Humble

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT January 14, 2026

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

§

Shantalace Humble, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§ Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-01081

v. §

§

Harris County Texas, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This is a civil rights case.1 Defendant Harris County, Texas (“Harris

County”), and Defendants Steven Lamar Carpenter, Jr., Omar Ramirez,

Bryant Crespin, and Adrian Miller, all of whom are Deputies of the Harris

County Sherriff’s Office (collectively, “the Deputies”), have moved to dismiss

Plaintiff Shantalace Humble’s amended complaint (Dkt. 14) under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6). Dkts. 15, 24, 30, 33, 41.

After carefully reviewing the motions, responses, Dkts. 27, 46, replies,

Dkts. 39, 47, the record, and the applicable law, the Court (a) grants in part

and denies in part Deputy Carpenter’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 24); (b) grants

in full Deputies Ramirez’s, Miller’s, and Crespin’s motions to dismiss (Dkt. 30,

Dkt. 33; Dkt. 41); and (c) grants Harris County’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 15).

1 All parties consented to the undersigned judge. See Dkt. 6, 25, 31, 43, 34.

Background

I. Factual background

The following facts are taken as true at this stage. They concern a traffic

stop on February 4, 2023.

Humble is a Black woman and the mother of two children, a 15-month-

old daughter and 14-year-old son. Dkt. 14 at 8-9. In January 2023, she bought

a car from “a local dealership/mechanic” known to her and her family. Id. at

9. The seller provided Humble with purchase and registration documentation.

Id. The car had paper plates that had not expired as of February 2023. Id.

On the evening of the incident, Humble was driving her children in the

new car. Id. at 9-10. A Harris County Sheriff’s Office cruiser pulled up behind

Humble’s vehicle, and the deputy inside it “appeared to be running her plates.”

Id. at 10. The cruiser activated its lights and sirens. Id. at 11. Humble pulled

over and placed her vehicle in park. Id. Humble’s sister Tanny, who had been

driving behind them in another car with Humble’s mother and siblings,

stopped behind the cruiser. Id. at 10-11.

Carpenter was the Deputy who had stopped Humble’s car. Id. at 11. He

approached Humble’s vehicle and asked for her identification. Id. at 5, 11. She

rolled down her window and provided her name and date of birth. Id. at 11.

Humble asked Carpenter multiple times why she had been stopped and

informed him that she suffers from anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic

stress disorder. Id. at 2, 12. She did not attempt to flee. Id. at 11. Carpenter

then ordered Humble to exit her vehicle. Id. Humble expressed that she was

“uncomfortable,” requested a supervisor, and disclosed her mental health

issues. Id. at 11-12. But Carpenter became “angry,” “annoyed,” and

“aggressive.” Id.

Carpenter then aimed his light toward the back seat, commented that

Humble’s son “looks ‘big,’” and demanded that he exit the vehicle. Id. at 12.

Humble responded that her son was a minor and would not be getting out of

the car. Id. She continued to ask why she had been stopped, to express her

discomfort, and to request a supervisor. Id. at 13. At some point, Humble’s

sister stepped out of her vehicle and identified herself to Carpenter. Id.

Carpenter returned to his patrol car. Believing that he was calling his

supervisor, Humble rolled up her window. Id. When he returned, Carpenter

“was aggressive and angry,” banged his fist on Humble’s window, and

demanded her to roll it down. Id. Instead of doing so, Humble again told

Carpenter that she did not feel comfortable and asked for a supervisor. Id.

Humble’s sister informed Carpenter that Humble suffered from mental health

issues, was a victim of domestic violence prone to panic attacks, and expressed

concern that Humble could “freak out.” Id. But Humble did not make any

threatening movements or attempt to flee. Id. Humble eventually rolled down

her window at her sister’s request. Id. at 14.

During the traffic stop, Carpenter told Humble that her “license tags

were not coming back.” Id. at 14. She responded that the tags were valid and

offered to show him the documents. Id.

Carpenter ordered Humble to get out of her car, but she did not initially

comply. Id. Instead, Humble repeated that she did not feel comfortable and

asked for a supervisor. Id. After her sister persuaded her to exit the vehicle,

Humble did so “peacefully,” making no attempt to flee or resist. Id.

When Humble stepped out, Carpenter “grabbed her arms behind her

back” and screamed that she was under arrest. Id. at 2, 14. Humble asked

why she was being arrested. Id. at 14. Carpenter then “violently slammed”

Humble to the ground. Id. at 2, 15. The impact of her face and head hitting

the ground rendered her unconscious. Id. at 3, 15. When she woke up, Humble

was lying face-down, hands cuffed behind her back, with her breasts exposed.

Id. Although Humble was not resisting, Carpenter kneeled on her back while

an unidentified officer held her down. Id. at 15.

Deputies Ramirez, Miller, and Crespin arrived on scene, although the

complaint does not explain when this occurred. Id. Yet the complaint asserts

that one or more of them “assisted” in restraining Humble. Id. It also accuses

those other deputies of failing to move, restrain, or otherwise de-escalate

Deputy Carpenter’s actions. Id.

