United States v. Nidal Hatum

USCA11 Case: 22-13312 Document: 102-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 1 of 31

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13312

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

NIDAL AHMED WAKED HATUM,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-20189-RNS-1

____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In 2017, Nidal Ahmed Waked Hatum (“Waked”) pled guilty

to conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and 1957(a). As part of his guilty plea, Waked

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13312

admitted that on multiple occasions he borrowed money from a

bank in Panama based on fraudulent representations, transferred

that money into the United States and back to Panama through

Florida-based corporations that he owned, and then repaid the

money with interest to the Panamanian bank.

As part of Waked’s sentence, the government sought a

forfeiture money judgment for the total amount of money that he

laundered. The district court denied the government’s motion and

refused to impose a forfeiture money judgment against Waked.

The government appealed, and we reversed, holding that the

district court was required to impose forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.

§ 982(a)(1). United States v. Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir.

2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 72 (2021). However, we left it for the

district court to (1) calculate in the first instance the amount of the

forfeiture money judgment that it was required to impose, and

(2) determine whether a judgment of that amount would be an

excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1169.

On remand, the district court imposed a forfeiture money

judgment of $10,426,000, the undisputed sum total of Waked’s

money laundering transactions. The district court also concluded

that the judgment was not an excessive fine in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Waked appeals the forfeiture money

judgment. After review, 1 we affirm.

1 “We review the validity and scope of an appeal waiver de novo.” King v. United

States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2022). “We review de novo the subject

matter jurisdiction of the district court.” United States v. Mims, 143 F.4th 1311,

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I. BACKGROUND2

In March 2015, Waked was indicted for, among other

charges, conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and 1957(a). In October 2017, Waked pled

guilty to that charge pursuant to a plea agreement in exchange for

the dismissal of the remaining charges.

In pleading guilty, Waked agreed to a proffer of the

following facts. From approximately 2000 to 2009, Waked was the

general manager of the Panamanian corporation Vida Panama,

Z.L., S.A. (“Vida Panama”) and the owner of two Miami-based

corporations, Star Textile Manufacturing (“Star Textile”) and

Global World Import & Export (“Global World”). During that

time period, on multiple occasions Waked drew from Vida

Panama’s line of credit at the International Bank of China (“ICBC”)

in Panama for sums of money ranging from approximately $22,000

to $550,000. Waked then transferred those funds via wire transfer

to Star Textile and Global World at Ocean Bank in Miami.

1315 (11th Cir. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). “We review the factual

findings underlying a forfeiture order for clear error, but we review any legal

conclusions de novo.” United States v. Philossaint, 141 F.4th 1334, 1339 (11th Cir.

2025). We review whether a fine is excessive under the Eighth Amendment

de novo. United States v. Schwarzbaum, 127 F.4th 259, 275 (11th Cir. 2025).

2 We limit our summary of this case’s factual and procedural history to those

facts that are directly relevant to this appeal. For a more complete summary

of the background of this case, see our decision in the first appeal that arose

from this case. See Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1159-61.

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In order to justify the credit draws and wire transfers,

Waked claimed to ICBC that the purpose of the transfers was that

Vida Panama was purchasing goods from Star Textile and Global

World. Waked submitted invoices to ICBC in support of that

representation. However, no such purchases occurred, and the

invoices were fraudulent. If ICBC had known the truth, it would

not have authorized the credit draws and wire transfers.

Therefore, Waked admitted that the funds he transferred “were

derived from fraud on a bank in Panama.”

After transferring the funds to Star Textile and Global World

in Florida, Waked arranged for those funds to be promptly

deposited back in Vida Panama’s bank account in Panama via

check. Waked then repaid the credit draws to ICBC with interest,

so ICBC did not suffer any net financial losses.

In the plea agreement, Waked agreed to negotiate with the

government regarding the amount of money that would be subject

to forfeiture, but he reserved the right to present arguments before

the district court regarding forfeiture if they did not reach an

agreement. Waked also agreed to waive his right to appeal any

sentence the district court imposed with three exceptions: (1) if his

sentence included an upward departure or variance, (2) if his

sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, and (3) “if the United

States exercise[d] its statutory rights to appeal.”

The district court then entered a preliminary order of

forfeiture, which stated that a forfeiture money judgment would

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be imposed, with the amount to be determined at a later date under

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(C) and (e)(1).

In the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) prepared for

Waked’s sentencing, the probation officer included additional

details about Waked’s offense conduct not contained in the factual

proffer. As is relevant for this appeal, the PSI listed each of the

transactions in which Waked drew funds from ICBC based on Vida

Panama’s credit line and transferred those funds to Star Textile and

Global World. The PSI stated that, through these transactions,

Waked transferred approximately $10,426,000 to Star Textile and

Global World, all of which was sent back to Vida Panama and

repaid to ICBC with interest. Waked objected to various facts in

the PSI, but he did not specifically object to the $10,426,000

calculation.

