Byrnside

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

1:23-cv-319-MEO

AUSTIN AMOS BYRNSIDE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

LOWELL GRIFFIN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

___________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

[Doc. 30].

I. BACKGROUND

The incarcerated pro se Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, addressing

incidents that allegedly occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at the Henderson County

Detention Center (“HCDC”). [Doc. 1: Complaint]. The unverified Complaint passed initial review

against Defendants Dylan Rollins, Brandon Hemphill, and Cameron Burrell (the “deputy

Defendants”) for the use of excessive force and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need,

and against Henderson County Sheriff Lowell Griffin and the deputy Defendants for authorizing

an unreasonable use of force policy. [Doc. 8: Order on Initial Review]. The deputy Defendants

asserted Counterclaims for assault and battery, and a Default was entered. [Doc. 13: Answer and

Counterclaim; see Doc. 20: Default].

The Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting materials.

[Doc. 30: MSJ; Doc. 31: MSJ Memo., Exh.]. The deputy Defendants stipulate to the dismissal of

their Counterclaims should the Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. [See Doc. 31: MSJ

Memo. at 1-2]. The Court entered an Order in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d

309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the requirements for filing a response to the summary

judgment motion and of the manner in which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 32:

Roseboro Order]. The Plaintiff has not responded, and the time to do so has expired. This matter

is ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving

party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3.

The nonmoving party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings

to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party must oppose a

proper summary judgment motion with citation to “depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the nonmoving party must

present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To that end, only evidence admissible at trial may be considered

by the Court on summary judgment. Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 F. App’x 302, 308

(4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence and any

inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

As the Supreme Court has emphasized,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c),

the opponent must do more than simply show there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts …. Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita

Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87,

106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986) (footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of

some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the

requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-28, 106 S. Ct.

2505 (1986). When opposing parties tell two different stories, one

of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version

of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary

judgment.

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The relevant forecast of evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff shows

the following.1

1 The Plaintiff’s unverified Complaint cannot be considered on summary judgment as a forecast

of evidence. See generally Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2021) (a verified complaint

The deputy Defendants were members of the HCDC Special Response Team (“SRT”), a

team of detention officers trained to perform cell extractions of combative inmates. [Doc. 31-2:

Burrell Decl. at ¶¶ 2-3; Doc. 31-3: Hemphill Decl. at ¶¶ 2-3; Doc. 31-4: Rollins Decl. at ¶¶ 2-3].

During the days leading up to August 27, 2023, the Plaintiff and other inmates became

frustrated with a detention officer’s racist remarks. [Doc. 31-6: Depo. at 5]. The Plaintiff and six

others “felt like [they] had to do something,” so they decided to give the detention officers a “rough

time.”2 [Id. at 6-7]. Plaintiff’s goal was to force officers to come into his cell so he could fight

them. [Id. at 12]. The Plaintiff flooded his toilet, other inmates popped their sprinkler heads, and

the Plaintiff and others kicked their doors. [Id. at 10]. The Plaintiff wrapped a towel around his

face to block officers’ anticipated use of a chemical agent, he barricaded his cell door with a

mattress, and he readied a cup of liquid to throw at officers to provoke them. [Id. at 9-12, 15].

SRT leader Kiel Boyette, who is not a defendant in this case, gathered a team including the

deputy Defendants, to extract inmates who were refusing to leave their cells. [Doc. 31-2: Burrell

Decl. at ¶ 4; Doc. 31-3: Hemphill Decl. at ¶ 4; Doc. 31-4: Rollins Decl. at ¶ 4]. The Plaintiff was

believed to have weapons in his cell including a jail-made knife and a broken sprinkler head, and

he had previously bitten officers. [Doc. 31-4: Rollins Decl. at ¶ 6; Doc. 31-2: Burrell Decl. at ¶ 12;

Doc. 31-6: Depo. at 3-4]. Burrell was assigned to handle handcuffs and shackles, Hemphill was

assigned to grab Plaintiff’s left side, and Rollins was assigned the taser shield – a device that emits

a nonlethal electrical current so that an inmate can be secured. [Id. at ¶ 5; id. at ¶ 5; id. at ¶ 5].

When the SRT approached Plaintiff’s cell, Boyette ordered Plaintiff to submit to handcuffs.

is the equivalent of an opposing affidavit for summary judgment purposes).

2 The Court need not accept the Plaintiff’s contradictory statement that the incident “wasn’t

planned….” [Doc. 31-6: Depo. at 5]; see Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

[Doc. 31-6: Depo. at 7; Doc. 31-2: Burrell Decl. at ¶ 7]. The Plaintiff refused. [Doc. 31-6: Depo.

at 13-14]. Boyette then ordered pepper balls to be fired; they struck the back of Plaintiff’s cell. [Id.

at 14, 25; Doc. 31-2: Burrell Decl. at ¶ 9]. Plaintiff was not affected by the pepper balls. [Doc. 31-

6: Depo. at 9]. The cell door was opened and the SRT entered. [Id.]. Plaintiff threw liquid that

struck Hemphill and Rollins. [Doc. 31-6: Depo. at 11-12; Doc. 31-3: Hemphill Decl. at ¶ 8; Doc.

31-4: Rollins Decl. at ¶ 11]. The Plaintiff pushed the taser shield with his mattress and tried to

“sidesweep” an officer; he also tried to punch Hemphill’s face but he missed and struck Hemphill’s

shoulder. [Doc. 31-6: Depo. at 11, 15-16]. The Plaintiff was pushed onto the bunk and fell to the

floor. [Id. at 15-16]. Officers held the Plaintiff face-down on the floor. [Id. at 17]. Had they not

done so, the Plaintiff would have continued swinging at officers. [Id.].

The Plaintiff continued to struggle as much as possible and was “going all the way out”

because he knew he would be sanctioned for his conduct. [Id. at 21]. Officer Edwards, who is not

a defendant in this case, administered “pain compliance” via taser gloves, Rollins used the taser

shield, Burrell and Hemphill punched the Plaintiff’s back, and Burrell struck Plaintiff’s thigh twice

in an effort to get Plaintiff to comply with officers’ commands. [Id. at 14; Doc. 31-3: Hemphill

Decl. at ¶ 9; Doc. 31-2: Burrell Decl. at ¶ 13]. The Plaintiff continued resisting officers’ attempts

to apply restraints.3 [See, e.g., Doc. 31-6: Depo. at 19 (“I was … trying to refuse my hands…”);

id. at 20 (“Q. So you were still resisting? A. Yes.”)]. When the Plaintiff had finally “had enough”

of the taser gloves, he gave up his hands for cuffing. [Id. at 22, 26]. He was handcuffed and escorted

out of the housing pod without further issues. [Doc. 31-6: Depo. at 26; Doc. 31-2: Burrell Decl. at

¶ 14].

3 The Court need not accept the Plaintiff’s contradictory contention that he was fully restrained at

this juncture. [See Doc. 31-6: Depo. at 19 (“…I was on the ground in full restraints, laying in water,

getting beat, getting punched in the head and in the back and sides”)]; see Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

The Plaintiff was placed on a bench under the central control window. [Doc. 31-2: Burrell

Decl. at ¶ 15]. He was allowed to shower approximately seven hours later. [Doc. 31-6: Depo. at

23-24]. He was not taken to medical. [Id.]. The Plaintiff had a headache, blurred vision, his chest

was hurting, he was sore, and he suspects that he had a “mild concussion” because he had severe

headaches for a couple of weeks. [Id. at 24].

IV. DISCUSSION

1. Excessive Force

The Fourteenth Amendment “protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force

that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). To succeed on

an excessive force claim, a pretrial detainee must show only that the force “purposely or knowingly

used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397

(2015). The standard for assessing a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is “solely an objective

one.” Id. Considerations that may bear on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used

include: “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the

extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of

force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer;

and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). In

determining whether the force was objectively unreasonable, a court considers the evidence “from

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time,

not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 394 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

The forecast of evidence demonstrates that: the Plaintiff and other inmates created a

coordinated disturbance so that officers would be forced to respond; the Plaintiff prepared himself

defensively (towel and mattress) and offensively (cup of liquid) to fight officers in his cell; Plaintiff

refused an order to cuff up; pepper balls were deployed but had no effect; officers knew that the

Plaintiff may be armed and that he had a history of biting; upon officers’ entry into the cell,

Plaintiff attacked by throwing liquid and punching; the Plaintiff continued resisting to the

maximum possible extent; when the Plaintiff finally decided to submit to handcuffs, he was

secured and escorted away without further incident; and Plaintiff sustained headache, blurred

vision, soreness, and a suspected concussion.

