Anderson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CLARENCE ANDERSON, III, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-142-ECM

) [WO]

TROY MEINK, Secretary of the Air Force, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Plaintiff Clarence Anderson, III (“Anderson”), proceeding pro se, brought this

action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“APA”), against

Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink (the “Secretary”) seeking review of the Air Force

Board of Correction of Military Records’ (“AFBCMR”) denial of Anderson’s request for

relief relating to a 2015 court martial conviction which resulted in his dismissal from the

Air Force. On November 10, 2025, the Magistrate Judge entered a Recommendation that

this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Anderson failed to

timely file this action. (Doc. 17). Anderson timely filed objections to the Recommendation.

(Doc. 19). After carefully reviewing the record in this case, the Recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge, and Anderson’s objections, the Court concludes that Anderson’s

objections are due to be overruled, the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is due to

be adopted as modified, and this case is due to be dismissed without prejudice.1

When a party objects to a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the

district court must review the disputed portions de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also

United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 (1980). The district court “may accept, reject,

or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge[,] . . . receive further evidence[,] or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with

instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). De novo review requires that the district court

independently consider factual issues based on the record. Jeffrey S. by Ernest S. v. State

Bd. of Educ. of State of Ga., 896 F.2d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1990). However, objections to

the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation must be sufficiently specific in order

to warrant de novo review. See LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 750 (11th Cir. 1988)

(“Whenever any party files a timely and specific objection to a finding of fact by a

magistrate [judge], the district court has an obligation to conduct a de novo review of the

record with respect to that factual issue.”). Otherwise, a Report and Recommendation is

reviewed for clear error. See Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006).2

Anderson objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the six-year limitations

period began to run on February 6, 2019, when the AFBCMR’s final decision was issued

1 As the Recommendation explains, “a suit against the United States presents an ‘unusual situation’ in which

subject matter jurisdiction can be precluded by untimeliness.” (Doc. 17 at 2) (citing Compagnoni v. United

States, 173 F.3d 1369, 1370 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999)). Dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are

without prejudice. See Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232–35

(11th Cir. 2008).

2 While the Court recognizes that Macort is nonprecedential, the Court finds it persuasive.

in his administrative proceedings.3 He insists that the limitations period did not begin to

run until February 19, 2019, which is when he claims he received notice by email of the

final agency decision. Upon de novo review and consideration of applicable caselaw, the

Court concludes that the six-year statute of limitations on Anderson’s claim began to run

on February 6, 2019, when the AFBCMR issued its final decision. See Alabama v. PCI

Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278, 1291 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that § 2401(a)’s six-year

statute of limitations “begins to run when the agency issues the final action that gives rise

to the claim”); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining

that an APA action “is barred unless filed within six years of the final agency action” (citing

28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)). Consequently, this objection is due to be overruled. Anderson also

asserts that the Secretary did not make clear that the final agency decision was issued on

February 6, 2019. However, Anderson does not directly refute the declaration of Janet M.

Hutson, an employee of the AFBCMR, which affirms that the final agency decision was

issued on February 6, 2019, and also explains why the date does not appear on the

decisional document itself. (See doc. 12-2 at 1–3, paras. 4–6). Thus, this objection is also

due to be overruled.4

Accordingly, upon an independent review of the record, and for good cause, it is

ORDERED as follows:

3 Anderson does not dispute that the applicable limitations period is six years as provided in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2401(a). Anderson also does not dispute that the relevant AFBCMR decision was a final decision.

4 Anderson also complains of the Secretary’s alleged failure to respond in this action within sixty days of

being served with Anderson’s complaint. The timing of the Secretary’s response has no bearing on the

Court’s conclusion that Anderson filed this action too late. Therefore, to the extent Anderson intended

these arguments to operate as objections to the Recommendation, they are due to be overruled.

1. Anderson’s objections (doc. 19) are OVERRULED;

2. The Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (doc. 17) is ADOPTED as

modified;

3. The Secretary’s motion to dismiss (doc. 11) is GRANTED to the extent that

this case is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction;

4. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot, and all pending deadlines

are TERMINATED.

A separate Final Judgment will be entered.

DONE this 12th day of January, 2026.

/s/ Emily C. Marks

EMILY C. MARKS

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE