WHITEHEAD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHNSTOWN DIVISION

CARL WHITEHEAD, )

)

) Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-00083

Plaintiff, )

) Senior United States District Judge

vs. ) Nora Barry Fischer

)

CORRECTIONS OFFICER )

)

MACHESKY, SARGEANT WILLIAMS, United States Magistrate Judge

)

and MR. EMEIGH, ) Christopher B. Brown

)

)

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: MOTION

FOR EMERGENCY RESTRAINING ORDER AND RELEASE, ECF NO. 45

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Recommendation

Pending before the court is the Motion for Emergency Restraining Order and

Release filed by Plaintiff Carl Whitehead, ECF No. 45, and the response in

opposition filed by the Corrections Defendants. ECF No. 59. The motion has been

referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons

that follow, it is recommended the motion be denied.

II. Report

A. Background

Plaintiff, Carl Whitehead, proceeding pro se, is state prisoner in the custody

of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at State Correctional Institution at

Somerset. Whitehead began this civil rights action in the Court of Common Pleas of

Somerset County on February 22, 2024. ECF No. 1-1. The Corrections Defendants

removed the case to this Court on April 16, 2024. ECF No. 1. He asserts claims

under federal law for violating his constitutional rights under the First, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments, as well as claims of state law tort negligence. ECF No. 1-1

at 15-19.

Whitehead alleges the Corrections Defendants failed to protect him by not

clearing an icy walkway, subjected him to a pattern of discrimination and

harassment, engaged in retaliatory conduct, participated in a civil conspiracy, and

obstructed his right of access to courts. Id. He also alleges the Corrections

Defendants were negligent in not properly clearing an icy walkway, which resulted

in him falling and injuring his back. Id.

After the ruling on the Corrections Defendants’ motion to dismiss, only the

following claims remain against the Corrections Defendants:

Count II: First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against

Corrections Defendant Machesky. Whitehead also asserts Machesky’s

conduct violated Article I, §§ 11, 20, and 26 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution; see ECF No. 101, ¶¶ 112- 113;

Count III: Conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 to

violate Whitehead’s First Amendment claims against Corrections

Defendant Williams and Emeigh; see id., ¶ 114; and

Count IV: First Amendment claim against Corrections Defendant

Williams; see id., ¶ 115.

See ECF No. 61, adopting in substantial part, Report and Recommendation at ECF

No. 28.

Whitehead filed the instant “motion for emergency restraining order and

release,” which the undersigned deems to be a motion for preliminary injunction

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. ECF No. 45. Whitehead claims that he

was “kidnapped from General Population” and placed in a restrictive housing unit

(“RHU”) from July 18, 2025, to July 24, 2025. ECF No. 45, ¶ 1. As a result of being

placed in the RHU, he contends he was “unable to comply with any court order.” Id.

On July 23, 2025, he was allowed inventory of property and access to legal

documents, but claims he was not provided an “operational pen” or any other

writing tool. Id., ¶ 2.

He also contends he was sentenced to three sanctions associated with his

failure to attend a disciplinary hearing in June 2025: “60 day DC, reprimand

warning, and 15 days in DC[.]”. Id., ¶ 3. He claims that as a result of these

sanctions, he does not have access to legal resources. Id., ¶ 5. As relief, he is

requesting the Court to conduct “an emergency hearing, where the Court will

discover [he] was never served [a misconduct] at anytime between 6-18-25 and 6-24-

25 the date the motion was filed.” Id., ¶ 4.

The Corrections Defendants filed a response in opposition arguing the motion

should be denied because Whitehead is in court with respect to his underlying

claims, and therefore he has failed to show that he has been denied his First

Amendment right to access the courts. ECF No. 59 at 4.

After reviewing the submissions of the parties, and the applicable law, it is

recommended the motion be denied.

B. Standard of Review

Preliminary injunctions motions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65. The party seeking a preliminary injunction has the burden of

demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable

harm will result if relief is denied; (3) granting preliminary injunction relief will not

result in even greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) granting the

preliminary relief will be in the public interest. Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DOE, Inc.,

171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999).