The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact

that any deputy Defendant used excessive force. The deputy Defendants used physical force only

after verbal commands and pepper balls failed. They use limited hands-on force and a taser shield

to prevent the assaultive and potentially armed Plaintiff from further harming them, to gain control

over him, and to restore order. See, e.g., Gardner v. Momon, 2025 WL 2206325 (4th Cir. Aug. 4,

2025) (police officers used objectively reasonable force against a disorderly-conduct arrestee by

bringing him to the ground and using hand strikes to the arrestee’s head where the arrestee had

punched an officer, continued to actively resist on the ground, had an arm free, and possessed a

knife);4 Fuller v. Clark, 3:21-cv-254, 2022 WL 3723105 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 2022) (it was

objectively reasonable for police officer to repeatedly headbutt a homicide suspect who refused to

stop reaching, resisted handcuffing, and was likely armed); Bulluck v. Martin, 1:20-cv-292, 2022

WL 179142 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 19, 2022) (granting summary judgment to officers who brought a

pretrial detainee to the ground to regain control after the detainee was aggressive, combative, and

attempted to assault an officer). The Plaintiff continued physically resisting officers until he grew

tired of the taser gloves and decided to submit to handcuffs, at which point he was secured without

4 Somers v. Devine, 132 F.4th 689, 698 (4th Cir. 2025) (the excessive force claims of arrestees

under the Fourth Amendment, and of pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, are

“functionally identical”).

further incident. The Plaintiff has forecast vague evidence suggesting that he sustained, at most,

de minimis injuries. The Plaintiff has not forecast any evidence that the deputy Defendants used

objectively unreasonable force in response to his planned, disruptive and assaultive conduct that

necessitated officers’ entry into his cell.

The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact

as to the deputy Defendants’ use of excessive force, accordingly, they will be granted summary

judgment on this claim.

2. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need

A pretrial detainee’s claim based on deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is

properly brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th

Cir. 2023). A plaintiff asserting such a claim must prove that:

(1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious

harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act

to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew

or should have known (a) that the detainee had the condition and (b) that the

defendant’s action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as

a result, the detainee was harmed.

Id. at 611. Under this standard, “the plaintiff [need not] show that the defendant had actual

knowledge of the detainee’s serious medical condition and consciously disregarded the risk that

their action or failure to act would result in harm.” Id. “[I]t is enough that the plaintiff show that

the defendant acted or failed to act ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either

known or so obvious that it should be known.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

836). It remains, however, insufficient “for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant negligently or

accidentally failed to do right by the detainee.” Id. at 611-12.

The forecast of evidence demonstrates that: pepper balls struck the back of Plaintiff’s cell

while he shielded himself with a towel; officers used physical force as described supra to cease

his assaultive behavior and to restrain him; the Plaintiff showered approximately seven hours after

the incident; the Plaintiff never received medical care; and the Plaintiff had a headache, blurred

vision, soreness, and a suspected concussion.

As to the pepper balls, there is no forecast of evidence that the Defendants were deliberately

indifferent by failing to provide the Plaintiff with a shower sooner. The lack of prompt

decontamination after the use of a chemical agent can rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

See, e.g., Sullivan v. Branch, 2025 WL 2663667 (E.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2025) (denying jail officers’

motion for summary judgment on excessive force and deliberate indifference claims where a

reasonable factfinder could conclude that the defendants sprayed a chemical agent in a pretrial

detainee’s face, then placed him in a restraint chair without first allowing him to rinse his eyes and

body). Here, however, it is undisputed that the Plaintiff anticipated officers’ use of pepper balls

and shielded himself from the same by wrapping his face with a towel. It is unclear whether the

Plaintiff experienced any ill effects from the pepper balls whatsoever. The only complaints that

are conceivably attributable to the pepper balls are a headache and blurred vision. Assuming

arguendo that those conditions are attributable to the pepper balls, there is no forecast of evidence

that these conditions were known, obvious, or sufficiently serious such that they required

immediate decontamination or other action by the Defendants, or that the Plaintiff was harmed by

the Defendants’ delay.

