Albert Randall Worrell v. Obion County School District

FILEE

JUL I I 2024

Clerk of the

IN TFM SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE Rec'd By

SPECIAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL

AT NASHVILLE

February 12, 2024 Session

ALBERT RANDALL WORRELL v. OBION COUNTY SCHOOL

DISTRICT

Appeal from the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

Court of Workerso Compensation Claims

No. 2021-07-0284 Amber E. Luttrell, Judge

No. W2023-01082-SC-R3-WC- Mailed June 14, 2024

Albert Randall Worrell injured his shoulder in the course and scope of his employment

with Obion County School District. Mr. Worrell and Obion County entered into a

settlement agreement. Among other things, the agreement required Obion County to pay

for future medical expenses related to his work injury. Almost three years after his initial

injury, Mr. Worrell's doctors reeommended that he undergo shoulder replacement surgery.

The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims concluded that Obion County was not

required to pay for the shoulder replacement surgery because Mr. Worrell did not prove

that the recommended surgery was causally related to his work injury. The Workers'

Compensation Appeals Board affirmed, In his appeal to this Panel, Mr. Worrell presses

federal and state constitutional challenges to two provisions of Tennessee's workers'

.compensation law-Tennessee Code Annotated

section 50-6-116 (2014), which instructs

'courts to construe the workers' compensation law fairly and impartially, and Tennessee

o'injury." Mr'

Code Annotated section 50-6-102(1a) (Supp. 2016), which defines the term

Worrell argues that both provisions violate the substantive due process protections of the

United States and Tennessee Constitutions and the Open Courts Clause of the Tennessee

Constitution. He further argues that the definition of "injury" violates the equal protection

guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. We hold that the challenged statutory

provisions are constitutional and affirm the judgment of the Workers' Compensation

Appeals Board.

Tenn. Code Ann. $ 50-6-217(aX2XB) Appeal as of Right;

Decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board Affirmed

SenaH K. CeNapeELL, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which RosEnr E. LBB

DAvtes, Sn. J. and D. KBt t v TuotvtAs, Jn., SR. J., joined.

Charles L. Holliday, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Albert Randall Worrell

Heather H. Douglas, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Obion County School District

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrde Blumstein, Solicitor General;

and Mara Cunningham, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee,

State of Tennessee

OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2019, Albert Randall Woruell injured his left shoulder while moving

bleachers for Obion County School District. Dr. David Pearce examined Mr. Worrell and

determined that he had a rotator cuff tear. Dr. Pearce performed corrective surgery in

December 2019. After several follow-up appointments, Dr. Pearce placed Mr. Worrell at

maximum medical improvement.

In June 2021, Mr. Worrell and Obion County entered into a settlement agreement

to resolve his claim for workers' compensation benefits. This agreement obligated Obion

County to provide "reasonable and necessary, authorized future medical expenses that are

directly related to the work injury under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-204."

The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims approved this settlement agreement and

entered a judgment incorporating its terms.

In June 2022, Mr. Worrell returned to Dr. Pearce after experiencing shoulder pain.

Dr. Pearce referred Mr. Worrell to Dr. Adam Smith to discuss shoulder replacement

surgery. Dr. Smith examined Mr. Worrell and determined that his rotator cuff was

'oextremely thin" and that he had "end-stage arthritis with loose bodies in each joint." Dr.

Smith recommended that Mr. Worrell undergo shoulder replacement surgery.

The Medical Director of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation approved the

recommended surgery on August 31, 2022. Obion County filed a petition for benefit

determination in the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims to dispute whether Mr.

Worrell's work-related injury caused the need for shoulder replacement surgery.

The court held a compensation hearing in February 2023. The only medical proof

Mr. Worrell offered regarding causation was Dr. Pearce's deposition testimony. Dr. Pearce

testified that his examination of Mr. Worrell following his initial work injury in 2019

revealed preexisting rotator cuff tears and arthritis. When asked for his opinion about the

cause of Mr. Worrell's need for a total shoulder replacement, Dr. Pearce was unable to say

whether the work injury and initial surgery were a greater than fifty percent cause. Dr.

Pearce noted that Mr. Worrell had "severe underlying problems with his shoulder." But he

2

agreed with Mr. Worrell's counsel that there was 'ono medically accepted way to quantiff

[that] preexisting condition into a percentage."

