Moncrief

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JANICE MONCRIEF, as Administratrix )

of the Estate of Gary Moncrief, deceased, )

and in her individual capacity, BENITA )

MONCRIEF, and TAMARA ACREE, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:23-cv-331-JTA

) (WO)

CITY OF MONTGOMERY, a municipal )

corporation of the State of Alabama, )

CHRISTOPHER BROWN, in his )

individual capacity as a Police Officer of )

the City of Montgomery Police )

Department, and JAMES ALBRECHT in )

his individual capacity as a Police Officer )

of the City of Montgomery Police )

Department, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are the following motions: Plaintiffs’ Second Renewed and

Amended Motion for Leave to File Conventionally (Doc. No. 188), Plaintiffs’ Renewed

and Amended Motion for Leave to File Under Seal (Doc. No. 189), Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Reconsider (Doc. No. 190), and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Third Amended

Complaint (Doc. No. 191). For the reasons stated below, the motions are due to be denied.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of a May 18, 2021 incident in which Defendants Christopher

Brown and James Albrecht, police officers for the City of Montgomery, used deadly force

by firing into a vehicle occupied by Plaintiffs. One of the occupants, Gary Moncrief (whose

estate is represented in this action by Plaintiff Janice Moncrief), died due to a gunshot

wound. (Doc. No. 173 at 3.) According to the Second Amended Complaint, Alabama State

Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”) officers, Defendants Wayne Gaskin and Jared Roberson,

investigated the shooting. (Doc. No. 74 at 18–22.) In a summary of his investigative efforts,

Defendant Gaskin stated that, on the date of the incident, he met with Montgomery Police

Department Captain Tucker,1 who was preserving a Taurus handgun as evidence inside his

vehicle. (Doc. No. 74 at 19–20; Doc. No. 74-28.) Captain Tucker told Defendant Gaskin

the Taurus handgun had been secured from Gary Moncrief. (Doc. No. 74 at 19–20; Doc.

No. 74-28.) A coroner’s report later indicated Gary Moncrief died of a self-inflicted

gunshot wound inside his mouth that completely severed his brainstem. (Id.) The coroner

reported Gary Moncrief also suffered an “indeterminate range graze wound” to the head

which could have caused death, but may also have been survivable. (Id.)

The extensive procedural history of this case has been documented in prior opinions

and thus will not be recounted here in detail. For purposes of this Memorandum Opinion

and Order, the following procedural events and corresponding dates are most relevant:

• On May 17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed this action. (Doc. No. 1.)

• On November 8, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint against

Defendants City of Montgomery (“City”), Albrecht, and Brown. (Doc. No. 29.)

1 Captain Tucker was formerly a Defendant in this action. The Court dismissed him from this

action on November 21, 2025. (Docs. No. 175, 176.)

• On September 10, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. (Doc. No. 42.)

• On March 18, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint against

Defendants City, Albrecht, Brown, Bianka Ruiz, D’Shana Snyder, Laquita

Clark, Alix Payne, Jr., Brian Dixon, Edkenjunta2 Jones, Ralph Tucker, Raynard

Dabney, Gaskin and Roberson. (Doc. No. 74.)

• On June 11, 2025, Defendants Gaskin and Roberson filed a Partial Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 134.)

• On June 11, 2025, Defendants City, Albrecht, Brown, Ruiz, Snyder, Clark,

Payne, Dixon, Jones, Tucker, and Dabney filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 135.)

• On July 10, 2025, briefing on the partial motions to dismiss closed. (Doc. No.

152.)

• On July 25, 2025, the Court entered an Amended Scheduling Order. (Doc. No.

166.) In accordance with the Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 49) and Amended

Scheduling Order, the pertinent deadlines are as follows:

o The deadline to file motions to amend the pleadings expired on March 17,

2025. (Docs. No. 49, 61, 70.) However, the Court permitted Plaintiffs to file

a Second Amended Complaint on March 18, 2025. (Doc. No. 77.)

2 In their brief in support of the motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs clarify that, although

Defendant Jones was identified as “Ed Jones” prior to his dismissal from this action, his correct

name is “Edkenjunta Jones.” (Doc. No. 190-1 at 23 n.13.)

o The deadline for completion of discovery is January 20, 2026. (Doc. No.

166.)

o The deadline for dispositive and Daubert motions is February 13, 2026. (Id.)

o The Court will hold a pretrial conference on March 9, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. (Id.)

o This cause is set for a jury trial during the term of court commencing on April

20, 2026, in Montgomery, Alabama. (Doc. No. 49; Doc. No. 166 at 1 n.1.)

• On November 10, 2025, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order

granting the partial motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Gaskin and Roberson

and dismissed them from this action. (Docs. No. 175, 176.)

• On November 21, 2025, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order

granting in part and denying in part the partial motion to dismiss filed by

Defendants City, Albrecht, Brown, Ruiz, Snyder, Clark, Payne, Dixon, Jones,

Tucker, and Dabney. (Docs. No. 175, 176.) The Court dismissed Defendants

Ruiz, Snyder, Clark, Payne, Dixon, Jones, Tucker, and Dabney from the action.

(Id.) Some claims remain pending against Defendants City, Albrecht, and

Brown. (Id.)

• On December 1, 2025, Plaintiffs filed (1) a motion for leave to file under seal a

motion for reconsideration of the November 10 and 21, 2025 Memorandum

Opinions and Orders; and (2) a motion for leave to file a Third Amended

Complaint under seal. (Docs. No. 180, 181.) On December 10, 2025, the Court

held a status conference with respect to those motions and denied the motions

without prejudice to refile them after the parties conferred to eliminate

unnecessary sealing of a large volume of exhibits. (Docs. No. 182, 183, 184.)

• On December 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed (1) a renewed and amended motion for

leave to file under seal a motion for reconsideration of the November 10 and 21,

2025 Memorandum Opinions and Orders; and (2) a renewed and amended

motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint under seal. (Docs. No. 185,

186.) On December 19, 2025, the Court denied the motions because Plaintiffs

failed to state the grounds upon which they sought to seal the documents. (Doc.

No. 187.)

• On December 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the following motions:

o Plaintiffs’ Second Renewed and Amended Motion for Leave to File

Conventionally. (Doc. No. 188.)

o Plaintiffs’ Renewed and Amended Motion for Leave to File Under Seal.

(Doc. No. 189.)

o Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider. (Doc. No. 190.)

o Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. No.

191.)

• On January 5, 2026, on the parties’ joint request, the Court referred this action

to court-annexed mediation before United States Magistrate Judge Kelly

Fitzgerald Pate. (Docs. No. 192, 195.)

• On January 6, 2026, Judge Pate set this case for mediation on January 16, 2026.

(Doc. No. 196.)

Upon review of Plaintiffs’ Second Renewed and Amended Motion for Leave to File

Conventionally (Doc. No. 188), Plaintiffs’ Renewed and Amended Motion for Leave to

File Under Seal (Doc. No. 189), Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider (Doc. No. 190), and

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 191), the Court

concludes further briefing is unnecessary and the motions are ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion for Leave to Amend

A district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend a complaint is “severely

restricted” by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), which stresses that courts should freely give leave to

amend “when justice so requires.” Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289,

1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir.

1988)). The policy of liberally favoring amendment exists to facilitate determination of

claims on their merits, rather than allowing litigation to become a survival exercise in the

technical points of pleading. Davis v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 18-25361-CIV, 2019 WL

13261027, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2019) (citing Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660

F.2d 594, 597–98 (5th Cir. November 5, 1981)); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,

182 (1962) (“If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a

proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the

merits.”).

Despite Rule 15(a)’s “mandate” that leave to amend is to be freely given when

justice requires, leave to amend may be denied for such reasons as “undue delay, bad faith

or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.

B. Motion for Reconsideration of a Nonfinal Order

Except in limited circumstances3 not applicable here, Rule 54(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer

than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties

does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised

at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all

the parties’ rights and liabilities.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

“[A] district court has broad and ‘plenary power’ over its interlocutory orders, and

‘may therefore reconsider, revise, alter or amend [an interlocutory] order at any time prior

to final judgment.’” Holmes v. Fresenius Kidney Care of Tuskegee, No. 3:21-cv-578-ECM,

2023 WL 2413993, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 8, 2023) (quoting Hardin v. Hayes, 52 F.3d 934,

938 (11th Cir. 1995) (quotations and citation omitted)). However, “[i]n the interests of

finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources, reconsideration of an order is an

extraordinary remedy and is employed sparingly.” Gougler v. Sirius Prods., Inc., 370 F.