Nor has the Plaintiff forecast evidence that he sustained any other injury in the incident

that warranted medical attention. His references to a headache, blurred vision, soreness, and a

suspected concussion are vague and conclusory. He has failed to forecast evidence that these

conditions were known, obvious, or that they were sufficiently serious such that the deputy

Defendants’ inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm, and that he was harmed as a result.

Any suggestion that the Defendants underestimated his injuries is insufficient. See Short, 87 F.4th

at 611-12.

There is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the deputy Defendants’ deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need and, accordingly, summary judgment will be granted on this

ground.

3. Official Capacity Claims

Suits against an officer in his official capacity “generally represent only another way of

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 690 n. 55 (1978)). Local governing bodies such as a sheriff’s department “can be sued directly

under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to

be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; see Mt.

Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (Eleventh Amendment

immunity “does not extend to counties or similar municipal corporations.”). Municipal liability

under § 1983 cannot be predicated upon a respondeat superior theory. Burgess v. Goldstein, 997

F.3d 541, 562 (4th Cir. 2021). Liability arises only when the offensive acts are taken in furtherance

of municipal policy or custom. Id.; see City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)

(a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the “moving force” behind

the constitutional violation) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)).

There are three necessary elements for Monell liability. First, the plaintiff must prove a

constitutional harm that stems from the acts of a municipal employee “taken in furtherance of some

municipal ‘policy or custom.’” Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir.

1984) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); see also Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1389 (4th

Cir. 1987). A policy, custom or practice can exist in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such

as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking

authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train [employees], that “manifest[s]

deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that is so “persistent and

widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d

463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)). Second,

the plaintiff must prove that the policy’s creation is fairly attributable to the municipality. Spell,

824 F.2d at 1389; see also Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attorney’s Office, 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th

Cir. 2014) (“Only if a municipality subscribes to a custom, policy, or practice can it be said to have

committed an independent act, the sine qua non of Monell liability.”). Third, the plaintiff must

show an affirmative causal link between the “policy or custom,” and the particular injury suffered

by the plaintiff. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1389.

The Plaintiff asserts claims against the deputy Defendants and against Sheriff Griffin for

authorizing an unreasonable use of force policy at the HCDC. The Plaintiff has not forecast any

evidence whatsoever regarding a municipal policy or custom. Moreover, and the Plaintiff’s

underlying excessive force claim has not survived summary judgment as discussed supra. The

Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim based on the use of force likewise fails. See Young v. City of

Mt. Rainier, 238 F.3d at 579 (4th Cir. 2001) (no Monell claim can exist “where there is no

underlying constitutional violation by the employee”); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,

799 (1996) (per curiam) (“[N]either Monell ... nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of

damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when it has

been concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.”); Anderson v. Caldwell Cty.

Sherriff’s Office, 524 F. App’x 854, 862 (4th Cir. 2013) (“No actionable claim against supervisors

or local governments can exist without a constitutional violation committed by an employee”).

Summary judgment will, therefore, be granted for Sheriff Griffin and the deputy Defendants on

the Plaintiff’s Monell claims.

4. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but who, in

light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v.

Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled

to qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the

officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time

of the alleged violation.” E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government officials

breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir.

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of evidence that any Defendant violated his

constitutional rights. As such, summary judgment for the Defendants would also be proper on this

ground.

5. Counterclaims

Because summary judgment is being granted in favor of the deputy Defendants, their

Counterclaims against the Plaintiff for assault and battery will be dismissed pursuant to their

stipulation. [See Doc. 31 at 1-2].

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted

as to Plaintiffs claims, the Counterclaims by Defendants Rollins, Hemphill, and Burrell are

dismissed pursuant to their stipulation, and this action is dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 30] is GRANTED and this

action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail a copy of this Order to the Plaintiff at his

address of record and at the Maury CI, and to terminate this action.°

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: January 12, 2026

Matthew E. Orso ts

United States District Judge x WY

> The Plaintiff’s address of record is at the Bertie CI, however, NCDAC’s website indicates that

the Plaintiff is presently at the Maury CI. See

https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=1520285 &searc

hOffenderld=1520285 &searchDOBRange=0&listurl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&listpage=1

(last accessed Jan. 5, 2026); see also Fed. R. Ev. 201 (addressing judicial notice).

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