The district court sentenced Waked to 27 months’

imprisonment. The parties and the court agreed that they would

address forfeiture after sentencing.

The district court ultimately rejected the government’s

request for a forfeiture money judgment and vacated the

preliminary order of forfeiture. The court recognized that

forfeiture was mandatory but decided not to impose any forfeiture

money judgment against Waked because Waked returned the

funds that he laundered to ICBC with interest. Additionally, the

court stated that, if it was required to impose a forfeiture money

judgment, the amount requested by the government—

$20,852,000—was excessive under the Eighth Amendment. The

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court explained that, because Waked returned all funds he

borrowed from ICBC on Vida Panama’s credit line with interest,

the bank suffered little harm, and so a forfeiture money judgment

of $10,000 per transaction, for a total of $520,000, would be

appropriate.

The government appealed the district court’s forfeiture

ruling.

On appeal, we reversed the district court’s forfeiture ruling

and held that the district court erred by failing to impose

mandatory forfeiture against Waked. Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at

1162-67. Waked raised multiple arguments in support of the

district court’s decision not to impose forfeiture, all of which we

rejected. Specifically, we held that (1) the district court was

required to impose forfeiture against Waked based on his

conviction under § 982(a)(1), (2) § 982(a)(1) permitted forfeiture

money judgments, and (3) the money that Waked laundered was

property “involved in” his laundering scheme that was subject to

forfeiture. Id. at 1162-65.

In reaching the third holding, we concluded that (1) it was

not “impermissible double counting” to impose forfeiture against

Waked even though he returned all of the laundered funds to

ICBC; (2) it did not matter that the funds were technically

possessed by Vida Panama, not Waked, because Waked had

sufficient personal interest in the funds as Vida Panama’s general

manager; and (3) the requirement in Honeycutt v. United States, 581

U.S. 443 (2017), that property must be “tainted” to be forfeitable

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did not apply to this case because that decision concerned 21 U.S.C.

§ 853(a), while this case was based on § 982(a)(1). Id. at 1164-65.

We also held that the government could seek substitute asset

forfeiture under § 853(p) even though the “third party” to whom

Waked transferred the laundered money was the victim, ICBC. Id.

at 1166.

After holding that the district court erred by failing to

impose forfeiture against Waked, we then held that the district

court also erred in holding that a fine of $10,000 per transaction was

the constitutional ceiling for a forfeiture judgment under the

Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1167-69. Applying the factors for the

Eighth Amendment analysis, we first concluded that Waked was

within the class of persons whom the money laundering statutes

were meant to cover. Id. at 1167.

We then stated that the maximum fine for Waked’s money

laundering conviction was twice the amount of money “involved

in” his offense, which appeared to be $20,852,000, i.e., twice the

amount of the total transferred funds as listed in the PSI. Id. at

1167-68. However, we noted that the district court did not make

the necessary findings of fact as to the proper forfeiture amount, so

we could not determine whether that was the correct statutory

maximum. Id. at 1168. Lastly, we explained that the district court

erred by only considering the direct economic harm that ICBC

suffered as a result of Waked’s scheme because the court should

have looked “beyond the impact on [ICBC’s] bottom line when

considering whether Mr. Waked’s conduct was harmful.” Id. at

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1168-69. Specifically, we stated that the court should have

considered the general harm to society that money laundering

causes. Id. at 1169.

Based on the above holdings, we remanded for the district

court in the first instance to (1) engage in the necessary factfinding

to calculate the proper amount for the forfeiture money judgment,

and (2) determine whether that judgment would be an excessive

fine under the Eighth Amendment. 3 Id.

On remand, the government moved for an amended

preliminary order of forfeiture, which the district court granted on

January 13, 2022. Pursuant to our opinion in the government’s

appeal, the district court determined that it was required to impose

a forfeiture money judgment against Waked. The court calculated

that the money judgment should be for $10,426,000 because that

was the unobjected-to total amount of Waked’s laundering

transactions as stated in the PSI. The court then scheduled a date

for a separate hearing to address Waked’s objections to the

forfeiture judgment under the Eighth Amendment.

On September 16, 2022, the district court entered a “Final

Order of Forfeiture” in which it confirmed its imposition of the

$10,426,000 forfeiture money judgment.4 The court again

3 Waked petitioned for a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court, which

the Court denied. Waked Hatum v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 72 (2021).

4 Although the district court titled the order as the “Final Order of Forfeiture,”

the order was not the type of “final order of forfeiture” that Fed. R. Crim. P.