Carpenter put Humble in the back of a police vehicle. Id. at 16. She

remained handcuffed. Id. At some point, paramedics arrived and examined

her. Id. Carpenter eventually told Humble that she was free to go. Id. at 16.

No citation was issued. Id. at 3.

Sometime later, Carpenter filed an affidavit with the Harris County

District Attorney’s Office, alleging that Humble’s rolling up her window

supported a charge for interference with public duties. Id. at 16. The charges

were dismissed for lack of probable cause. Id. at 16.

The incident left Humble with a concussion, a foot injury, and “serious

and long-term mental and emotional consequences.” Id. at 3. She filed an

Internal Affairs complaint but received no response. Id. at 17.

II. Procedural history

On February 4, 2025, Humble sued Harris County and the Deputies in

state court. Dkt. 1-1 (original petition). Harris County timely removed the

case. Dkt. 1 (notice of removal).

Post-removal, Humble filed a motion requesting that Harris County be

ordered to provide the Deputies’ addresses for service of process. Dkt. 11. The

Court granted the motion, Dkt. 13, and Harris County provided the

information as directed on April 21, 2025, see Dkt. 46 at 5. Carpenter was

served on May 29, 2025. Dkt. 18. Ramirez and Crespin were served on June

9 and June 11, 2025, respectively. Dkts. 19, 20. Miller was served on June 26,

2025. Dkt. 37.

Humble filed an amended complaint asserting claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 premised on violations of the Fourth, Fourteenth, and First

Amendments. See Dkt. 14 at 20, 32. And she also asserted a Section 1983

municipal liability claim against Harris County. See id. at 27.

Defendants moved to dismiss all claims. Dkt. 15 (Harris County);

Dkt. 24 (Carpenter); Dkt. 30 (Ramirez); Dkt. 33 (Crespin); Dkt. 41 (Miller).

Humble responded to Harris County’s motion, see Dkt. 27; see also Dkt. 28

(amended certificate of service to Dkt. 27), prompting Harris County to file a

reply, Dkt. 39. Humble also filed a consolidated response to the Deputies’

motions to dismiss, Dkt. 46, to which the Deputies replied, Dkt. 47. The

motions are ripe for resolution.

Legal Standard

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted if a party fails “to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather,

“[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken

as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will

reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” See Lormand v. U.S.

Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555-56). When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] all well-

pleaded facts as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs.” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation

omitted).

Analysis

Defendants’ motions to dismiss raise one overlapping contention. They

all maintain that Humble’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. But

as explained below, Humble filed suit within the limitations period. And

because her diligence in effectuating service cannot be ascertained from the

pleadings alone, the timeliness of her claims—which is an affirmative

defense—is not appropriately resolved at this motion-to-dismiss stage.

Apart from limitations, the Deputies assert that qualified immunity bars

Humble’s Section 1983 claims that challenge the constitutionality of her initial

traffic stop; allege that the arresting deputy, Deputy Carpenter, used excessive

force; accuse other deputies of wrongfully failing to intervene; and assert that

Carpenter retaliated against her for exercising protected speech. The Court

agrees that Humble has not adequately alleged that Deputy Carpenter lacked

reasonable suspicion to stop her. But she has alleged enough facts to suggest

that Carpenter violated clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights by

slamming Humble to the ground after she had already complied with his

directives and continued to apply force even when she was unconscious.

On the other hand, Humble’s allegations are insufficient to show that

Deputy Carpenter violated any clearly-established First Amendment right.

Likewise, Humble has not plausibly alleged that Deputies Ramirez, Miller, and

Crespin can be liable as bystanders with respect to Carpenter’s use of force.

And the lack of a viable First Amendment retaliation claim against Carpenter

forecloses any related bystander theory against those other deputies, too.

Humble’s remaining claims against Harris County are barred. Her

allegations fail to show that County officers had a pattern of using excessive

force under similar circumstances. And her assertions about the County’s

customs or policies are conclusory and lack any articulated connection to the

incident in this case. There is no basis for municipal liability.

I. Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the Section 1983

claims based on their limitations defense.

Defendants first contend that Humble’s claims are barred by the statute

of limitations. See Dkt. 15 at 5; Dkt. 24 at 10; Dkt. 30 at 8; Dkt. 33 at 8; Dkt. 41

at 8. Humble pleaded that she timely filed her petition and served Harris

County soon thereafter. See Dkt. 14 at 4-5. In her response brief, Humble also

asserts that she diligently sought to serve the Deputies. Dkt. 46 at 1-2.

A. Texas law, which supplies the limitations period, looks at

when suit was filed and when the defendants were served.

“Because no specified federal statute of limitations exists for § 1983 suits,

federal courts borrow the forum state’s … personal-injury limitations

period ….” Edmonds v. Oktibbeha Cnty., Miss., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir.

2012) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In Texas, the

statute of limitations for personal-injury claims is two years. See Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003. For § 1983 claims, accrual “occurs when the

plaintiff knows, or should have known, of the facts that form the basis of the

claim.” Griffin v. New Orleans City, 628 F. App’x 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2016).

Humble’s claims accrued on February 4, 2023, the date of the traffic stop.

