Robinson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

URBANA DIVISION

LEON ROBINSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 25-2225

)

SHELLY HARDING, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently detained at Graham Correctional Center, was

granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The case is now before the Court for a merit review

of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such process to

identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” Id.

The Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the

plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements

and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s allegations arise from his detention at the Vermilion County Jail. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Rush attempted to speak with him about his mental health conditions in

front of an officer during an intake exam, and that Defendant Rush referred him to a provider on

two occasions when he refused to speak with her about it. Plaintiff alleges that officials charged

him $30.00 for each visit.

Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendant Harding that he was diabetic, that the condition

“gets bad while incarcerated due to the high carb diet jailers tend to feed us,” that he needed his

blood sugar checked “continuously,” and that he takes medications to control blood sugar.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Harding told him that he would check him for 30 days and adjust

the frequency as needed, but that she never performed the checks personally. Plaintiff alleges

that some of the officers conducting the checks attempted to give him unsanitary equipment.

Plaintiff alleges that medical staff discontinued blood sugar checks because Plaintiff was “in

range.” Plaintiff alleges that medical staff did not give him his medication or put him on a special

diet for several months. Plaintiff alleges that he was charged for visits with the physician, and

that the food he receives is cold because it is kept separate from other detainees’ food.

Plaintiff alleges that water in his cell is brown and contains rust, and that officials refused

to reimburse his family for hygiene items they had purchased for him that he believes he should

have received for free.

Liberally construed, Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant

Harding in her individual capacity for failure to provide adequate medical care related to his

diabetes treatment. Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352-53 (7th Cir. 2018). Because

Plaintiff does not allege that the charges for medical treatment obstructed his access to treatment,

this claim does not include his allegations that he was charged a co-pay for medical services.

Poole v. Isaacs, 703 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2012) (charging a copay is not unconstitutional).

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Rush attempted to speak with him about mental

health conditions does not permit a plausible inference that her actions were objectively

unreasonable, nor does the presence of an officer implicate privacy concerns given Plaintiff’s

allegations that he did not divulge any private medical information. Plaintiff’s allegations

regarding his water do not permit a plausible inference that the problem was so pervasive as to

arise to the level of a constitutional violation, nor does cold food. Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d

816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019); See Drake v. Velasco, 207 F.Supp.2d 809, 812 (N.D. Ill. 2002).

Plaintiff cannot assert a claim based on money other people paid to the jail. The jail is not a

“person” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758

(N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding the Cook County Jail was not a person under Section 1983). He does

not make any allegations against Defendants Heaton or Guess. The Court finds that Plaintiff fails

to state a claim against Defendants Vermilion County Correctional Center, Rush, Heaton, and

Guess.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Counsel (Doc. 4)

Plaintiff has no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in this case. In considering the

Plaintiff’s motion, the court asks: (1) has the indigent Plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to

obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of

the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself? Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,

654-55 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff has not shown that he made a reasonable effort to obtain counsel on his own. A

plaintiff usually does this by attaching copies of letters sent to attorneys seeking representation

and copies of any responses received. Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated statements that he wrote to

lawyers is not sufficient. Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 559-60 (7th Cir. 2023); Tackett v. Jess,

853 F. App’x 11, 16-17 (7th Cir. 2021). Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong, the

Court does not address the second. Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021).

Plaintiff’s motion is denied with leave to renew.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the

court finds that the plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant

Harding in her individual capacity for failure to provide adequate medical care related to

his diabetes treatment. Any additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the

court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 15.

2. This case is now in the process of service. The plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, in order to give notice to

the defendants and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. The

plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the court at this time, unless otherwise directed by

the court.

3. The court will attempt service on the defendants by mailing each defendant a

waiver of service. The defendants have 60 days from the date the waiver is sent to file an

answer. If the defendants have not filed answers or appeared through counsel within 90

days of the entry of this order, the plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of

service. After the defendants have been served, the court will enter an order setting

discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

4. With respect to a defendant who no longer works at the address provided by

the plaintiff, the entity for whom that defendant worked while at that address shall provide

to the clerk said defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said defendant's

forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the clerk and shall not be

maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the clerk.

5. The defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is

sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all

defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall

be to the issues and claims stated in this opinion. In general, an answer sets forth the

defendants' positions. The court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and

until a motion is filed by the defendants. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary

or will be considered.

6. This district uses electronic filing, which means that, after defense counsel

has filed an appearance, defense counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by the plaintiff with the clerk. The plaintiff does not need to

mail to defense counsel copies of motions and other papers that the plaintiff has filed with

the clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery

requests and responses are not filed with the clerk. The plaintiff must mail his discovery

requests and responses directly to defendants' counsel. Discovery requests or responses

sent to the clerk will be returned unfiled, unless they are attached to and the subject of a

motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until defense counsel has filed an appearance

and the court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in

more detail.

7. Counsel for the defendants is hereby granted leave to depose the plaintiff at

his place of confinement. Counsel for the defendants shall arrange the time for the

deposition.

8. The plaintiff shall immediately notify the court, in writing, of any change in

his mailing address and telephone number. The plaintiff's failure to notify the court of a

change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with

prejudice.

9. If a defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the clerk within

30 days after the waiver is sent, the court will take appropriate steps to effect formal

service through the U.S. Marshals service on that defendant and will require that

defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(d)(2).

10. The clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order

pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

11. The clerk is directed to terminate Vermilion County Correctional Center,

Rush, Heaton, and Guess as defendants.

12. The clerk is directed to attempt service on Shelly Harding pursuant to the

standard procedures.

13. Plaintiff’s Motion [4] is DENIED with leave to renew.

Entered this 15th day of January, 2026.

s/Sara Darrow

SARA DARROW

CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE