White v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

FOR PUBLICATION

No. 24-506C

(Filed: January 15, 2026)

)

NATHAN D. WHITE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

UNITED STATES, )

)

Defendant. )

)

)

Justin W. Burnam (argued), Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.

Richard L. Rainey and John Y. Veiszlemlein, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington,

DC; and Rochelle Bobroff, Esther N. Leibfarth (argued), and Matthew Handley,

National Veterans Legal Services Program, Arlington, VA, Of Counsel.

Joshua A. Mandlebaum (argued), Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation

Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.

With him on the briefs were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, and

Particia M. McCarthy, Director, and Steven J. Gillingham, Assistant Director,

Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice.

Maj. Nicole A. Oberjuerge (argued), Litigation Attorney, Judge Advocate General’s

Corps, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA, Of Counsel.

OPINION AND ORDER

BONILLA, Judge.

Plaintiff Nathan D. White, a former enlisted member of the United States

Regular Army and Army Reserve, seeks correction of his military records to reflect a

medical retirement rather than his current disability separation. The difference

between the health-related discharges carries significant financial consequence:

medical retirement entitles a service member to lifelong retired pay under 10 U.S.C.

§ 1201(a), whereas disability discharge offers a single lump sum severance payment

calculated under 10 U.S.C. § 1203(a). Mr. White reportedly suffers from service-

connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) rooted in childhood trauma that

returned to the fore during his military deployment.

Pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the

administrative record pursuant to Rule 52.1 of the Rules of the United States Court

of Federal Claims (RCFC). For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s dispositive

motion is granted-in-part and denied-in-part, and defendant’s dispositive cross-

motion is conversely denied-in-part and granted-in-part. Plaintiff’s dispositive

motion is granted insofar as he seeks a remand for reconsideration of his medical

retirement claim and denied insofar as he seeks the entry of judgment. Defendant’s

dispositive cross-motion is denied insofar as the government seeks the entry of

judgment and granted insofar as the government alternatively seeks a remand for a

determination whether plaintiff’s PTSD diagnosis was related to combat or military

sexual trauma. Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the Army Board for

Correction of Military Records (ABCMR or Board) for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

I. Military Service

Mr. White enlisted in the Regular Army and entered active duty on

February 4, 2009. Throughout his service in the Regular Army, Mr. White’s military

occupational specialty (MOS) was Aircraft Powerplant Repairer (15B), and he rose to

the rank of Specialist (SPC/E-4).1, 2 After completing his military service obligation,

SPC White was honorably discharged on August 3, 2015.3 About four months before

his discharge from the Regular Army, SPC White enlisted in the Army Reserve,

committing to an additional three years of military service. After reporting certain

medical issues, discussed infra, SPC White received a disability separation effective

July 19, 2018, and a lump sum severance payment based on his monthly basic pay

and years of service. Consistent with his tenure in the Regular Army, Mr. White’s

service in the Army Reserve was characterized as Honorable.

While serving in the Regular Army, on February 15, 2011, SPC White deployed

to Kandahar, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Four months

1 According to the U.S. Army career website, an Aircraft Powerplant Repairer (MOS 15B) “inspect[s]

and perform[s] maintenance on aircraft turbine engines and components to make sure they are safe

and ready to fly. [They] diagnose and troubleshoot problems with airplane and helicopter engines and

[perform] operational and safety checks.” See Aircraft Powerplant Repairer 15B, U.S. ARMY, available

at https://perma.cc/TX72-GRXB.

2 While on active duty, Mr. White earned the following medals, badges, ribbons, and citations:

Afghanistan Campaign Medal with two campaign stars, Army Achievement Medal (three), Meritorious

Unit Commendation, Army Good Conduct Medal (two), National Defense Service Medal, Global War

on Terrorism Service Medal, Army Service Ribbon, Overseas Service Ribbon (two), NATO Medal, Basic

Aviation Badge, and a Certificate of Achievement.

3 For clarity, and out of respect for his military service, the Court refers to plaintiff as “SPC White”

during his enlistment periods and “Mr. White” during his civilian life before and after his military

service.

2

into his deployment, on June 15, 2011, SPC White self-reported suicidal ideation and

behavior to his technical inspector/section sergeant. His mental health episode was

reportedly triggered by the confluence of debilitating shoulder pain from a recent

physical training test injury, work stress, and childhood trauma flashbacks. In

accordance with Army protocols, SPC White was disarmed, placed on unit watch

(a/k/a “buddy watch”), and escorted to the mental health department of an in-theater

medical clinic. Following a preliminary assessment, the Neuro-Psychiatric Mental

Health Technician on duty considered SPC White a “low safety risk,” but found the

soldier “not fit for duty.” AR 7415.4 During a follow-up examination the next

morning, a Psychiatric Mental Health Nurse Practitioner confirmed SPC White posed

a safety risk and was psychologically unfit for duty, citing the soldier’s “recent . . .

suicidal ideation and initiation of [a] highly lethal suicide gesture.” AR 7412. The

advanced practice nurse (APN) prescribed medication, recommended continued

psychotherapy, cautioned against returning the soldier’s service weapon, and

suggested “routine check-in[s] with [non-commissioned officer (NCO)] leadership”

rather than continued “1:1 buddy watch.” Id. A week later, the APN diagnosed

SPC White with adjustment disorder with depressed mood and PTSD, referencing

the soldier’s childhood trauma “with stress induced exacerbation.” AR 7394.

Two weeks later, during a July 8, 2011 follow-up appointment, the APN

reported that “[SPC White] is no longer considered a safety risk” and medically

cleared the soldier’s return to full duty, including the return of his service weapon.

AR 7368–69. Throughout the remaining months of his deployment, as recorded in

the soldier’s medical records, SPC White’s mental, emotional, and physical health

continued to improve. See, e.g., AR 7349–50, 7353, 7356, 7359, 7362, 7728. After a

July 25, 2011 session, for example, SPC White’s therapist noted that the soldier’s

PTSD symptoms from his childhood trauma “have resolved.” AR 7354.

SPC White’s deployment to Afghanistan ended on January 28, 2012,

whereupon he returned to his permanent duty station at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

During a March 9, 2012 intake medical appointment, SPC White declined additional

psychotherapy and requested that his prescribed medication be discontinued. In

support, SPC White cited the progress made during his extensive outpatient therapy

in Afghanistan. When asked about his deployment, SPC White reportedly offered:

“Never shot my weapon, no [improvised explosive devices (IED)], I never left the

[forward operating base (FOB)].” AR 7313. The medical provider’s notes further

indicate that SPC White “[d]enied any combat[-]related trauma.” Id.

On May 2, 2012, SPC White received permanent change of station orders

directing him to report to Fort Wainwright, Alaska. The parties do not identify any

relevant health issues or developments between May 2012 and January 29, 2014,

when SPC White reportedly incurred a lower back injury while performing manual

4 “AR ___” is a citation to the administrative record.

3

labor. SPC White’s resulting work limitations reportedly spurred behavioral issues

and tension with at least one NCO. See, e.g., AR 351 (“[SPC White] says that he had

a bad day yesterday. [He] says that something that was a joke turned into getting

written up for disrespecting a non-commissioned officer.”). During a February 7, 2014

medical appointment, SPC White’s provider prescribed him new ADHD medication5

and diagnosed him with chronic PTSD and adjustment disorder with depressed mood.

The treating psychologist further documented and relayed to SPC White that he was

“not deployable due to his Mental Health condition of PTSD and his medications.”

AR 350. Throughout SPC White’s remaining enlistment period in the Regular Army,

however, his medical providers generally described his PTSD as a thing of the past.6

Of note, on March 23, 2015, when SPC White formally agreed to enlist in the Army

Reserve, his PULHES scores were “1” across the board, indicating “[n]o current

psychiatric disorder.”7 AR 376.

Following his transition to the Army Reserve in September 2015, SPC White

was assigned to the 324th Expeditionary Signal Battalion in Greenville, South

Carolina, and his new MOS was Nodal Network System Operator-Maintainer

(25N2).8 SPC White failed to attend required MOS training and, consequently, never

5 Mr. White was diagnosed with and treated for Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)

as a child. Notwithstanding his acknowledgment of these facts during medical evaluations while

on active duty, Mr. White reportedly denied having a history of ADHD during his December 8, 2008

pre-enlistment medical examination.

6 See, e.g., AR 8558 (Sep. 29, 2014 records indicating no current psychiatric disorder); AR 7115 (Sep. 18,

2014: “Past diagnoses [for PTSD and depression] seem to have been overcome except for ADHD.”);

AR 6996 (Mar. 20, 2015: “PTSD t[reatment] a couple y[ea]rs ago, but s[ymptoms] resolved and

[SPC White] not t[reated] since.”).

7 P-U-L-H-E-S is a rough acronym documenting a soldier’s medical profile, comprised of: physical

capacity (P), upper extremities (U), lower extremities (L), hearing-ears (H), vision-eyes (E), and

psychiatric (S). Army Pamphlet 40-502, Table 4-2 (Dec. 18, 2023). Service members are scored from

1 to 4 in each category, with 1 being the most fit and 4 being the least fit. “An individual having a

numerical designation of ‘1’ describes a high level of medical fitness, deployable.” Id. ¶ 4-3(e)(1). A

score of 2 “indicates some medical condition or physical defect that requires some minor functional or

activity limitations,” but the soldier is nonetheless deployable. Id. ¶ 4-3(e)(2). Scores of 3 and 4

indicate a service member is not deployable until they have completed the requisite medical or

administrative board process. Id. ¶¶ 4-3(d), (e)(3)–(4).

