Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

EDUCATION EXPLOSION, INC. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-163-JWD-RLB

LOUISIANA BOARD OF ELEMENTARY CONSOLIDATED WITH

AND SECONDARY EDUCATION NO. 25-888-JWD-RLB

ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion to Stay Discovery filed by Defendants Taveres A. Walker

and Ronnie Morris. (R. Doc. 122). The motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 127).

I. Background

On February 23, 2025, Education Explosion d/b/a Impact Charter School (“Impact”)

commenced the first of these consolidated actions by filing a Verified Complaint, naming the

Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (“BESE”) as the sole defendant. (R.

Doc. 1). Chakesha Scott (“Scott”), the CEO of Impact, submitted a supporting Declaration. (R.

Doc. 1-1). In the Verified Complaint, Impact alleges that, in 2014, Scott started the charter

school in Baker, Louisiana, pursuant to a charter agreement with BESE. (R. Doc. 1 at 1). Impact

filed this lawsuit after BESE removed Impact’s Board of Directors, which included the five

members Eugene Collins, Tammy Clark, Jacqueline Huggins, Gwendolyn McClain, and

Lakeisha Robertson (collectively, the “Original Board”),1 replacing them with state appointees

(the “Replacement Board.”). (R. Doc. 1 at 2-3). Impact further alleges that the reconstitution of

the board resulted in constitutional and statutory violations, including violation of due process,

violation of Louisiana’s laws governing charter schools, violation of federal non-profit

1 It is unclear whether there are additional members of the original Board of Directors.

governance laws, and violation of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (R. Doc. 1 at 3-

4). Impact also filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (R. Doc. 2).

On February 26, 2025, Impact filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, asserting that it

had fired the attorney who commenced this action on behalf of Impact. (R. Doc. 8).

Within one week of the commencement of the initial lawsuit, Impact and the

Replacement Board enrolled new counsel on their behalf. (See R. Doc. 9).

On March 12, 2025, BESE filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6).

(R. Doc. 14).

Prior to ruling on Impact’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (R. Doc. 2) and

BESE’s Motions to Dismiss (R. Docs. 8, 14), the district judge provided the Original Board with

the opportunity to seek leave to intervene in this action and assert any claims they may have

against BESE or the Replacement Board. (R. Doc. 43). The Original Board filed their Motion to

Intervene on July 9, 2025. (R. Doc. 44).

On July 28, 2025, through separate counsel, Scott filed her own Motion to Intervene on

July 28, 2025. (R. Doc. 47).

Later that same day, the district judge issued a ruling dismissing Impact’s claims against

BESE, without prejudice, and providing 28 days (1) for the Replacement Board (as the effective

plaintiff in this action) to file an amended pleading addressing the deficiencies in the ruling and

(2) for any proposed plaintiffs-in-intervention to file amended complaints in intervention. (R.

Doc. 51). The district judge specifically concluded that an exercise of subject matter jurisdiction

over the pending motions to intervene is proper despite the dismissal of BESE as a defendant. (R.

Doc. 51 at 14).

On August 1, 2025, the Original Board submitted an Amended Proposed Complaint in

Intervention, which specifically names as defendants-in-intervention the BESE Board members

Paul Hollis, Dr. Sharon Latten Clark, Sandy Holloway, Stacey Melerine, Lance Harris, Ronnie

Morris, Kevin Berken, Preston Castille, Conrad Appel, Dr. Judy Armstrong, and Simone

Champagne (collectively, the “BESE Board”). (R. Doc. 53).

On August 15, 2025, BESE filed its Motion to Strike Amended Proposed Complaint in

Intervention, which seeks an order striking the foregoing proposed pleading pursuant to Rule

12(f). (R. Doc. 62).

The Replacement Board (as the effective plaintiff in this action) did not file a timely

amended pleading addressing the deficiencies in the district judge’s ruling.

On October 3, 2025, Scott commenced a separate civil action, naming as defendants

Taveres A. Walker (“Walker”), in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as

Executive of BESE, and Ronnie Morris (“Morris”) in his official capacity as the President of

BESE. See Scott v. Walker, et al., No. 25-888-JWD-RLB. These civil actions were consolidated

on October 16, 2025. (R. Doc. 80).

After consolidation, the Court ordered Scott to file a proposed pleading as required by

Rule 24(c), or otherwise withdraw her Motion to Intervene in light of the separate consolidated

action. (R. Doc. 81). Scott subsequently filed her Proposed Complaint in Intervention, which

seeks to name Impact and the Replacement Board as defendants-in-intervention. (R. Doc. 96).

On October 23, 2025, Walker and Morris filed a Motion to Dismiss, which seeks

dismissal, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), of Scott’s original Complaint in Civil Action No. 25-888.

(R. Doc. 87). In that motion, Walker and Morris argue that Scott’s claims are barred by

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment or precluded by the defense of qualified

immunity to the extent Scott seeks recovery against them in their individual capacities. (See R.

Doc. 87-1 at 10-15).

On October 30, 2025, the Court granted the Original Board’s Motion to Intervene (R.

Doc. 44), granted Scott’s Motion to Intervene (R. Doc. 47), and denied BESE’s Motion to Strike

(R. Doc. 62). (See R. Doc. 100).

On November 16, 2025, the BESE Board filed a Motion to Dismiss, which seeks

dismissal, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), of the Original Board’s Complaint-in-Intervention filed in

Civil Action No. 25-163. (R. Doc. 120). In that motion, the BESE Board argue that the Original

Board’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment or precluded

by the defense of qualified immunity to the extent the Original Board seeks recovery against any

BESE Board members in their individual capacities. (See R. Doc. 120 at 9-13).

Later that same day, Walker and Morris filed the instant Motion to Stay Discovery. (R.

Doc. 122). Through this motion, Morris and Walker seek a stay of discovery in the consolidated

actions pending resolution of their Motion to Dismiss in light of the defenses of sovereign and

qualified immunity. In opposing the motion, Scott argues that, pursuant to Rule 12(d), Walker

and Morris’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be converted into a Rule 56 motion for

summary judgment, therefore allowing Scott to conduct discovery. (R. Doc. 127).

II. Law and Analysis

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to issue a protective

order after a showing of good cause “to protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Rule 26(c)’s

“good cause” requirement indicates that the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to

show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of

fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int’l, Inc, 134

F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garret, 571 F.2d 302, 3026 (5th Cir.

1990) (citation omitted).

“Trial courts possess broad discretion to supervise discovery.” Landry v. Air Line Pilots

Ass’n Int’l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 436 n.114 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “A trial court

has broad discretion and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions that may

dispose of the case are determined.” Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1987).

“The qualified immunity defense affords government officials not just immunity from

liability, but immunity from suit.” Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996)

(citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985)). Qualified immunity shields

government officials from individual liability for performing discretionary functions unless their

conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

The Fifth Circuit has clarified that all discovery involving a defendant raising the defense

of qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss must be stayed until resolution of the defense of

qualified immunity:

The Supreme Court has now made clear that a plaintiff asserting constitutional

claims against an officer claiming [qualified immunity] must survive the motion

to dismiss without any discovery.

Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2022). In Carswell, the Fifth Circuit concluded

that a district court abused its discretion by deferring its ruling on a motion to dismiss on

qualified immunity grounds and subjecting the public official defendants to discovery on the

plaintiff’s Monell claims, which created an undue burden in light of increased litigation costs and

complications caused by bifurcated discovery. Id. at 310-314. The Fifth Circuit expressly held

that the required stay of discovery is not limited to claims to which the defense of qualified

immunity is raised. Id.

In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit highlighted the Supreme Court’s concerns about the

burdens of litigation imposed on public officials. It also noted that these same burdens would be

present if the Court allowed discovery to proceed against defendants in different capacities or

against co-defendants that make no claim for qualified immunity:

It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery for petitioners can be

deferred while pretrial proceedings continue for other defendants. It is quite likely

that, when discovery as to the other parties proceeds, it would prove necessary for

petitioners and their counsel to participate in the process to ensure the case does

not develop in a misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position.

Even if petitioners are not yet themselves subject to discovery orders, then, they

would not be free from the burdens of discovery.

Id. at 313 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685-86 (2009)). “In other words, the Court

ruled out even ‘minimally intrusive discovery’ against official defendants before a ruling that

plaintiff had met his burden to overcome the qualified immunity defense at the pleading

stage.” Carswell, 54 F.4th at 313 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686).

Consistent with Carswell, the undersigned has stayed all discovery where a defendant has

alleged qualified immunity and there was no practical manner to allow discovery to proceed

against a co-defendant that has not raised a defense of qualified immunity without prejudicing

the defendants who have raised the defense of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Miller v. LeBlanc,

No. 21-353-BAJ-RLB, 2022 WL 17490971 (M.D. La. Dec. 7, 2022).

Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, the Court finds it appropriate to stay

all discovery in these consolidated actions until resolution of the pending Motions to Dismiss (R.

Docs. 87, 120), both of which raise the defense of qualified immunity. The Carswell decision

controls the outcome of the instant motion to stay discovery. Given the assertion of the qualified

immunity defense, the Court must stay all discovery with respect to all defendants, including

discovery pertaining to claims to which the qualified immunity defense does not apply, because

such discovery would present an undue burden to those defendants. Carswell, 54 F.4th at 313-

314; see also Russell v. Jones, 49 F.4th 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[S]overeign immunity is an

immunity from suit (including discovery), not just liability.”).

To be clear, Scott and the Original Board have had an opportunity to respond to the

respective Motions to Dismiss. (See R. Doc. 118, 126). The district judge will have the

opportunity to address any and all arguments with respect to the need for discovery to address

the immunity defenses raised in those motions.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Stay Discovery filed by Defendants Taveres A.

Walker and Ronnie Morris (R. Doc. 122) is GRANTED, and discovery is STAYED in these

consolidated actions until further order of the Court. The parties shall contact the undersigned’s

chambers upon a resolution of the pending Motions to Dismiss (R. Docs. 87, 120) so appropriate

orders may be issued if necessary.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on January 14, 2026.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.

U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE