Humphrey

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

ALLEN HUMPHREY, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Cause No. 1:25-cv-00595-ALT

)

NAVPREET SINGH THIND, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant The BLM Group, Inc.’s (“BLM”) Motion to

Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF 14) filed on December 12, 2025, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Plaintiffs responded to the motion on December 31, 2025.

(ECF 18). BLM then filed a reply on January 7, 2026. (ECF 19). Accordingly, the motion is ripe

for adjudication, and it will be DENIED.

A. Factual and Procedural Background

On November 7, 2025, Plaintiffs brought this motor vehicle accident case against

Defendants. (ECF 1). Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on November 14, 2025. (ECF

4).

On December 12, 2025, BLM filed a motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint.

The Court construes BLM’s motion as one to strike the amended complaint (ECF 4) as the

controlling complaint. The motion alleges that numerous paragraphs in Plaintiffs’ complaint are

immaterial and impertinent, so much so that they “blur the difference between mere allegation

and actual factual supposition.” (ECF 14 at 2). It contends that because Plaintiffs’ claims “muddy

the waters between fact and fiction by casting Defendants in an unnecessary and derogatory

light, . . . [r]etention of these allegations will unfairly prejudice Defendants, and may further risk

confusing the trier of fact as to any potential disputes of material fact.” (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiffs

respond by arguing their inclusion of auto safety-related allegations is not prejudicial, the

description of the collision fairly characterized the events, the inclusion of “Rule of the Road”

allegations are material, allegations concerning corporate legal duties are relevant, and the notice

of intent to use U.S. Life Tables is relevant and nonprejudicial. (ECF 18 at 3, 6-9).

B. Applicable Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) “permits a district court to strike portions of a

pleading ‘[u]pon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading, or, if no responsive

pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20 days after the

service of the pleading upon the party.’” Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., 944 F.2d 1388, 1399 (7th

Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Rule 12(f) states that the Court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); see Delta

Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009). Motions to

strike are generally disfavored because they consume scarce judicial resources, see Custom

Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 464 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2006), and “potentially serve only

to delay[,]” Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989)

(citation omitted). “But where . . . motions to strike remove unnecessary clutter from the case,

they serve to expedite, not delay.” Id.

“A motion to strike should not be granted unless the language in the pleading has no

possible relation to the controversy and is clearly prejudicial.” Wilkins v. City of Chicago, 736 F.

Supp. 3d 616, 626 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted); see

also Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, 999 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2013). “Striking a

portion of a pleading is considered a drastic remed[y]”. Wilkins, 736 F. Supp. at 626 (alteration in

original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). On a Rule 12(f) motion, the movant

bears the burden to demonstrate “that the challenged allegations are so unrelated to plaintiff’s

claim as to be devoid of merit, unworthy of consideration, and unduly prejudicial.” Wilkins, 736

F. Supp. at 626 (citation omitted); Vakharia v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctrs., 2 F.

Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d

654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992)).

“A party will be prejudiced if the allegation at issue will confuse the issues in the case or

is so lengthy and complex that it places an undue burden on the party.” LeSEA, Inc. v. LeSEA

Broad. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 3d 732, 742 (N.D. Ind. 2019) (citation omitted); Stop Illinois Health

Care Fraud, LLC v. Sayeed, 2016 WL 4479542, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2016) (citation

omitted). “Even what could be called colorful descriptive language is not stricken where it is

material and pertinent to the claims at issue.” LeSEA, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d at 742 (citation

omitted). See, e.g., Kuhlmey v. City of Hammond, No. 2:16 CV 56, 2016 WL 5724484, at *2-3

(N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2016) (denying motion to strike characterization of defendants’ conduct as a

“shoot first, ask questions later” policy because case hinged in fact on “whether defendants

promulgated an improper pattern or practice”); Jordan v. VanWinkle, No. 3:04-CV-647 RM, 2005

WL 1500860, at *1-2 (N.D. Ind. Jun. 23, 2005) (denying motion to strike description of

defendant’s conduct as “sadistic” where wrongfulness of defendant’s conduct and use of force

were at issue in the lawsuit).

C. Analysis

a. Auto Safety Related Facts and Company History, Paragraphs 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16

In the “Factual “Background” section of the complaint, Plaintiffs list statistics of vehicle

accidents, BLM’s company information, FMCSA-reflected driver, compliance, and maintenance

issues based on recorded collisions. (ECF 4 ¶¶ 8, 11-16). Plaintiffs explain in their response brief

that this information comes from publicly available databases. (ECF 18 at 3-5). BLM argues the

use of these statistics invites the trier of fact to use emotion to decide the case as opposed to the

merits. For instance, take paragraph 8:

8. More than 100,000 vehicle collisions involving commercial vehicles occur annually in

the United States, which result in as many serious injuries and more than 5,000 deaths per

year. In the state of Indiana alone, more than 100 people die each year as a result of

commercial motor vehicle collisions. 94% of these commercial motor vehicle collisions

are caused by driver-related errors.