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concluded that $10,426,000 was the correct amount for the

forfeiture money judgment because that was the amount of money

that Waked laundered as part of his offense.

Then, applying the appropriate factors, the court

determined that the forfeiture money judgment was not an

excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. First, the court stated

that Waked was within the class of persons whom the money

laundering statutes intended to cover, as we concluded in the

government’s appeal. Second, the court stated that the amount of

the money judgment was well below the maximum penalty

authorized by Congress. The court stated that under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1957(b)(2), the maximum fine it could impose was twice the

amount of the criminally derived property involved in the

laundering transactions. Because Waked laundered a total of

$10,426,000, the maximum fine was $20,852,000, and so the

amount of the money judgment was well below the authorized

statutory maximum fine. Lastly, the court stated that the amount

of the forfeiture money judgment was appropriate in light of the

harm that Waked’s laundering scheme caused. Although Waked’s

laundering caused little to no economic harm to ICBC, the court

explained that it caused harm to society generally.

Waked then filed a notice of appeal challenging the

forfeiture money judgment.

32.2(c)(2) states should be entered after ancillary forfeiture proceedings are

completed.

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On appeal, Waked initially argued, among other things, that

the district court’s forfeiture judgment was jurisdictionally

defective because the court did not amend the sentencing

judgment to include the remand forfeiture order. In response,

prior to filing its appellate merits brief, the government moved to

stay the appeal, which we granted, and then moved the district

court to enter an amended sentencing judgment that incorporated

the remand forfeiture order.

Over Waked’s objection, the district court granted the

government’s motion and on October 18, 2024, entered an

amended sentencing judgment that incorporated the remand

forfeiture order. The court concluded that it was permitted to

amend the sentencing judgment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 because

its failure to incorporate the remand forfeiture order into the

sentencing judgment was a clerical error that it could resolve

immediately even though Waked’s appeal was pending.

II. DISCUSSION

Waked challenges the district court’s imposition of the

forfeiture money judgment against him on seven grounds. He first

argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the

amended sentencing judgment that incorporated the remand

forfeiture order because this appeal was already pending at that

time. Second, he argues that there was no factual basis to support

the forfeiture money judgment. Third, he argues that the district

court’s calculation of the forfeiture money judgment constituted

impermissible double counting. Fourth, he argues that the district

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court could not impose substitute asset forfeiture against him.

Fifth, he argues that the district court could not impose forfeiture

against him because he never personally received the funds that he

laundered. Sixth, he argues that the forfeiture money judgment

was an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. And lastly, he

argues that the district court was not authorized under the

forfeiture statute to impose a forfeiture money judgment.

In response, the government argues that we should dismiss

this appeal because it is barred by the sentence-appeal waiver

contained in Waked’s plea agreement. We address each issue in

turn.

A. Threshold Issues

Before reaching the merits of Waked’s appeal, we address

the two threshold issues that the parties raise: whether this appeal

is barred by a sentence-appeal waiver, and whether the district

court had jurisdiction to amend the sentencing judgment to

include the remand forfeiture order.

1. Sentence-Appeal Waiver

The government argues that we should not reach the merits

of Waked’s appeal because we should enforce the sentence-appeal

waiver contained in the plea agreement. It acknowledges that it

appealed Waked’s sentence when the district court initially refused

to impose forfeiture, but it asserts that its prior appeal did not

release Waked from the waiver as to his new sentence imposed on

remand.

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Sentence-appeal waivers that are made knowingly and

voluntarily must be enforced if they are raised by the government.

King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1367 (11th Cir. 2022). Plea

agreements are like contracts between the government and

criminal defendants, and so such agreements “must be construed

according to the intent and reasonable expectation of the parties.”

Id.

We disagree with the government that Waked’s

sentence-appeal waiver bars his appeal of the forfeiture money

judgment imposed on remand. The plea agreement states that

Waked agreed to waive his right to appeal any sentence that the

district court imposed unless, among other exceptions, “the United

States exercises its statutory rights to appeal.” The plea agreement

does not specify whether the waiver remains effective if (1) the

government successfully appeals Waked’s sentence, (2) the district

court resentences Waked on remand, and (3) the government does

not appeal Waked’s new sentence. The language of the plea

agreement is ambiguous on this issue, and “ambiguities in plea

agreements should be resolved against the government.” Allen v.

Thomas, 161 F.3d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1998).

Construing the ambiguity in Waked’s favor, we read the

plea agreement to state that if the government appeals, Waked is

no longer barred from appealing his sentence, including if he is

resentenced on remand after an earlier successful appeal by the

government. See United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th

Cir. 2009) (holding that a sentence-appeal waiver did not bar a

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defendant from appealing his sentence after he was resentenced on

remand from a successful appeal by the government because the

plea agreement, which stated that the defendant was released from

the waiver if the government appealed “the sentence imposed,”

was ambiguous, and any ambiguity should be construed in the

defendant’s favor), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 558 U.S.