Supp. 2d 1185, 1189 (S.D. Ala. 2005). “[C]ourts and litigants cannot be repeatedly called

upon to backtrack through the paths of litigation which are often laced with close questions.

3 Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provides that an order “direct[ing] entry

of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties,” is not a final judgment

unless a court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay and directs entry of final

judgment as to those claims or parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The undersigned has not expressly

directed final judgment as to any claims or parties. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motions are not

postjudgment motions.

There is a badge of dependability necessary to advance the case to the next stage.” Sussman

v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, 153 F.R.D. 689, 694 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (citing Kuenz v.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 617 F. Supp. 11, 14 (N.D. Ohio 1985)); see also Kelly

v. Montgomery Hous. Auth., No. 2:24-cv-166-MHT-JTA, 2024 WL 3240637, at *1 (M.D.

Ala. June 28, 2024) (noting judicial resources are generally ill-spent on “repetitive motions

[seeking] revisitation of prior orders by raising or expanding on previously-rejected

arguments,” as well as on “[m]otions seeking revisitation of prior orders based on new

arguments that could have been raised prior to entry of the challenged order”). Hence,

“‘[l]itigants should not use motions to reconsider as a knee-jerk reaction to an adverse

ruling.’” Spellman v. Haley, No. CIV.A. 97-T-640-N, 2004 WL 866837, at *2 (M.D. Ala.

Feb. 22, 2002); see also Armbuster v. Rosenbloom, No. 1:15-CV-114, 2016 WL 1441467,

at *1 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2016) (“[A] motion for reconsideration is not an appeal, and thus

it is improper on a motion for reconsideration to ‘ask the Court to rethink what [the Court]

ha[s] already thought through — rightly or wrongly.’” (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel

Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983))).

Extraordinary circumstances may warrant revisitation of a nonfinal order only in the

event of an intervening change in controlling law, discovery of new evidence, the need to

correct a clear error of fact or law, or the need to prevent manifest injustice. Gougler, 370

F. Supp. 2d at 1189; see also Holmes, 2023 WL 2413993, at *1 (noting the standards

governing Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend judgments often serve as guidelines for

deciding motions to reconsider nonfinal orders). “Additional facts and arguments that

should have been raised in the first instance are not appropriate grounds for a motion for

reconsideration.” Rossi v. Troy State Univ., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1249 (M.D. Ala. 2002),

aff’d, 64 F. App’x 743 (11th Cir. 2003). Newly discovered evidence generally will not

warrant reconsideration of an order if the evidence could have been submitted prior to the

entry of the order in question and the movant fails to show good cause why he or she did

not do so. Gougler, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 1189 (citing Rossi, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1249); see

also Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here a party attempts

to introduce previously unsubmitted evidence on a motion to reconsider, the court should

not grant the motion absent some showing that the evidence was not available during the

pendency of the [underlying] motion.”). “Nor can motions for reconsideration be used to

present new legal theories or to raise legal arguments that could have been raised

previously.” Spellman, 2004 WL 866837, at *2; Holmes, 2023 WL 2413993, at *1.

Furthermore, “re-consideration” on grounds of a change in controlling law “assumes that

the argument on which the intervening change in the law bears was actually made in the

first instance.” Spellman, 2004 WL 866837, at *2 (emphasis in original). In short, a motion

for reconsideration “cannot be used ‘to relitigate old matters, raise [new] argument[s,] or

present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’” Holmes, 2023

WL 2413993, at *1 (quoting Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757,

763 (11th Cir. 2005)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 191)

Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint to amend their factual allegations and add

a new4 conspiracy claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City, Brown,

and Albrecht, and against former Defendants Ruiz, Snyder, Clark, Payne, Dixon, Jones,

Tucker, Dabney, Gaskin, and Roberson. Plaintiffs indicate5 they should be allowed to

amend because they would like to continue pursuing outstanding discovery matters with

the former Defendants and because “[t]he participation of the former Defendants in the

§ 1983 civil conspiracy was not known until discovery commenced.” (Doc. No. 191 at 14-

15.) Plaintiffs also “respectfully ask this Court to reconsider its prior orders dismissing”

Defendants Ruiz, Snyder, Clark, Payne, Dixon, Jones, Tucker, Dabney, Gaskin, and

Roberson6 “to permit the Plaintiffs to amend its [sic] pleading to conform with existing

§ 1983 civil conspiracy law.” (Doc. No. 191 at 15.)