(ECF 4 ¶ 80). BLM points out that no plaintiff died in this case, so citing this statistic is a “clever

red herring” and thus prejudicial. (ECF 14 at 3). However, at this juncture, the Court is able to

discern the facts of the case as opposed to persuasive writing by Plaintiffs. There is little risk of

prejudice. Additionally, the case at hand does deal with a vehicle collision in the United States

and Indiana and crash statistics may be “material and pertinent to the claims at issue.” See

LeSEA, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d at 742. There is a possible relation to the controversy. See Wilkins,

736 F. Supp. 3d at 626 (explaining a motion to strike should not be granted unless the language

has no possible relation to the controversy and is clearly prejudicial).

Paragraphs 11 through 16 present BLM’s company information and FMCSA-reflected

driver, compliance, and maintenance issues based on recorded collisions involving BLM. (ECF 4

¶¶ 11-16). BLM argues the inclusion of their company information is irrelevant and takes issue

with Plaintiffs’ characterization of BLM as an “unsafe motor carrier” and BLM’s record as

“poor.” (ECF 14 at 3-4). However, with BLM company information potentially relevant to

corporate-negligence claims, driver-negligence claim, and gross negligence claims, and mere use

of colorful descriptive language to describe BLM, there is no reason to strike. See LeSEA, Inc.,

379 F. Supp. 3d at 742 (“colorful descriptive language is not stricken where it is material”).

Although BLM may not like the language in the complaint, these allegations are not irrelevant

and immaterial. Further, to the degree to which BLM is concerned the trier of fact will be

confused by the content of Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court assures BLM it is more than capable

of identifying the pertinent facts at this stage of the case. As such, the motion to strike is denied

as to paragraphs 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the amended complaint (ECF 4).

b. Description of Collision, Paragraph 22

BLM takes issue with Plaintiffs’ language such as “plowed violently” and “wholly

ignored” in paragraph 22, calling the language inflammatory. (ECF 14 at 6).

22. Despite traffic slowing and/or stopping, Defendant Thind failed to slow or stop his

vehicle, wholly ignored the stopped vehicles and plowed violently into multiple vehicles,

including the Silver Nissan Truck.

(ECF 4 ¶ 22). However, Plaintiffs’ complaint obviously must describe the events giving rise to

the case. Although BLM may not like the characterization of the accident, disliking Plaintiffs’

descriptive language is not enough. See LeSEA, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d at 742. “The Court declines

to engage in judicial editing of Plaintiffs’ complaint.” Wilkins, 736 F. Supp. 3d at 626. The

motion to strike is denied as to paragraph 22 of the amended complaint (ECF 4).

c. Rules of the Road and Responsibilities of Corporations, Paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 40, 41,

and 42

In paragraphs 28 to 32, the Plaintiffs’ complaint details various rules of the road such as a

driver must “always keep a proper lookout,” “always keep a safe distance,” and “always keep

from becoming distracted.” (ECF 4 ¶¶ 30-32). Similarly in paragraphs 40 to 42, Plaintiffs’

complaint details responsibilities of corporations like BLM to “hire qualified drivers,” “properly

train their drivers,” and “properly supervise their drivers.” (Id. ¶¶ 40-42). BLM argues these

rules are obvious and these statements only create prejudicial inferences that BLM does not

abide by rules of the road or follow proper hiring or supervisory practices. (ECF 14 at 7-9).

Plaintiffs argue these facts are important for their negligence claims as rules of the road

and corporate responsibilities are material to establish duty. (ECF 18 at 7-9). BLM has not met

its burden to dispute this. Even though these facts could be considered obvious, Plaintiffs are

correct that their pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, requires “more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). By calling the

facts obvious or expressing concerns about prejudicial inferences, BLM has not shown “that the

challenged allegations are so unrelated to plaintiff’s claim as to be devoid of merit, unworthy of

consideration, and unduly prejudicial.” Wilkins, 736 F. Supp. at 626 (citation omitted). The

motion to strike is denied as to paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 40, 41, and 42 of the amended

complaint (ECF 4).

d. Inclusion of the Life Table, Paragraph 63

BLM next argues that Plaintiffs’’ notice of intent to use the U.S. Life Tables from the

United States Department of Health and Human Services should be stricken as extraneous. (ECF

14 at 9). “However, mere redundancy or immateriality is not enough to trigger the drastic

measure of striking the pleadings or parts thereof; in addition the pleading must be prejudicial to

the defendant.” Hardin v. Am. Elec. Power, 188 F.R.D. 509, 511 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (citations

omitted). Thus, BLM has not met its burden by simply calling this notice extraneous. The motion

to strike is denied as to paragraph 63 of the amended complaint (ECF 4).

D. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant The BLM Group, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions

of Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF 14) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Entered this 12th day of January 2026.

/s/ Andrew L. Teel

Andrew L. Teel

United States Magistrate Judge