Draghi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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CHRISTOPHER DRAGHI,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

24-cv-2920 (EK)(MMH)

-against-

NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION,

Defendant.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Christopher Draghi brings this action against the New

York City Department of Education pursuant to the Americans with

Disabilities Act. He asserts claims for discrimination, refusal

to provide a reasonable accommodation, hostile work environment,

and retaliation. He also brings analogous claims under state

and city law.

The Department now moves to dismiss the federal

claims.1 For the reasons set out below, that motion is granted.

The Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the non-

federal claims.

1 The Department is a suable entity because “the City of New York and

the Department of Education are separate legal entities.” Brainbuilders LLC

v. EmblemHealth, Inc., No. 21-CV-4627, 2022 WL 3156179, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.

8, 2022) (collecting cases); see also N.Y. Educ. Law § 2551 (“The board of

education of each city school district of a city with one hundred twenty-five

thousand inhabitants or more according to the latest federal census is hereby

continued as a body corporate.”).

Background

The following facts are drawn from the amended

complaint, and they are presumed true for the purposes of this

motion. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56

(2007).2

Christopher Draghi worked as a paraprofessional with

special-needs students at a public school in Brooklyn. Draghi

suffers from anxiety. Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 6. This anxiety

“impacts his ability to sleep and concentrate,” and can cause

“physical manifestations” such as “extreme tightness in his

chest.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 13. Draghi alleges that on June 13, 2019, a

teacher called him “stupid” in a classroom full of students,

triggering an anxiety attack. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. In response, he

asked the assistant principal — Paul Parella — to be moved to a

different classroom or, alternatively, for a leave of absence.

Parella declined, stating that there were “only two weeks left

in the school year.” Id. ¶¶ 18-21. Draghi took the next day

off from work. Id. ¶ 22.

Around five days later, Parella assigned Draghi to

work in a different classroom. Id. ¶¶ 24-26. He also issued

Draghi a “disciplinary notice” for “excessive absenteeism.” Id.

¶ 23. At an ensuing disciplinary conference, Parella “berated

2 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order

accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal

quotation marks.

Draghi over his . . . request[s] for a change in schedule or a

leave of absence.” Id. ¶ 26. Parella further stated that June

13 (the day of the anxiety incident) was the “day . . . the

wheels came off the wagon” and was “the only reason” they were

having the disciplinary conference. Id. ¶ 26. Parella later

wrote Draghi a disciplinary letter, citing his “attendance” and

“professionalism” issues. Id. ¶ 29.

Tensions continued into the next academic year. In

October 2019, Parella sent Draghi another disciplinary letter,

claiming he was not abiding Parella’s instructions about how to

help certain special needs students. Id. ¶ 34. Draghi alleges

that Parella had never given him these instructions. Id. ¶¶ 32,

34. During a disciplinary conference related to that letter,

Parella stated the view that Draghi was “having some type of

anxiety breakdown.” Id. ¶ 33.

Several months later, in May 2020, Draghi filed his

first complaint with New York State Division of Human Rights

(“SDHR”), claiming disability discrimination and retaliation.

Id. ¶ 35; see also Pl.’s First SDHR Compl., ECF No. 12-3.3 He

claims that this filing prompted a further “campaign of false

3 Draghi does not append this SDHR complaint to his pleading. However,

the Court may (and does) judicially notice it, as well as a second SDHR

complaint that is discussed below. See Quarles v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps.,

No. 22-CV-4553, 2023 WL 3880015, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2023) (collecting

similar cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5321034 (S.D.N.Y.

Aug. 18, 2023).

and baseless discipline.” Id. ¶ 37. Draghi points to a series

of events that occurred almost two years later, including: (1) a

week-long suspension without pay in February 2022 for failing to

complete paperwork; (2) a disciplinary letter in March 2022 for

failing to supervise students; (3) another disciplinary letter

in March 2022 for miscellaneous infractions, such as writing

“inappropriate” notes on his students’ behavioral forms; and

(4) the assignment in April 2022 of two new students to him

without updated documentation about their educational needs,

which “set[] [him] up to fail.” Id. ¶¶ 38-51.

Multiple suspensions followed. The school suspended

him in May 2022, allegedly on unstated grounds. Id. ¶ 52. It

then informed him that he was being investigated for sexual

misconduct with a student. Id. ¶ 55. He was suspended again in

August 2022, again allegedly without explanation. Id. ¶ 56.

Draghi filed his second complaint with the SDHR in

January 2023. See generally Pl.’s Second SDHR Compl., ECF

No. 12-5. Eight months later, the school fired him for

“engag[ing] in inappropriate conduct with students.”

Compl.¶ 57. The complaint reports that certain unnamed

supervisors had accused Draghi of, among other things,

“look[ing] into the girls’ bathroom.” Id.

This suit, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss,

followed.

Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a

complaint must plead facts sufficient “to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The

Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as

true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s

favor. See Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711

F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2013). At the same time, the Court is

“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Discussion

A. Timeliness

Before addressing the merits of Draghi’s ADA claims,

we consider the matter of timeliness. An ADA claim accrues

“when [the plaintiff] knew or had to reason to know of the

injury serving as the basis for his claim.” Harris v. City of

New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999). At that point, a

New York plaintiff has “300 days to file his ADA complaint” with

the EEOC or its state counterpart. Id. at 247 & n.2.

1. Most of the Challenged Conduct Is Time-Barred

Most of the conduct Draghi challenges falls outside

the 300-day window. Draghi filed his first SDHR complaint on

May 27, 2020. ECF No. 12-3. So, any conduct that occurred

before August 1, 2019 is not independently actionable. Harris,

186 F.3d at 247. This includes the June 13 incident (during

which a teacher called Draghi “stupid”) and the ensuing

disciplinary action and request for accommodation. Draghi filed

his second SDHR complaint — which recounted allegations of

further discrimination from December 2021 onward — on January

26, 2023. See ECF No. 12-5. So, any conduct that occurred

before April 1, 2022 (and that does not fall within the 300-day

window covered by Draghi’s first complaint) is likewise

inactionable. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536

U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (“Each discrete discriminatory act starts a

new clock for filing charges alleging that act.”).

2. The Continuing-Violation Doctrine Does Not Apply

The parties agree that much of the challenged conduct

falls outside the required windows. See Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of

Dismissal 5-6, ECF No. 12-1; Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Dismissal 3,

ECF No. 15. They disagree, however, about whether such conduct

remains independently actionable under the continuing violation

doctrine. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Dismissal 4-5; Def.’s

Reply in Supp. of Dismissal 2-4, ECF No. 17.

The continuing violation doctrine has been described

as “heavily disfavored in the Second Circuit.” Trinidad v.

N.Y.C. Dep’t of Correction, 423 F. Supp. 2d 151, 165 n.11

(S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Curtis v. Airborne Freight Corp., 87

F. Supp.2d 234, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same) (collecting cases).

It does not apply to “discrete unlawful acts, even where those

discrete acts are part of a serial violation.” Gonzalez v.

Hasty, 802 F.3d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 2015). Instead, it applies

only to “claims that by their nature accrue . . . after the

plaintiff has been subjected to some threshold amount of

mistreatment,” id., such as hostile work environment claims.

See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. “[T]ermination, failure to

promote, denial of transfer, . . . refusal to hire,” and the

filing of disciplinary charges are all discrete acts. Id. at

114; Washington v. Cnty. of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir.

2004).

The continuing violation doctrine thus does not apply

to Draghi’s discrimination, retaliation, or accommodation

claims. Those claims are predicated on a three-year-long

sequence of discrete events, including discipline, suspension,

and termination. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 23 (June 2019 disciplinary

notice for excessive absenteeism); id. ¶ 40 (February 2022

suspension for failure to adequately complete paperwork); id.

¶ 57 (September 2023 termination for engaging in inappropriate

conduct with students). Those discrete acts cannot constitute a

continuing discrimination violation. See, e.g., Langella v.

Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 18-CV-10023, 2020 WL 2836760, at

*5-6 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2020) (no continuing violation where

plaintiff, despite alleging a “campaign of discrimination,”

nevertheless relied on claims of baseless discipline that

“squarely constitute[d] discrete acts”); Smith v. Nat’l Grid

USA, No. 2:21-CV-6899, 2025 WL 1248676, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.

30, 2025) (no continuing violation because series of allegedly

retaliatory actions constituted “discrete acts”).

The upshot is that Draghi cannot directly challenge

most of the conduct alleged in the complaint. Most importantly,

he cannot challenge the June 13 incident, or the disciplinary

conduct stemming from that incident. See Patterson v. Cnty. of

Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 220 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he mere fact

that an employee was dismissed within the statutory period

cannot be used to pull in a time-barred discriminatory act[.]”).

There are, however, two important qualifications here.

First, Draghi also brings a hostile work environment

claim. And the Supreme Court has held that a hostile work

environment claim is timely “so long as an act contributing to

that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time

period.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105. If that criterion is

satisfied, “the entire time period of the hostile environment

may be considered by a court . . . .” Id. at 117. Because

Draghi challenges some conduct (such as his suspensions) that

falls within the limitations period,4 the Court may consider some

older misconduct when evaluating Draghi’s hostile work

environment claim.