The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until

the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly

legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d

283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary

remedy . . . which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” Am. Tel. & Tel.

Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting

Frank's GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir.

1988)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing a “clear showing of

immediate irreparable injury.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI

v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987). Absent a showing of

immediate, irreparable injury, the court should deny preliminary injunctive relief.

See Acierno v. New Castle Cnty., 40 F.3d 645, 655 (3d Cir. 1994).

Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always

be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in

dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.’” Goff

v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211,

1214 (8th Cir.1982)). Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require

the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate

consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the

availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976

(citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928 (1975)). The federal courts are

not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require

broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at

best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging

deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to

preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 548

U.S. 521 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527, (1979).

C. Discussion

With the above considerations in mind, the undersigned finds Whitehead has

not demonstrated that preliminary injunctive relief is warranted.

“Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners retain a right of

access to the courts.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996)). “Where prisoners assert that defendants’

actions have inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim, they must

show (1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury’—that they lost a chance to pursue a

‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; and (2) that they have no other

“remedy that may be awarded as recompense” for the lost claim other than in the

present denial of access suit.” Id. (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415

(2002)).

Whitehead’s allegations in his motion bear no relation to the action pending,1

and therefore, is an impermissible basis for seeking injunctive relief as the issuance

of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable

harm until the court has an opportunity to rule on the merits of the pending

lawsuit. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 647.

Alternatively, even if the Court were to assume that Whitehead’s requests

regarding preliminary injunction were sufficiently related to the complaint, the

motion would still fail because he is unable to demonstrate a likelihood of success on

the merits. The Supreme Court of the United States has “consistently required

States to shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful access

to the Courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977) (abrogated by Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1966)). However, for claims involving inadequate legal

supplies, such as paper, pens, and photocopying, a plaintiff must show that the

alleged inadequacies resulted in an “actual injury” where the plaintiff was actually

1 In the original complaint, Whitehead alleged Corrections Defendant Gaunther denied him

access to the library to make photocopies and as a result his administrative appeal to final review

was deemed untimely. ECF No. 101, ¶ 110. That claim has been dismissed as the complaint was

void of any allegation that Whitehead had been denied his First Amendment right to access the

courts. The alleged conduct of Defendant Gaunther has not caused Whitehead to lose any

potentially meritorious claim in this litigation. See ECF No. 61, adopting in substantial part, Report

and Recommendation at ECF No. 28.

.

denied access to the courts. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-52. Whitehead has not met

this burden.

Whitehead asserts he was not provided an “operational pen or any other

writing tool.” Even supposing Whitehead was denied necessary legal supplies, he

would need to prove that he has suffered or will suffer an “actual injury” as a result

of the inadequate supplies. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-52. An actual injury is

shown only where a nonfrivolous claim, or one of arguable merit, is lost.

Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415; see also Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205. Whitehead cannot

just point to alleged lack of materials as a basis for injury; rather, he must show

that he has or will suffer a relevant, actual injury because of the lack of materials

and this he has not done. Whitehead has not shown that that a loss of legal

supplies and access to legal resources has hindered his ability to prosecute this case.

Therefore, Whitehead has failed to meet the burden of proof required to

demonstrate that he is being denied access to the courts.

III. Conclusion

For the above reasons, it is recommended Whitehead’s motion for emergency

restraining order and release, which has been deemed a motion for preliminary

injunction, be denied.

Any party is permitted to file written specific Objections to this Report and

Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Whitehead, because

he is a non-electronically registered party, must file written objections, if any, to

this Report and Recommendation by January 2, 2026. The Corrections

Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections,

if any, by December 30, 2025. The parties are cautioned that failure to file

Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v.

Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d

113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. City of Long

Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017).

DATED this 15th day of December, 2025.

BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown

Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: CARL WHITEHEAD

EK 5805

SCI Somerset

1600 Walters Mill Road

Somerset, PA 15510

(via U.S. First Class Mail)

Jorden P. Colalella

Senior Deputy Attorney General

PA Office of Attorney General

(via ECF electronic notification)