The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims issued its compensation order on

March 28,2023. The court concluded that Mr. Worrell was not entitled to the shoulder

replacement surgery under the future medical provision of his workers' compensation

settlement because he failed to prove that his "work injury or first surgery contributed more

than fifty percent in causing the need for his shoulder replacement surgery."

The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. The Board agreed with the

Court of Workers' Compensation Claims that Mr. Worrell had failed to sufficiently prove

causation. Mr. Worrell argued that the statutory requirements concerning preexisting

conditions discriminated against older employees, but the Board declined to address this

argument. The Board explained that neither it nor the Court of Workers' Compensation

Claims has authority to address a facial constitutional challenge to the workers'

compensation statutes and noted that Mr. Worrell's argument was "more properly directed

to Tennessee's General Assembly or, if appropriate, in a properly filed constitutional

challenge."

Mr. Worrell appealed. He no longer challenges the deterrnination of the Court of

Workers' Compensation Claims that he failed to prove causation. Instead, he challenges

the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- I 16 and the definition of

'oinjury" in section 50-6-102.

Standard of Review

We review questions of constitutional interpretation de novo without any

presumption of correctness. Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417

S.W.3d 393,399 (Tenn. 2013). When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we

must start with the presumption that the law is constitutional and "resolve every doubt in

favor of the statute's constitutionality." Gallaher v. Elam, 104 S.W.3d 455,459 (Tenn.

2003). Because we must presume a statute is constitutional, the party challenging a statute

"bear[s] a heavy burden in establishing some constitutional infirmity of the Act in

question." West v. Tenn. Hous. Dev. Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275,279 (Tenn. 1974). A facial

constitutional challenge is "the most difficult challenge to mount." Lynch v. City of Jellico,

205 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tenn.2006). To succeed on a facial challenge, the plaintiff "must

establish that no set of circumstances exist under which the flawl would bevalid." Id.

Analysis

More than a decade ago, the General Assembly passed the Tennessee Workers'

Compensation Reform Act of 2013, ch. 289, 2013 Tenn. Pub. Acts 767 (codif,red as

amended in scattered sections of the Tennessee Code Annotated) ("Reform Act"). As

a

J

relevant to this appeal, the Reform Act eliminated the remedial construction requirement

in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-116 and amended the definition of "injury" in

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102.

Before the Reform Act, section 50-6-116 provided that the workers' compensation

chapter was "a remedial statute, which shall be given an equitable construction by the

courts, to the end that the objects and purposes of this chapter may be realized and

attained)'Tenn. Code Ann. $ 50-6-116 (2008 & Supp. 2013). The Reform Act eliminated

this remedial construction requirement and replaced it with a neutral instruction. As

amended, section 50-6-116 provides that "this chapter shall not be construed in a manner

favoring either the employee or employer" but shall be "construed fairly, impartially, and

in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction." Tenn. Code Ann. $ 50-6-

116 (2otq.l

The Reform Act also amended the definition of "injury" in section 50-6-102 by

adopting a more explicit causation standard. Before this amendment, the statute provided

thatacompensable injury "[m]ean[s] an injury by accident, arising out of and in the course

of employment, that causes either disablement or death ofthe employee." Tenn. Code Ann.

$ 50-6-102(12XA) (Supp. 2013). But it did not define the phrase "arising

out of and in the

course of employment."

As amended, the statute provides in relevant part that "injury" for purposes of the

workers' compensation law means "an injury . . . arising primarily out of and in the course

and scope of employment, that causes death, disablement or the need for medical treatment

of the employee." Tenn. Code Ann. $ 50-6- 102(14) (Supp. 2016). The amended statute

oarises primarily out of and in the course and scope of

elaborates that "[a]n injury

employment' only if it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

employment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering

all causes." Id..S 50-6-102(14X8). The term injury "shall not include the aggravation of a

preexisting disease, condition or ailment unless it can be shown to a reasonable degree of

medical certainty that the aggravation arose primarily out of and in the course and scope

of employment." ld $ 50-6-102(14)(A). Moreover, "[a]n injury causes death, disablement

or the need for medical treatment only if it has been shown to a reasonable degree of

medical certainty that it contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the death,

disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes." ld $ 50-6-102(l4XC).

