Com. v. Wheeler, C.

J-S38032-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

CHARLES WHEELER :

:

Appellant : No. 91 EDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 29, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-0010895-2015

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 15, 2026

Appellant, Charles Wheeler, appeals from the post-conviction court’s

order denying his timely-filed petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the facts and procedural history of

Appellant’s case, as follows:

Appellant was a drug dealer in North Philadelphia who worked for

a man named "AJ[.”] Raphael Cruz and eyewitness/surviving-

victim Gabriel Ortega were rival drug dealers in the same

neighborhood. On the afternoon of September 23 rd, 2014,

Decedent got into an argument with AJ over who could sell drugs

on Mascher Street. During this argument, AJ and another man

had guns concealed in their hoodies. The argument then

escalated into a screaming match, and both groups threatened

each other. Ramon Vera, Decedent’s older brother, convinced

Decedent to leave. Later, that evening, AJ and Decedent were

involved in a shootout, during which ten to twenty shots were

fired. The following day, Decedent picked up the surviving victim,

… Ortega, in his Ford Taurus. … Ortega got into the car; Decedent

handed him a gun. About ten minutes later, at around 1:00 p.m.,

J-S38032-25

Decedent and … Ortega were driving down Cambria Street. As

they did so, Appellant got out of [a] car, approached the Ford

Taurus from the rear, and opened fire. … Ortega ducked down

and put his arm up to shield himself. He suffered gunshot wounds

to his back and his left arm. … [D]ecedent was shot in the chest.

The bullet penetrated Decedent’s heart and lungs, killing him.

Decedent’s car continued moving down the street and crashed,

striking and injuring a bicyclist. A crowd of forty to fifty people

gathered around Decedent’s car, and some of the bystanders

attempted to give him aid. … Ortega took the gun that Decedent

had given him earlier and fled. He stopped and hid the gun under

a traffic cone several blocks away. A short time later, … Ortega

collapsed. A police officer picked him up and drove him to Temple

Hospital. On September 25th, 2014, after he was released from

the hospital, … Ortega provided a statement to Homicide

Detectives Derrick Venson and Patrick Whalen, in which he

identified Appellant as the murderer by name and in a photo array

presented by assigned Detective Laura Hammond. Rather than

returning to his neighborhood, … Ortega stayed in another area of

the city. On May 6th, 2015, … Ortega returned to the Homicide

Unit and provided a video-recorded statement to Detectives

Gregory Singleton and Thorsten Lucke. In the video-recorded

statement, he again identified Appellant as the shooter. …

Ortega’s identification served as the only direct evidence

presented at trial linking Appellant to the instant shooting. During

the preliminary hearing, … Ortega testified that he provided his

May 6th, 2015[] video-recorded statement because he did[ not]

want to face charges for firearm possession after being arrested

while on probation. Furthermore, … Ortega testified that an

unidentified detective promised him a $20,000.00 reward but did

not elaborate further regarding the identity of this detective.

Detectives … Venson and … Singleton each testified that neither

of them offered … Ortega a $20,000.00 reward in exchange for

Appellant’s identification. Detective … Hammond testified that …

Ortega never contacted her about collecting any reward money. 1

1 On cross-examination, Detective … Venson testified that[,]

although [it was] common knowledge that the City of

Philadelphia [had at one time] offered $20,000.00 for

information leading to a homicide arrest and conviction, the

City of Philadelphia never paid those rewards.

***

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On October 28th, 2015, … Ortega denied his identification of

Appellant as the shooter, as recorded in his September 25 th,

2014[] statement. During a jury trial before the Honorable Diana

L. Anhalt, … Ortega again recanted his statement.3

3 [Ortega] testified that he did not see the shooter.

Furthermore, [Ortega] stated that prior to providing his

statement, one or two white male detectives, other than

Detective Venson, offered him [a] $20,000.00 reward in

exchange for identifying Appellant. [Ortega] claimed he

never received payment and did not mention any reward

money when he provided his second statement to Detective

… Singleton and [Detective] Lucke. See[] N.T. [Trial],

01/04/2017[,] at [] 40-45, 103; N.T. [Trial], 01/05/2017[,]

at [] 31-32, 194.

