of proof and persuasion regarding eligibility
and suitability for mental health diversion.” While the trial court agreed that Rincon had
demonstrated he suffered from schizoaffective disorder, severe alcohol use disorder,
moderate cannabis use disorder, and moderate stimulant use disorder, as required under
section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), he did not satisfy the requirement that his mental
health disorder played a significant role in the commission of the charged offenses.
Specifically, the trial court noted that Dr. Murphy’s report only stated Rincon was
psychotic “following the offenses and in the months to follow, not during the commission
of the charged offense.” Further, the trial court noted that in the police reports for both
offenses, Rincon did not mention any of the alleged voices that he later claimed to have
been hearing at the time during his competency evaluations. In addition, the court found
that Rincon’s statements reflected “self-awareness” and “presence of mind” based on
numerous factors, including: (1) his decision to cover his face during the commission of
9
the offenses; (2) his attempts to minimize his actions by denying that he threatened V.V.
during the February offense, and claiming he was too intoxicated to remember anything
during the April offense; and (3) avoiding answering any questions that he had been
driving while intoxicated during the April offense in order to not incriminate himself.
The trial court therefore concluded that “[t]here is insufficient evidence to find that Mr.
Rincon’s mental disorder played a significant role in the commission of the charged
offenses in his cases.”
Rincon timely appealed the court’s denial of his motion for mental health
diversion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“In 2018, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 to create a pretrial
diversion program for defendants with certain mental health disorders. [Citation.]
Pretrial diversion ‘allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential
dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment.’ [Citation.]
The statute expressly promotes ‘[i]ncreased diversion of individuals with mental
disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system
while protecting public safety.’ [Citations.]” (Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133.)
“As presently enacted, section 1001.36, subdivision (b) provides that a defendant
is eligible for pretrial diversion if two criteria are met. First, the defendant has been
diagnosed with a [specified] mental disorder . . . within the last five years by a qualified
mental health expert. [Citation.] Second, the ‘defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.’ [Citation.] ‘If the defendant
has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or
10
contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795 (Graham).)
“If a defendant meets these eligibility requirements, the court also must find that
the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion based on satisfaction of the following
criteria: ‘(1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms
of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would
respond to mental health treatment. [¶] (2) The defendant consents to diversion and
waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial . . . . [¶] (3) The defendant agrees to comply
with treatment as a condition of diversion . . . . [¶] [and] (4) The defendant will not pose
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated
in the community.’ [Citation.]” (Graham, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 795.)
“We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for pretrial mental health diversion
for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an
arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases
its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence [citation].’ [Citation.]” (Graham, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 795.) Therefore,
we review a trial court’s factual findings in support of its ruling for substantial evidence.
(People v. Whitmill, 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147.)
B. Analysis
Rincon argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
mental health diversion because substantial evidence does not support a finding by clear
and convincing evidence that his schizoaffective disorder was not a “motivating factor,
causal factor, or contributing factor to [Rincon’s] involvement in the alleged offense.”
Rincon contends that under the court’s analysis, he needed to have been “floridly
psychotic” for his condition to be a substantial factor in his offenses, which he was not
required to prove in order to demonstrate his eligibility for diversion. Further, Rincon
argues that based on Dr. Murphy’s report and testimony, as well as the facts of each
11
offense, alcohol abuse featured “prominently” in all of his charged offenses, and his
schizophrenic disorder was “at the least” a contributing factor. The Attorney General
concedes that the trial court misapplied the presumption under section 1001.36,
subdivision (b)(2), based on its statements indicating that Rincon had not met his burden
of demonstrating his conditions were contributing factors to the offense, and a
conditional remand is required for the trial court to reconsider Rincon’s eligibility and
suitability for diversion.
The Attorney General’s concession is well taken. As both parties note, under the
current version of section 1001.36 as amended in 2022, if a defendant establishes that he
has been diagnosed with a specified mental disorder within the last five years by a
qualified mental health expert, “the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder
was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing
factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2),
italics added.) Accordingly, “[i]n practical terms, following the 2022 amendments,
defendants with a proper mental health diagnosis will seldom be ineligible for diversion.
The more difficult question will be determining whether they are suitable.” (People v.
Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485, 490 (Harlow).)
In the instant matter, the trial court indicated in its ruling that Rincon had been
diagnosed with four mental health disorders within the past five years, thus satisfying the
first eligibility requirement. Therefore, once this qualifying diagnosis was made, the
presumption should have arisen that Rincon’s mental condition contributed to his
criminal behavior, which the People were then required to rebut by producing clear and
convincing evidence that there was no causal connection. However, the record reflects
the trial court did not apply this presumption. In particular, the trial court stated on more
than one occasion that there was insufficient evidence presented by Rincon to
demonstrate a nexus between his mental health disorders and the underlying offenses. As
12
the Attorney General acknowledges, such statements reflect that the trial court mistakenly
placed the burden on Rincon to establish this causal connection, when it was the People
who had the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that there was no
such connection. (See Harlow, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 491 [“[o]nce the defendant
produces a timely mental health diagnosis, the statute requires that the court presume the
crime with which the defendant is charged was causally related to his mental condition.
The burden then shifts to the prosecution to show by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant’s diagnosed mental disorder was not a contributing factor”].) Further, the
trial court’s statements reflected that it placed substantial emphasis on the fact that
Rincon’s diagnosis and manifestation of his psychosis only took place in the months
following his offense; however, the statute provides no requirement that the diagnosis be
made prior to the offense. (See Harlow, supra, at p. 491 [“[t]he statute nowhere says that
the diagnosis must precede the crime of which the defendant is accused. Indeed, it
strongly implies the contrary”].) Accordingly, we find that the trial court misapplied the
standard of proof requirements under the mental health diversion statute.
In his reply brief, Rincon requests that in accordance with Harlow, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th 485, the matter should be conditionally reversed and remanded with
directions for the trial court to find Rincon eligible for diversion and only assess his
suitability pursuant to section 1001.36, subdivision (c). However, while eligibility and
suitability are preconditions, mental health diversion remains discretionary even if they
are met. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882; People v.
Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888.) Because of the existence of this residual
discretion, we believe the proper remedy is to remand with instructions for the trial court
to consider both eligibility and suitability, along with making relevant findings, in
accordance with the current law. Therefore, we will vacate the trial court’s order denying
diversion and direct the court to hold further proceedings to determine both Rincon’s
eligibility and suitability. (See § 1001.36, subds. (b) & (c).)
13
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court
with directions to reconsider Rincon’s eligibility and suitability for diversion pursuant to
section 1001.36 and in accordance with this opinion. If the trial court determines Rincon
is eligible and suitable, it may grant mental health diversion. If the court determines he is
not, or if he does not successfully complete mental health diversion once granted, it shall
reinstate Rincon’s convictions and resentence him.
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___________________________________
Wilson, J.
WE CONCUR:
__________________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.
__________________________________________
Lie, J.
People v. Rincon
H052416