8 According to the Army National Guard website, “[t]he Nodal Network Systems Operator-Maintainer

is responsible for making sure that the lines of communication are always up and running. They

maintain strategic and tactical nodal systems.” Nodal Network Systems Operator-Maintainer, ARMY

NAT’L GUARD, available at https://perma.cc/S65T-HPQW. As described by SPC White’s commander:

“The Nodal Network Systems Operator-Maintainer supervises, installs, operates, and performs field-

level maintenance on intellectual property (IP)-based, high-speed electronic nodal systems, integrated

network control centers, network management facilities, associated multiplexing and transit-cased

subscriber-interface equipment, Communications Security (COMSEC) devices, and other equipment

associated with network nodal operations.” AR 395 (cleaned up). The physical requirements of this

role reportedly include lifting and carrying 150 pounds of equipment in a two-soldier team while

wearing/carrying roughly eighty pounds of uniform and combat equipment. AR 396.

4

qualified for his newly assigned role. He now submits that both his back injury and

his PTSD prevented him from attending training, notwithstanding his ability to

concurrently maintain a civilian job as a transmission assembler while working

toward a bachelor’s degree in information systems. Over the rest of his time in the

Army Reserve, particularly between late 2016 and mid-2017, SPC White often missed

drill.

In response to SPC White’s chronic absenteeism, an Administrative Separation

Board (ASB) was noticed on February 16, 2017, and formally convened on July 11,

2017. After hearing testimony from several witnesses, including SPC White, the ASB

found: “SPC White has accrued nine or more unexcused absences from scheduled

inactive duty training during a 12-month period.” AR 391. The ASB recommended

that SPC White be honorably discharged from the Army Reserve. The discharge

order was revoked on July 28, 2017, however, when SPC White was referred into the

Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) for evaluation of his chronic lower

back pain.9 See Army Reg. 635-40 ¶ 4-3(f)(3) (Jan. 19, 2017) (IDES processing

generally takes precedence over administrative separation action); see also

Army Reg. 135-178 ¶ 1-10(a) (Nov. 7, 2017) (same).

II. IDES

[IDES] is a joint [United States Department of Defense (DoD)]

and [United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)] disability

evaluation process. Under this system, VA helps DoD determine if

wounded, ill, or injured Service members are fit for continued Military

service and provide disability benefits to Service members and Veterans,

if appropriate. IDES allows VA and DoD to share information and to

complete each agency’s respective process simultaneously, without the

need for duplicative exams and ratings.[10]

IDES participants do not apply or elect to participate in IDES.

Upon referral into IDES by their branch of service, each Service member

is assigned a dedicated military Physical Evaluation Board Liaison

Officer (PEBLO) and a VA Military Services Coordinator (MSC) to assist

and advise.

Any Service member who participates in IDES can file a VA claim

for disability compensation through their MSC. Service members

determined to be unfit for duty receive a single set of disability ratings

9 SPC White’s chronic lower back pain and PULHES score of “3” for lower extremities is documented

in his Physical Profile Record as a duty-limiting permanent profile as of July 28, 2016. AR 653.

10 Prior to 2008, under the legacy Disability Evaluation System, the military branches conducted

disability evaluation proceedings independently of the VA.

5

to determine the appropriate level of DoD and VA disability benefits.

IDES participants found fit for duty continue their military service.

Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES), U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFS.,

available at https://perma.cc/2YAU-36NU.

Upon referral, the soldier is examined by VA medical staff to assess the

conditions prompting the IDES referral and any other issues or concerns raised by

the service member. The Medical Evaluation Board (MEB)—comprised of military

medical professionals—then evaluates whether the documented medical conditions

meet retention standards under Army Regulation 40-501 (June 27, 2019) (Standards

of Medical Fitness). See Army Reg. 635-40 ¶ 4-7(a). If the MEB determines that the

soldier does not meet retention standards, the matter is referred to the Physical

Evaluation Board (PEB) for a fitness determination.11 Id. ¶ 4-12(f). In turn, the

PEB—comprised of medical and non-medical military personnel—evaluates whether

the soldier’s documented medical conditions merit separation or retirement. In doing

so, the PEB assigns disability ratings based on the severity of the soldier’s medical

condition(s).12

In connection with the MEB, SPC White’s commander completed a Disability

Evaluation System (DES) Commander’s Performance and Functional Statement

(DA Form 7652) on August 5, 2017, wherein she rated the physical demands of his

assigned MOS 25N (Nodal Network Systems Operator) as “heavy” and provided the

following assessment of SPC White’s ability to adequately perform his duties:

Due to the high physical demands of duty MOS 25N, [SPC White]

will not be able to adequately perform duties. . . . [SPC White] has a

permanent profile that limits him from wearing [a] helmet and/or body

armor. [He] is not deployable and cannot conduct MOS or Soldier specific

training due to the restriction of wearing protective gear.

. . . It is my assessment that [SPC White]’s conditions will prevent

him from serving in his primary MOS (per contract) of 25N. He is not

able to don body armor or lift heavy objects, which is essential to his job

11 A soldier who disagrees with the MEB’s determination may request an impartial medical

review (IMR) by an independent medical provider (i.e., a provider not connected to the MEB).

See Army Reg. 635-40 ¶¶ 4-13(a), 4-14(a)–(d). Depending on the outcome of the IMR, additional

proceedings may be warranted. See id. ¶¶ 4-14(e)–(i), 4-15.

12 The PEB identifies which conditions, if any, render a soldier unfit for continued military service;

whether the conditions are service connected; and whether and to what extent an unfitting condition

is compensable. See Army Reg. 635-40 ¶¶ 4-19, 4-22 to -24. There are two levels of review within the

PEB: an informal PEB and a formal PEB that follows from a soldier’s appeal of an informal PEB. See

generally id. ¶¶ 4-22 to -24. A soldier may appeal the formal PEB decision to the United States Army

Physical Disability Agency (USAPDA). See id. ¶¶ 4-25 to -27. From the USAPDA, soldiers may seek

relief from the ABCMR. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 1552; Army Reg. 15-185 (Mar. 31, 2006).

6

function. [SPC White] also has permanent hearing loss that prevents

him from operating in loud environments. He may also miss important

cues in difficult listening environments.[13]

. . . Soldier has missed a substantial amount of [Battle Training

Assemblies (BTA)] due to re-injury of back.

AR 395 (emphasis added). SPC White’s commander made no reference to mental

health concerns in general or to PTSD in particular. On the contrary, the commander

consistently listed SPC White’s psychiatric PULHES score as “1” (i.e., no current

psychiatric disorder, deployable).14 Id.

On October 3, 2017, SPC White sent the following email to VA medical staff

related to the MEB process:

The reason for this message is as I am going through the MEB for the

Army Reserve, I have been dealing with negativity from my command

that is causing undue stress, and depression, and anxiety. I talked to my

nurse case manager for the MEB and she told me to contact my

psychologist and to ask for him to fill out a profile packet to pull me out

of drill. . . . My nurse case manager just wants me pulled out until after

my IDES process is complete, at which point I will be out of the Army

Reserve medically separated or retired. . . .

AR 1478 (cleaned up). This appears to be the first time SPC White suggested that

his mental health prevented him from attending drill. Rather than mention his

PTSD or cite his 2011–12 deployment or childhood trauma, however, SPC White

references only the current “negativity from [his] command” while participating

in the IDES process. Thereafter, on October 12, 2017, SPC White filed an Application

for Disability Compensation and Related Compensation Benefits (VA Form

21-526EZ). Adding to the MEB-referred disability of lumbosacral strain, SPC White

listed a series of claimed ailments including “PTSD” and “adjustment disorder with

depressed moods.” AR 3343. The same day, SPC White submitted a new Army

Reserve Medical Management Center Profile Request Letter of Instruction to reflect

the following temporary conditions: “PTSD,” “Anxiety,” and “Depression.” AR 2564.

Two weeks later, a psychologist confirmed SPC White’s diagnoses of PTSD and

inattentive ADHD. Of note, in documenting his medical opinion, the healthcare

13 SPC White’s reported hearing loss and corresponding PULHES score of “2” is documented in his

Physical Profile Record as a duty-limiting permanent profile as of March 14, 2017. AR 653.

14 In contrast, SPC White’s commander listed differing PULHES scores for lower extremities (i.e., “2”

and then “3”) and for vision-eyes (i.e., “2” and then “1”). AR 395. Additional limitations were

consistently listed for physical capacity and hearing-ears as reflected by the PULHES scores of “2.”

Id. For completeness, SPC White’s PULHES scores for upper extremities were consistently scored “1.”

Id.

7

provider discounted SPC White’s childhood trauma,15 instead attributing the

soldier’s PTSD to “enemy combatant-related” stress while deployed:

[SPC White] reports [that] while serving in Afghanistan there was

mortar fire nearly every day. He reports there were a number of other

extremely distressing events that occurred at his base. He reports that

there was one instance in which an infiltrator got inside the gate. He

also reports [that] a car bomb exploded on his base. He reports that

during these very stressful events he became so distraught that he

considered suicide and told his command he was scared to carry and use

a gun. He was eventually cleared to again carry a weapon after about

two months of treatment and support.

AR 3571.16 During a November 7, 2017 follow-up evaluation, SPC White reported

being less anxious and that his newly increased dose of an ADHD medication “helped

decrease his stress ‘by 70%.’” AR 3270–71.

An MEB convened on November 21, 2017, to consider whether SPC White’s

eleven reported medical conditions—including lumbosacral strain, PTSD, and

inattentive ADHD—met the Army’s medical retention standards. After reviewing

the case file, the MEB concluded that only SPC White’s January 2014–incurred lower

back injury “d[id] not meet” the applicable retention standard. AR 399 (citing

Army Reg. 40-501 ¶ 3-39) (alteration to capitalization). As for the other ten ailments,

including PTSD and inattentive ADHD, the MEB concluded that each of

those medical conditions “meets” the applicable retention standard. Id. (citing

Army Reg. 40-501) (alteration to capitalization). An IMR requested by SPC White

affirmed the MEB’s findings, which were formally approved and deemed final on

December 19, 2017. Consistent with the MEB’s findings, SPC White’s case was

referred to the PEB for a fitness determination.

An informal PEB convened on January 31, 2018, and determined SPC White’s

chronic lower back injury was unfitting. In support, the informal PEB cited the

physical demands of SPC White’s assigned MOS provided by the soldier’s

commander, as well as the commander’s assessment of SPC White’s performance

limitations.17 The informal PEB recommended a disability rating of twenty percent

15 See AR 3571 (documenting medical opinion that SPC White’s childhood trauma does not support

PTSD diagnosis).

16 The October 24, 2017 report is contradicted by SPC White’s March 9, 2012 account of his deployment.

AR 7313 (“Deployments: ‘it was alright other than the unit stress and childhood stuff. Once I got into

therapy and on meds, things improved. Never shot my weapon, no IEDs, I never left the FOB.’ Denied

any combat related trauma.”).

17 As addressed infra, notwithstanding the informal PEB’s reliance on SPC White’s Army Reserve

commander’s description of the soldier’s then-current MOS (i.e., 25N) in “Section III: Medical

Conditions Determined To Be Unfitting,” the informal PEB listed SPC White’s previous MOS

8

and that SPC White be medically separated with a severance payment.18 The

informal PEB further determined that SPC White’s other ten medical conditions,

including PTSD and inattentive ADHD, were not unfitting. In response to an appeal

by SPC White, the informal PEB’s findings and recommendations were confirmed,

and a formal PEB convened on April 13, 2018. Following a hearing, the formal PEB

reaffirmed the findings and recommendations of the informal PEB. Addressing

SPC White’s reported PTSD, the formal PEB remarked: “There is no evidence that

this condition has precluded him from military duties.”19 AR 454. SPC White’s

appeal to the PEB President was denied on May 15, 2018. He was then separated

from the Army Reserve effective July 19, 2018.

III. ABCMR

On July 1, 2022, nearly four years after his separation from the Army Reserve,

Mr. White applied to the ABCMR for correction of his military records to reflect

medical retirement in lieu of his disability separation.20 Mr. White principally

asserted that the PEB should have found his PTSD unfitting and assigned him at

least a fifty percent (combined) disability rating, warranting a medical retirement.21

In support, SPC White challenged the PEB’s: reliance on, and characterization of,

his civilian employment; dismissal of his commander’s expressed safety concerns for

(i.e., 15B) in both Section III and “Section I: Administrative Data.” AR 416 (alteration to

capitalization).

18 If the PEB had found a disability rating of at least thirty percent for unfitting conditions—in addition

to finding that SPC White’s lumbosacral strain and PTSD were “of a permanent nature and stable,”

were “not the result of [SPC White’s] intentional misconduct or willful neglect, and w[ere] not incurred

during a period of unauthorized absence”—SPC White would be entitled to medical retirement rather

than a disability separation. See 10 U.S.C. § 1201(b).

19 During VA examinations conducted on November 30, 2015, and February 23, 2016, SPC White’s

healthcare providers found no signs of PTSD. AR 6583–85, 6682. Although the VA assigned

SPC White a 60% (combined) disability rating for certain medical conditions (including left shoulder

and lumbar strains) on March 8, 2016, the agency documented he did not have PTSD. AR 6538, 6540.

VA and Army doctors thereafter examined SPC White at least six times between March 23, 2016, and

August 17, 2017, each time indicating he was not suffering from PTSD while periodically referencing

his long-term ADHD diagnoses. See, e.g., AR 2539, 2550, 2558, 3321, 6245, 6323. Notwithstanding

this history, on May 23, 2017, the VA issued SPC White a 10% disability rating for service-connected

ADHD (with a general reference to PTSD) effective August 4, 2015 (i.e., “the day following the date

of [SPC White’s] military discharge”), elevated to 30% effective March 20, 2017. AR 6057–60.

On January 23, 2018, the VA converted SPC White’s mental health diagnoses to PTSD with attention

deficit disorder (ADD) and increased this disability rating from 30% to 50% effective October 5, 2017,

coinciding with the MEB and PEB proceedings. AR 408–10. A month later, the VA rolled back the

effective date of the 50% disability rating for PTSD with ADD to May 12, 2017. AR 810, 812–13. The

VA ultimately assigned SPC White a combined disability rating of 90%.

20 The ABCMR excused Mr. White’s failure to seek administrative relief within the three-year period

codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b).

21 In addition to his PTSD diagnosis, Mr. White challenged the PEB’s conclusions related to his

reported left lumbar lower extremity radiculopathy (LER). That issue is not raised here.

9

SPC White and the unit; assignment of SPC White’s reported impulse control as a

unique symptom of his previously-diagnosed ADHD rather than a contemporaneous

PTSD symptom; and conclusion that Mr. White’s PTSD was seemingly manageable

with conservative treatment. After requesting a recommendation from the Army

Review Boards Agency (ARBA) Medical Advisor and then summarizing SPC White’s

military service, SPC White’s medical history, and the IDES (MEB and PEB)

proceedings, the ABCMR summarily denied relief on June 13, 2023.

Mr. White filed suit in this Court on April 4, 2024, alleging the ABCMR’s

decision was arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and contrary

to law. Among his claims, Mr. White charged that the ABCMR applied the wrong

regulatory fitness standard, failed to liberally consider his PTSD claim as required

by statute, ignored evidence, and abandoned its responsibility to perform an

independent analysis. The Court then granted defendant’s unopposed request for a

voluntary remand to facilitate the ABCMR’s reconsideration of Mr. White’s claims.

The Board issued its remand decision on November 18, 2024, again denying relief.

Briefing on the parties’ dispositive cross-motions, including supplemental questions

posed by the Court (ECF 21), was completed on November 14, 2025. Oral argument

took place on December 18, 2025.

ANALYSIS22

I. Standard of Review

In adjudicating cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record under

RCFC 52.1, the Court resolves factual disputes as it would at trial: by making factual

findings in accordance with the weight of the evidence presented. Bannum, Inc. v.

United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2005). A decision of the ABCMR,

however, “may only [be] set aside . . . if it was ‘arbitrary or capricious, unsupported

by substantial evidence, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ . . . .” See Doyon v.

United States, 58 F.4th 1235, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1180).

Reviewing courts “do not substitute [their] judgment for that of the military ‘when

reasonable minds could reach differing conclusions on the same evidence.’” Mote v.

United States, 110 F.4th 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Heisig v. United States,

719 F.2d 1153, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

To obtain relief from a decision by the ABCMR, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that the Board’s decision should be set aside by “cogent and clearly convincing

evidence.” Id. (quoting Dodson v. United States, 988 F.2d 1199, 1204–05 (Fed. Cir.

22 The Court has jurisdiction over this medical retirement pay action under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491(a). Dillon v. United States, No. 24-2307, 2025 WL 2528324, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 3, 2025)

(per curiam) (“The Claims Court has jurisdiction to hear claims under 10 U.S.C. § 1201, which is

money-mandating for the purposes of the Tucker Act.” (citing Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167,

1174–75 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).

10

1993)). “The Court will uphold a decision of ‘less than ideal clarity,’ if the Court can

reasonably discern the Board’s actions.” Dillard v. United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 214,

227 (2023) (citing Sokol v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 144, 151 (2015)), quoted in

Martin v. United States, 175 Fed. Cl. 239, 276 (2025); accord Bowman Transp., Inc. v.

Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285–86 (1974). “Moreover, ‘military

administrators are presumed to act lawfully and in good faith like other public

officers, and the military is entitled to substantial deference in the governance of its

affairs.” Martin, 175 Fed. Cl. at 262 (quoting Dodson, 988 F.2d at 1204) (additional

citations omitted); accord Voge v. United States, 844 F.2d 776, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

(“Judicial deference must be ‘at its apogee’ in matters pertaining to the military and

national defense.” (first quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981); and then

citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953))).

Nevertheless, the ABCMR must explicitly analyze and make findings with

respect to “all relevant criteria” under the applicable regulations. See Kelly v. United

States, 69 F.4th 887, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Failure to do so renders an ABCMR

decision arbitrary and capricious. See Kelly v. United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 114, 130

(2021), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 69 F.4th 887; Kelly, 69 F.4th at 896

(agreeing that a decision by the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) was

arbitrary and capricious because the BCNR did not explicitly analyze and make

findings with respect to “all relevant criteria enumerated” in applicable regulations).

II. Fitness Determinations

By statute, when a military Secretary deems a member of the armed forces

with fewer than twenty years of service “unfit to perform the duties of the member’s

office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical disability incurred while entitled to

basic pay,” the member may be medically retired or separated if certain other

conditions are satisfied. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (medical retirement), with id.