On January 9th, 2017, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree

murder [(18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a)), carrying a firearm without a

license] ([18 Pa.C.S. §] 6106), [carrying a firearm in public in

Philadelphia] ([18 Pa.C.S. §] 6108), and [possessing an

instrument of crime (PIC) (18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a)).] … [T]he [trial

court] imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment[,] plus

… 3½ to 7 years[’ imprisonment] for [carrying a firearm without

a license]. On January 16th, 2017, Appellant filed a timely post-

sentence motion by and through James F. Berardinelli, Esquire.

On May 17th, 2017, the post-sentence motion was denied by

operation [of] law. On June 12th, 2017, Appellant, by and through

counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal. The Superior Court of

Pennsylvania affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence in a

decision without a published opinion.4 [See Commonwealth v.

Wheeler, 217 A.3d 446 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished

memorandum).] Appellant did not file a [petition for permission

to appeal] with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

4 The judgment of sentence became final on June 30 th, 2019.

On June 4th, 2019, Appellant filed a timely[,] pro se PCRA petition.

[Counsel was appointed and, o]n June 21 st, 2020, … an amended

PCRA petition [was filed on Appellant’s behalf,] averring that

[Appellant] is entitled to an evidentiary hearing or a new trial on

the grounds [of] after-discovered evidence in the form of ex-

detective Philip Nordo’s misconduct…. On April 11 th, 2023, an

evidentiary hearing was held. On August 3rd, 2023, this court

denied Appellant’s PCRA petition.

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PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 4/4/25, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalization and

some footnotes omitted; formatting altered).

Appellant did not file an appeal from the court’s August 3, 2023 order

denying his petition. However, the court’s order did not properly notify him

of his right to appeal from that order, as required by Pennsylvania Rule of

Criminal Procedure 908(E). See Pa.R.Crim.P. 908 (“If the case is taken under

advisement, or when the defendant is not present in open court, the judge,

by certified mail, return receipt requested, shall advise the defendant of the

right to appeal from the final order disposing of the petition and of the time

limits within which the appeal must be filed.”). This Court has found that this

type of error constitutes a breakdown in the operations of the court. See

Commonwealth v. Meehan, 628 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Pa. Super. 1993).

Then, for some unknown reason, on October 27, 2023, the PCRA court

issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, stating that it intended to dismiss Appellant’s

petition without a hearing (despite that a hearing had already occurred), and

explaining its basis for that decision. See Rule 907 Notice, 10/27/23, at 1-2

(unnumbered). Although he was still represented by counsel, Appellant filed

a pro se response on November 21, 2023. On November 29, 2023, the PCRA

court issued an order dismissing his petition. Again, that order failed to notify

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Appellant of his right to appeal; nevertheless, Appellant filed a timely notice

of appeal on December 26, 2023.1

While Appellant’s appeal was pending, he filed two pro se motions with

this Court indicating that he desired either new counsel, or wished to proceed

pro se, so that he could challenge, on appeal, the effectiveness of his PCRA

attorney, James Lloyd, Esq. Accordingly, this Court issued an order on April

15, 2024, remanding Appellant’s case for the PCRA court to either appoint

new counsel, or conduct a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier,

713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), to determine whether Appellant was knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his right to counsel and proceeding pro

se. A Grazier hearing was held on July 30, 2024, after which new counsel

was appointed for Appellant.

Appellant thereafter filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal, and the PCRA court issued a responsive Rule

1925(a) opinion. Herein, Appellant states two issues for our review:

1. Did the PCRA court err[,] and was dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA

petition without a hearing not supported by the record and free

from legal error[,] because … Nordo played a significant role in

the investigation of Appellant’s case?

2. Did the PCRA court err[,] and was dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA

petition not supported by the record and free from legal error[,]

because PCRA counsel was ineffective in a layered context for

____________________________________________

1 Given this record, and considering that the court’s initial order entered on

August 3, 2023 constitutes a breakdown in the operations of the court, we

deem the November 29, 2023 order, from which Appellant has timely

appealed, as the final order dismissing his petition.

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failing to raise a Brady discovery violation issue in his amended

PCRA petition?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

To begin, we note that:

“In reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA

relief, an appellate court is limited to ascertaining whether the

record supports the determination of the PCRA court and whether

the ruling is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, …

966 A.2d 523, 532 ([Pa.] 2009). We pay great deference to the

findings of the PCRA court, “but its legal determinations are

subject to our plenary review.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 810 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Here, Appellant first claims that the PCRA court erred by denying his

petition, wherein he alleged that he discovered new evidence that Nordo had

bribed Ortega to falsely accuse Appellant of shooting him. Appellant claims

that he presented sufficient evidence to establish that Nordo bribed Ortega.

Specifically, Appellant insists that he demonstrated Nordo had a “habitual

practice of bribing witness[es]” by setting forth six other, unrelated criminal

cases in which the defendants’ “convictions [were] vacated and their cases

discharged because of Nordo’s misconduct.” Appellant’s Brief at 15-16.

Although in this case, Ortega did not specifically name Nordo as the detective

who bribed him, Appellant contends that “[i]t could have only been … Nordo[,]

given the limited number of task force detectives.” Id. at 17. He also stresses

that he presented “police activity sheets from May 6, 2015[, which] showed

that Ortega was transported to the Police Administration Building by Nordo”

and other detectives. Id. (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Accordingly,

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Appellant insists that he presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his

case “should be remanded for a new trial.” Id.

We disagree. We have explained that,

[t]o be entitled to relief under the PCRA on [the] basis [of after-

discovered evidence], the petitioner must plead and prove by a

preponderance of the evidence “[t]he unavailability at the time of

trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become

available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had

been introduced.” 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9543(a)(2)(vi). As our Supreme

Court has summarized:

To obtain relief based on after-discovered evidence, [an]

appellant must demonstrate that the evidence: (1) could not

have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the

exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely

corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to

impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely

result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.

Commonwealth v. Pagan, … 950 A.2d 270, 292 ([Pa.] 2008)

(citations omitted). “The test is conjunctive; the [appellant] must

show by a preponderance of the evidence that each of these

factors has been met in order for a new trial to be warranted.”

Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 363 (Pa. Super.

2010) (citation omitted). Further, when reviewing the decision to

grant or deny a new trial on the basis of after-discovered

evidence, an appellate court is to determine whether the PCRA

court committed an abuse of discretion or error of law that

controlled the outcome of the case. Commonwealth v. Reese,

… 663 A.2d 206 ([Pa. Super.] 1995).

Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532, 537 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Instantly, in concluding that Appellant’s “new evidence” regarding

Nordo’s misconduct in other, unrelated cases did not meet the after-

discovered-evidence test, the PCRA court initially found that “Appellant

fail[ed] to present evidence or argument demonstrating that … Nordo played

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a significant role in the investigation or in obtaining … Ortega’s statement.”

PCO at 4. The court then continued:

On January 4th, 2017, … Ortega appeared before the jury that

convicted Appellant and testified that he never saw the person

who shot him and Decedent. Recanting his prior accusation, …

Ortega testified that he only identified Appellant as the shooter

because an unidentified police detective offered him a $20,000.00

reward in exchange for providing a statement. At trial, the

prosecutor impeached … Ortega by presenting both his September

25th, 2014[] statement[,] and May 6 th, 2015[] video-recorded

statement, where he identified [Appellant]. Appellant fails to

demonstrate that evidence of … Nordo’s misconduct in unrelated

matters is relevant to the instant case. Nor does he corroborate

his supposition that … Nordo was the one who allegedly offered …

Ortega a reward for his statement. Ortega never identified the

detective who offered him reward money, instead claiming that it

was one or two white male detectives who spoke to him before

giving his witness statement:

[The Prosecutor:] So then I assume, correct me if I’m

wrong, Detective Venson would be one of the individuals

you’re speaking with [who was] trying to bribe you?

[Ortega:] He wasn’t the one -- it was a white male, it was

two white males. I got questioned four different times when

I went to Homicide.

[The Prosecutor:] Okay. And you don’t remember any of

their names?

[Ortega:] No, I do not.

[N.T. Trial, 1/4/17, at 123-24.]

To date, … Ortega has not provided, and Appellant has not

submitted[,] an affidavit identifying … Nordo as the detective who

allegedly promised to secure reward money. Appellant simply

cites … Nordo’s 2014-2015 assignment to the homicide “Task

Force,” a unit of seven detectives responsible for long-term

investigations. … Nordo’s assignment to the task force is

insufficient to permit an inference that he was present for either

the September 25th, 2014 or the May 6th, 2015 interviews, let

alone that he promised … Ortega a reward. Appellant has not

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presented any evidence indicating that Nordo played a larger role

in the investigation leading to Appellant’s conviction. In the

absence of any evidence that … Nordo ever interacted with

[Ortega], Appellant fails to meet his burden in demonstrating that

… Nordo’s unrelated misconduct entitles him to a new trial.

PCO at 4-5 (footnoted citations to the record and unnecessary capitalization

omitted).

We discern no abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s decision. In

support, we rely on Commonwealth v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097 (Pa. Super.

2016). There, this Court rejected Brown’s claim that he deserved an after-

discovered-evidence hearing based on two newspaper articles discussing the

misconduct of former Philadelphia Police Detectives Ronald Dove and James

Pitts in unrelated cases. Id. at 1108. Dove and Pitts had both been directly

involved in Brown’s case, taking statements from Brown and another witness,

who later recanted that statement. Id. Despite this direct involvement, we

concluded that Brown was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to explore

whether the detectives had committed misconduct in his case. Id. at 1108-

09. We reasoned that, with respect to Dove, Brown had relied only “on [a]

newspaper article reporting on Dove’s possible misconduct” in an unrelated

case, and he did “not articulate what evidence he would present at the

evidentiary hearing on remand.” Id. at 1109. Pertaining to Pitts, Brown only

specified witnesses that he would call to testify about Pitts’ improper

interrogation techniques in other cases. Id. We concluded that, absent proof

that Pitts had committed misconduct in Brown’s case, the evidence of his

improper interrogation tactics from other cases could only be used by Brown

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to attack Pitts’ credibility, which cannot satisfy the after-discovered-evidence

test. Id. Therefore, because “an evidentiary hearing is not meant to function

as a fishing expedition for any possible evidence that may support some

speculative claim,” we held that Brown had not demonstrated that a hearing

was warranted. Id.

In this case, unlike in Brown, Appellant had an evidentiary hearing,

yet he failed to present any evidence that Nordo was the detective who bribed

Ortega. Notably, at the hearing, Appellant’s counsel informed the court that

he had spoken to Ortega, and Ortega was “not willing to appear. He [was]

not willing to assist the defense in this petition.” N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/11/23,

at 4. Moreover, Appellant also failed to present any evidence that Nordo was

directly involved in his case at all, or that Nordo had any significant interaction

with Ortega.

Although Appellant now contends that “police activity sheets” show that

Nordo was one of several detectives who transported Ortega to his statement

on May 6, 2015, this document was not attached to Appellant’s PCRA petition.

It also was not entered into evidence — or even mentioned — at the PCRA

hearing. Instead, from our review of the record, it appears that the police

activity sheet was only presented to the PCRA court as an attachment to

Appellant’s pro se response to the court’s Rule 907 notice. Given that

Appellant was still represented by counsel at that time, his filing a pro se

response constituted impermissible hybrid representation. See

Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“In this

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Commonwealth, hybrid representation is not permitted.”) (citing

Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1036 (Pa. 2011) (concluding that a

petitioner’s pro se motion for remand when that petitioner is represented by

counsel is impermissible as hybrid representation)). We have stated that “pro

se motions have no legal effect and, therefore, are legal nullities.” Id. (citing

Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 355 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(discussing a pro se post-sentence motion filed by a petitioner who had

counsel)). Accordingly, Appellant’s pro se response to the Rule 907 notice

which included, for the first time, the police activity sheet, was a legal nullity,

and that document could not be properly considered by the PCRA court. 2

Nevertheless, we would agree with the Commonwealth that the police

activity sheet “does not lend any meaningful support to [Appellant’s] claim.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 14. The Commonwealth explains:

The activity sheet states: “On 5/6/15, Gabriel Ortega was

transported to the Homicide Unit by Det. Nordo, Det. Santiago,

and Det. Williams.” [See Appellant’s Pro Se Response to Rule 907

Notice, 11/21/23, at “Exhibit 2”.] The sheet also stated that on

this date, Ortega reaffirmed his identification of [Appellant] and

agreed to have his statement and identification memorialized by

way of a video recording. The sheet indicates only that Nordo was

one of the detectives who transported Ortega to the homicide unit.

