Satterfield

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

3:25-cv-00977-MR

MARCUS ANTONIO SATTERFIELD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

vs. )

) MEMORANDUM OF

) DECISION AND ORDER

AVERY MITCHELL CORRECTIONAL ) ON INITIAL REVIEW

INSTITUTION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, [Doc. 1], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2,

5].

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Marcus Antonio Satterfield (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of

the State of North Carolina currently incarcerated at Johnston Correctional

Institution in Smithfield, North Carolina. On December 9, 2025, he filed this

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on alleged events at

Avery/Mitchell Correctional Institution (“AMCI”) in Spruce Pine, North

Carolina. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff names the following AMCI officials as

Defendants: Richard Ellis, Sergeant; Matthan Hicks,1 Correctional Officer;

Danny Strafford, Correctional Officer; Landon Brown,2 Unit Manager; Loren

Aldrige, Unit Manager; Derrick E. Fox, not otherwise identified; Robert B.

Bullis, Warden, and FNU Crow, Assistant Warden, all in their individual and

official capacities. [Id. at 1-3]. Plaintiff also names the Department of Adult

Correction (“NCDAC”) and AMCI as Defendants. [Id. at 1]. Plaintiff appears

to allege as follows.

On July 21, 2023, between 5:00 and 6:30 p.m., Defendants Strafford,

Hicks, and Ellis “[g]anged up” on the Plaintiff, calling him out of the dorm and

into the hallway. [Id. at 4]. These Defendants verbally assaulted the Plaintiff

and Defendant Ellis threatened him. [Id. at 4-5]. Plaintiff “contact[ed] their

superior officers,” who ignored the Plaintiff and his plea for help. [Id. at 5].

Plaintiff was ordered to submit to handcuffs “under false Allegations [sic].”

[Id. at 4-5]. After Plaintiff submitted to handcuffs, Defendant Hicks “twisted

[Plaintiff’s] wrist and Butterflied [his] Hands before placing The Hand Cuffs

1 In docketing Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Clerk listed this Defendant as “Nathan” Hicks. This

Defendant, however, consistently appears throughout the Complaint as “Matthan” Hicks.

Additionally, the Clerk docketed Defendant “Aldrige” as “Aldridge.” The Court will direct

the Clerk to correct these errors.

2 Plaintiff inconsistently refers to Defendant Brown in the Complaint. That is, he identifies

this Defendant as Landon “Brown” in the caption of the Complaint but later refers to him

as Landon “Browning.” [See Doc. 1 at 1, 4]. Plaintiff is directed to correct this Defendant’s

name in the docket if necessary.

on,” “[j]acked [Plaintiff’s] shoulder,” and ignored his medical issues. [Id.].

Defendant Stafford carried Plaintiff to isolation alone. [Id.].

On August 21, 2023, after receiving Plaintiff’s complaints, presumably

regarding the alleged July 21, 2023 incident, Defendants Brown and Aldrige

attempted to cover up the matter by falsifying documents and placing Plaintiff

in isolation again “for making complaints about the Actions going on in Their

unit, which caused [Plaintiff] To Be Assaulted By use of force Handcuffs

process.” [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff also noticed that after the “Institution Head

Leaders” insisted that the accused officers “Deal with It,” Plaintiff was

“Harassed and Targeted For senseless Infractions showing Deliberate

Indifference.” [Id. at 5].

Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants at AMCI have a custom of

using excessive force and false documentation and allegations to cover up

their actions, as well as shredding grievances and denying process to all

complaints. [Id. at 4].

Plaintiff claims violation of his rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.3 [Id. at 3]. For

injuries, Plaintiff claims that he suffered physical pain and various physical

3 The Court will address only those claims fairly raised by Plaintiff’s Complaint.

injuries, emotional and mental stress, “lost time being in the hole,” monetary

loss from infraction payment, and medical copayment. [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff

seeks monetary and injunctive relief.4 [Id.].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must review the

Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that

it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, § 1915A requires an initial

review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and

the court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any

portion of the complaint, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from

a defendant who is immune from such relief.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

4 Plaintiff also purports to seek “over 20 million” in damages as a “class action lawsuit …

[f]or all inmates who suffered from the same incidents … at [AMCI].” [Doc. 1 at 5]. Plaintiff

cannot recover damages for injuries suffered by individuals who are not joined as plaintiffs

in this matter.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under

color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,

526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski,

599 U.S. 166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023).

Plaintiff attempts to name the NCDAC as a Defendant. However,

“neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’

under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Therefore, NCDAC is not a “person” under § 1983. See Fox v. Harwood,

2009 WL 1117890, at *1 (W.D.N.C. April 24, 2009). Plaintiff's claims against

NCDAC are, therefore, dismissed with prejudice.