Second, the Court may consider otherwise stale conduct

as “background evidence to support” Draghi’s claims of

discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation, even if

that misconduct cannot be an independent basis for liability.

Id. at 112.

B. Employment Discrimination

To plead employment discrimination under the ADA, a

plaintiff must show that “(1) his employer is subject to the

ADA; (2) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) he

was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of

his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he

suffered an adverse employment action because of his

disability.” Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 71 (2d

4 An allegedly discriminatory suspension can contribute to a hostile

work environment. E.g., Bader v. Special Metals Corp., 985 F. Supp. 2d 291,

328 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he discriminatory warnings and suspensions discussed

[herein] contributed to the severity or pervasiveness of the hostile work

environment.”).

Cir. 2019). Only the second and fourth elements are disputed on

this motion.

1. Draghi Has Alleged a Cognizable Disability

As relevant here, a plaintiff is plausibly disabled

within the meaning of the ADA if he alleges that he: (1) has “a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more of [his] major life activities,” or (2) is “regarded as

having such an impairment.” Capobianco v. City of New York, 422

F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)). While

Draghi fails to allege a disability under the first prong, he

alleges a disability under the second: that his employer

“regarded” him as having a disability.

The complaint’s primary allegation about the nature

and severity of Draghi’s anxiety is that it “impact[ed] his

ability to sleep and concentrate.” Compl. ¶ 7.5 This is not

enough. To be sure, sleeping and concentrating are major life

activities. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). But the complaint

says nothing about the degree to which Draghi’s anxiety impaired

those activities. It simply “recite[s] activities found in the

[ADA] that [Draghi] could not adequately perform . . . .”

5 Draghi also alleges that his anxiety caused “extreme tightness in his

chest” during the June episode. Compl. ¶ 12. But he has not “hinted at how

this [symptom] affected him other than on that day,” and never explains how

such tightness substantially affected other major life activities. DeFranco

v. N.Y. Power Auth., 731 F. Supp. 3d 479, 493 (W.D.N.Y. 2024). Accordingly,

this “single episode — without more — does not constitute a disability under

the ADA.” Id. at 492.

Dancause v. Mt. Morris Cent. Sch. Dist., 590 F. App’x 27, 28 (2d

Cir. 2014). This type of superficial description does not

suffice to allege a substantial limitation on a major life

activity. See id. at 28-29.

Draghi does, however, plausibly allege that his

employer regarded him as having a disability. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(1) (defining “disability” to extend to individuals who

are “regarded” by their employer “as having” a qualifying

physical or mental impairment). To plead that he is “regarded

as” having a disability, a plaintiff must allege that his

employer perceived him as having some disability, even if the

employer did not perceive that disability as substantially

limiting. Horsham v. Fresh Direct, 136 F. Supp. 3d 253, 262

(E.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120, 129

(2d Cir. 2012). This definition of disability “does not apply

to impairments that are both ‘transitory and minor’, which [the

ADA] defines as impairments with ‘an actual or expected duration

of [six] months or less.’” Horsham, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 262-63

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)); see also 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.15(f).

Here, Draghi has plausibly alleged that Parella viewed

him as suffering from anxiety. Indeed, Parella described the

June 13 incident as an “anxiety breakdown.” Compl. ¶ 33.

Moreover, the complaint permits the reasonable inference that

Parella viewed Draghi’s anxiety as an ongoing condition.

Parella implied that Draghi’s “excessive absenteeism” was

“connected” to his anxiety by bringing the June 13 incident up

at a disciplinary conference and stating that June 13 was the

day “the wheels came off the wagon.” Id. ¶ 26. And in

September 2019, more than three months after the June incident,

he observed that Draghi was suffering from an “anxiety

breakdown.” Id. Thus, drawing all reasonable inferences in

Draghi’s favor, the complaint plausibly alleges that his

employer perceived him as suffering from an ongoing, non-

transitory impairment (i.e., anxiety). The complaint therefore

sufficiently alleges a disability under the ADA.

2. Draghi Has Not Plausibly Alleged Causation

While Draghi has alleged a cognizable disability, he

has not alleged a causal link between that disability and an

adverse employment action. So, his discrimination claim still

fails.

“An adverse employment action is a materially adverse

change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Atkins v.

Rochester City Sch. Dist., 764 F. App’x 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2019).