Dkt. 14 at 2. She filed suit on February 4, 2025, which is within the limitations

period. See Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 1-1.

“To comply with a statute of limitations,” however, Texas law also

requires that defendants be served “within the limitations period.” Ortega v.

Young Again Prods., Inc., 548 F. App’x 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Slagle

v. Prickett, 345 S.W.3d 693, 697 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.)). “[T]he

date of service will relate back to the date suit was filed” if the plaintiff

exercised due diligence in obtaining service of process. See Henderson v.

Repub. of Tex., 672 F. App’x 383, 385 (5th Cir. 2016); see also, e.g., Lopez v.

Unknown Galveston Police Officer, 2006 WL 3702895, at *9-10 (S.D. Tex. Dec.

13, 2006) (applying this principle to a § 1983 claim). To meet that test, a

plaintiff must “present evidence regarding the efforts that were made to serve

the defendant” and “explain every lapse in effort or period of delay.” Proux v.

Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tex. 2007).

Moreover, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. That

defense supports dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) only if “it is evident from the

plaintiff’s pleadings that the action is barred and the pleadings fail to raise

some basis for tolling or the like.” Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th

Cir. 2003).

B. Humble diligently served Harris County, making her

claims against it timely.

Harris County was served on February 17, 2025, thirteen days after the

limitations period expired. See Dkt. 1-2 at 2-4. It argues that Humble failed

to exercise due diligence by waiting until the final day of the limitations period

to file this suit and not serving Harris County until afterwards. See Dkt. 15 at

5 n.3 (citing and incorporating Dkt. 4 at 13).

Humble responds that she undertook diligent efforts to serve Harris

County. Dkt. 27 at 3. This is evident on the face of her pleadings. She

requested issuance of the citation immediately upon filing suit. See Dkt. 14 at

4 (first amended complaint). Eight days passed before the district clerk issued

the citation. See id. at 5 (February 12, 2025 citation); see also Dkt. 1-3 (copy of

citation). That brief delay was not within Humble’s control. Once the citation

was issued, Humble ensured that Harris County was served with process

quickly, within five days. See Dkt. 14 at 5 (February 17, 2025 date of service).

That is sufficiently diligent for the date of service to relate back to the filing of

suit, making her claims against the County timely.

C. Whether Humble diligently served the Deputies cannot be

resolved at this stage.

The Deputies similarly invoke the limitations period. But their

contentions implicate matters outside the pleadings and thus are insufficient

to merit dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

According to the Deputies, Plaintiff’s waiting until the end of the

limitations period to sue in state court, especially when removal was “likely,”

showed a lack of diligence. See Dkt. 47 at 2. But there is nothing wrong with

filing suit on the last day of the limitations period—just like Humble did in

this case. See, e.g., Larkins v. S.D.P. Mfg. Inc., 2024 WL 3744396, at *3 (S.D.

Tex. Aug. 8, 2024) (state court suit was timely filed on the next business day

after the limitations period ended); McPhaul v. Kimbrough, 2020 WL 5735173,

at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2020) (Section 1983 claim was timely filed on the last

day of the two-year limitations period), adopted by 2020 WL 5709270 (E.D.

Tex. Sept. 24, 2020).

The only remaining question is whether Humble diligently served the

Deputies. “[O]nce the defendant demonstrates that service occurred after the

limitations deadline, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to explain the delay.”

Sutton Place 1 Townhouse v. AmGuard Ins. Co., 668 F. Supp. 3d 684, 690 (W.D.

Tex. 2023) (quoting Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 215). Because determining if service

was diligent can be a fact-intensive inquiry, it is often resolved on summary

judgment or at trial. See id. (collecting cases).

There are some instances where failure to diligently serve has led to

dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. That has occurred when (1) in response

to the motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff offered no excuse—or excuses that were

invalid as a matter of law—for” the delay, (2) “documents subject to judicial

notice (such as court dockets) evinced” a lack of due diligence, and (3) neither

party attached relevant evidence to the motion or response. Id. at 691

(collecting cases). None of those categories applies.

Far from failing to explain the delayed service, Humble provided a

detailed account of her service efforts when responding to the motions to

dismiss. See Dkt. 46 at 4-5. She also attached an affidavit corroborating her

allegations, see Dkt. 46-1, which is not a proper subject for judicial notice. And

in other filings, Humble maintained that she tried to serve the Deputies sooner

but only learned their correct addresses after Harris County finally agreed to

and then was ordered to divulge them. See Dkt. 11 at 2; Dkt. 13 (April 17, 2025

order compelling Harris County to supply those addresses).

Based on the pleading alone, this Court cannot determine whether

Humble’s service efforts were adequately diligent. No judicially noticeable

records conclusively negate the possibility that she exercised the requisite

diligence. And this Court declines to consider materials outside the pleadings,

which would require converting the motions to dismiss into motions for

summary judgment. See Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Huntsman Corp., 255 F.R.D. 179,

188 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (when matters outside the pleadings are submitted to

support or oppose a motion to dismiss, courts may, but are not required to,

convert the motion to one of summary judgment and consider those materials).

The statute of limitations cannot justify dismissal at this stage.