Plaintiffs contend that, “due to ongoing extensive discovery after the filing of

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended complaint and the close of submissions related to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (sic), Plaintiffs have uncovered new evidence that tends to show that

Gary Moncrief did not commit suicide.” (Id. at 15.) Plaintiffs do not specifically identify

what “new evidence” warrants another opportunity to amend or when that evidence was

4 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint contained a claim for conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985. (Doc. No. 74 at 28.) The Court dismissed that conspiracy claim on grounds the conspiracy

claim was not cognizable under § 1985 and for failure to allege sufficient facts to plausibly show

Defendants engaged in a conspiracy. (See Doc. No 173 at 5–9; Doc. No. 175 at 17–21.)

5 Plaintiffs’ argument is not a model of clarity.

6 Plaintiffs’ argument for reconsideration is subsumed in Section III.B. of this Memorandum

Opinion, which addresses Plaintiffs’ separate motion for reconsideration. (Doc. No. 190.)

discovered.7 Yet, the undersigned notes the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 74)

was filed on March 18, 2025, and briefing on the partial motions to dismiss the Second

Amended Complaint (Docs. No. 134, 135) closed July 10, 2025. (See Docs. No. 152, 156.)

Only now, on the eve of the close of discovery, after receiving an adverse ruling on the

partial motions to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, do Plaintiffs formally seek

leave to file a thirty-six page amended complaint with thirty-one exhibits8 to add a § 1983

claim for civil conspiracy against thirteen defendants and cure pleading deficiencies

discussed in the adverse ruling.

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend is due to be denied as untimely and because

Plaintiffs did not show good cause for extending the Scheduling Order’s expired

amendment deadline. Fed. R. Civ. 16(b)(4) (“A [scheduling order] may be modified only

for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”).

Alternatively, the motion is due to be denied on grounds of undue prejudice and

delay. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. This action was filed on May 17, 2023. (Doc. No. 1.) It is

nearly three years old. The case has already been delayed by a late-filed amendment to the

7 In their Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 191), Plaintiffs provide

a timeline of discovery events (primarily depositions), including discovery that occurred after the

filing of the Second Amended Complaint and after the close of briefing on the partial motions to

dismiss. Still, they do not state what new information they uncovered in any of that discovery. Nor

do they explain which deposition or other evidence first evinced their need to amend the complaint

to include allegations that Gary Moncrief did not commit suicide. Thus, Plaintiffs have not

provided any basis for a finding of good cause for extending the deadline for amending the

complaint at this late date based on newly discovered evidence.

8 The exhibits, which include documents, audio files, and video files, are extensive. At least some

portion of them were also attached to the Second Amended Complaint, although the Court has not

undertaken a comparison to determine how many of the exhibits are new.

pleadings, which in turn necessitated extensions of deadlines and the entry of an amended

scheduling order on July 25, 2025.9 (Doc. No. 166.) The parties have also been afforded

numerous other extensions of time.10 Discovery commenced in December 2024.11 The

deadline to file motions for leave to amend the pleadings, which was extended on several

occasions, expired on March 17, 2025. (Doc. No. 70.) Prior to the expiration of the deadline

to seek leave to amend the pleadings, Plaintiffs knew they wished to assert a § 1983 civil

conspiracy claim, but they did not allege a § 1983 claim in the Second Amended

Complaint. (Doc. No. 146 at 2 (Plaintiffs’ statement that they had intended to include a

§ 1983 claim in the Second Amended Complaint); see also Doc. No. 173 at 8–9 & n.16