Additionally, NCDAC facilities are not “persons” under § 1983.

See Fox v. Harwood, 2009 WL 1117890 at *1 (W.D.N.C. April 24, 2009). As

such, Defendant AMCI is also dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff purports to sue Defendants, who are state officials, in their

individual and official capacities. However, “a suit against a state official in

his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit

against the official’s office.” Will v. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989). Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting

in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder. Allen v.

Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019).

Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages

against the State of North Carolina and its various agencies. See Ballenger

v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). As such, Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants in their official capacities do not survive initial review and

will be dismissed.

To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must

affirmatively show that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation

of [his] rights.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018)

(cleaned up); see Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)

(citation omitted). Mere knowledge of a deprivation is insufficient.

Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171. Plaintiff fails to make any allegations against

Defendants Fox, Bullis, or Crow. [See Doc. 1]. The Court, therefore, will

dismiss these Defendants for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief

against them.

A. Excessive Force and Failure to Protect

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual

punishments,” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must satisfy

both an objective component–that the harm inflicted was sufficiently serious–

and a subjective component–that the prison official acted with a sufficiently

culpable state of mind. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir.

1996). In adjudicating an excessive force claim, the Court must consider

such factors as the need for the use of force, the relationship between that

need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and,

ultimately, whether the force was “applied in a good faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of

causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made clear that “[a]n inmate who

is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an

excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape

without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010).

The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also

imposes on prison officials a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the

hands of other prisoners and other prison officials. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at

833. Still, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another

. . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the

victim’s safety.” Id. at 834. To state a claim against a prison official for failure

to protect, an inmate must show: (1) “serious or significant physical or

emotional injury,” and (2) that prison officials exhibited deliberate indifference

to inmate health or safety.” De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th

Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). To show deliberate

indifference, the inmate “must show both (1) ‘that the [prison] official in

question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm’ and (2) that the

official also ‘subjectively recognized’ that any actions he took in response

‘were inappropriate in light of that risk.’” Ford v. Hooks, --- F.4th ---, 2024

WL 3260902, at *4 (Jul. 2, 2024) (quoting Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland,

372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up)). It is not enough that the

prison official should have recognized the risk and the inadequacy of his

response. Id. Instead, the official “actually must have perceived” both.

Parrish, 372 F.3d at 302-03 (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard,”

and “a showing of mere negligence will not meet it”) (quoting Grayson v.

Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999)).

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every

reasonable inference, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant

Hicks survives initial review as not clearly frivolous. Plaintiff, however, has

failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Strafford and

Ellis. That is, Plaintiff alleges only that these Defendants verbally assaulted

him, and that Defendant Ellis threatened him. The law is well-established

that taunting comments, slurs, threats, and other verbal harassment by

correctional facility staff, without more, are not actionable under § 1983.

Wilson v. United States, 332 F.R.D. 505, 520 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 19, 2019)

(collecting cases). The Court, therefore, will dismiss this claim against

Defendants Strafford and Ellis.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim

based on the failure to protect him from harm. While he alleges that

Defendants Strafford and Ellis were present when Defendant Hicks allegedly

used excessive force in applying the handcuffs, Plaintiff’s allegations do not

reflect that the force used by Defendant Hicks was of sufficient duration or

severity that Defendant Strafford and Hicks could or should have appreciated

a substantial risk of harm or that they had the opportunity to act differently in

light of that risk. The Court, therefore, will also dismiss this claim.

B. Access to Grievance Procedure

“[T]he Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or

access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state.” Adams v.

Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). “An inmate thus cannot bring

a § 1983 claim alleging denial of a specific grievance procedure.” Booker v.

S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff, therefore,

has failed to state a claim based on the denial of access to or interference

with the grievance procedure. The Court, therefore, will dismiss this claim.

C. Retaliation

An inmate has a clearly established First Amendment right to be free

from retaliation for filing lawsuits. See Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 855

F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017); Thompson v. Commonwealth of Va., 878 F.3d

89, 110 (4th Cir. 2017). Inmates also have a protected First Amendment right

to complain to prison officials about prison conditions and improper treatment

by prison employees that affect them. See Patton v. Kimble, 717 Fed. App’x

271, 272 (4th Cir. 2018).

To state a colorable First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must

allege that (1) he engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the

defendant took some action that adversely affected his First Amendment

rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between his protected activity

and the defendant’s conduct. Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir.

2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The causation element

“requires that a plaintiff plausibly allege that the defendants were aware of

the plaintiff’s engaging in a protected activity and show some degree of

temporal proximity to suggest a causal connection.” Gowen v. Winfield, 130

F.4th 162, 173 (2025) (cleaned up).