1144 (2010). Therefore, we may reach the merits of Waked’s

appeal.

2. District Court’s Jurisdiction

Waked argues as a threshold matter that the district court

lacked jurisdiction to enter the October 18, 2024, amended

sentencing judgment to incorporate the remand forfeiture order

because this appeal was already pending at that time. He asserts

that the district court was divested of jurisdiction to amend the

sentencing judgment when he filed his notice of appeal, so it was

not authorized to amend the judgment as the government

requested.

“The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional

significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and

divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case

involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459

U.S. 56, 58 (1982). However, this principle does not prevent a

district court from amending a judgment to fix a clerical error

pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 while an appeal is pending. United

States v. Pease, 331 F.3d 809, 816 (11th Cir. 2003) (“It is settled law

that the appeal of a judgment in a criminal case deprives the district

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court of jurisdiction to amend the judgment (except for clerical

errors pursuant to Rule 36).”), superseded by rule on other grounds,

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (2009).

Although Waked’s notice of appeal that he filed after the

September 16, 2022, forfeiture order generally divested the district

court of jurisdiction over the case, the court did not lack

jurisdiction to amend the sentencing judgment to incorporate the

remand forfeiture order. See Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58. Rule 32.2 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a district court

include any forfeiture order imposed in the case in the judgment.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(4)(B); see also United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d

1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that Rule 32.2 “requires that the

forfeiture order be made a part of the sentence and included in the

judgment”). However, Rule 32.2 also provides that the failure to

include a forfeiture order in the judgment is an error that “may be

corrected at any time under Rule 36.” Fed. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b)(4)(B). Rule 36 allows a district court to “at any time correct

a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or

correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.

Under Rule 32.2(b)(4)(B), the district court’s failure to

incorporate the remand forfeiture order into the sentencing

judgment was a clerical error that could be corrected at any time

under Rule 36. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(4)(B), 36. The district

court therefore had jurisdiction to amend the sentencing judgment

as it did even though Waked had already filed a notice of appeal

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because the filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the district

court of jurisdiction to correct clerical errors under Rule 36. 5

See Pease, 331 F.3d at 816.

B. Merits Challenges to the Forfeiture Money Judgment

We next turn to the merits of Waked’s various arguments

challenging the validity of the forfeiture money judgment.

1. Factual Basis for the Forfeiture Judgment

First, Waked argues that there was an insufficient factual

basis to support the imposition of the forfeiture money judgment.

Specifically, he asserts that there was no basis in the record to

support the conclusion that he was responsible for any substantive

violations of the money laundering statutes such that any of the

funds that he transferred from Vida Panama to Star Textile and

Global World were “involved in” any money laundering offense

and so forfeitable under § 982(a)(1). He reasons that (1) the

government failed to establish that any of the credit draws from

ICBC constituted bank fraud under Panamanian or U.S. law, and

(2) the credit draws could not constitute bank fraud because ICBC

did not suffer any net economic loss as a result of the transactions.

5 In Pease, we held that a district court lacked jurisdiction to amend a

sentencing judgment to include a forfeiture order that was inadvertently

omitted because an appeal was pending. 331 F.3d at 815-17. However, Pease

was decided before Rule 32.2 was amended to clarify that amending a

judgment to include an omitted forfeiture order was a correction of a clerical

error under Rule 36. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(4)(B) (2009). Therefore, that

holding in Pease was superseded by the amended Rule 32.2.

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Waked also argues that the district court erred by relying on the

PSI’s calculation that he transferred a total of $10,426,000 from

Vida Panama to Star Textile and Global World in determining the

amount of the forfeiture money judgment.

Waked did not raise any of these arguments before the

district court, so we review them for plain error. See United States

v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2022) (“We find plain

error when (1) an error has occurred, (2) the error was plain, and

(3) it affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and if those prongs

are met, we then have discretion to correct the error if it

(4) seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings.”).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), a district court must order a

person who has been convicted of an offense in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 1956 or 1957 to forfeit to the government “any property,

real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable

to such property.” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1). Waked pled guilty to a

conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), which criminalizes

“knowingly engag[ing] or attempt[ing] to engage in a monetary

transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than

$10,000 [that] is derived from specified unlawful activity.” 18

U.S.C. § 1957(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (criminalizing

conspiring to violate § 1957). “Specified unlawful activity” includes

any offense against a foreign nation involving “fraud, or any

scheme or attempt to defraud . . . a foreign bank” that occurred in

whole or in part in the United States. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957(f)(3),

1956(c)(7)(B)(iii).