§ 1203(a) (medical separation). For medical retirement, the diagnosed disability

must, among other things, be “of a permanent nature and stable,” be “based upon

accepted medical principles,” and merit a disability rating of “at least 30 percent

under the standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the [VA] at the time of

the determination.” See id. § 1201(b)(1), (b)(3)(B). The bar for separation is lower:

separation is proper where the disability “is or may be of a permanent nature” and

yields a disability rating of “less than 30 percent.” See id. § 1203(b)(3), (b)(4)(A).

As for substantive fitness determinations, the DoD and the Army have

promulgated governing instructions and regulations, respectively, in accordance with

10 U.S.C. § 1216(a). Under this regulatory scheme, soldiers are presumed fit for duty

11

absent a showing of preponderant evidence to the contrary.23 DoDI 1332.18 ¶ 6.5

(Aug. 5, 2014); Army Reg. 635-40 ¶ 5-1. According to the DoD Instruction:

A Service member may be considered unfit when:

a. The evidence establishes that the member, due to disability, is

unable to reasonably perform the duties of their office, grade, rank,

or rating, including those during a remaining period of Reserve

obligation; or

b. The evidence establishes that their disability:

(1) Represents a decided medical risk to their health or to the

welfare or safety of other members; or

(2) Imposes unreasonable requirements on the military to

maintain or protect the Service member.

DoDI 1332.18 ¶ 6.2; accord Army Reg. 635-40 ¶¶ 5-1, 5-3. Paragraph a. accords with

the statutory language included in 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a) and 1203(a). For enlisted

soldiers, the Army Regulation further defines the applicable duties as “[t]he duties

of an enlisted Soldier’s PMOS at the Soldier’s current rank and skill level.”

Army Reg. 635-40 ¶ 5-2. Paragraph b. of the DoD Instruction codifies what are

commonly referred to as the “risk and burden” factors. Although not mentioned in

the governing statutes, this Court has ruled that the risk and burden factors can be

decisive. As explained in Hassay v. United States, for example, a finding that

continued military service would pose “a decided medical risk” under paragraph b.

precludes a determination that the service member is able to reasonably perform

their duties under paragraph a. 150 Fed. Cl. 467, 479 & n.10 (2020).

In Count I, Mr. White charges that the ABCMR misapplied the above

instructions and regulations in assessing his claim. As an initial matter, the Court

addresses the MEB’s and PEB’s citations to SPC White’s prior Regular Army MOS

(i.e., 15B) rather than his assigned Army Reserve MOS (i.e., 25N). AR 399, 416.

Mr. White argues that by focusing on his Regular Army MOS rather than his Army

Reserve MOS, the PEB completed the wrong analysis. To the extent this could have

23 During oral argument, counsel for Mr. White asserted that a soldier is presumed fit only where the

soldier in fact desires to be found fit. While the presumption of fitness is nominally based on “the

presumption that the Soldier desires to be found fit for duty,” Army Reg. 635-40 ¶ 5-6(a), the applicable

regulation further provides that “[a] Soldier will be considered unfit when the preponderance of

evidence establishes that the Soldier, due to disability,” meets the legal standard of unfitness, id. ¶ 5-1.

The burden thus remains on the party seeking to prove unfitness to do so by preponderant evidence,

regardless of whether the soldier desires to be found fit.

12

been legal error by the PEB, it was corrected by the ABCMR, which correctly

identified Mr. White’s Army Reserve MOS and explained:

There is no evidence of record [SPC White] ever attended and

successfully completed [Active Duty Training (ADT)] for MOS 25N

qualification or was ever awarded MOS 25N as either his primary or

secondary MOS while in the [Army Reserve]. The evidence of record

shows [SPC White]’s only awarded MOS was 15B, which was awarded

during his period of service in the Regular Army; therefore, that is his

MOS of record.

AR 25.

Yet Mr. White is correct in his charge that the ABCMR was required—and

failed—to perform a task-by-task assessment of his reported PTSD symptoms against

the specific duties of a Nodal Network Systems Operator-Maintainer (MOS 25N).

Despite the intuitive appeal of the government’s argument that an employer cannot

be expected to evaluate the specific abilities of an employee who does not show up for

work, the military is not an ordinary employer and, of course, service members are

not ordinary employees. Even where a service member has stopped attending drill

and training, in determining that the service member’s disability is not unfitting, the

military is required to list the service member’s specific MOS duties and explain why

the disability does not prevent the service member from performing those duties.

See Kelly, 69 F.4th at 896.

Instead of listing the specific duties associated with MOS 25N, the ABCMR

concluded from Mr. White’s ability to perform in his prior MOS, his ability to perform

a civilian job, and his failure to demonstrate a meaningful difference between these

activities, that he did not prove that PTSD prevented him from doing his job:

In deciding whether [Mr. White]’s PTSD prevented him from

performing his duties, the Board determined [Mr. White] did not

establish an inability to perform the duties of a [25N] Nodal Network

Systems Operator[-]Maintainer in the Army Reserve . . . . The Board

noted [Mr. White] had been able to perform his previously assigned

duties for several years while still on active duty, and then elected to

join the Army Reserve. It was only after enlisting in the Reserve that

[Mr. White] started to allege his inability to perform any of his assigned

duties. [Mr. White] does not explain why he had been able to perform

the duties of his prior MOS, but not those of his MOS in the Army

Reserve. . . . [T]he Board also noted [Mr. White] did not provide any

information on his ability to maintain a civilian job, which would have

strengthened his case if his PTSD were truly debilitating.

13

. . . Ultimately, given [Mr. White]’s successful completion of his

deployment and active duty term, the Board was convinced that

[Mr. White]’s failure to perform in the Army Reserve was more due to

his failure to show up for duty than due to his PTSD. The Board took

note of [Mr. White]’s assertion that the failure to report for duty was due

to symptoms of PTSD; however, [Mr. White]’s former positive

performance on active duty and his decision to enlist in the Reserve led

the Board to conclude that [Mr. White]’s PTSD was not a significant

cause of his failure to attend training or scheduled duty.

AR 58–59. This analysis, while relevant, falls short of the specific duty-by-duty

assessment that the applicable instructions and regulations require under Kelly,

69 F.4th 887. Accordingly, this case must be remanded to the ABCMR to perform

such an assessment in the first instance. On remand, although the Board may choose

to reiterate much of the analysis it already performed, it must supplement its

analysis with an explicit discussion of SPC White’s MOS 25N duties and whether

PTSD rendered him unable to perform them.

Mr. White next argues that the ABCMR improperly disregarded his Army

Reserve commander’s concerns for his safety and the welfare of the unit and failed to

consider the burden the military would have had to bear to protect him from the

threats posed by his PTSD. The commander’s February 23, 2018 statement, included

in a Memorandum for Record, reads:

SPC Nathan White is currently under my command . . . . He currently

has health problems that he states prevent him from drilling. One such

health problem is his mental health. During the MEB process he

reported having a mental breakdown and his physician recommended

that he not attend Battle Assemblies because of his condition. I am

excusing him from participating as it is not beneficial to the Army

Reserve or the Soldier. I am concerned about his safety and the safety of

the unit due to his reported PTSD.

AR 425.24

Contrary to Mr. White’s assertions, the ABCMR duly “evaluated [SPC White]’s

fitness for duty based upon . . . whether his PTSD posed a medical risk to his health

or to the welfare or safety of other personnel.” AR 58. The Board recounted

SPC White’s June 2011 mental health episode, concurred with his service-connected

PTSD diagnosis, and acknowledged his then-current commander’s expressed

concerns. In discounting—rather than dismissing—this evidence, the ABCMR:

inventoried the countervailing data points documenting SPC White’s treatment and

24 SPC White’s staff sergeant also expressed concerns about SPC White’s mental health and physical

limitations in a March 12, 2018 letter addressed to the PEB President. AR 428–29.

14

recovery; highlighted SPC White’s continued active-duty service throughout the

remaining four years of his service in the Regular Army; noted the soldier’s

March 2015 enlistment in the Army Reserve; took into account the commander’s lack

of medical expertise and her personal unfamiliarity with SPC White’s reported PTSD

symptoms, citing SPC White’s chronic absenteeism from training and drill; and noted

SPC White’s contemporaneous civilian employment in a similar field of work. After

weighing the evidence, “the Board determined [Mr. White] did not establish . . . that

he posed a health or safety risk to himself or others.”25 AR 58. On this record, the

Court cannot find that the ABCMR failed to properly consider whether SPC White’s

PTSD posed a risk to himself or the welfare of his unit.

Although the ABCMR performed the required analysis and rendered the

requisite findings with respect to the “risk” factor, the Court cannot, in light of the

Federal Circuit’s precedent in Kelly, 69 F.4th 887, simply infer that the ABCMR’s

“risk” analysis and findings apply with equal force to the “burden” factor. It is not

clear what daylight, if any, there may be between the risk and burden factors, but

the Court leaves it to the ABCMR to explicitly consider—and render findings

regarding—the burden factor on remand. In other words, the ABCMR must explicitly

analyze and state its conclusion in the first instance as to whether SPC White’s PTSD

“[i]mpose[d] unreasonable requirements on the military to maintain or protect” him.

DoDI 1332.18 ¶ 6.2.b(2).

III. Liberal Consideration

In Count II, Mr. White asserts the ABCMR violated 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h) by

failing to apply “liberal consideration” to the fitness determination underlying his

disability retirement claim. On this count, the parties disagree as to (1) whether the

ABCMR is ever statutorily required to apply liberal consideration to fitness

determinations; (2) assuming the ABCMR is required to apply liberal consideration

to fitness determinations in some cases, whether this is such a case; and (3) further

assuming liberal consideration is triggered in this case, whether liberal consideration

requires something more than the consideration the ABCMR already afforded

Mr. White.

Under § 1552(h), when a former service member petitions a BCM/NR26 to

review their “discharge or dismissal,” and the claim “is based in whole or in part on

matters relating to [PTSD] or traumatic brain injury [(TBI)] . . . related to combat or

military sexual trauma,” BCM/NRs “shall . . . review the claim with liberal

consideration to the claimant that [PTSD] or [TBI] potentially contributed to the

circumstances resulting in the discharge or dismissal or to the original

25 Of note, a March 19, 2018 psychologist’s report that Mr. White complains the ABCMR ignored

concludes with the following mental competency statement: “[SPC White] is NOT a danger to himself

or others.” AR 446.

26 “BCM/NR” refers to all of the military record correction boards, including the ABCMR.

15

characterization of the claimant’s discharge or dismissal.” Id. (emphasis added). As

noted supra, the parties’ principal dispute is whether fitness determinations may

ever be subject to liberation consideration.

Addressing this legal issue, the ABCMR noted: “per current applicable policy”

interpreting 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h), liberal consideration categorically does not apply to

fitness determinations. AR 58. The referenced policy is found in an April 4, 2024

memorandum issued by then–Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and

Readiness Ashish S. Vazirani (the “Vazirani Memo”). Issued in the wake of the

Federal Circuit’s decision in Doyon, the Vazirani Memo includes the following

directives regarding mental health condition–based claims for retroactive medical

retirements and separations under 10 U.S.C. § 1552:

It is DoD policy that the application of liberal consideration does

not apply to fitness determinations, an entirely separate Military

Department determination regarding whether, prior to “severance from

military service,” the Applicant was medically fit for military service

(i.e., fitness determination). While the BCM/NRs are expected to apply

liberal consideration to discharge relief requests seeking a change to the

narrative reason for discharge in accord with Doyon, they should not

apply liberal consideration to retroactively assess the Applicant’s

medical fitness for continued service prior to discharge in order to

determine how the narrative reason should be revised.

...

Accordingly, in the case of an Applicant described in 10 U.S.C.

§ 1552(h)(1) who seeks a correction to their records to reflect eligibility

for a medical retirement or separation, the BCM/NR will bifurcate its

review. First, the BCM/NR will apply liberal consideration to the eligible

Applicant’s assertion that combat- or [military sexual trauma–]related

PTSD or TBI potentially contributed to the circumstances resulting in

their discharge or dismissal to determine whether any discharge relief,

such as an upgrade or change to the narrative reason for discharge, is

appropriate. After making that determination, the BCM/NR will then

separately assess the individual’s claim of medical unfitness for

continued service due to that PTSD or TBI condition as a discreet [sic]

issue, without applying liberal consideration to the unfitness claim or

carryover of any of the findings made when applying liberal

consideration.

ECF 45 at 445–46 (emphasis added). Limiting the application of the liberal

consideration evidentiary standard, the Vazirani Memo further explained:

16

[A]ny request for a medical retirement or separation necessarily asserts

the existence of an error or injustice in the previous failure of the

Service to discharge the individual for unfitness, rather than in the

circumstances of individual’s actual discharge or dismissal. As such,

10 U.S.C. § 1552(h) cannot be read to require the application of liberal

consideration to assess whether a qualifying PTSD or TBI condition

potentially contributed to the circumstances resulting in a medical

discharge which never occurred.

Id. at 445 (emphasis in original). Mr. White argues that, in instructing the military

record correction boards to categorically refrain from applying liberal consideration

to fitness determinations, the Vazirani Memo is contrary to 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h). The

Court agrees.

In the above-quoted passage, the Vazirani Memo seeks to distinguish between

“the previous failure of the Service to discharge the individual for unfitness,” to which

liberal consideration purportedly cannot apply, and “the circumstances of the

individual’s actual discharge or dismissal,” to which liberal consideration would

apply. This case demonstrates why the distinction drawn in the Vazirani Memo is

both contradictory and unworkable. Mr. White asserts error in the “failure of the

service to discharge [him] for unfitness” on the very ground that the ABCMR should

have recognized that PTSD “contributed to the circumstances of [his] discharge or

dismissal.” ECF 27 at 44–45; 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h). That is, Mr. White asserts that

PTSD contributed to the circumstances of his separation by preventing him from

showing up to drill and training, thereby rendering him unfit and requiring his

medical retirement.

The Vazirani Memo suggests, and the government maintains, that the

“circumstances resulting in” a soldier’s discharge should be limited by the specific

narrative reason recited in the soldier’s DD Form 214 or other discharge order. Here,

for instance, the government cites SPC White’s physical disability (i.e., lumbosacral

strain) as the narrative basis for his unfitness-based separation—a reason entirely

independent of his mental health–based PTSD claim. The Court rejects the

government’s attempt to construe the “circumstances resulting in” a soldier’s

discharge so narrowly. The relevant inquiry—whether a soldier’s PTSD “potentially

contributed to the circumstances resulting in [their] discharge or dismissal . . . ,” see

10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B)—reaches beyond the military’s stated reason for the

challenged separation to the factual underpinnings resulting in the end of one’s

military career. The “circumstances resulting in” a soldier’s discharge must include,

at a minimum, any performance issues that triggered the proceedings culminating in

the discharge. Here, those issues would be SPC White’s chronic failure to attend drill

and MOS training while in the Army Reserve. The ABCMR could not conceivably

review such issues with liberal consideration while, at the same time, shielding its

fitness inquiry from liberal consideration. When liberal consideration applies, it

reaches both the factual underpinnings of a service member’s discharge and any

17

fitness determination based on those underlying facts. Invoking the basic tenet of

improv, these claims must be constructed in functional terms: “Yes, And . . . .”

This approach closely follows the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Doyon. As

here, Doyon involved a former service member challenging the underlying basis for

his disability separation in an effort to secure a medical retirement under § 1201(a).

58 F.4th at 1237, 1240–41. Specifically, the Vietnam War veteran sought to correct

his military record to reflect an unfitting service-connected PTSD diagnosis rather

than the unsuitable personality disorder diagnosis cited in his discharge. Id. The

Federal Circuit rejected the government’s position that the liberal consideration

evidentiary standard codified in § 1552(h) “is limited to misconduct-based upgrades

or modifications to a service member’s characterization of service (characterization

upgrades)—e.g., changing a service member’s discharge from dishonorable or less-

than-honorable to honorable.” Doyon, 58 F.4th at 1242–48. Rather, the Federal

Circuit ruled that liberal consideration applied more broadly to the narrative reason

for the discharge, explaining: “Had Congress intended to limit liberal consideration

only to upgrading or modifying a service member’s characterization of service, the

statute would not include the alter[n]ative ‘circumstances resulting in the discharge’

clause as an additional, separate ground for liberal consideration.” Id. at 1247 (citing

10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B)).

Moreover, “a veteran’s challenge to the recorded narrative reason for discharge

necessarily encompasses the factual determinations necessary to correct or maintain

the narrative reason.” Doyon, 58 F.4th at 1244. As noted supra, in the case of a

veteran seeking medical retirement based on unfitness, it is unclear how a BCM/NR

could possibly apply liberal consideration to the “factual determinations necessary to

correct or maintain the narrative reason” without applying liberal consideration to

the underlying fitness determination. Id. Indeed, nothing in the statutory or

regulatory scheme directs the bifurcated approach adopted in the post-Doyon

Vazirani Memo, whereunder liberal consideration applies to a veteran’s challenge to

the narrative reason for discharge but not to the fitness determination on which the

narrative reason is based. For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Vazirani

Memo is contrary to law and that fitness determinations are not categorically

excluded from the application of liberal consideration.

The next issue is whether the ABCMR was required to apply liberal

consideration in this case. The Court, however, cannot answer this question in the

first instance. Liberal consideration is triggered only where a claimant’s PTSD or

TBI is “related to combat or military sexual trauma, as determined by the Secretary

concerned.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(1) (emphasis added). The Secretary of the Army,

acting through the ABCMR, has made no such determination with respect to

SPC White. Thus, on remand, the ABCMR should (1) determine in the first instance

whether SPC White’s PTSD was related to combat or military sexual trauma and, if

so, (2) apply liberal consideration to the issue whether his PTSD “potentially

18

contributed to the circumstances resulting in” his discharge—including, insofar as it

is implicated, whether SPC White’s PTSD rendered him unfit for service.

Even if the ABCMR determines that SPC White’s PTSD was combat- or

military sexual trauma–related and, consequently, that it should apply liberal

consideration to his claim, however, it is unclear whether Mr. White’s claim will fare

any better on remand. In the Court’s view, liberal consideration does not have quite

the substantive force that Mr. White contends it does. True, liberal consideration

would require the ABCMR to afford Mr. White’s claim particularly careful

consideration, which the Board indicated it did not do. AR 58 (declining to apply

liberal consideration). But liberal consideration would neither alter Mr. White’s

burden to prove unfitness by preponderant evidence nor require the ABCMR to pen

a more detailed rationale for denying his claim.27 These conclusions become clear

through analysis of what, exactly, “liberal consideration” means.

Chapters 61 and 79 of Title 10, United States Code, addressing Retirement or

Separation for Physical Disability and Correction of Military Records, respectively,

do not define “liberal consideration.” See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201–22, 1551–59.

Accordingly, the Court must turn to the origin of the nebulous phrase for guidance.

See Percipient.AI, Inc. v. United States, 153 F.4th 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“Where

Congress employs a term of art obviously transplanted from another legal source, it

brings the old soil with it.” (quoting George v. McDonough, 596 U.S. 740, 746 (2022))),

cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, No. 25-428, 2026 WL 79975 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2026) (mem.).

Three years before Congress enacted § 1552(h), then–Secretary of Defense Charles

(“Chuck”) T. Hagel issued guidance to BCM/NRs considering PTSD-based discharge

upgrade requests. The September 3, 2014 memorandum and attached guidance

(the “Hagel Memo”) shined a light on the “previously unrecognized” mental health

condition now diagnosed as PTSD, particularly as it related to Vietnam War veterans.

ECF 45 at 436–37. The guidance focused on veterans whose characterization of

service was Other than Honorable (a/k/a a “bad paper” discharge) based on perceived

misconduct potentially attributable to undiagnosed PTSD.28 The guidance declared:

“Liberal consideration will be given in petitions for changes in characterization of

service to Service treatment record entries which document one or more symptoms

which meet the diagnostic criteria of [PTSD] or related conditions.” Id. at 438. The

guidance then specified two areas of application: determining whether PTSD existed

at the time of service/discharge and, if so, assessing whether the mental health

condition mitigates the reason for the bad paper discharge. Explaining the need for

this approach, the Hagel Memo highlighted the difficulties in documenting a

27 For the reasons explained elsewhere in this opinion, however, the Board is required to offer a more

detailed written rationale than it has on other issues, such as risk, burden, and deployability.

28 A “‘bad paper’ discharge” generally refers to any characterization of service less than Honorable.

19

previously unrecognized mental health condition and establishing a causal nexus

between that condition and the cited misconduct.

The term “liberal consideration” was adopted by Congress in enacting the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (FY2017 NDAA), Pub. L.

No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000 (Dec. 23, 2016). Through Section 535, Congress amended

the statute authorizing Discharge Review Boards (DRB), 10 U.S.C. § 1553—distinct

from BCM/NRs, 10 U.S.C. § 1552—which review applications for changes in the

narrative reason for, and character of, a service member’s discharge.29 Relevant here,

Congress added subsection 1553(d)(3), directing DRBs to review the cases of former

service members whose applications are based in whole or in part on a claim that

PTSD (or TBI) potentially contributed to the circumstances resulting in their

bad paper discharge “with liberal consideration.” See 130 Stat. at 2123–24 (current

version at 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d)(3)).30 The amendment’s sponsor, Senator Gary C.

Peters, explained:

While scars, lost limbs, and other injuries are readily apparent to

the eye, there are thousands of veterans coping with the invisible

wounds of war. We have far too many servicemembers who are suffering

from trauma-related conditions such as [PTSD] or [TBI]. Unfortunately,

many of these have received a less-than-honorable discharge, also

known as a bad paper discharge. These former servicemembers often

receive bad paper discharges for minor misconduct—the same type of

misconduct that is often linked to behavior seen in those suffering from

PTSD, TBI, and other trauma-related conditions.

...

. . . Bad paper discharges make former servicemembers who are

suffering from service-connected conditions ineligible for a number of

benefits that they need the most. . . .

...

This amendment builds upon the policy guidance issued by

former Defense Secretary and Vietnam veteran Chuck Hagel. The

20[1]4 Hagel memo instructed liberal consideration to be given when

reviewing discharge status upgrade petitions for PTSD-related cases at

29 Narrative “Reason for Discharge” and “Character of Discharge” are terms of art denoting standard

information included in a service member’s formal discharge papers (usually a DD Form 214). See

DoDI 1332.28 § E3.1.3 (Apr. 4, 2004). Narrative “Reason for Discharge” refers to the narrative for

separation (e.g., “completion of required active service”) included in Box 28. “Character of Discharge”

refers to the characterization of service (e.g., Honorable) included in Box 24. See, e.g., AR 587

(SPC White’s May 29, 2015 DD Form 214 for his discharge from active duty).

30 More recent amendments to § 1553(d)(3) are immaterial to this analysis.

20

the military department boards for correction of military and naval

records. The Peters amendment would codify the commonsense

principles of the Hagel memo, ensuring that liberal consideration will

be given to petitions for changes in characterization of service related to

PTSD or TBI before [DRBs].

162 CONG. REC. S3258–59 (daily ed. May 26, 2016) (statement of Senator Gary C.

Peters). Given the explicit statement that the amendment to the statute “builds

upon” the Hagel Memo’s instruction to apply “liberal consideration” to certain

military discharge claims, the term should be understood consistently with its

meaning in the Hagel Memo—at least as it is used in § 1553. Percipient.AI, 153 F.4th

at 1236 (quoting George, 596 U.S. at 746).

The following year, then–Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and

Readiness Anthony M. Kurta issued clarifying guidance. The August 25, 2017

memorandum and attached guidance (the “Kurta Memo”) made clear that the

military’s liberal consideration standard for mental health conditions, now codified

in § 1553(d)(3), applied to both DRBs and BCM/NRs. The Kurta Memo then outlined

the areas of “discharge relief” where liberal consideration should apply: first,

determining whether PTSD existed during military service/at discharge; and second,

assessing whether the mental health condition excuses or mitigates the reason for

discharge. ECF 45 at 441–44. The Kurta Memo also clarified the types of discharge-

related relief service members may seek, including changes to a service member’s

characterization of service, narrative reason for discharge and coinciding separation

code, and reenlistment code. Similar to the Hagel Memo, the Kurta Memo

highlighted the need for adopting the liberal consideration standard in light of

practical evidentiary issues that had historically plagued mental health condition–

based claims.

Two consistent evidentiary principles emerge from the Hagel and Kurta

Memos. First, liberal consideration moderates the scrutiny with which evidence must

be examined when determining whether service-connected PTSD existed during

service and/or at discharge. See Jeanpierre v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 11, 18 (2025)

(“At minimum, the liberal consideration standard is a relaxed evidentiary standard.”

(citing Bee v. United States, No. 21-1970, 2024 WL 3912596, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 23,

2024), appeal docketed, No. 24-2306 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 12, 2024)31)). Second, DRBs and

BCM/NRs are required to carefully consider32—and then, in writing, explicitly

address—whether and to what extent service-connected PTSD or TBI excuses or

mitigates the misconduct underlying the service member’s discharge.

31 Oral argument in Bee is scheduled for February 6, 2026.

32 When applying liberal consideration, the military record correction boards should refer to the Hagel

and Kurta Memos for more detailed guidance on what this consideration entails.

21

Four months later, Congress passed the FY 2018 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 115-91,

131 Stat. 1283 (Dec. 12, 2017). Through Section 520, Congress added subsection (h)

to 10 U.S.C. § 1552. 131 Stat. at 1379. The new subsection provides:

(1) This subsection applies to a former member of the armed forces

whose claim under this section for review of a discharge or dismissal is

based in whole or in part on matters relating to [PTSD] or [TBI] as

supporting rationale, or as justification for priority consideration, and

whose [PTSD] or [TBI] is related to combat or military sexual trauma,

as determined by the Secretary concerned.

(2) In the case of a claimant described in paragraph (1), a board

established under subsection (a)(1) shall—

(A) review medical evidence of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs or a

civilian health care provider that is presented by the claimant; and

(B) review the claim with liberal consideration to the claimant that

[PTSD] or [TBI] potentially contributed to the circumstances

resulting in the discharge or dismissal or to the original

characterization of the claimant’s discharge or dismissal.

10 U.S.C. § 1552(h) (emphasis added).33 This language is nearly identical to that

used in subsection 1553(d),34 signaling the more-lenient evidentiary standard applies

equally in proceedings before DRBs and BCM/NRs under the in pari materia canon

of statutory construction. Strategic Hous. Fin. Corp. of Travis Cnty. v. United States,

608 F.3d 1317, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Under th[e in pari materia] canon, courts

should interpret statutes with similar language that generally address the same

subject matter together, ‘as if they were one law.’” (some internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972)));

cf. Monsalvo v. Bondi, 604 U.S. 712, 726 (2025) (“[I]dentical words and phrases within

the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.” (quoting Powerex

Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007))).

To be clear, the liberal consideration evidentiary standard does not disturb the

presumption of fitness or shift the burden of persuasion. Thus, assuming arguendo

that liberal consideration applies, to convert his current physical disability–based

separation into a mental health–augmented medical retirement, Mr. White must

rebut the presumption of his mental health fitness and prove by preponderant

33 Section 1552 has since been amended four times, but the original language of subsection (h) remains.

34 The 2018 NDAA included a conforming amendment tailoring certain language in subsection 1553(d)

to align with subsection 1552(h). See 131 Stat. at 1379. Only immaterial differences remain. Compare

10 U.S.C. § 1553(d)(3)(A)(ii) (referring to a “case” and a “former member”), with id. § 1552(h)(2)(B)

(referring to a “claim” and a “claimant”).

22

evidence that his PTSD rendered him unfit for continued Army Reserve service.

Heisig, 719 F.2d at 1157; see DoDI 1332.18 ¶ 6.6; Army Reg. 635-40 ¶ 5-1. “When

Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a ‘longstanding administrative

construction,’[35] this Court generally presumes the new provision should be

understood to work in harmony with what has come before.” Monsalvo, 604 U.S. at

725 (first quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297–98 (1981); then citing United

States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546, 553–54 (1993); and then citing FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp.,

476 U.S. 426, 437 (1986)); accord U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n,

590 U.S. 604, 621 (2020) (“[W]hen Congress wishes to ‘alter the fundamental details

of a regulatory scheme,’ . . . we would expect it to speak with the requisite clarity to

place that intent beyond dispute.” (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 515 (2018))). Mr. White’s contentions to the

contrary are unavailing.

Invoking a provision of the Kurta Memo, Mr. White posits that, when a service

member proffers evidence of service-connected PTSD, the PTSD is presumed to have

caused the behavior warranting that service member’s separation or discharge.

Proceeding from this premise, he further asserts this presumption may only be

rebutted by “clear evidence to the contrary.” ECF 27 at 16 (emphasis omitted)

(quoting ECF 27-6 at 4). This reversed presumption reflects a misreading of the

Kurta Memo. In context, under the heading “Was there a condition or experience?”

the Kurta Memo provides: “Absent clear evidence to the contrary, a diagnosis

rendered by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist is evidence the veteran had a

condition that may excuse or mitigate the discharge.” ECF 27-6 at 4 (emphasis

added). Read plainly, this portion of the Kurta Memo creates a presumption that a

diagnosis by a licensed medical professional serves as evidence that the service

member had a mental health condition that might (i.e., “may”) excuse or mitigate

their separation or discharge—not that such evidence should be assigned any

particular weight or that a service member’s alleged condition in fact excuses or

mitigates their discharge.

Having clarified what liberal consideration does—and does not—mean, the

Court now considers the substance of the ABCMR’s decision. The ABCMR accepted

Mr. White’s service-connected PTSD diagnosis. The Board then assessed the service

member’s fitness for duty. In doing so, the ABCMR explicitly addressed whether

PTSD excused or mitigated SPC White’s absences from drill and training—i.e., the

behavior that undisputedly led to Mr. White’s separation from the Army Reserve.

As explained by the ABCMR:

In deciding whether [Mr. White]’s PTSD prevented him from performing

his duties, the Board determined [Mr. White] did not establish an

inability to perform the duties of a Nodal Network Systems

35 The requirement that unfitness be proven by preponderant evidence is “longstanding,” as it dates

back to at least 1983, when the Federal Circuit decided Heisig. See 719 F.2d at 1157.

23

Operator[-]Maintainer [(MOS 25N2)] in the Army Reserve or that he

posed a health or safety risk to himself or others. Rather, the evidence

showed that he generally did not show up at all to his assigned duties.

AR 58 (emphasis added). In support, the Board cited SPC White’s successful

completion of his Regular Army term of enlistment, subsequent civilian employment

and, as detailed supra, found the safety and welfare concerns expressed by

SPC White’s chain of command lacking in personal knowledge and medical expertise.

Addressing “[Mr. White]’s assertion that [his] failure to report for duty was due to

symptoms of PTSD,” the ABCMR explained that the former service member’s years

of “positive performance on active duty and his decision to enlist in the [Army]

Reserve led the Board to conclude that [Mr. White]’s PTSD was not a significant cause

of his failure to attend training or scheduled duty.”36 AR 59.

Put differently, Mr. White advanced a principal argument that his PTSD

“potentially contributed to the circumstances resulting in the discharge” under

10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B): that his failure to show up to drill and training, which

resulted in his discharge, was symptomatic of his PTSD. Assuming liberal

consideration applies to Mr. White’s claim, the ABCMR was required to carefully

consider and then explicitly address the merits of this argument. While the ABCMR

appears to have explicitly addressed whether PTSD contributed to the circumstances

of SPC White’s discharge, the Court is not convinced that the Board carefully

considered the merits of that argument in accordance with the Hagel and Kurta

Memos—particularly in light of the Board’s statement, at the outset of its opinion,

that it would not apply the liberal consideration standard to Mr. White’s claim. If, on

remand, the Board determines that liberal consideration is triggered and that PTSD

did not contribute to the circumstances resulting in SPC White’s discharge, the Court

cannot require the Board to explicitly discuss more than it already did in its June 13,

2023 decision. Although helpful in any post-remand review, to require such precision

would impermissibly stray from the statutory language, alter the longstanding

36 The ABCMR’s decision is supported by the ARBA Medical Advisor’s assessment:

There is evidence [SPC White] was absent from his place of duty [in] the [Army

Reserve] on numerous occasions for a variety of reported reasons. While there is a

nexus between avoidant behavior and PTSD, this is not sufficient evidence of a mental

health condition[ that] would be determined to be medically unfitting. The applicant

was not placed on a psychiatric profile for this condition, he did not submit any

documentation that his behavioral health condition has adversely affected his Army

duties, he never required inpatient psychiatric treatment, and he did not attend

therapy specifically for this condition for over six months without improvement.

AR 57.

24

requirement that unfitness be proven by preponderant evidence, and impinge on the

discretion properly afforded to the military in making fitness determinations.37, 38

IV. Consideration of Evidence

In Count III, Mr. White contends the ABCMR either ignored or failed to

properly consider certain evidence supporting his medical unfitness/retirement claim,

including his formal PEB hearing testimony, a psychologist’s diagnoses during the

IDES process, his VA disability ratings, and the safety and welfare concerns

expressed by SPC White’s wife and former Army Reserve commander.39 On these

issues—even assuming liberal consideration applies—Mr. White fails to prove

“by cogent and clearly convincing evidence that the correction board acted arbitrarily,

capriciously, contrary to law, or that its determination was unsupported by

substantial evidence.” Mote, 110 F.4th at 1354 (quoting Dodson, 988 F.2d at

1204–05). While the ABCMR must explain the rationale for its decision in writing,

Army Reg. 15-185 ¶ 2-13, that obligation is limited: “the [military record correction

board] is not required to detail its assessment of every piece of evidence in the record,

nor resemble ‘a model of analytic precision to survive a challenge.’” Osburn v. United

States, 171 Fed. Cl. 38, 45 (2024) (first quoting Dickson v. Sec’y of Def., 68 F.3d 1396,

1404 (D.C. Cir. 1995); and then citing Sokol, 120 Fed. Cl. at 151), aff’d, No. 24-2025,

2025 WL 3719434 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2025). Stated differently, the decision need only

include enough detail to enable the Court to reasonably discern the ABCMR’s

analytical path. Sokol, 120 Fed. Cl. at 151 (citing cases). At bottom, it is the

ABCMR’s conclusion (i.e., SPC White’s PTSD was not unfitting) that is reviewed for

substantial evidence, not the ABCMR’s decision to focus its written opinion on some

evidence over other evidence, or the ABCMR’s assessment and assignment of

comparative evidentiary weight. See Heisig, 719 F.2d at 1157.40

37 This Court recently noted that “the presence or absence [of] the phrase ‘liberal consideration’ should

not dictate whether liberal consideration was actually applied.” Bee, 2024 WL 3912596, at *9, quoted

in Jeanpierre, 176 Fed. Cl. at 32. That principal does not extend to situations where, as here, the

Board explicitly stated it did not apply liberal consideration.

38 To the extent the Board decides to deliberately review the evidence using the “liberal consideration”

standard, the Court reminds the Board of the “concepts” included in “liberal consideration,” as outlined

in the Kurta Memo. ECF 27-6 at 5–6.

39 Having already addressed Mr. White’s claim regarding his Army Reserve commander’s concerns,

the Court will not revisit that issue.

40 Mr. White’s reliance on Fuentes v. United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 433 (2021), and Valles-Prieto v. United

States, 159 Fed. Cl. 611 (2022), is unavailing. In both Fuentes and Valles-Prieto, this Court found that

the military record correction boards erred in concluding that “no evidence” supported an unfitness

determination notwithstanding the existence of contradictory evidence in the record presented. See

Fuentes, 157 Fed. Cl. at 463; Valles-Prieto, 159 Fed. Cl at 617–18. Here, as in Mazarji v. United States,

the military record correction board reviewed and accurately summarized the entire record before

crediting medical and anecdotal evidence showing that SPC White’s claimed medical condition was

not unfitting. See 164 Fed. Cl. 298, 310–11 (2023).

25

During his April 10, 2018 appearance before the formal PEB, SPC White

testified about the impact of his PTSD symptoms on his personal and family life,

civilian career, and Army Reserve service. Addressing his civilian employment as a

machinist, SPC White spoke of being easily offended and quick to anger. In one

exchange, SPC White expressed that he had been concerned about losing his civilian

job when he misinterpreted a “joke” in a text from his production manager.

Consistent with the ABCMR’s findings, however, SPC White made no mention of

chronic absenteeism or difficulties in showing up for his civilian job.41 ECF 27-1 at 9.

The ABCMR accurately recounted the sum and substance of this evidence. See, e.g.,

AR 13, 19–20, 31–32, 35–36, 41, 45. While SPC White’s PEB testimony and his wife’s

letter are not specifically cited in the Board Discussion section of the ABCMR’s

written decision, the relative import of this evidence is referenced: “Finally, the Board

also noted the applicant did not provide any information on his ability to maintain a

civilian job, which would have strengthened his case if his PTSD were truly

debilitating.” AR 59.