Generally speaking, disciplinary actions that have “no negative

impact on compensation, benefits, or title” are not adverse

employment actions. Id. Here, Draghi has plausibly alleged

several adverse employment actions. He was fired in the fall of

2023, Compl. ¶ 57, and dismissal is a “[q]uintessential” adverse

employment action.6 Sealy v. State Univ. of N.Y. At Stony Brook,

408 F. Supp. 3d 218, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). He has also alleged

that the Department suspended him without pay in May 2022 and

August 2022. Compl. ¶ 56. Those actions count as well.

Collazo v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 163 F. Supp. 3d 27, 53 (E.D.N.Y.

2016). Draghi’s remaining allegations involve disciplinary

letters, conferences, and reprimands, which do not — on their

own — amount to adverse employment actions. See, e.g.,

Sotomayor v. City of New York, 862 F. Supp. 2d 226, 254-55

(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Criticism of an employee in the course of

evaluating and correcting her work is not an adverse employment

action.”).

Once a plaintiff has alleged an adverse employment

action, they must plead “plausible support [for] a minimal

inference of discriminatory motivation.” Dooley v. JetBlue

Airways Corp., 636 F. App’x 16, 21 (2d Cir. 2015). The facts

alleged must support an inference of but-for causation.

Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 349 (2d Cir. 2019).

Such an inference may arise from “the employer’s criticism of

6 Draghi’s termination post-dated his second SDHR complaint. This

suggests that Draghi may not have exhausted his claim based on that

termination. Soules v. Conn., Dep't of Emergency Servs. & Pub. Prot., 882

F.3d 52, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2018). But the defendants do not raise this issue,

and exhaustion is waivable. See Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 543-

44, 553 (2019).

the plaintiff’s performance in . . . degrading terms; or its

invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected

group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the

protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the

plaintiff’s discharge.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795

F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2015).

Draghi has not pled a plausible inference of

discriminatory intent with respect to his suspensions or

termination. He does not allege that his employer spoke about

his anxiety in degrading terms, nor does he allege generally

invidious comments about people suffering from anxiety or any

other disability. The statement that comes closest is Parella’s

use of the word “breakdown” in September 2019. Compl. ¶ 33.

But this comment came years before Draghi was suspended and

eventually terminated and therefore cannot support a plausible

inference of causation. See Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp.,

Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2007), abrogated on other

grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)

(“[T]he more remote and oblique the remarks are in relation to

the employer’s adverse action, the less they prove that the

action was motivated by discrimination.”). Just as importantly,

the word “breakdown” — while perhaps anachronistic — does not

reflect negative “assumptions or attitudes” regarding the

abilities of persons with anxiety as a class. Id. at 116.

Parella’s comments about Draghi’s June 13, 2019

episode are also too remote in time from his suspensions and

firing to support an inference of discriminatory intent. While

Parella is alleged to have said that Draghi’s anxiety attack and

resulting request for an accommodation were the “only reason”

for the discipline he faced in June 2019, Compl. ¶ 26, any

challenge to that discipline is time-barred. The first

actionable employment action that Draghi faced — his May 2022

suspension — occurred around three years later. Compl. ¶ 52.

The lengthy gap between Parella’s comments in June 2019 and

Draghi’s eventual suspension undercuts any causal connection

between the two incidents. Tomassi, 478 F.3d at 115; see also

Graham v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 14-CV-3192, 2016 WL 354897, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016), aff’d, 675 F. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2017)

(“Merely because an employee or employees at some point mocked

or dismissed [plaintiff’s] disabilities does not mean that any

later adverse actions taken against her by Macy's were because

of her disability.”).

Draghi does assert that similarly situated employees

without disabilities were not subject to the same discipline he

received. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 39-40, 42, 44. But he offers no

supporting facts to buttress this allegation. It is, therefore,

the type of conclusory allegation that the Court need not credit

at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(plaintiff may not rely on “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements”).

C. Failure To Accommodate

To plead a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff

must allege (1) that he had a disability; (2) that the employer

knew it; (3) that he could perform the essential functions of

the job with a reasonable accommodation; and (4) that the

employer refused to provide such an accommodation. Mitchell v.

Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999).

The Court need not apply this standard, however, because

Draghi’s claim is time-barred.

The complaint reveals only one request for an

accommodation: Draghi’s request to switch assignments in June

2019. Compl. ¶¶ 16-20. But as discussed above, the June

incident (and the events immediately following it) are not

actionable, because they fall outside the 300-day window covered

by Draghi’s first SDHR complaint. Accordingly, the failure-to-

accommodate claim is dismissed.

D. Hostile Work Environment

To allege a hostile work environment, “a plaintiff

must show that (i) the workplace was permeated with

discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] work environment, and

(ii) the harassment was based on [his] protected group.”

Williams v. Geiger, 447 F. Supp. 3d 68, 80-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)

(Cave, M.J).