It does not state that Nordo participated in any of Ortega’s

interviews. Furthermore, Ortega gave his initial statement

____________________________________________

2 It is also well-settled that a petitioner may not raise entirely new claims in a

response to a Rule 907 notice, without seeking and being granted leave of

court to file an amended petition. See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 317

A.3d 1070, 1076 (Pa. Super. 2024). From this, it logically follows that

Appellant could not present the police activity sheet to the PCRA court for the

first time as an attachment to his response to the court’s Rule 907 notice.

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implicating [Appellant] on September 25, 2014. The activity sheet

states that he was transported to the homicide unit by Nordo and

others on May 6, 2015—[over] seven months after he gave his

initial identification. There is no evidence whatsoever that Nordo

had any contact with Ortega prior to May 6.

Id. at 14-15. The record supports the Commonwealth’s argument.

In sum, we conclude that no relief is due on Appellant’s after-

discovered-evidence claim. If the evidence of Dove’s and Pitts’ misconduct

was insufficient in Brown to warrant even an evidentiary hearing, despite that

they had been directly involved in Brown’s case, it is clear that the evidence

of Nordo’s misconduct in unrelated cases is not sufficient to warrant a new

trial for Appellant, where he has not established any nexus between his

conviction and the misconduct by Nordo in those other cases. See

Commonwealth v. Butler, No. 788 EDA 2021, unpublished memorandum at

9-10 (Pa. Super. filed June 10, 2022) (relying on Brown to conclude that

Butler was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his after-discovered

evidence claim where he only presented “speculative allegations” and “failed

to establish a nexus between his convictions and the misconduct of [certain

detectives involved in his case] in other unrelated cases”). Ortega never

identified Nordo as the detective who bribed him, and there is no evidence

showing that Nordo had any interaction with Ortega, or involvement in

Appellant’s case at all, prior to Ortega’s first statement identifying Appellant

in September of 2014. There is also no evidence that Nordo bribed Ortega

when he and other detectives transported Ortega on May 6, 2015. Appellant’s

speculation that Nordo must have bribed Ortega simply because of Nordo’s

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misconduct in other cases, and his limited contact with Ortega on May 6, 2015,

is insufficient to demonstrate that Nordo committed misconduct in the instant

case. Therefore, the PCRA court did not err in concluding that no relief is due

on Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim.

Next, Appellant contends that his

PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a discovery issue

in relation to police misconduct of the detectives involved. Trial

counsel should have also ensured that he received and used full

discovery because the allegations of police corruption were known

at the time of trial. Therefore, this matter should be remanded

for an evidentiary hearing and/or a new trial.

Appellant’s Brief at 17.

Essentially, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth had an obligation

under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to disclose “the habitual

misconduct” of Nordo and other detectives, including Detective Gregory

Singleton, who Appellant claims was also accused of misconduct in another,

unrelated case. Appellant’s Brief at 22. Appellant argues that “[t]he

detectives involved corrupted a crucial witness and Detective Singleton

testified at trial without being impeached as to his own misconduct. He also

testified that he was part of a Task Force and … Nordo was part of that Task

Force.” Id. (citations to the record omitted). According to Appellant, because

there was already knowledge of relevant police misconduct, trial

counsel was ineffective for not requesting discovery on these

issues. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue.

Appellant suffered prejudice because he was denied due process

and crucial impeachment and corroboration [evidence,] as well as

exculpation material.

Id. at 23.

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Initially, we note that Appellant raises this ineffectiveness of PCRA

counsel claim for the first time on appeal. In Commonwealth v. Bradley,

261 A.3d 382 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme Court held “that a PCRA petitioner

may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or

acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first

opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Id. at 401. Here, Appellant is

represented by new counsel; thus, we will consider his ineffectiveness claim,

applying the following standard of review:

[A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence

resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-

determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or

innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

“Counsel is presumed effective, and to rebut that presumption,

the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance

was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.”