(discussing Plaintiffs’ two attempts to assert a § 1983 conspiracy claim without filing a

motion for leave to amend, both of which the Court rejected).) The January 20, 2026

discovery deadline is fast approaching. The dispositive motions deadline is only a little

over two months away, and the final pretrial conference is just over six weeks away. The

trial date is looming. Allowing amendment at this juncture to add a new conspiracy claim

against thirteen defendants would further delay trial and necessitate further extensions of

9 On July 24, 2025, the Court held an on-the-record status and scheduling conference and oral

argument to address scheduling matters, the parties’ then-pending joint motion to amend the

scheduling order, and a pending motion to set aside entry of default. (Docs. No. 117, 157, 162.)

At that proceeding, the Court impressed upon the parties the need to ensure the efficient resolution

of this action. The Court also noted that, as of the date of the July 24, 2025 proceeding, which is

two years after Plaintiffs filed the original complaint, Plaintiffs had attempted five times to amend

the complaint.

10 The Court will not provide a detailed list of extended deadlines. The docket speaks for itself.

11 Early discovery was allowed in 2023, after which Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in

November 2023. (Docs. No. 28, 29.)

discovery and other deadlines. Plaintiffs have made no attempt to justify the delay, burdens,

or prejudice inherent in allowing amendment at this time.

Accordingly, the motion for leave to amend will be denied. This action must move

forward.

B. Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 190)

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of this Court’s November 10 and 21, 2025

Memorandum Opinions and Orders (Docs. No. 173–176) on the partial motions to dismiss

the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 191.) Plaintiffs seek reconsideration “to permit

this Court to entertain a Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint.” (Id. at 1.)

Plaintiffs also argue they are “presenting newly available evidence,” in support of the

motion, “and altering or amending the judgment will correct clear error or prevent manifest

injustice.” (Id. at 2.)

As discussed in Section III.A. of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the motion

for leave to amend is due to be denied as untimely and to prevent undue prejudice and

delay. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ desire to file a Third Amended Complaint does not warrant

reconsideration of the Court’s prior orders on the partial motions to dismiss the Second

Amended Complaint.

The Court also finds no merit in Plaintiffs’ argument that newly discovered evidence

warrants reconsideration of the previous rulings on the partial motions to dismiss the

Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs contend that, since the filing of the Second

Amended Complaint, discovery revealed evidence that Gary Moncrief did not have a gun

at the scene of the police-involved shooting and, thus, could not have died by a self-

inflicted bullet wound as the coroner’s report concluded. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege they

discovered evidence in the following categories: (1) evidence showing the Taurus handgun

with which Gary Moncrief allegedly shot himself was not at the scene of the police-

involved shooting;12 (2) evidence showing that, during the shooting, Gary Moncrief was

not in possession of the Taurus handgun and was unarmed;13 (3) evidence showing

someone planted the Taurus handgun at the scene of the police shooting;14 (4) evidence

12 In support of their argument that newly discovered evidence shows the Taurus handgun with

which Gary Moncrief allegedly shot himself was not at the scene, Plaintiffs cite evidence obtained

in June 2025 showing the Taurus handgun in question was black. (Doc. No. 190-1 at 20–21.) They

also cite Defendant Albrecht’s October 30, 2025, deposition testimony that he saw a silver and

black Taurus handgun on the floorboard of Plaintiffs’ vehicle immediately after the shooting,

though he “c[ould]n’t remember” the gun’s color “exactly.” (Id.)

13 In support of their argument that newly discovered evidence shows Gary Moncrief was unarmed

during the police shooting, Plaintiffs cite depositions taken September 30, 2025, October 2, 2025,

October 30, 2025, and November 5, 2025. (Doc. No. 190-1 at 21–23.) That deposition testimony

consists of testimony from the five officers on the scene stating either that they did not see the gun

on the scene, did not see Gary Moncrief in possession of a gun, did not see Gary Moncrief fire a

gun, or were “not at an angle to see Gary Moncrief shoot.” (Id.)

14 In support of their argument that newly discovered evidence shows the Taurus handgun was

planted at the scene, Plaintiffs contend new evidence indicates “[t]he chain of custody related to

the Taurus handgun . . . is unreliable at best and fabricated at worst.” (Doc. No. 190-1 at 23.)