Retaliation claims brought by prisoners are treated with skepticism

because every act of discipline by a prison official is retaliatory in that it

responds directly to prisoner misconduct. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72,

74 (4th Cir. 1994). More, bare or conclusory assertions of retaliation are

insufficient to establish a retaliation claim. Id., 40 F.3d at 74.

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every

reasonable inference, his First Amendment retaliation claim against

Defendants Brown and Aldrige survives initial review as not clearly frivolous.

To the extent Plaintiff purports to state a retaliation claim against any other

Defendant, he has failed to do so.

D. Disciplinary Charges

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to state a claim based on false disciplinary

charges, this claim appears to be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held as follows:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction and

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to

make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable

under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a

§ 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction

or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court

determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not

demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment

against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in

the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Id. at 485-87 (footnotes omitted). In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641

(1997), the Supreme Court extended the Heck rule to claims alleging

constitutional deficiencies in prison disciplinary proceedings that have

resulted in the loss of good time credits.

Here, if the Plaintiff were to prevail on a claim that any disciplinary

charges were unfounded, that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the

disciplinary convictions. See, e.g., Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-47 (plaintiff’s

claims that he was denied the opportunity to put on a defense and that there

was deceit and bias by the hearing officer would necessarily imply the

invalidity of the disciplinary proceedings); Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F.4th 289

(4th Cir. 2022) (prisoner could not bring § 1983 due process claim that prison

officials fabricated evidence so that plaintiff would be wrongfully convicted of

prison disciplinary infractions, causing him to lose good-time credits,

because the disciplinary conviction had not been invalidated). The Plaintiff,

however, has not alleged that any disciplinary convictions have been

reversed or otherwise invalidated. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim appears to be

barred by Heck.

E. Due Process

Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution

and the full array of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not

apply. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citing Morrissey

v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)). Where a prison disciplinary hearing

may result in loss of good time credits or solitary confinement, however, an

inmate is entitled to certain due process protections. These include: (1)

advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when

consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses

and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written

statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the

disciplinary action. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. There is no constitutional

right, however, to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to retain and be

appointed counsel. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322 (1976);

Brown v. Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 505-06 (4th Cir. 2004). If the hearing

officer’s decision contains a written statement of the evidence relied upon,

due process is satisfied. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 323 n.5. Moreover,

substantive due process is satisfied if the disciplinary hearing decision was

based on “some evidence.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472

U.S. 445, 455 (1985).

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every

reasonable inference, he has nonetheless failed to state a due process claim

based on the conduct of any disciplinary proceedings. Plaintiff’s allegations

are too vague and conclusory to state a claim for relief in the first place. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d

33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific

allegations of material fact are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309

F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader must allege facts, directly or

indirectly, that support each element of the claim). Plaintiff alleges only that

his “Rights To fair and Impartial Hearings” have been violated and that he

“Lost Time Being in The Hole.” [Id.].

Moreover, to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

show that the defendants “acted personally” to cause the alleged violation.

See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff does not allege who was responsible for the conduct of the

disciplinary proceeding(s) that allegedly resulted in “lost time.”

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a due process claim in any event.

That is, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that he was deprived of advance

written notice of the disciplinary charges, the opportunity to call witnesses

and present documentary evidence in his defense, or a written statement by

the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary

action. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71.

For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim.

The Court, therefore, will also dismiss this claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, Plaintiff’s individual capacity Eighth Amendment excessive

force claim against Defendant Hicks and Plaintiff’s First Amendment

individual capacity retaliation claim against Defendants Brown and Aldrige

survive initial review. The Court will dismiss all remaining claims and the

remaining Defendants in this matter.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s individual capacity

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Hicks and

Plaintiff’s First Amendment individual capacity retaliation claim against

Defendant Brown and Aldrige survive initial review.

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that all remaining claims are

DISMISSED on initial review for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Fox, Bullis, Crow,

Stafford, Ellis, Avery Mitchell Correctional Institution, and Department of

Adult Correction are hereby DISMISSED as Defendants in this matter.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Clerk of Court shall commence

the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for

Defendants Hicks, Brown, and Aldrige, who are alleged to be current or

former employees of the North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to update the docket to reflect

Defendant “Nathan” Hicks’s name as “Matthan” Hicks and Defendant

“Aldridge” as “Aldrige.”

The Clerk is also instructed to mail Plaintiff an Opt-In/Opt-Out form

pursuant to Standing Order 3:19-mc-00060-FDW.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: January 12, 2026

Martifi Reidinger Le,

Chief United States District Judge “lly

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