II. Humble has adequately pleaded one Section 1983 theory against

Deputy Carpenter but none against the other deputies.

As their alternative basis for dismissal, the Deputies invoke qualified

immunity. Dkt. 24 at 14; Dkt. 30 at 13; Dkt. 33 at 13; Dkt. 41 at 13. Humble

responds that she has alleged enough facts to overcome qualified immunity by

detailing how each of the Deputies violated her clearly established

constitutional rights. See Dkt. 46 at 7, 9-10. The Court agrees with the

Deputies, as concluded below, that most of the Section 1983 theories are

barred. Nevertheless, the Court also concludes that Humble has adequately

stated an excessive force theory against Deputy Carpenter.

A. Qualified immunity

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields government

officials from civil liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).

At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must “plead specific facts that both

allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with

equal specificity.” Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 664 (5th Cir. 2015)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Overcoming qualified immunity requires sufficient allegations both that

(1) the defendant’s conduct, as alleged, violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights; and (2) the defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of

clearly established law. See Alexander v. Eeds, 392 F.3d 138, 144 (5th Cir.

2004). For the second requirement, the Court determines “whether the

allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of

the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively

unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.” Hare v. City of

Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Hare III”). A right was “clearly

established” if “a legislative directive or case precedent” made it “sufficiently

clear such that every reasonable officer would have understood that what he is

doing violates the law.” Keller v. Fleming, 952 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2020).

B. One theory against Deputy Carpenter survives dismissal.

According to the complaint, Deputy Carpenter violated Humble’s

constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fourteenth, and First Amendments.

Dkt. 14 at 20, 32. Specifically, Humble alleges that Carpenter unlawfully

stopped her car, used excessive force against her during the stop, and did so to

retaliate against her protected speech. Id. at 20, 23, 32.

Humble has adequately alleged that Carpenter violated her clearly

established rights by using excessive force. But her initial stop was lawful.

And her failure to address the First Amendment theory warrants its dismissal.

1. Carpenter had reasonable suspicion to stop Humble’s car.

According to the complaint, Deputy Carpenter stopped Humble’s vehicle

without reasonable suspicion and profiled her because of her race and

temporary dealer plates. Dkt. 14 at 23-24. Carpenter counters that the stop

was justified because the temporary plate was not showing as valid. See Dkt.

24 at 14 (citing Dkt. 14 ¶ 45).

“The legality of a traffic stop is analyzed under the framework

articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).” United States v. Lopez-Moreno,

420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005). This is a two-part inquiry, asking “whether

the officer’s action was: (1) ‘justified at its inception’; and (2) ‘reasonably related

in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first

place.’” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20).

“For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an

objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a

traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur ....” Id.; see also United States v.

Khanalizadeh, 493 F.3d 479, 482 (5th Cir. 2007) (lawful stop of vehicle that

failed to display a front license plate); United States v. Fontenot, 284 F. App’x

193, 194 (5th Cir. 2008) (stop was proper when officer did not see a rear license

plate on the car). For this inquiry, the Court looks to the facts known to the

officer at the time of the stop, not his motivations, even if they are pretextual.

See United States v. Escalante, 239 F.3d 678, 680-81 (5th Cir. 2001).

Humble’s own allegations confirm that there was an objectively

reasonable basis for Deputy Carpenter to believe that she had violated traffic

laws. The complaint concedes that Carpenter “appeared to be running her

plates” before pulling her over. Dkt. 14 at 10. It also admits that Carpenter

told Humble, during the traffic stop, that her paper tags were not returning as

valid. See id. at 14. As Defendants note, Dkt. 47 at 4-5, driving with an

unauthorized temporary tag would violate Texas law. See Tex. Transp. Code

Ann. § 503.067(b) (2021), repealed by Act 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 668, § 32(7) (eff.

July 1, 2025); see also id. § 503.094(1) (making it a Class C misdemeanor),

amended by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 668, § 32(9) (eff. July 1, 2025). The

suspected violation was enough to justify stopping Humble.

2. Humble adequately pleaded that Carpenter violated clearly

established law by using excessive force.

The complaint also alleges that Carpenter violated Humble’s Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by “violently slamm[ing] Ms. Humble to the

ground with such force that she hit her face and head and lost

consciousness ....” Dkt. 14 at 15. Carpenter argues that his use of force was

justified because Humble had failed to cooperate with his instructions. Dkt. 24

at 15; see also Dkt. 47 at 5. But Humble’s allegations—which must be taken

as true—paint a different picture.

Claims “that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly

or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free

citizen” are “analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’

standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). “To prevail on an

excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) injury, (2) which resulted

directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the

excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Tarver v. City of Edna,

410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005). “The court considers the totality of the

circumstances, i.e., (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the

suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others, and

(3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Barnes v. Felix, 152 F.4th 669, 674 (5th Cir. 2025) (quotation

omitted). That fact-intensive analysis must balance “the nature and quality of

the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396

(quotations omitted).

Based on those factors, Humble has sufficiently pleaded an excessive

force claim. The suspected crime—driving with an invalid plate—is a minor

traffic infraction, which “substantially lower[s]” the need for force. See Hanks

v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2017) (driving below the speed limit); see

also Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009) (speeding). The

complaint also alleged both that she posed no threat while seated in her car,

and that she did not “attempt to flee or resist.” See Dkt. 14 at 12.

Carpenter’s position that Humble’s resistance prompted him to use force

does not track the order of events detailed in the complaint. To be sure, the

complaint acknowledges that Humble initially refused to comply with Deputy

Carpenter’s order to get out of the car. See id. at 13-14. But Humble’s sister,

who had intervened, successfully persuaded Humble to step out. See id. at 14.

Humble then exited the car “peacefully,” without “attempt[ing] to flee” or

“display[ing] any violence or resistance.” Id. at 14.

At that point, Humble had complied with Deputy Carpenter’s directive.

Her lack of resistance eliminated any justification for using force. See Lytle v.

Bexar Cnty., 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n exercise of force that is

reasonable at one moment can become unreasonable in the next if the

justification for the use of force has ceased.”). Yet the complaint asserts that

Carpenter not only slammed her to the ground—with enough force to render

her unconscious—but continued to kneel on her back for an unspecified period

even after she was handcuffed. See Dkt. 14 at 14-15.

Well-established law reflects that it was unreasonable for Deputy

Carpenter to use such force when Humble was no longer resisting and posed

no threat. Whereas Carpenter merely lists cases where use of force was

deemed permissible—without regard to their specific circumstances, see Dkt.

24 at 14-15—Humble cites on-point binding precedent finding the use of force

was excessive and unreasonable on strikingly similar facts.

In Hanks v. Rogers, the court found it “obvious” that an officer had used

excessive force. See 853 F.3d at 747. Like Humble, the plaintiff in Hanks was

stopped for a minor traffic infraction. Compare Dkt. 14 at 14 (Humble stopped

for suspected invalid license tags), with Hanks, 853 F.3d at 745 (plaintiff

stopped for driving below speed limit). Also like Humble, see Dkt. 14 at 13-14,

the plaintiff did not immediately comply with the officer’s directives but “made

no attempt to flee.” See Hanks, 853 F.3d at 742 (non-compliance with order to

exit the vehicle and kneel). The officer in Hanks nevertheless struck the

plaintiff, pushed him to the ground, and injured him, even though the plaintiff

posed no immediate safety threat. See id. at 743, 745.

Reversing the district court’s conclusion that the officer was entitled to

qualified immunity, the Fifth Circuit explained in Hanks “that an officer

violates the Fourth Amendment if he abruptly resorts to overwhelming

physical force rather than continuing verbal negotiations with an individual

who poses no immediate threat or flight risk, who engages in, at most, passive

resistance, and whom the officer stopped for a minor traffic violation.” Id. at

747 (citing Deville, 567 F.3d at 167-69; Doss v. Helpenstell, 626 F. App’x 453,

459-60 (5th Cir. 2015); Brothers v. Zoss, 837 F.3d 513, 520 (5th Cir. 2016)).

That is sufficiently similar to Humble’s allegations to show that any reasonable

officer in Deputy Carpenter’s position should have known that his use of

violent force against Humble was unlawful.

The conclusion is reinforced by another decision, Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d

492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008). There, the court found it amply clear that an officer

“could not forcefully slam [a suspect’s] face into a vehicle while she was

restrained and subdued.” Id. at 502 (holding that defendants failed to

establish qualified immunity). The same principle fits this case, where Deputy

Carpenter allegedly slammed a non-resisting Humble forcefully to the ground

and continued to kneel on her after she was cuffed and unconscious.

Carpenter’s motion to dismiss the excessive force theory is denied.

3. Qualified immunity bars the First Amendment theory

against Deputy Carpenter.

The conclusion differs for Humble’s theory that Deputy Carpenter

violated her First Amendment rights by retaliating against her. Dkt. 14 at 32.

Although Deputy Carpenter raised a qualified immunity defense with respect

to that theory, Dkt. 24 at 15, Humble wholly failed to address it. Dkt. 46.

Even outside the qualified immunity context, “[a] plaintiff abandons

claims when it fails to address the claims or oppose a motion challenging those

claims.” See Terry Black’s Barbeque, L.L.C. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.,

22 F.4th 450, 459 (5th Cir. 2022); see also McClelland v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist.,

63 F.4th 996, 1010 (5th Cir. 2023) (characterizing this as “well-settled

precedent”). That conclusion applies with especial force here because it is

Humble’s burden to overcome the qualified immunity defense. See Willis v.

Bastrop Cnty., 2019 WL 252051, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2019) (plaintiff failed

to meet this burden “because he has failed to even respond to the qualified

immunity defense”). Yet nowhere does her response even mention the First

Amendment theory, see Dkt. 16, thereby abandoning it. Her Section 1983

claim premised on any First Amendment violation is dismissed.

C. Humble has not stated plausible claims against Deputies

Ramirez, Miller, and Crespin.

Humble also brings Section 1983 claims against Ramirez, Miller, and

Crespin (collectively the “Remaining Deputies”). Dkt. 14 at 24. The Remaining

Deputies assert qualified immunity from all claims. Dkt. 30 at 13; Dkt. 33 at

13; Dkt. 41 at 13.

The conclusions above foreclose most of Humble’s claims against the

other deputies. Because the initial traffic stop was valid, see supra Part II.B.1,

Humble cannot show that any other deputy wrongfully stopped her. And

because Humble failed to defend her First Amendment retaliation theory, that

theory is abandoned with respect to all the Deputies. See supra Part II.B.3.

Nor could the Remaining Deputies be derivatively liable as bystanders for any

of Deputy Carpenter’s actions that the Court has concluded did not violate

Humble’s clearly established constitutional rights. See Est. of Parker v. Miss.

Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 140 F.4th 226, 245 (5th Cir. 2025) (bystander liability

requires an underlying constitutional violation); see also Buehler v. Dear,

27 F.4th 969, 989 (5th Cir. 2022).

That leaves Humble’s theory that the Remaining Deputies wrongfully

failed to intervene during Deputy Carpenter’s use of excessive force. Dkt. 14

at 24. The Remaining Deputies argue that Humble has alleged no facts

showing they were present when unlawful force was applied or were otherwise

aware of its use. Dkt. 47 at 6. They are right.

“[A]n officer who is present at the scene and does not take reasonable

measures to protect a suspect from another officer’s use of excessive force may

be liable under section 1983.” Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir.

1995). Bystander liability attaches when an officer: “(1) knew a fellow officer

was violating an individual’s constitutional rights, (2) was present at the scene

of the constitutional violation, (3) had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the

harm but nevertheless, (4) chose not to act.” Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph

v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 343 (5th Cir. 2020).

Bystander liability “requires more than mere presence in the vicinity of

the violation;” courts must “also consider whether an officer acquiesced ….” Id.

at 343 (quotations omitted). Relevant considerations include how long the

force was used, the bystanders’ physical proximity to the officer who used force,

their conduct in response to the use of force, and their prior training. See, e.g.,

Timpa v. Dillard, 20 F.4th 1020, 1039 (5th Cir. 2021) (officers trained in how

to properly restrain subjects “stood mere feet away,” laughed, and made jesting

comments during a fourteen-minute restraint of an incapacitated arrestee);

Hale, 45 F.3d at 919 (officers “stood by and laughed” and “yelled

encouragement” as another officer used excessive force).

To overcome qualified immunity, Humble primarily relies on an

unpublished decision, Greene v. DeMoss, 2022 WL 3716201 (5th Cir. Aug. 29,

2022). See Dkt. 46 at 7. There, the plaintiff plausibly alleged bystander

liability where the officers “watched” and personally participated in the use of

excessive force for a period of almost thirty minutes while fellow officers beat

an unresisting suspect. Id. at *4.

But Humble’s allegations are far too sparse to show that any of the

Remaining Deputies could be liable, let alone that their conduct violated

clearly established law. At best, the complaint asserts that Ramirez, Miller,

and Crespine “arrived at the scene” while Humble was unconscious and did not

“move [] Carpenter off” her or otherwise intervene while he was kneeling on

her back. Dkt. 14 at 15. It also pleads that “at least one” of the Remaining

Deputies held Humble down as Carpenter kneeled on her. See id. at 15, 22.

This is not enough to show that these Remaining Deputies acquiesced to

Carpenter’s use of force. Nothing indicates that any of those deputies were

there long enough such that they should have known that the force applied

was unreasonable. Likewise, the factual allegations do not reflect that the

Remaining Deputies had a sufficient opportunity to prevent excessive force

from being used. And the lack of factual detail makes it impossible to show

that their unspecified conduct violated clearly established law, whether as

bystanders or otherwise.

Humble explains that she lacks further detail because she was face-down

and regaining consciousness when Deputy Carpenter kneeled on her back. See

Dkt. 14 at 15. She contends that “[f]urther details will have to be flushed out

in discovery ….” Dkt. 46 at 7. But Humble had access to information necessary

to flesh-out her bystander claim. After all, her sister was right there at the

scene. Her complaint even relies on her sister’s actions and statements that

reflect her sister’s proximity to where Humble exited the car and was taken to

the ground. See Dkt. 14 at 14, 16 (explaining how Tanny convinced Humble to

get out of the car and then obtained Defendant Carpenter’s permission to help

Humble sit up after she was handcuffed). The fact that Humble chose to

include some of her sister’s observations, while omitting any facts describing

the actions of the Remaining Deputies whom the sister would have plainly

observed, is telling. Indeed, Humble had a duty to investigate those facts

readily available to her before filing the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

In short, Humble has not pleaded a plausible basis to conclude that the

Remaining Deputies violated her rights. And Humble has not shown that their

conduct, which she fails to adequately describe, rises to the level of violating

clearly established law. Her claims against Deputies Ramirez, Miller, and

Crespin are dismissed.

III. Humble’s allegations against Harris County are deficient.

Humble’s Section 1983 claim against Harris County depends on Monell

v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and

its progeny. See Dkt. 14 at 27. Harris County contends that the allegations

are conclusory and fail to meet the Monell standard. See Dkt. 15. The County

is correct. Other than citing general principles and incorporating passages in

her complaint, Humble offers little in the way of response.2 See Dkt. 27.

“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

tortfeasor ....” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in original). “Consequently,

the unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality

through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional

actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.” Piotrowski

v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted). To

recover, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that: “(1) an official policy

(2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind

the violation of a constitutional right.” Martinez v. City of Rosenberg, Tex., 123

F.4th 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 2025 WL

1727389 (U.S. June 23, 2025).

2 Plaintiff filed an amended certificate of service regarding her response to the

County’s motion to dismiss, which for whatever reason is characterized on the docket

sheet as a “motion.” Dkt. 28. Because the amendment has already been filed without

objection, the Court denies any “motion” to amend the certificate as moot.

Based on the disposition of Humble’s other claims, the only potential

basis for municipal liability concerns Deputy Carpenter’s use of excessive force.

For that claim, the complaint asserts, in somewhat disjointed fashion, that

(1) the County’s officers have a pattern of using excessive force, which the

County has failed to address, see Dkt. 14 at 28-32; (2) the County has other

official or unofficial policies or customs regarding hiring practices, use of

special patrol units, and insurance that led to Deputy Carpenter’s use of

excessive force, see id. at 17, 19, 36, 37; and (3) the County failed to properly

train its deputies, see id. at 17-18, 37-38. But as concluded below, those

theories do not provide a plausible basis for municipal liability here.

A. Humble has not alleged a pattern of sufficiently similar

excessive force incidents.

The complaint asserts that Harris County has “an official policy or

custom of systemic unwillingness to address” its officers’ use of excessive force.3

Dkt. 14 at 28. Conclusory allegations that a custom or policy exists are

insufficient to support municipal liability. See Martinez, 123 F.4th at 289.

Instead, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead: (1) a written policy, (2) “a

widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a

3 Humble also makes passing references to the County’s “ratification” of the Deputies’

conduct. Allegations that the County failed to change policies or customs that

allegedly led excessive force to be used do not fit within any “extreme factual

situation’ where ratification applies.” Webb v. Town of St. Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 217

n.48 (5th Cir. 2019) (rejecting ratification theory).

custom that fairly represents municipal policy,” or (3) the rare circumstance

where the official policymaker performed the act underlying the Section 1983

claim. See Webb v. Town of St. Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2019)

(quotation omitted). A claim based on a widespread practice “requires

similarity and specificity; [p]rior indications cannot simply be for any and all

bad or unwise acts, but rather must point to the specific violation in question.”

Peterson v. City of Ft. Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009) (emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted); see also Davidson v. City of Stafford,

Tex., 848 F.3d 384, 396 (5th Cir. 2017) (“A pattern requires similarity,

specificity, and sufficiently numerous prior incidents.”).

Harris County argues that the examples mentioned in the complaint lack

sufficient similarity and specificity to show a systemic practice or policy of

failing to address excessive force. See Dkt. 15 at 8. The Court agrees.

Incidents within the Harris County jail, see id. at 28-29 (DOJ memorandum

“Investigations of the Harris County Jail”); id. at 29-30 (excessive force against

inmates), involve an entirely distinct environment from the traffic stop here.

See Woods v. Harris Cnty., 2022 WL 18396216, at *12 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2022)

(rejecting reliance on same DOJ report and incidents in jails to substantiate

municipal liability in non-jail setting), adopted in relevant part by, 2022 WL

22596773 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2022), aff’d, 2024 WL 1174185 (5th Cir. Mar. 19,

2024). Equally deficient is Humble’s reference to a police dog biting someone

during a home raid in a 2011 suit, which not only bears no similarity to the

traffic stop here, but did not lead to any finding that excessive force was used.

See Complaint, Prespentt v. Harris Cnty., No. 4:13-cv-1678, Dkt. 1 at 4-5 (S.D.

Tex. June 18, 2013); Agreed Motion to Dismiss, Prespentt, Dkt. 28 (S.D. Tex.

Jan. 30, 2015) (plaintiff’s voluntary motion to dismiss with prejudice); Order of

Dismissal, Prespentt, Dkt. 29 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015).

Humble’s declaration that there were “over 3000 excessive force

allegations against Harris County in 2015” fares no better. Dkt. 14 at 29. Mere

allegations do not constitute findings that excessive force was used, even in

2015. They also have no bearing on the County’s actions eight years later when

Humble was stopped. Humble’s conclusory assertions, whether about 2015

statistics or other incidents in 2016 or 2017, “do not raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” See Verastique v. City of Dall., Tex., 106 F.4th 427, 432

(5th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted) (rejecting pattern-or-practice allegations

premised on incidents that were not described with adequate factual detail),

cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 772 (2024). Humble’s pattern or practice theory is

dismissed.4

4 Humble also alleges that the County “has an official policy or unofficial custom of

justifying” arrests without probable cause. See Dkt. 14 at 28. But she did not

affirmatively plead that she was arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nor

does she invoke such a claim in her responses.

Nothing in the complaint approaches the threshold for sustaining a related Monell

claim against Harris County. Much like her excessive force argument, Humble fails

B. Humble inadequately pleaded deliberate indifference or

causation with respect to Harris County’s policies.

In addition to asserting a pattern of excessive force, Humble insinuates

that four other customs or policies are relevant: (1) Harris County’s reliance on

the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement’s (“TCOLE”) minimum standards

for hiring, supervising, disciplining, and retaining deputies, Dkt. 14 at 30, 36-

37, (2) its approach of hiring officers with only a high school-level education,

id. at 18-19, 37, (3) its custom of not requiring deputies to obtain excessive force

claim insurance, id. at 37, and (4) its use of special patrol units, called “jump-

out-boys,” id. at 17. Even assuming that these are actionable policies or

customs, Humble does not satisfy other requirements for municipal liability.

One of these hurdles is deliberate indifference. “‘[D]eliberate

indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal

actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). This degree of culpability exceeds mere

negligence or even gross negligence; “it must amount to an intentional choice,

not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” James v. Harris Cnty.,

to allege instances of sufficiently similar or specific conduct to plausibly support the

existence of a pattern of justifying unlawful arrests.

577 F.3d 612, 617-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty.,

973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)).

There must also be a direct causal link between the municipal policy and

the violation at issue. See James, 577 F.3d at 617; Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 580.

To survive dismissal, the complaint must articulate specific facts supporting

that causal relationship. See Henderson v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 51 F.4th 125,

130 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Barnes v. City of El Paso, 677 F. Supp. 3d 594, 615

(W.D. Tex. 2023) (conclusory allegations attempting to link the city’s failure to

implement body-worn cameras with plaintiff’s injury were inadequate).

Pleading both deliberate indifference and causation is crucial to ensure that

municipal liability does not devolve into respondeat superior liability. See

James, 577 F.3d at 618; Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 415.

Humble’s allegations come nowhere close to meeting those standards.

She claims that it is “well known and accepted” that both “training and

oversight deficiencies” and hiring deputies with only a high school-level

education lead to “increased rates of excessive force.” See Dkt. 14 at 30, 18.

Those bare assertions do not plausibly suggest that the County’s hiring and

training standards caused Deputy Carpenter to use excessive force.

Humble’s allegation that Harris County’s special patrol units (called

“jump-out boys”) operate without adequate oversight, id. at 17-18, is even less

connected to her claims. She offers no facts suggesting that Deputy Carpenter

was part of one of those units, such that they could even be relevant to what

occurred. Cf. Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th

Cir. 1997) (dismissing municipal liability claims where the cited policy was

“not implicated” by the plaintiff’s circumstances). And Humble offers neither

facts nor argument indicating that the County’s policy of not requiring deputies

to obtain insurance coverage for excessive force claims caused the violation she

alleges. See Dkt. 14 at 37. Indeed, that is far too attenuated on its face.

Humble cannot rely on any supposed policy to support her claim.

C. The failure to train allegations are also insufficient.

As a final theory, the complaint alleges that Harris County failed to

adequately train its deputies. See Dkt. 14 at 17, 19, 38. This theory is

deficient.

“In limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train

certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may

rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of Section 1983.”

Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. But “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation

of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Id.

(citing Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-23 (1985)). “That a particular

officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability

on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other

than a faulty training program.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

390-91 (1989). “And plainly, adequately trained officers occasionally make

mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the training program or the

legal basis for holding the city liable.” Id. at 391. Permitting failure-to-train

cases to move forward on a “lesser standard of fault would result in de facto

respondeat superior liability on municipalities—a result [the Supreme Court]

rejected in Monell.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-94).

To sustain a failure-to-train theory, a plaintiff must plead “that (1) the

supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate officer; (2) a

causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of

the plaintiff's rights, and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to

deliberate indifference.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 277 (5th Cir. 2023)

(quoting Davidson, 848 F.3d at 397). But Humble makes only conclusory

allegations about the Deputies’ training and the causal link between that

training and the violation pleaded. See, e.g., Dkt. 14 at 17 (the

“unconstitutional conduct is a result of failure to train”). The complaint does

not identify what made the training inadequate. Merely claiming that training

was subpar does not show deliberate indifference. See Armstrong, 60 F.4th at

277. Moreover, “[t]hat a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained”

does not establish causation between that officer’s conduct and the training he

received. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91. Nothing in the complaint

bridges that that critical gap. Humble’s failure-to-train theory is barred.

In sum, Humble has not plausibly stated any theory under which Harris

County can be liable. Her claims against the County are dismissed.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Steven Lamar

Carpenter Jr.’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 24) be GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. Humble’s theories under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Deputy

Carpenter unconstitutionally stopped her car and violated her First

Amendment rights are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. But Humble’s

excessive force claim against Carpenter survives dismissal.

It is further ORDERED that the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants

Omar Ramirez, Bryant Crespin, and Adrian Miller (Dkt. 30; Dkt. 33; Dkt. 41),

and by Defendant Harris County (Dkt. 15) be GRANTED in full, and all claims

against those defendants be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

It is further ORDERED that Humble’s motion (Dkt. 28) to amend the

certificate of service in her response to the County’s motion to dismiss is

DENIED AS MOOT.

Signed on January 14, 2026, at Houston, Texas.

nited States Magistrate Judge

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