Specifically, they cite information from the SBI investigatory file they obtained prior to filing the

Second Amended Complaint, and they also reference body camera footage and other evidence

without stating when they first received the footage or evidence in discovery. In addition, they rely

on testimony from depositions held September 5, 2025, September 10, 2025, September 18, 2025,

September 30, 2025, and October 2, 2025. (Doc. No. 190-1 at 23–28, 31.) They also cite deposition

testimony from November 12, 2025, and November 17, 2025, as well as a gun trace report on the

Taurus that was presumably obtained after November 20, 2025. (Id. at 29–32, 34.) However,

Plaintiffs provide no explanation why evidence acquired after November 12, 2025, provided the

first clue they needed to amend their pleadings or present new arguments in response to the partial

motions to dismiss. Nor do they indicate why the more extensive evidence obtained prior to the

issuance of the November 10 and November 21, 2025 Memorandum Opinions and Orders

provided no indication they needed to bring new evidence to the Court’s attention sooner than they

did. (Docs. No. 173–75.)

showing Gary Moncrief did not fire a weapon during the shooting incident;15 and (5)

evidence indicating “other investigative issues” regarding a shell casing allegedly

recovered from the scene of a crime involving Gary Moncrief several days prior to the

police-involved shooting.16

Other than possibly cumulative evidence, it appears the “newly discovered

evidence” as to all five of the previous categories was collected prior to the issuance of the

November 10 and November 21, 2025 Memorandum Opinions and Orders from which

Plaintiffs seek relief. (Docs. No. 173–75.) Further, as Plaintiffs point out, had Gary

Moncrief possessed a gun, turned it on himself, or fired it, he would have done so “in the

back seat of his aunt [Plaintiff] Benita Moncrief’s vehicle,” which she was driving, “next

to his mother[, Plaintiff] Janice Moncrief, and in front of his mother’s friend[, Plaintiff]

Tamara Acree,” who was in the front passenger seat. (Doc. No. 190-1 at 16.) It stretches

credulity to suggest Plaintiffs could not have relied at any time on their own recollection

of whether they saw the gun at the scene as grounds for amendment17 or reconsideration,

15 In support of their argument that new evidence showed Gary Moncrief did not fire a weapon

during the shooting incident, Plaintiffs cite a May 2021 death report and a June 2022 investigatory

report by the Montgomery Office of City Investigations. (Doc. No. 190-1 at 38–39.) Plaintiffs did

not state when they first received those reports in discovery.

16 In support of their argument that new evidence of “other investigatory issues” justifies

reconsideration, Plaintiffs cite testimony from depositions taken on September 10, 2025,

September 30, 2025, and October 10, 2025. (Doc. No. 190-1 at 36.)

17 Indeed, it stretches credulity to suggest that, until Plaintiffs obtained the officers’ testimony that

the officers did not see a gun at the scene, Plaintiffs could not have relied on their own recollection

to include in any of their previous pleadings good-faith based allegations that Gary Moncrief had

no gun. After all, Plaintiffs state they “have maintained from the time of the [shooting incident]

that Gary Moncrief did not commit suicide in the back seat of” his aunt’s car in the presence of all

three Plaintiffs. (Doc. No. 190-1 at 16.)

but instead had to wait until they obtained other evidence shedding doubt on whether Gary

Moncrief had a gun, such as evidence regarding the chain of custody or deposition

testimony that the officers at the scene did not see Gary Moncrief with a gun.

Because the newly discovered evidence could have been presented prior to the

issuance of the November 10 and 21, 2025 Memorandum Opinions and Orders,18 it is

incumbent upon Plaintiffs to establish good cause for not timely bringing that evidence to

the Court’s attention, but they have not done so in their motion. See Rossi, 330 F. Supp. 2d

at 1250 (“[T]he court finds that the motion to reconsider on the basis of newly submitted

evidence is due to be denied because the Plaintiff failed to submit the evidence prior to the

court’s Memorandum Opinion and failed to show good cause why he could not have done

so.”). Though Plaintiffs appear19 to argue they had good cause for not basing allegations in

the Second Amended Complaint on the newly discovered evidence, Plaintiffs have not

demonstrated (or even argued) good cause for failing to bring forth the alleged newly

18 As to the few items of evidence obtained after the entry of the Memorandum Opinions and

Orders from which Plaintiffs seek relief, Plaintiffs have failed to show such evidence is anything

more than cumulative or that it served as their first notice that they needed to amend their complaint

or further brief the partial motions to dismiss.

