United States v. Edson Gelin

USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11901

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

EDSON GELIN,

a.k.a. Bo,

Defendant- Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cr-00131-CEM-LHP-3

____________________

Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11901

Edson Gelin, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, was sen-

tenced to a total of 600 months’ imprisonment (the statutory min-

imum sentence) following his convictions on various narcotics and

firearm charges. He now appeals the denial of his motion for com-

passionate release pursuant 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). For the rea-

sons which follow, we affirm.

I

Mr. Gelin argues that that the district court abused its discre-

tion by denying his motion because it disregarded intervening

changes of law and fact, including amendments to U.S.S.G. §

1B1.13. He contends that he established “extraordinary and com-

pelling reasons” for release based on a combination of factors under

§ 1B1.13(b)(5), including his diminishing health conditions, inter-

vening changes in the statutory penalties for his offenses, and gov-

ernment misconduct. He maintains that the court did not properly

consider the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly the need

to avoid disproportionate sentences. He also submits that the

court erred in finding that he posed a danger to the community

because it relied on outdated circumstances.

We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen-

tence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). The same plenary standard

applies to a district court’s legal conclusions about the scope of its

legal authority under the statute. See United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th

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24-11901 Opinion of the Court 3

1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Maiello, 805 F.3d 992,

996 (11th Cir. 2015). 1

After eligibility is established, we review a district court’s de-

nial of an eligible defendant’s request for compassionate release un-

der § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discretion. See Giron, 15 F.4th at

1345. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect

legal standard, follows improper procedures in making its determi-

nation, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Giron,

15 F.4th at 1345. The abuse of discretion standard is not “simply a

rubber stamp.” United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1183 (11th Cir.

2021) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir.

2017)). A district court must explain its sentencing decisions, in-

cluding its decision to grant or deny a motion for compassionate

release, adequately enough to allow us to meaningfully review the

decision on appeal. Id.

In general, a court may not modify a sentence once it has

been imposed, except under certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c); United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 909 (11th Cir. 2021).

Either the Bureau of Prisons, or a defendant who has fully ex-

hausted administrative remedies, may move the court to reduce

1 Pro se pleadings are held to a less-stringent standard than those drafted by

attorneys and are liberally construed. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d

1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-11901

the term of imprisonment based on compassionate release. See

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) if: (1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor doing

so; (2) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing

so; and (3) doing so would not endanger any person or the com-

munity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and a reduction

is consistent with applicable Sentencing Commission policy state-

ments. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th

1234, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021). District courts need not address

these three conditions in a specific sequence, as the lack of even

one forecloses a sentence reduction. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237-

38. If the district court finds against the movant on any one of these

requirements, it cannot grant relief and need not analyze the other

requirements. See id.

II

In order to qualify for compassionate release, U.S.S.G. §

1B1.13(a)(2) provides that the court must find that the defendant is

not a danger to any other person or to the community under

§ 3142(g). To determine whether a defendant is a danger to the

community under § 3142(g), the district court must consider (1) the

nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including

whether it is a crime of violence, a terrorism crime, involved a mi-

nor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destruc-

tive device; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person;

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24-11901 Opinion of the Court 5

(3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the na-

ture and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community

that would be posed by the defendant’s release. See § 3142(g).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-

ing Mr. Gelin’s motion for a sentence reduction because it did not

clearly err in finding that he posed a danger to the community un-

der § 3142(g). In its order, the court incorporated the findings it

had made in 2020 when it denied an earlier similar motion by Mr.

Gelin. See D.E. 662 (incorporating D.E. 448). In the 2020 order,

the court found that Mr. Gelin was a danger to the community:

At trial the evidence revealed that Defendant Gelin

participated as a member in a drug trafficking organi-

zation that transported cocaine from Miami, Florida

to be sold from multiple residences in the Orlando,

Florida area. Defendant Gelin was responsible for the

distribution of over five kilograms of cocaine and

would personally travel to Miami in order to

transport cocaine to Orlando. During their investiga-

tion, law enforcement officers conducted a traffic

stop where they seized two kilograms of cocaine be-

ing transported by Defendant Gelin from Miami to

the drug trafficking organization in Orlando. Further

exacerbating the danger these offenses posed to the

community at large was the fact that Defendant Gelin

possessed multiple firearms in furtherance of these

drug offenses. In consideration thereof, the Court

cannot in good conscience grant the relief requested.

D.E. 448 at 3-4.

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-11901

Based on our review of the record, we see no clear error in

this determination, particularly given Mr. Gelin’s role as a manager

in the narcotics scheme. See PSI at ¶ 70. See also United States v.

Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1472 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a dan-

gerousness finding under § 3142(g) is a factual one that is subject to

the clearly erroneous standard of review). 2

III

The district court’s denial of Mr. Gelin’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) mo-

tion is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

2 Because we may affirm on this ground alone, we need not determine

whether the district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, nor

whether it erred in finding that no extraordinary and compelling reasons for

release existed under § 1B1.13.