Draghi has not alleged severe or pervasive harassment.

He mainly alleges that, over four years, Parella and other

supervisors criticized him, wrongly disciplined him, or paired

him with teachers who made him anxious.7 But “the ordinary

tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of

abusive language, do not rise to a level constituting a hostile

work environment.” Montanez v. McDean LLC, 770 F. App’x 592,

594 (2d Cir. 2019). And courts in this circuit have held that a

complaint that relies primarily on allegations of meritless

discipline (like Draghi’s) does not adequately allege a hostile

work environment. See, e.g., Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 321

(allegations of “harsh tones” and “wrongful[] reprimand[s]”

insufficient for hostile work environment claim); Trachtenberg

v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of N.Y., 937 F. Supp. 2d 460, 472-73

(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“negative performance evaluations and

7 Draghi does not claim that his colleague’s remark that he was “stupid”

was discriminatory against persons with anxiety. That argument would fail in

any event, because (a) stupidity is not, of course, a disability, even if it

may be invoked to demean the listener; and (b) Draghi does not allege any

other discriminatory epithets in his complaint. “Isolated comments . . .

without more, are insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim.”

Maines v. Last Chance Funding, Inc., No. 17-CV-5453, 2018 WL 4558408, at *11

(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2018), amended, 2018 WL 4610898 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2018);

see also Kemp v. A & J Produce Corp., 164 F. App’x 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2005)

(noting that “more than a few isolated incidents” of discriminatory language

are necessary to allege hostile work environment).

letters . . . that contained scurrilous charges” did not

constitute severe or pervasive harassment).

E. Retaliation

To state an ADA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must

allege that (1) he engaged in protected ADA activity (e.g.,

requesting reasonable accommodation or filing a discrimination

complaint); (2) the employer was aware of this; 3) the employer

took adverse action against him; and (4) a causal connection

existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Vale v. Great Neck Water Pollution Control Dist., 80 F. Supp. 3d

426, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). The parties dispute only the fourth

element.

“To prove a causal connection, a plaintiff must show

that but for the protected activity, the adverse action would

not have been taken.” Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc.,

103 F.4th 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2024). A plaintiff can allege

causation by pointing to “direct evidence of retaliatory

animus,” or by “showing that the protected activity was followed

closely by discriminatory treatment.” Id.

Draghi has not alleged a plausible causal connection

here. To be sure, Draghi engaged in protected activities:

filing complaints with the SDHR and requesting an accommodation

(though the latter is time-barred). See Zoulas v. N.Y.C. Dep’t

of Educ., 400 F. Supp. 3d 25, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (filing SDHR

complaint is protected activity); Laface v. Eastern Suffolk

Boces, 349 F. Supp. 3d 126, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (requesting a

reasonable accommodation is protected activity). However,

Draghi’s suspensions and firing occurred more than two years

after he filed his first SDHR complaint, and more than three

years after he requested the accommodation. The closest-in-time

activity was the filing of his second SDHR complaint, which

occurred eight months before his termination. ECF No. 12-5; see

also Compl. ¶ 57. But all these temporal gaps are too long to

permit a plausible inference of causation. See Clark Cnty. Sch.

Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (temporal

proximity must be “very close”); Flood v. UBS Asset Mgmt., Inc.,

No. 10-CV-374, 2012 WL 288041, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2012)

(“[C]ourts in this Circuit have consistently held that a passage

of more than two months between the protected activity and the

adverse employment action does not allow for an inference of

causation.”). And Draghi has alleged no facts suggesting the

suspensions or firings — rather than the minor discipline he

faced three years earlier — were motivated by “direct evidence

of retaliatory animus.” Sharikov, 103 F.4th at 170. So, the

retaliation claim must be dismissed.8

8 Draghi also claims that the Department engaged in a retaliatory

“campaign of false and baseless discipline” against him during the winter and

spring of 2022. Compl. ¶ 37. Almost all of that conduct is time-barred and,

regardless, it runs into the same causation problem — it occurred more than

18 months after Draghi filed his first SDHR complaint.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s motion to

dismiss the federal ADA claims is granted in full. Because

Draghi has not sought leave to amend, his federal claims are

dismissed with prejudice. See Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364,

369 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[N]o court can be said to have erred in

failing to grant a request [for leave to amend] that was not

made.”); Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp. Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1132

(2d Cir. 1994) (“[W]e do not deem it an abuse of the district

court’s discretion to order a case closed when leave to amend

has not been sought.”). Given that dismissal, the Court

declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, which

are dismissed without prejudice to Draghi refiling those claims

in an appropriate state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). The

Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United States District Judge

Dated: January 9, 2025

Brooklyn, New York