United States v. Demetrius Floyd

USCA11 Case: 25-10884 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 1 of 10

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-10884

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DEMETRIUS GREGORY FLOYD,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cr-00065-JDW-AEP-1

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Demetrius Floyd, a federal prisoner, appeals the district

court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release. On appeal,

he argues that the court erred in denying his motion because his

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-10884

sentence was unusually long, he would not pose a danger to the

community if released, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors sup-

ported his release. After thorough review, we affirm.

“We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a

sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States

v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). “After eligibility is

established, we review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion.” Id. “A district

court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard,

follows improper procedures in making its determination, or

makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. We review de novo

whether a defendant is a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.

United States v. Gibson, 434 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006). We

also review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a con-

viction of a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.

United States v. Estrada, 777 F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015).

The First Step Act amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow district

courts to reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment upon motion

of the defendant. See Pub. L. No. 115-391 § 603 (“First Step Act”);

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A district court may grant a sentence re-

duction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) if: (1) an extraordinary and compel-

ling reason exists; (2) a sentencing reduction would be consistent

with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor

of a sentence reduction.1 United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234,

1 Factors under § 3553(a) the district court may consider include the nature

and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the

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25-10884 Opinion of the Court 3

1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021). When the district court finds that any one

of the necessary conditions for a sentence reduction is not met, it

need not examine the other conditions. Id.

The policy statements applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) are

found in § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Under subsection (a), a

court may reduce a term of imprisonment if, after considering the

§ 3553(a) factors, it determines that, among other things, “[t]he de-

fendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the

community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)[.]” Id. § 1B1.13(a). 2

Subsection (b) provides that an extraordinary and compelling rea-

son exists under any of these circumstances or a combination

thereof: the defendant’s medical circumstances, his age, his family

circumstances, if the defendant was the victim of abuse while serv-

ing a term of incarceration, or if he received an “unusually long

sentence.” Id. §1B1.13(b)(1)–(4), (6). Under the “unusually long

defendant, the seriousness of the crime, the need to promote of respect for the

law, to provide just punishment, to protect the public from the defendant’s

crimes, and to afford adequate deterrence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)–

(C). A district court need not address each of the § 3553(a) factors or all the

mitigating evidence. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241.

2 Factors the district court should consider in determining whether a defend-

ant is a danger to another person or the community include: (1) the nature and

circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense involved

a firearm; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) his history

and characteristics, including his criminal history and whether, at the time of

the current offense or arrest, he was on probation, on parole, or on release

pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense; and

(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community

that would be posed by the defendant’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1)–(4).

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10884

sentence” provision, in cases where a defendant “received an unu-

sually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of

imprisonment,” a district court may consider “a change in the law

. . . [that] would produce a gross disparity between the sentence

being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the

motion is filed” in deciding “whether the defendant presents an ex-

traordinary and compelling reason” for a sentence reduction,

though the change in law must be considered in light of all “the

defendant’s individualized circumstances.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(6).

Under § 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant

is classified as a career offender if (1) he was at least 18 years old at

the time he committed the instant offense; (2) the instant offense is

a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled-substance

offense; and (3) he had at least 2 prior felony convictions for either

a crime of violence or a controlled-substance offense. U.S.S.G. §

4B1.1(a). For the purpose of calculating criminal history, offenses

committed before the age of 18 are counted as adult convictions if

the defendant was convicted as an adult and sentenced to a term of

imprisonment exceeding 1 year and 1 month. Id. § 4A1.2(d)(1).

Section 4B1.2 defines a “crime of violence” as any offense

under federal or state law that is punishable by at least one-year

imprisonment and that:

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of

another; or

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(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnap-

ping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, rob-

bery, arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful posses-

sion of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or

explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)–(2). In 2023, the guideline was amended to

expressly include inchoate offenses, including attempt, as part of

the term “crime of violence.” Id. § 4B1.2(d); id., App. C.

Amend. 822.

In United States v. Taylor, the Supreme Court considered

whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a “crime of vi-

olence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). 596 U.S. 845, 848 (2022). If

attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a crime of violence, the

defendant would have been subject to an enhanced sentence. Id.

Notably, the Supreme Court said that § 924(c)(3)(A)’s “elements

clause” defined a “crime of violence” to include offenses that have

as an element “‘the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physi-

cal force against the person or property of another.’” Id. The Su-

preme Court noted that, to convict a defendant of attempted

Hobbs Act robbery, the government must prove “an intention to

take property by force or threat, along with a substantial step to-

ward achieving that object.” Id. at 851. However, proof of this

intention and a substantial step does not necessarily require the

government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or

even threatened the use of force against another person or prop-

erty. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that attempted Hobbs Act

robbery did not satisfy § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. Id. at 851.

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-10884

In State v. Gray, the Florida Supreme Court overruled prior

contrary state precedent and held that there is no crime of at-

tempted felony murder in Florida, reasoning that the extension of

the felony murder doctrine “‘so as to make intent irrelevant for

purposes of attempt crimes was illogical and without basis in law.’”

654 So. 2d 552, 553–54 (Fla. 1995) (citation omitted). The Florida

Supreme Court recognized the error of allowing a conviction for

attempted first-degree felony murder because “[t]he legal fictions

required to support the intent for felony murder are simply too

great.” Id. at 554. Then, in Williamson v. State, a state post-convic-

tion case, the Florida Supreme Court held that a prisoner’s counsel

was ineffective on appeal for not raising a Gray claim, where the

prisoner was convicted of three counts of attempted murder, and

one of the alternative bases for those convictions was based on the

crime of attempted first-degree felony murder. 994 So. 2d 1000,

1016 (Fla. 2008). The Florida Supreme Court concluded that coun-

sel’s failure to raise the Gray claim undermined confidence in the

correctness of those convictions and vacated them. Id.

Because the “elements clause” definition of “crime of vio-

lence” under § 4B1.2(a)(1) in the Guidelines and the definition of

“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)

are “virtually identical,” we look to the Supreme Court’s and our

own decisions applying the ACCA for guidance to determine

whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence under the

Guidelines, and vice versa. United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074,

1107 (11th Cir. 2019). Notably, we’ve held that Florida attempted

first-degree murder is a violent felony under the ACCA, and

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acknowledged that the Supreme Court has called attempted mur-

der a “‘prototypically violent crime.’” Hylor v. United States, 896

F.3d 1219, 1223 (11th Cir. 2018) (involving a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 case).

The 2012 version of § 841(b)(1)(A) stated that:

In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this sec-

tion involving . . . 5 kilograms or more of a mixture

or substance containing a detectable amount of . . .

cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and

salts of isomers . . . such person shall be sentenced to

a term of imprisonment which may not be less than

10 years or more than life. . . . If any person commits

such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony

drug offense has become final, such person shall be

sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not

be less than 20 years or more than life imprisonment.

. . . If any person commits a violation of this subpar-

agraph or of section 849, 859, 860, or 861 of this title

after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug

offense have become final, such person shall be sen-

tenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment

without release . . . .

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012). In 2018, the statutory minimum

after a prior serious drug felony conviction was amended from 20

years to 15 years, and after two serious drug felonies was amended

from life imprisonment to 25 years. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2018).

The 2012 version of § 841(b)(1)(B) stated that

In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this sec-

tion involving . . . 28 grams or more of a mixture or

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8 Opinion of the Court 25-10884

substance described in clause (ii) which contains co-

caine base . . . such person shall be sentenced to a term

of imprisonment which may not be less than 5 years

and not more than 40 years. . . . If any person com-

mits such a violation after a prior conviction for a fel-

ony drug offense has become final, such person shall

be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may

not be less than 10 years and not more than life im-

prisonment . . . .

Id. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2012). The 2018 amendment to this subsection

only changed the term “felony drug offense” to “serious drug fel-

ony or serious violent felony,” but did not change the mandatory-

minimum terms of imprisonment for defendants who had one or

more prior convictions for this offense. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2018).

Here, the district court did not err in denying Floyd’s motion

for compassionate release because he did not show extraordinary

and compelling circumstances warranting relief. For starters,

Floyd would have been subject to the same Sentencing Guidelines

calculation and mandatory minimum today as he was at the time

of sentencing. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2012) with id. §

841(b)(1)(B) (2018). Floyd’s argument that he received an “unusu-

ally long sentence” is based on subsequent changes lowering the

mandatory-minimum sentences set forth in the statutory text in §

841(b)(1)(A), but Floyd was convicted by a jury of the lesser-in-

cluded offense under § 841(b)(1)(B). Today, this provision still car-

ries the same mandatory-minimum sentence of ten years for a de-

fendant with a prior conviction for a “serious drug felony.” Compare

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2012) with id. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2018).

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Further, Floyd still would have been sentenced as a career

offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. His predicate Florida

conviction for cocaine delivery remains a “serious drug felony,”

and his Florida conviction for attempted first-degree murder re-

mains a qualifying crime of violence. See Hylor, 896 F.2d at 1223;

Ochoa, 941 F.3d at 1107. The Florida Supreme Court cases he cites

rejected attempted felony murder as a crime, whereas Floyd was

convicted of attempted first-degree murder. In fact, the state cases

differentiated attempted first-degree murder and attempted felony

murder because felony murder requires an intent created through

legal fiction -- something attempted first-degree murder does not.

See Williamson, 994 So. 2d at 1016; Gray, 654 So. 2d at 554. These

state cases simply do not apply, so his claim that he was convicted

of a non-existent crime under Florida law is without merit. The

career offender enhancements still apply to Floyd, and his total of-

fense level remains 37, making his Guidelines calculation the same.

The Guidelines also clearly provide that if a defendant was

sentenced to more than one year and one month imprisonment,

and was convicted in adult court, the prior offenses should be used

in determining his criminal history and career offender status.

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(1). Floyd was sentenced to two years’ impris-

onment for attempted first-degree murder and attempted robbery

with a weapon in adult court. Thus, the district court correctly

considered Floyd’s previous crimes in analyzing his career-offender

status, and he has not shown that his sentence is unusually long.

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10 Opinion of the Court 25-10884

In addition, because the court found that Floyd was a danger

to the community and that the § 3553(a) factors did not support his

release, the court did not need to discuss Floyd’s argument that he

had an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying his release

under § 1B1.13(b)(6). See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241. Indeed, the dis-

trict court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the §

3553(a) factors did not support his release. His crime was serious -

- his drug offense involved a significant amount of cocaine, and one

of his predicate offenses, attempted first-degree murder, was ex-

tremely violent and could have resulted in loss of life. As for his

history and characteristics, Floyd continued to violate the law after

he was released from previous sentences and repeatedly commit-

ted crimes while on supervised release for other offenses. These

circumstances indicate not only that Floyd lacks respect for the law

and is unable to be deterred by a short sentence, but also that the

district court did not err in concluding that he remains a danger to

the community and the safety of others. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(g),

3553(a).

As we’ve noted, § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions can only be granted

when all three prongs of the statute are satisfied. In this instance,

none of the prongs were met. As a result, the district court was not

required to consider Floyd’s rehabilitation efforts in analyzing the

§ 3553(a) factors, nor was it required to address each factor or all

the mitigating evidence. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.