[Commonwealth v.] Colavita, … 993 A.2d [874,] 886 [(Pa.

2010)] (citing Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ...

(1984)]). In Pennsylvania, we have refined the Strickland

performance and prejudice test into a three-part inquiry. See

[Commonwealth v.] Pierce, [527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987)]. Thus,

to prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner must show that: (1)

his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no

reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner

suffered actual prejudice as a result. Commonwealth v. Ali, …

10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010). “If a petitioner fails to prove any of

these prongs, his claim fails.” Commonwealth v. Simpson, …

66 A.3d 253, 260 ([Pa.] 2013) (citation omitted). Generally,

counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if he

chose a particular course of conduct that had some reasonable

basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. See Ali, supra.

Where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, “a finding

that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted

unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered

a potential for success substantially greater than the course

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actually pursued.” Colavita, … 993 A.2d at 887 (quotation and

quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate prejudice, the

petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceedings would have been different.” Commonwealth v.

King, … 57 A.3d 607, 613 ([Pa.] 2012) (quotation, quotation

marks, and citation omitted). “‘[A] reasonable probability is a

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome of the proceeding.’” Ali, … 10 A.3d at 291 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Collins, … 957 A.2d 237, 244 ([Pa.] 2008)

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694…)).

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311-12 (Pa. 2014).

In the instant case, Appellant seems to be asserting that his PCRA

counsel was ineffective for not raising, or arguing that his trial/appellate

counsel were ineffective for failing to raise, a Brady claim based on the

Commonwealth’s failure to disclose to Appellant the misconduct of Nordo and

other detectives, including Detective Singleton. As our Supreme Court has

explained,

[i]t is well-settled that Brady and subsequent precedent flowing

therefrom imposes upon a prosecutor the obligation to disclose all

favorable evidence that is material to the guilt or punishment of

an accused, even in the absence of a specific request by the

accused. This Court has held that, to establish a Brady violation,

a defendant has the burden to prove that: (1) the evidence at

issue was favorable to the accused, either because it is

exculpatory or because it impeaches; (2) the prosecution has

suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3)

the evidence was material, meaning that prejudice must have

ensued.

Commonwealth v. Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075, 1085–86 (Pa. 2020) (citations

omitted).

Here, Appellant has failed to prove the materiality prong of the Brady

test, or that he suffered prejudice by the Commonwealth’s failure to turn over

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evidence of misconduct in other cases by Nordo, Detective Singleton, or any

other detective involved in Appellant’s case. As the Commonwealth aptly

explains:

[Appellant’s] Brady claim with respect to Nordo fails because, as

explained above, he has not demonstrated that Nordo played a

significant role, let alone committed any misconduct, in this case.

Without any evidence that Nordo committed misconduct in the

present case, [Appellant] cannot prove that he suffered prejudice

as a result of the Commonwealth’s alleged Brady violation.

Furthermore, [Appellant’s] allegations about misconduct

committed by other detectives involved in the case (particularly

Detective Singleton) are also insufficient to warrant relief.

[Appellant] has not demonstrated that any of the investigating

detectives committed misconduct in this case…. Thus, his Brady

claim must fail.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 15-16 (emphasis added).

We agree with the Commonwealth that it had no obligation under Brady

to turn over evidence of misconduct committed by Nordo or Detective

Singleton (or any other detectives) in cases wholly unrelated to Appellant’s,

as it was not material evidence without some proof that the detectives

committed misconduct in this case. Appellant has presented no evidence that

any of the detectives, including Nordo, did anything improper in his case, aside

from Ortega’s claim that a detective offered him a bribe. However, Ortega

refused to testify at the PCRA hearing, and has never identified what detective

allegedly committed that misconduct. Thus, Appellant has failed to

demonstrate that the Commonwealth had material evidence of misconduct in

this case that it failed to turn over to Appellant in violation of Brady. As

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J-S38032-25

such, his PCRA counsel was not ineffective (nor was his trial counsel) for failing

to raise a Brady claim.

Order affirmed.

Date: 1/15/2026

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