With respect to his concomitant Army Reserve duties, SPC White testified:

I was struggling to even show up [to drill] because I felt like, one,

[my Army Reserve unit] didn’t really care about me as a soldier and

about my situation; and two, there’s been a few times where my back

went out . . . and I would have a doctor’s note and I’d request the

[rescheduling of training], and they kept denying me because I didn’t

have an updated [physical fitness] test.

ECF 27-1 at 9. As addressed supra, the ABCMR did consider (and address)

SPC White’s statement that his PTSD excused or mitigated his chronic absenteeism

and consequent discharge. The ABCMR was simply unpersuaded in light of the

volume of contemporaneous evidence to the contrary.

Mr. White’s citations to the psychologist’s October 27, 2017 PTSD Disability

Benefits Questionnaire (DBQ), supplemented on March 19, 2018, and his

VA disability rating are similarly unavailing. The ABCMR accurately summarized

the history and substance of the PTSD DBQ and resulting VA disability rating.

See, e.g., AR 6, 10–12, 18, 25–26, 30, 33–35. Consistent with the medical advisory

opinion requested from the ARBA, the ABCMR limited their probative value,

explaining:

41 In an April 5, 2018 letter to the PEB, SPC White’s wife reiterated the substance of SPC White’s

testimony regarding the impact of his mental health issues and physical limitations. Similarly absent

from her letter is any mention of Mr. White’s difficulty in showing up for his civilian job. AR 450.

26

[T]his evaluation was initially directed at the applicant’s level of

disability in regard to the VA system of disability. It is not sufficient

evidence to determine the applicant medically unfit for military service

as the result of PTSD.

AR 58; see AR 222–23, 225 (ARBA Medical Advisory Opinions). To be clear,

“VA disability ratings and the exams on which they are based constitute relevant

evidence that must be considered in determining unfitness for duty.” Bee, 2024 WL

3912596, at *15 (citing Valles-Prieto, 159 Fed. Cl. at 618). This is particularly true

where, as here, the medical examination is part of/occurs contemporaneously with

the IDES process. See id.; cf. Hinkle v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 801, 804 (1982)

(per curiam) (VA disability rating issued five years after discharge “has no probative

value” regarding the service member’s fitness for duty at separation). That said,

“VA disability ratings are not binding on the service branches and are ‘in no way

ultimately determinative of claims for military disability retirement.’” Bee, 2024 WL

3912596, at *15 (quoting Hinkle, 229 Ct. Cl. at 805).

As explained in Hinkle: “The awards of the [VA] are in the nature of gratuities

by a grateful nation and extend to nonservice-connected disabilities as well as those

believed to be service-connected. The [VA] does not determine fitness for military

duty, which is the responsibility of the Secretary and military authorities.”

229 Ct. Cl. at 805 (collecting cases). One reason why a VA rating might be

unpersuasive in a fitness inquiry is that, before the VA, reasonable doubt is resolved

in the claimant’s favor; a veteran need only prove that they are as likely as not to

have a service-connected disability and a certain disability rating.42 The cited PTSD

DBQ illustrates this point. The psychologist opines only that “it is at least as likely

as not that [Mr. White’s] PTSD was incurred during his military service,” and that

“[Mr. White’s] PTSD is as likely as not to be ‘unlikely to significantly improve or

deteriorate[.]’” AR 733–34; AR 446. Fitness inquiries, by contrast, require the

claimant to overcome the presumption of fitness and prove unfitness by preponderant

evidence (i.e., more likely than not). DoDI 1332.18 ¶¶ 6.5–6.6; Army Reg. 635-40

¶¶ 5-1, 5-5, 5-6.

Here, the ABCMR found the PTSD DBQ and VA disability rating

unpersuasive. In support, the ABCMR focused on the timeline of medical and

anecdotal evidence documenting SPC White’s June 2011 mental health episode,

positive response to medical treatment, recovery, completed deployment, continued

service on active duty in the Regular Army through 2015, interim enlistment in the

Army Reserve, and continuing engagement in similar civilian employment. While

42 See 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (In VA proceedings, “[w]hen . . . reasonable doubt arises regarding service

origin, the degree of disability, or any other point, such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant.

By reasonable doubt is meant one which exists because of an approximate balance of positive and

negative evidence which does not satisfactorily prove or disprove the claim.”).

27

remand is warranted for other reasons, there was no error in how the ABCMR

weighed the PTSD DBQ and VA disability rating at issue.

V. Deployability

Finally, Mr. White asserts the ABCMR failed to adequately address his

deployability. Per Army Regulation 635-40, deployability is among the list of factors

to be considered in determining whether a Soldier’s medical impairments preclude

the Soldier from reasonably performing their duties. Army Reg. 635-40 ¶ 5-4(a), (e).

The regulation further provides that, absent exceptions not relevant here, “the PEB

will find Soldiers unfit who are medically disqualified for worldwide deployment in a

field or austere environment.” Id. ¶ 5-4(e)(2). Under Kelly, 69 F.4th at 896, failure

to explicitly analyze and make findings with respect to deployability is error.

In rejecting Mr. White’s claim of PTSD-based unfitness, the closest the

ABCMR came to addressing his deployability was in commenting that, “given

[SPC White]’s successful completion of his deployment and active duty term, the

Board was convinced that [SPC White]’s failure to perform in the Army Reserve was

more due to his failure to show up for duty than due to his PTSD.” AR 59 (emphasis

added). This analysis falls short. At best, this might be understood as an analysis of

SPC White’s deployability in or around January 2012, when he completed his

deployment to Afghanistan; but the ABCMR was tasked with considering his

deployability at the time of his discharge proceedings from the Army Reserve, which

began over five years later. See Stine v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 776, 795 (2010),

aff’d, 417 F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). While there is evidence of

SPC White’s mental health deployability leading up to his discharge from the

Army Reserve—including several PULHES scores of “1,” indicating “deployable”

psychiatric condition—the ABCMR did not discuss that evidence or render the

required current deployability finding in denying his unfitness claim. On remand,

the ABCMR must consider all the evidence weighing in favor of and against

SPC White’s deployability, offer a reasoned analysis of the issue, and make an explicit

finding as to whether SPC White’s PTSD rendered him undeployable at the time of

his discharge from the Army Reserve.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the

administrative record (ECF 27) is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART,

and defendant’s cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record (ECF 32) is

DENIED-IN-PART and GRANTED-IN-PART:

(1) Pursuant to RCFC 52.2(a), this military pay case is REMANDED to the ABCMR

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

(2) Pursuant to RCFC 52.2(b)(1)(A), the ABCMR must RECONSIDER Mr. White’s

medical retirement claim.

28

a. If the ABCMR again denies Mr. White the relief sought, the ABCMR must

ISSUE a written decision in full compliance with applicable statutes,

instructions, and regulations, consistent with this opinion.

b. In the case of a denial, the ABCMR’s written decision must INCLUDE a

discussion section that includes (but is not limited to):

i. Analysis of each of the following criteria, as described in this opinion

and applicable regulations: risk, burden, and deployability. The

ABCMR must additionally render findings with respect to each of

these criteria.

ii. Analysis of SPC White’s specific MOS 25N duties, including a

discussion determining whether and to what extent his PTSD

interfered with his ability to perform those duties. The ABCMR must

render findings with respect to whether and to what extent

SPC White’s PTSD interfered with his ability to perform those

duties.

iii. Analysis of whether SPC White’s PTSD was related to combat or

military sexual trauma. The ABCMR must additionally render a

finding on this issue.

1. In the case of an affirmative finding on this issue, the ABCMR

must review Mr. White’s claim with liberal consideration as to

whether his PTSD potentially contributed to the

circumstances resulting in his discharge or dismissal. The

ABCMR’s application of liberal consideration must be

substantively consistent with the Court’s explanation of

liberal consideration in this opinion.

2. In the case of a negative finding on this issue, the ABCMR

need not review Mr. White’s claim with liberal consideration.

c. Pursuant to RCFC 52.2(b)(1)(B), the ABCMR shall COMPLETE its

remand review within 120 days. This deadline is subject to good faith

extension under RCFC 52.2(c)(1).

(3) During the requested remand:

a. Pursuant to RCFC 52.2(b)(1)(C), the Clerk of Court is directed to STAY

all proceedings in this matter until further order of the Court. The Court

will retain jurisdiction over this case during the remand period.

b. Pursuant to RCFC 52.2(b)(1)(D), the defendant shall FILE a status report

on or before February 17, 2026, and every 30 days thereafter, during the

remand period.

29

c. Pursuant to RCFC 52.2(d), within 10 days of the conclusion of the

voluntary remand proceedings before the ABCMR, the ABCMR shall

SERVE all counsel of record in this case with a copy of the ABCMR’s final

decision and SEND the Court a copy of the ABCMR’s final decision.

d. Pursuant to RCFC 52.2(e)(1), within 30 days of the filing of the ABCMR’s

final decision on remand, the parties shall FILE a joint status report with

the Court setting forth the parties’ position(s) regarding whether further

litigation of this matter is necessary. If further proceedings are warranted,

the parties shall include a proposed schedule to govern this case going

forward.

(4) The Clerk of Court shall SERVE a copy of this opinion and order on the

Army Board for Correction of Military Records:

Joseph P. Lister

Director, Army Board for the Correction of Military Records

Army Review Board Agency

251 18th Street South – Suite 385

Arlington, VA 22202-3531

It is so ORDERED.

___________________

Armando O. Bonilla

Judge

30