19 The motion for reconsideration is not a model of clarity. Plaintiffs also may be arguing they

obtained the newly discovered evidence after Defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended

Complaint or after briefing closed on the motions. Yet, newly discovered evidence would not have

been relevant to the merits of a motion to dismiss, which was limited to considering the allegations

of the Second Amended Complaint. At no time during the pendency of the partial motions to

dismiss the Second Amended Complaint did Plaintiffs seek to obviate the motions by moving to

amend their complaint on the basis of newly discovered evidence, nor did they request leave to

file supplemental briefs. Only after receiving unfavorable rulings do they now seek to adjust their

pleadings in response to those rulings. In any event, the critical question is whether Plaintiffs had

good cause not to present the newly discovered evidence prior to those unfavorable rulings. Rossi,

330 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.

discovered evidence prior to the issuance of the Memorandum Opinions and Orders for

which Plaintiffs seek reconsideration. Hence, the motion for reconsideration is due to be

denied. See Mays, 122 F.3d at 46 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding a “court should not grant” a

motion to reconsider on the basis of newly discovered evidence “absent some showing that

the evidence was not available during the pendency of the [underlying] motion”).

C. Plaintiffs’ Second Renewed and Amended Motion for Leave to File Conventionally

(Doc. No. 188); Plaintiffs’ Renewed and Amended Motion for Leave to File Under

Seal (Doc. No. 189)

In Plaintiffs’ Second Renewed and Amended Motion for Leave to File

Conventionally, Plaintiffs seek leave “to file under seal a redacted version[20] of Plaintiffs’

Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider, and redacted or sealed versions of

Plaintiffs’ Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider.” (Doc. No. 188.) In

Plaintiffs’ Renewed and Amended Motion for Leave to File Under Seal, Plaintiffs seek

leave to file under seal their motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, or some

20 Plaintiffs’ continued requests to file redacted copies of documents under seal are befuddling.

There is generally no need to seal a redacted document. Redactions facilitate maintenance of a

public record of all nonprotected information, with the redactions shielding only confidential or

otherwise protected information from public view. With limited exceptions (such as where

redactions only remove irrelevant personally identifying information), unredacted copies of

publicly filed redacted documents are usually simultaneously filed under seal to preserve the

unredacted version in the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a),(d),(f). This allows the Court to

independently review the propriety of shielding the redacted information from public view. It also

enables judicial consideration of sealed material relevant to dispositive issues in the case, and,

where appropriate, motions to unseal information that may later be filed by a party or an interested

third party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(d); see generally Pettaway v. Barber, 645 F. Supp. 3d 1269

(M.D. Ala. 2022) (considering the common law right of access to judicial records in the context

of a motion to unseal police body camera footage that previously had been filed under seal pursuant

to a protective order).

exhibits thereto.*! (Doc. No. 189.) The motions for leave to file are due to be denied as

moot because the motion for leave to amend the complaint and motion for reconsideration

are due to be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ Second Renewed and Amended Motion for Leave to File

Conventionally (Doc. No. 188) is DENIED.

2. Plaintiffs’ Renewed and Amended Motion for Leave to File Under Seal

(Doc. No. 189) is DENIED.

3. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider (Doc. No. 190) is DENIED.

4. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No.

191) is DENIED.

The Court has ruled. Further motions for reconsideration of motions or

matters addressed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, however denominated,

will be summarily denied. This case must move forward.

DONE this 14th day of January, 2026.

mate T. ADAMS

UNI/YED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Tn their motion, Plaintiffs state they “respectfully move this Court for the entry of an Order

granting Plaintiffs the right to file under seal Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Third Amended

Complaint,” but the rest of the motion suggests Plaintiffs only seek to file certain exhibits to the

proposed Third Amended Complaint in redacted form or under seal. (Doc. No. 189.)

18