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Waked has not shown that the district court plainly erred by

failing to conclude that there was no factual basis for the imposition

of the forfeiture money judgment against him under § 982(a)(1). In

pleading guilty, Waked admitted that he borrowed funds from

ICBC via Vida Panama’s credit line by falsely representing to ICBC

that those funds would be used to purchase goods from Star Textile

and Global World. Waked also admitted that the funds were

derived from bank fraud on ICBC and that he transferred the funds

into and out of the United States through Star Textile and Global

World. The district court could rely on these admissions to

conclude that Vida Panama’s credit draws from ICBC based on

fraudulent misrepresentations constituted fraud sufficient to

trigger mandatory forfeiture under § 982(a)(1). See United States v.

Evans, 958 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating that a sentencing

court may base its factual findings on, among other things, “facts

admitted by a defendant’s plea of guilty” (quotation marks

omitted)). Waked does not cite to any legal authority supporting

his argument on this ground, so he has failed to establish plain

error. See United States v. Johnson, 694 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir.

2012) (“In order for an error to be obvious for purposes of plain

error review, it must be plain under controlling precedent or in

view of the unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule.”

(quotation marks omitted)).

Waked has also not shown that the district court plainly

erred by failing to conclude sua sponte that the government needed

to prove that ICBC suffered a net economic loss as a result of his

credit draws to trigger mandatory forfeiture under § 982(a)(1). The

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Supreme Court has held that certain federal fraud statutes do not

require that the victim suffer a net economic loss. See Shaw v.

United States, 580 U.S. 63, 67-68 (2016) (holding that the federal

bank-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, does not require that the

victim suffer an ultimate financial loss); Kousisis v. United States, 605

U.S. 114, 123-35 (2025) (holding that the federal wire-fraud statute,

18 U.S.C. § 1343, does not require that the victim suffer a net

economic loss). Given that Waked’s argument is inconsistent with

relevant Supreme Court precedent, and Waked has not cited to any

binding precedent in support of his argument, Waked has failed to

establish plain error. 6 See Johnson, 694 F.3d at 1195.

Lastly, the district court did not err, let alone plainly err, by

relying on the PSI to calculate the amount of the forfeiture money

judgment. Forfeiture is part of a defendant’s sentence, and facts

not objected to in the PSI are admitted for purposes of sentencing.

See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39 (1995) (“Our precedents

have . . . characterized criminal forfeiture as an aspect of

punishment imposed following conviction of a substantive

criminal offense.”); United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 924 (11th

6 Additionally, to the extent that Waked argues that the district court erred by

imposing the forfeiture money judgment based on his laundering transactions,

such an argument is foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine because we

explicitly held in the government’s appeal that the district court was required

to impose a forfeiture money judgment based on those transactions.

See Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1162-67; United States v. Jordan, 429 F.3d 1032,

1035 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The law of the case doctrine bars relitigation of issues

that were decided, either explicitly or by necessary implication, in an earlier

appeal of the same case.”).

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Cir. 2001) (“It is beyond doubt that criminal forfeiture is part of a

defendant’s sentence.”), superseded by rule on other grounds as

recognized in United States v. Marion, 562 F.3d 1330, 1340-41 (11th

Cir. 2009); United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.

2006) (“It is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to

allegations of fact in a PSI admits those facts for sentencing

purposes.”). Therefore, in calculating the amount of the forfeiture

money judgment, the district court could rely on the unobjected-to

fact in the PSI that Waked transferred a total of $10,426,000 to Star

Textile and Global World in the laundering transactions to which

he admitted as part of his guilty plea.

Waked asserts that the district court could not rely on that

unobjected-to calculation in the PSI because (1) the PSI merely

addressed relevant conduct that was only pertinent to sentencing,

not forfeiture, and (2) the PSI did not include any forfeiture

calculations or conclusions about the scope of forfeiture.

However, those arguments are inconsistent with the above-cited

law, and, regardless, Waked does not cite to any binding precedent

in support of his arguments. Therefore, Waked has failed to

establish plain error. See Johnson, 694 F.3d at 1195.

2. Double Counting

Next, Waked argues that the district court engaged in

impermissible double counting when it calculated the amount of

the forfeiture money judgment. He asserts that, because he

acquired all of the money that he laundered by drawing on Vida

Panama’s single credit line at ICBC, the total amount of money

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-13312

“involved in” his laundering offense was not the total aggregated

amount of money that he transferred through his laundering

transactions, but rather was limited to the largest single amount of

money that he ever borrowed from ICBC based on Vida Panama’s

credit line, which was a “static pool of funds.” Waked reasons that

his credit draws and subsequent laundering transactions

constituted a “repeated utilization of the same fungible property,”

which was like “repeatedly borrowing and returning the same bar

of gold.”

The property that is subject to forfeiture under § 982(a)(1)

includes “the money or other property being laundered (the

corpus), any commissions or fees paid to the launderer, and any

property used to facilitate the laundering offense.” United States v.

Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1153 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks

omitted). In this case, the government is seeking the “corpus” of

funds that Waked laundered. Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1163.

Waked is incorrect that the district court engaged in

impermissible double counting. Waked’s various laundering

transactions were not limited to a single “static pool of funds.” On

multiple separate occasions, Waked borrowed money from ICBC

based on Vida Panama’s credit line and then returned the

borrowed funds to ICBC with interest. Each credit draw was a

discrete transaction with ICBC to borrow an amount of money

separate from the funds that he borrowed on other occasions. Each

of Waked’s separate laundering transactions thus involved a

discrete, separate amount of money, even if each was derived from

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the same source—Vida Panama’s credit line. Therefore, Waked’s

multiple laundering transactions did not constitute a “repeated

utilization of the same fungible property.”

However, even if Waked’s analogy comparing his credit

draws and repayments to the borrowing and returning of a single

gold bar was apt, which it is not, he would still not be entitled to

reversal of the forfeiture money judgment. Under § 982(a)(1), the

district court was required to order forfeited all “money or other

property” that Waked “laundered,” which includes the aggregated

amount of all of his laundering transactions. See Puche, 350 F.3d at

1153; 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1).

In United States v. Martin, we rejected a similar argument in

reviewing a district court’s calculation of the total amount of

money for which a defendant convicted of money laundering

under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) was accountable for purposes of

determining the defendant’s sentencing guideline base offense

level under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1. 320 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir.

2003). On multiple separate occasions, the defendant laundered

funds that he derived from a single stolen check in transactions

whose aggregate amount exceeded the original check amount. Id.

at 1226. The defendant argued that he should not be held

accountable for an amount greater than the value of the single

check. Id.

We rejected the defendant’s argument and concluded that

the district court correctly calculated the amount for which the

defendant was accountable by aggregating the amount of each

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22 Opinion of the Court 22-13312

individual transaction. Id. at 1226-27. We explained that “money

laundering is not a continuing offense” because “each transaction

or transfer of money constitutes a separate offense” and cited to a

persuasive case in which a district court rejected a similar

argument. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Li,

973 F. Supp. 567, 574 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“It does not make sense to

look only at the amount of capital injected or infused into the

money laundering scheme, as [defendant] suggests, and ignore

what happens to that capital. Clearly, the magnitude of the

criminal enterprise is larger for a conspiracy involving a hundred

unlawful transfers of $100 or $99 compared to a conspiracy

involving one unlawful transfer of $100.” (quotation marks

omitted))). We reasoned that because “[e]ach unlawful monetary

transaction harms society by impeding law enforcement's efforts to

track ill-gotten gains,” the district court did not err by aggregating

the total amount of each individual transaction even though that

total was greater than the value of the single check that was the

source of all of the laundered funds. Id. at 1227.

Although Martin is procedurally distinct from this case, its

reasoning is highly relevant. The district court did not err in

calculating the amount of the forfeiture money judgment by

aggregating all of Waked’s laundering transactions.

3. Arguments Rejected in the Prior Appeal

Waked also raises multiple arguments that we rejected in

the government’s earlier appeal. Specifically, he argues that

(1) substitute asset forfeiture is unavailable in this case because his

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return of the laundered funds did not constitute transference to a

third party under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(1)(B); 7 (2) the district court

should not have ordered forfeiture against him based on the funds

that he laundered because he never personally received those

funds; and (3) the relevant forfeiture statute does not permit the

imposition of forfeiture money judgments.

Waked is barred from relitigating these issues pursuant to

the law of the case doctrine. See United States v. Jordan, 429 F.3d

1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The law of the case doctrine bars

relitigation of issues that were decided, either explicitly or by

necessary implication, in an earlier appeal of the same case.”); This

That And The Other Gift And Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb Cnty., Ga., 439 F.3d

1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Under the law of the case doctrine,

7 Additionally, Waked argues that the government abandoned the right to

seek substitute asset forfeiture against him because it failed to do so before the

district court during the remand forfeiture proceedings. Waked is incorrect

because “at any time” the government can request the district court to amend

the preexisting forfeiture order to include any property subject to substitute

forfeiture. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(e)(1)(B) (“On the government's motion,

the court may at any time enter an order of forfeiture or amend an existing

order of forfeiture to include property that . . . is substitute property that

qualifies for forfeiture under an applicable statute.”); see also United States v.

Misla-Aldarondo, 478 F.3d 52, 75 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[A] court may properly issue

a money judgment as part of a forfeiture order, whether or not the defendant

still retains the actual property involved in the offense, or any property at all.

Furthermore, the money judgment can be used in the future to seek forfeiture

of substitute assets by court order under § 853(p) and Rule 32.2, even where the

government has not expressed an intent to do so at any time before it seeks such an

order.” (emphasis added)).

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the findings of fact and conclusions of law by an appellate court are

generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in

the trial court or on a later appeal. . . . The doctrine’s central

purposes include bringing an end to litigation, protecting against

the agitation of settled issues, and assuring that lower courts obey

appellate orders.” (quotation marks omitted)).

In the government’s earlier appeal, we explicitly held in a

published, precedential opinion that (1) the government could seek

substitute forfeiture under § 853(p) because Waked’s transference

of the laundered funds to ICBC satisfied § 853(p)(1)(B); (2) it did not

matter that Waked never personally received the laundered funds

because he had a strong personal interest in the funds; and (3) the

district court was permitted to, and in fact was required to, impose

a forfeiture money judgment against Waked. Waked Hatum, 969

F.3d at 1163-67. Additionally, none of the exceptions to the law of

the case doctrine apply here. See United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d

662, 668-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (“There are limited exceptions to the

law-of-the-case doctrine: where there is new evidence, an

intervening change in controlling law dictates a different result, or

the appellate decision, if implemented, would cause manifest

injustice because it is clearly erroneous.” (quotation marks omitted

and alteration adopted)). Accordingly, we will not address these

arguments again. See also United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352

(11th Cir. 2008) (stating that under the prior-panel precedent rule

“a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless

and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation

by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.”).

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C. Eighth Amendment

Lastly, Waked argues that the district court erred by

concluding that the $10,426,000 forfeiture money judgment was

not an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. He asserts

that “the forfeiture bore no relationship to the underlying criminal

law concerns and significantly exceeded the harm at issue given the

actual fungible amount involved and the complete absence of any

loss.”

“Forfeitures are subject to the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against excessive fines if they constitute punishment for

an offense.” United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281 (11th Cir.

2007) (quotation marks omitted). “Subject forfeitures violate the

Excessive Fines Clause if they are grossly disproportional to the

gravity of the defendant’s offense.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

In determining whether a fine is excessive under the Eighth

Amendment, we examine three factors: “(1) whether the defendant

falls into the class of persons at whom the criminal statute was

principally directed; (2) other penalties authorized by the

legislature (or the Sentencing Commission); and (3) the harm

caused by the defendant.” Id. (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524

U.S. 321, 337-40 (1998)).

As to the first factor, we already decided in the first appeal

that Waked is within the class of persons whom the money

laundering statutes were intended to cover, and Waked does not

dispute that conclusion. Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1167.

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As to the second factor, the maximum penalty that Congress

and the Sentencing Commission authorized for Waked’s § 1957

conspiracy conviction is $20,852,000—twice the amount of funds

that the district court properly concluded were involved in

Waked’s laundering transactions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)

(providing that a defendant convicted of conspiracy to violate

§ 1957 “shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed

for the offense the commission of which was the object of the

conspiracy.”); id. § 1957(b)(2) (authorizing a fine “of not more than

twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in

the transaction”); U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(4) (providing that the

maximum of the fine guideline range for defendants convicted

under statutes that authorize a maximum fine of greater than

$500,000 is the statutory maximum fine). The fact that the

$10,426,000 forfeiture money judgment is well below the statutory

maximum fine that the district court could have imposed is a

consideration that we give “great weight” to. 8 See United States v.

Chaplin’s, Inc., 646 F.3d 846, 852 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Congress, as a

representative body, can distill the monetary value society places

on harmful conduct; forfeitures falling below the maximum

statutory fines for a given offense therefore receive a strong

presumption of constitutionality.” (quotation marks omitted)). It

is also significant that the statutory maximum sentence that the

8 The district court did not impose any other fines against Waked as part of his

sentence other than the standard $100 assessment.

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district could have imposed on Waked for his money laundering

offense was 10 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(b)(1).

As to the third factor, while it is uncontested that ICBC did

not suffer any net economic harm from Waked’s actions, Waked’s

laundering caused some harm to society generally.

In Martin, we rejected the defendant’s argument that the

district court erred by aggregating the total sum of his laundering

transactions even though that sum was greater than the value of

the single stolen check that was the sole source of the laundered

funds. 320 F.3d at 1225-27. We reasoned that the purpose of the

money laundering statute under which the defendant was

convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), was “to punish defendants

who, after the completion of the underlying specified unlawful

activity, take the additional step of attempting to legitimize their

proceeds so that observers think their money is derived from legal

enterprises.” Id. at 1226-27 (quotation marks omitted). We also

stated that the harm caused by money laundering “does not

generally fall upon an individual, but falls upon society in general,”

and “[e]ach unlawful monetary transaction harms society by

impeding law enforcement’s efforts to track ill-gotten gains.” Id. at

1227 (quotation marks omitted). Based on these general principles,

it is clear that Waked’s actions in transferring money that he

undisputedly acquired through bank fraud into the United States

and then back to Panama via two Florida-based corporations

caused at least some harm to society.

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In United States v. Bajakajian, the Supreme Court considered

whether a forfeiture award was an unconstitutionally excessive fine

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 524 U.S. at 324. In that

case, the defendant pled guilty to failure to report that he was

transporting more than $10,000 outside of the United States, in

violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a). Id. at 324-25. The defendant had

attempted to transport a total of $357,144 outside of the United

States without reporting it to customs inspectors. Id. The

government sought forfeiture of the entire $357,144 based on 18

U.S.C. § 982(a)(1). Id. at 325. The district court rejected the

government’s request because the funds were not connected to

any other crime, and therefore the government’s requested

forfeiture would be “extraordinarily harsh” and “grossly

disproportionate to the offense in question.” Id. at 325-26. Instead,

the court ordered forfeiture of $15,000 in addition to 3 years of

probation and a fine of $5,000. Id. at 326. The government

appealed, seeking full forfeiture of the relevant funds. Id.

The Supreme Court held that the full forfeiture of the

relevant funds would be an excessive fine under the Eighth

Amendment. Id. at 334-44. First, the Court reasoned that the

defendant did not fit into the class of persons for whom the

forfeiture statute was principally designed because he was not “a

money launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax evader.” Id. at 337-38

(footnote omitted). Second, the Court noted that the maximum

fine that the district court could have imposed under the

Sentencing Guidelines was only $5,000, which was significantly

lower than the government’s requested forfeiture of $357,144. Id.

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at 338-39. Lastly, the Court concluded that the harm that the

defendant caused was minimal because he was guilty of a mere

reporting offense that only caused relatively minor harm to the

government. Id. at 339.

In this case, while the harm that Waked caused by his

laundering transactions was not necessarily as severe as the harm

caused by the defendant in Martin, given that the defendant in that

case did not return the laundered money that he stole from the

victim voluntarily, the harm Waked caused was more severe than

that caused by the defendant in Bajakajian. See Waked Hatum, 969

F.3d at 1169 (distinguishing this case from Bajakajian and

comparing it to Martin); Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-39. Waked did

not commit a mere reporting offense when he laundered a total of

$10,426,000 into and out of the United States, and the money

involved in his laundering scheme was directly connected to

criminal activity—bank fraud against ICBC. Unlike the defendant

in Bajakajian, Waked is exactly the type of person for whom the

Supreme Court stated the forfeiture statute was principally

designed—a money launderer. 9 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-38.

9 Waked relies primarily on the unpublished decision in United States v.

Ramirez, 421 F. App’x 950 (11th Cir. 2011), which, like Bajakajian, involved a

defendant who committed a mere reporting offense with funds unrelated to

any other criminal activity. That unpublished decision is not precedential. See

United States v. Morris, 131 F.4th 1288, 1293 n.3 (11th Cir. 2025). Regardless,

Ramirez does not support Waked’s argument because that decision is

distinguishable from this case for the same reasons that Bajakajian is

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Applying all of the relevant factors, we conclude that the

district court did not err by determining that the $10,426,000

forfeiture money judgment was not an unconstitutional fine in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Waked has failed to show

that the forfeiture judgment was grossly disproportional to the

gravity of his offense, especially in light of the highly significant fact

that, unlike in Bajakajian, the amount of the forfeiture money

judgment is well below the statutory maximum fine the district

court could have imposed. See United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive,

Wilton Manors, Fla., 175 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999)

(“[A]lthough we retain a duty under the Eighth Amendment

independently to examine fines for excessiveness, a defendant

would need to present a very compelling argument to persuade us

to substitute our judgment for that of the United States Sentencing

Commission. Thus, in a forfeiture action, if the value of the

property forfeited is within or near the permissible range of fines

under the sentencing guidelines, the forfeiture almost certainly is

not excessive.”); United States v. Schwarzbaum, 127 F.4th 259, 284

(11th Cir. 2025) (stating that the presumption that a fine is not

constitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment “is

particularly strong when the specific penalty sought by the

Government is less than the statutory maximum”).

distinguishable. See Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1169 (distinguishing this case

from both Ramirez and Bajakajian).

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III. CONCLUSION

The district court did not err by imposing the $10,426,000

forfeiture money judgment against Waked. The court also did not

err by concluding that the forfeiture judgment was not an

unconstitutionally excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.

Accordingly, we affirm the forfeiture money judgment.

AFFIRMED.