The phrase "'[s]hown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty' means that, in the

opinion of the physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes, as opposed to

speculation or possibility." /d $ 50-6-102(14XD).

I Citations to the amended version of the workers' compensation law are to the version that was in

effect at the time of Mr. Worrell's injury in October 2019. See Tenn. Code Ann. $ 50-6-l l6 (2014); Tenn.

Code Ann. g 50-6-102(14) (Supp. 2016).In the current version of the law, the definition of "injury" appears

at Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12) (2022).

4

Mr. Worrell raises three constitutional challenges in this appeal. First, he argues that

section 50-6-116 and the definition of "injury" in section 50-6-102 violate his substantive

due process rights under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Second, he argues

that the definition of "injury" in section 50-6-102 violates the equal protection guarantees

in the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Third, he argues that both amended

provisions violate the Open Courts Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. We address each

argument in turn.

I. Substantive Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from

"depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.

Const. amend. XIV, $ 1. Similarly, the "law of the land" provision in the Tennessee

Constitution provides that "no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his

freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or

deprived of his life, liberfy or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the

land." Tenn. Const. art.I, $ 8. This "law of the land" provision has "consistently been

interpreted as conferring identical due process protections" as the Fourteenth Amendment.

Mansell,4l7 S.W.3 d at 407; see also Burford v. State,845 S.W.2d204,207 (Tenn. 1992).

The doctrine of substantive due process "bars certain arbitrary, wrongful

government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them."'

Zinermonv. Burch,494 U.S. ll3,I25 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams,474U.S.327,

331 (1986)). The doctrine imposes limits on both legislative and executive action. Cnty. of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). But the "criteria to identiff what is fatally

arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a governmental

officer that is at issue." Id.; see also Parks Props. v. Maury Cnty., 70 S.W.3 d 735, 7 44

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (Koch, J.).

When, as here, legislation is at issue, the standard used to evaluate the challenged

law depends on whether it implicates a fundamental right. See Gallaher, 104 S.W.3d at

463.If no fundamental right is implicated, rational basis review applies. Id.; Riggs v.

Burson,94l S.W.2d 44,51 (Tenn. 1997). But if the challenged legislation infringes a

fundamental right, the court must apply strict scrutiny. Washingtonv. Glucksberg,s2l IJ.S.

702,720 (1997).

Mr. Worrell does not argue that the challenged provisions irnplicate a fundamental

right.z Consequently, his substantive due process challenge to those provisions warrants

only rational basis review. A statutory provision survives rational basis review if it "bears

2

The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that, "[w]hile workers' compensation benefits, as

property rigl-rts, are protected by article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, they are not fundamental

riglrts." Mansell, 417 S.W.3d at 409.

5

'a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose' and is 'neither arbitrary nor

discriminatory."' Gallaher, 104 S.W.3 d at 463 (quoting Riggs,941 S.W.2d at 51). This

standard is met if "any reasonably conceivable state of facts could provide a rational basis"

for the provision. Fisher v. Hargett,604 S.W.3d 381, 399 (Tenn. 2020). Put another way,

a statute does not violate substantive due process "so long as some 'plausible' reason exists

for the law-any plausible reason, even one that did not inspire the enacting legislators."

Tiwari v. Friedlander,26 F.4th 355,361 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Heller v. Doe,509 U.S.

312,320,324,330 (1993); Nordlinger v. Hahn,505 U.S. l, lI, 17-18 (1992)).

Section 50-6-116 easily survives rational basis review. As explained above, this

provision eliminated the remedial construction requirement and replaced it with a neutral

instruction. It is not difficult to identiff a rational purpose for this provision: the neutral

instruction requirement promotes the predictable interpretation of the workers'

compensation statutes and ensures that employees and employers are treated equally. This

pu{pose reflects a legitimate government interest. See Brown v. Campbell Cnty. Bd. of

Educ., gl5 S.W.2d 407,415-16 (Tenn. 1995) (noting that "uniformity, fairness and

predictability" are "legitimate state interests"). Moreover, section 50-6-116 is reasonably

ielated to this putpose. The plain language of the provision obligates courts to interpret the

workers' compensation law "fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of

statutory construction." Tenn. Code Ann. $ 50-6-116. Nor is section 50-6-116 arbitrary or

discriminatory. To the contrary, it cautions courts that the workers' compensation statutes

"shall not be construed in a manner favoring either the employee or employet." Id.

The amended definition of "injury" in section 50-6-102 also clears the rational basis

hurdle. Under this definition, an "injury" for purposes of the workers' compensation

statutes "arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment" only if "it has

been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more

than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes." Tenn. Code Ann.

$ 50-6-102(14)(B). When the injury at issue is an aggravated

preexisting condition, the

employee must show "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the aggravation

arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment." Id. S 50-6-102(14XA).

One possible purpose of the amended definition is to reduce workers' compensation

insurance premiums for employers, which is a legitimate government interest. Brown,9I5

S.W.2d at 415. Section 50-6-102 is reasonably related to this purpose because it is

conceivable that requiring proof of causation will reduce costs for insurers and thereby

lower employer premiums. And this provision is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory

because the causation requirement applies equally to all employees.

Mr. Worrell argues that the challenged provisions violate substantive due process

because they are conscience shocking, in the constitutional sense. The shocks-the-

conscience standard generally applies only when executive action is challenged. See, e.g.,

Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen, l8l S.W.3d 292,309 (Tenn. 2005) ("Substantive due process

. . . is implicated where an executive agency of government acts in a manner that is . ' . so

6

egregious that it shocks the conscience." (emphasis added)); Lewis,523 U.S. at846 ("[F]or

half a century now, we have spoken of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as

that which shocks the conscience." (emphasis added)). The Tennessee Supreme Court,

however, has at times applied this standard when evaluating substantive due process

challenges to legislation, including provisions of the workers' compensation statutes. See,

e.g., Mansell, 417 S.W.3d at 409-10; Lynch,205 S.W.3 d at39l-92.

To the extent the shocks-the-conscience standard applies in this context, Mr.

Worrell has failed to establish that the challenged provisions are "conscience shocking, in

the constitutional sense." Mansell,4lT S.W.3 dat409 (quoting Lynch,205 S.W.3 dat392).

"[O]nly the most egregious official conduct" will violate that standard. Lewis,523 U.S. at

845. As one example, the United States Supreme Court held that forcibly pumping a

criminal suspect's stomach to obtain evidence "shock[ed] the conscience" where the force

used was "so brutal and so offensive to human dignity" that it violated the "decencies of

civilized conduct." Rochinv. Califurnia,342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952).

Mr. Worrell argues that "the elimination of the remedial construction frequirement]

is constitutionally conscience shocking because it destroys the quid pro quo and the bargain

struck more than 100 years ago in return for giving up the right to sue in tort." But section

50-6-116 merely requires courts to construe the workers' compensation statutes fairly and

impartially. Employees who are entitled to benefits under a fair interpretation of the law

will still receive them. As the Tennessee Supreme Court has repeatedly held, the legislature

has the prerogative 'oto establish the policies and procedures necessary to administer

workers' compensation claims." Mansell, 417 S.W.3d at 410; see also Martin v. Lear

Corp.,90 S.W.3d 626,632 (Tenn. 2002) ("[T]he Legislature is the appropriate body to set

the policy that governs workers' compensation cases."). The legislature validly exercised

that prerogative when it amended section 50-6-116.

Mr. Worrell argues that the amended definition of "injury" is conscience shocking

because it effectively makes it impossible for workers with preexisting injuries to recover

benefits. To support that argument, he points to Dr. Pearce's testimony that there was no

medically accepted way to quanti$z to what extent Mr. Worrell's work-related injury-as

opposed to his preexisting condition-caused his need for shoulder replacement surgery.

The principal problem with this argurnent is that Dr. Pearce's testimony concerned the

difficulty of proving causation in this case. As the State points out, in other cases courts

have awarded workers' compensation benefits under the amended definition to employees

whose work-related injuries aggravated their preexisting injuries. See, e.g., Joiner v. United

Parcel Serv., /nc., No. M2018-01876-SC-R3-WC, 2019 WL 6652096, at *6 (Tenn.

Workers'Comp. Panel Dec.6, 2019); Miller v. Lowe's Home Ctrs.,1rzc., No.2015-05-

0158, 2015 WL 6446638, at *7 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Oct.2l,2015). Even if

Mr. Worrell were right that a complete denial of workers' compensation benefits for the

aggravation of preexisting injuries would be conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense,

Mr. Worrell has not established that a complete denial occurred here. At most, he has

7

shown that the amended definition prevented him from proving causation in this case. That

is not enough to succeed on a facial constitutional challenge.

Mr. Worrell also complains that the amended definition of injury makes it more

difficult to obtain workers' compensation benefits than to recover in tort. As an initial

matter, it is not clear that the causation standards that apply in the two contexts are

appreciably different. A plaintiff bringing a negligence claim must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's conduct was both the cause in fact and

the proximate cause of the plaintiffls injury. See, e.g., Kingv. Anderson Cnty., 419 S.W.3d

232,246 (Tenn. 2013). As the State points out, moreover, a negligence plaintiff must show

not only that the defendant's conduct caused the injury, but also that the defendant's

conduct fell below the applicable standard of care. Id.In that respect, it is arguably more

difficult to recover in tort than to recover under the workers' compensation law. In any

event, Mr. Worrell provides no authority to support his view that setting a higher bar for

workers' compensation claimants than for tort plaintiffs is so arbitrary or egregious that it

violates substantive due process protections.

In sum, Mr. Worrell has not carried his burden of proving that the challenged

provisions lack a rational basis or shock the conscience. We therefore reject Mr. Worrell's

substantive due process challenges to section 50-6-116 and the definition of "injury" in

section 50-6-102.

il. Equal Protection

Both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions guarantee the equal protection

of the laws. Hughes v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. and Parole,s14 S.W.3d707,715 (Tenn.2017).

The federal guarantee appears in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, while the state guarantee stems from Article I, Section 8 and Article XI,

Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained

that the federal and state guarantees "confer essentially the same protection." Tenn. Small

Sch Sys. v. McWherter,S5l S.W.2d 139,152 (Tenn. 1993). Accordingly, Tennessee courts

follow "the framework developed by the United States Supreme Court when analyzing

equal protection claims." McClay v. Airport Mgmt. Servs., LLC,596 S.W.3d 686' 695

(Tenn. 2020).

The equal protection guarantees of our federal and state constitutions require that

"all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Dotson v. State,673 S.W.3d

204,219 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting State v. Robinson,2g S.W.3d 476,480 (Tenn. 2000)). As

a general matter, "laws that apply evenhandedly to all 'unquestionably comply' with the

Equal Protection Clause." Vacco v. Quill,52l U.S. 793, 800 (1997) (quoting N.Y.C. Transit

Auth. v. Beazer,44O U.S. 568, 587 (1979)). Laws that are discriminatory warrant additional

scrutiny. The level of scrutiny to be applied depends on whether the law interferes with a

fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class. Riggs,941 S.W.2d at 52-53.

8

When the challenged law does neither of these things, rational basis review applies. Id. at

53. A facially neutral law may violate equal protection if it has a discriminatory effect and

was adopted with discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Washingtonv. Davis,426U.5.229,240-

a2 Q976); McClay,596 S.W.3 d at 695.

Mr. Worrell argues that the amended definition of "injury" in Tennessee Code

Annotated section 50-6-102 "has created a distinction between workers who have

preexisting asymptomatic degenerative conditions and those who do not." It is unclear

whether Mr. Worrell is arguing that the definition is facially discriminatory or rather that

it has a discriminatory impact. Either way, his equal protection challenge fails.

The challenged definition is not facially discriminatory because it establishes a

single causation standard for all employees and all injuries, whether preexisting or not. An

employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her employment was

a greatt than fifty percent cause of the injury or the aggravation of a preexisting injury.

Tenn. Code Ann. $ 50-6-102(14XA), (B).

Mr. Worrell suggests that the challenged definition disproportionately burdens

employees with preexisting conditions-whom he claims are mostly older-by making it

more difficult for them to prove causation. But even if he were right that the definition is

discriminatory in effect, he still cannot prevail on his equal protection challenge because

he has failed to present any evidence that the General Assernbly enacted the Reform Act

for the purpose of discriminating against employees with preexisting asymptomatic

degenerative conditions. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 242; McClay, 596 S.W.3d at 695.

Moreover, even if Mr. Worrell could show that the amended definition discriminates

against those with preexisting conditions, his equal protection challenge would trigger only

rational basis review because the statute neither implicates a fundamental right nor involves

a suspect class.3 The definition survives rational basis review for the reasons explained

above. We therefore hold that the amended definition of "injury" in Tennessee Code

Annotated section 50-6-102 does not violate the equal protection guarantees of the United

States or Tennessee Constitutions.

III. Open Courts Clause

The Open Courts Clause of the Tennessee Constitution provides that "a11 courts

shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or

reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered

without sale, denial, or delay." Tenn. Const. art.I, $ 17. In Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.,

3 Mr. Worrell points out that older workers are rnore likely to have preexisting degenerative

conditions and suggests that the amended definition of "injury" therefore discriminates on the basis of age.

But age is not a suspect classification. Rather, age-based classifications need only satisfl' rational basis

review. Gregoryv. Ashcroft,50l U.S. 452,470 (1991).

9

oois

the Tennessee Supreme Court explained that this provision a mandate to the judiciary

and was not intended as a limitation of the legislative branch of government." 223 S.W.

844, g52 (Tenn. lg20). Consequently, Tennessee courts have held that plaintiffs may not

assert Open Courts Clause claims against the legislatvre. See, e.g., Harmon v. Angus R.

Jessupissocs.,Inc.,619 S.W.2d522,524(Tenn 1981); Harcisonv. Schrader,569 S.W.2d

822,827 (Tenn. 1978). Our Court of Appeals has relied on this case law to hold that the

Open Courts Clause 'odoes not limit a legislature's power to define what is and is not an

*5 (Tenn.

'injury."' Smithv. Pratt,No. M2008-01540-COA-R9-CV,2009 WL 1086953,at

Ct. app. Apr. 22, 2009) (quoting David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 Temp' L'

Rev. 1 197, 1206 (1992)).

Mr. Worrell contends that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-116 and the

amended definition of "injury" in section 50-6-102 violate the Open Courts Clause of the

Tennessee Constitution because they deny him a "reasonable remedy" for his injury. Mr.

Worrell acknowledges that Scott presents an insurmountable barrier to this claim, so he

urges this panel to ovenule that decision and adopt a broader interpretation of the Open

Courts Clause. But this Panel does not have authority to overrule a decision of the

Tennessee Supreme Court. See, e,g., Mayes v. Peebles, Inc., No. E2009-02030-wc-R3-

WC, 2010 WL 3323742, at *3 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel Aug.23,2010) ("Employer

contends that Kitgore was wrongly decided, requests that it be reviewed and overruled,

which is outside the authority of this panel."); Day v. Zurich Am. Ins', No. W2009-01349'

WC-R3-WC,2010 WL 1241779, at *3 (Tenn. Workers'Comp. Panel Mar. 31,2010). To

the contrary, we are bound by Tennessee Supreme Court precedent and must faithfullv

apply it. Sie Cookv. General Motors Corp.,No. M2010-00272-WC-R3-WC,20ll WL

SSO+SA, at *5 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel Feb. 16,2011) ("[A] panel is obligated

to

follow established precedent. ").

Scott forecloses Mr. Worrell's argument that the challenged provisions violate the

Open Courts Clause by limiting his remedy. Consequently, we reject his constitutional

challenge and hold that the challenged provisions do not violate the Open Courts Clause.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Workers' Compensation

Appeals Board. Thi coits of this appeal are taxed to Albert Randall Worrell, for which

execution may issue if necessarY.

SARAH K. CAMPBELL, JUSTICE

10

FILED

0711912024

rN rHE SUPREM+iri??t3oF TENNESSEE Clerk of ths

Appellate Courts

ALBERT RANDALL WORRELL v. OBION COUNTY SCHOOL

DISTRICT

Appeal from the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

No.2021-07-0284

No. W2023-0 1 082-SC-WCM-WC

JUDGMENT ORDER

This case is before the Court upon the motion for review filed by Albert Randall

Worrell pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(a)(5XAXii), the entire

record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals

Panel, and the Panel's Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

It appears to the Court that the motion for review is not well taken and is, therefore,

denied. The Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated by

reference, are adopted and affirmed. The decision of the Panel is made the judgment of

the Court.

Albert Randall Worrell's motion to consolidate this case with Wigdor v. Electric

Research & Manufacturing Cooperative, Inc.,No. W2023-01733-SC-R3-WC, is denied as

moot.

Costs are assessed to Albert Randall Worrell, for which execution may issue if

nocessary.

It is so ORDERED

PER CURIAM

Saneu K. CeNapsELL, J., not participating