The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0249-24
J.W.,1
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POLICE AND FIREMEN'S
RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
_________________________
Argued November 18, 2025 – Decided January 12, 2026
Before Judges Firko and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and
Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the
Treasury, PFRS No. xx7632.
Wayne Brown argued the cause for appellant (Alterman
& Associates, LLC, attorneys; Stuart J. Alterman, of
counsel and on the briefs).
1
We use initials to preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-
3(a)(2).
Thomas R. Hower argued the cause for respondent
(Nels J. Lauritzen, Deputy Director of Legal Affairs, of
counsel; Kimberly A. Sked, Staff Attorney, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner J.W. appeals from the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Police
and Firemen's Retirement System's August 14, 2024 final agency decision
(FAD) denying his accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits application
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1). Having reviewed the record, parties'
arguments, and applicable law, we affirm.
I.
J.W. was a patrol officer with the Audubon Police Department (APD). He
began working as a police officer in 2007 and transferred to work for the APD
in May 2013. J.W. resided in Audubon with his wife and two children. J.W.'s
brother, M.W., also resided in Audubon with his wife, C.W., and their two
children. C.W.'s father, K.V., and mother, J.V., lived near J.W.'s residence and
maintained a close relationship.
On January 11, 2021, while working at the APD, J.W. received a phone
call from his brother, advising that K.V. had shot and killed J.V. and then
committed suicide (first incident). J.W., along with his supervisor, C.G.,
responded to the residence, encountering C.W., who was crying, and her brother,
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2
E.V., outside. The siblings advised J.W. that their parents were deceased. J.W.
went to the backyard and observed K.V. was "slumped over . . . with an apparent
gunshot wound" that caused his head to be mostly "blown off." Approximately
one month later, on February 8, 2021, a colleague officer, M.M., called the APD
while J.W. was working. The officer requested assistance at his home for his
daughter, but after J.W. arrived, the officer was not there and was later found to
have committed suicide (second incident). J.W. did not return to work after the
second incident.
On July 19, 2021, citing the first incident, J.W. filed an ADR benefits
application under N.J.S.A. 43:16-7 with the Division of Pensions and Benefits.
J.W. stated that he was disabled because he could "no longer . . . perform the
required duties of a police officer" based on the first incident.
On April 11, 2022, the Board denied J.W.'s application for ADR benefits,
finding he failed to satisfy all the factors under N.J.S.A. 43:16-7. The Board
found that J.W. had established he was "totally and permanently disabled from
the performance of [his] regular and assigned job duties" and was "physically or
mentally incapacitated from the performance of [his] usual or other duties."
Regarding whether J.W. had established the first incident was a traumatic event
that caused his disability, the Board determined the event: was "identifiable as
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3
to time and place"; and was "undesigned and unexpected." The Board also
determined the traumatic event "occurred during and as a result of [his] regular
or assigned duties" and was "not a result of [his] willful negligence." The Board,
however, further found J.W. had failed to prove that: the "reported disability
[wa]s . . . the direct result of a traumatic event, as the event [wa]s not caused by
an external circumstance"; his disability "result[ed] from [a] 'direct personal
experience of a terrifying or horror inducing event that involved actual or
threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to the physical
integrity of the member or another person'"; and the traumatic event "was
objectively capable of causing a reasonable person in similar circumstances to
suffer a disabling mental injury." The Board granted J.W. ordinary disability
retirement benefits, effective as of December 1, 2021.
J.W. moved for reconsideration and, alternatively, requested that the
Board accept an appeal of the decision and forward the matter to the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL). J.W. noted the Board found each relevant ADR
factor was established except that the disability was the "result of a traumatic
event" that was a "'direct personal experience of a terrifying or horror inducing
event that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly
serious threat to the physical integrity of the member or another person'" and
A-0249-24
4
"was objectively capable of causing . . . a disabling mental injury." On June 14,
2022, the Board approved J.W.'s hearing request and transferred the matter to
the OAL as a contested case. The Board did not seek to challenge any factors it
found J.W. had proven under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1) or J.W.'s request to appeal
the "Board's denial" "based on two aspects only."
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a four-day hearing.
Relevant to J.W.'s treatment and mental disability from the traumatic event, the
parties admitted into evidence: J.W.'s medical records from Dr. Jennifer Kelly ,
his treating psychologist, and her authored reports; the APD reports; and the
Board's expert Dr. Daniel LoPreto's authored reports. During the hearing, J.W.,
C.G., and the two experts testified.
Prior to hearing testimony, the ALJ addressed motions in limine and the
disputed issues counsel presented. J.W.'s counsel argued the appeal stemmed
from the Board's finding that J.W.'s alleged "disability [wa]s not the direct result
of a traumatic event." J.W.'s counsel asserted there was agreement with the
Board's counsel that the issue of "direct results" was "to the extent of whether it
was horrific or not." The Board's counsel acknowledged that "causation[,] . . .
being part of a definition of a traumatic event[,]" was at the heart of the case and
"the reason [the parties] have the medical reports that [they] have."
A-0249-24
5
J.W. testified that on the day of the first incident, he was in the APD
headquarters when he received a call from his brother who requested J.W.
respond to C.W.'s parents' house. J.W. learned that C.W.'s parents, K.V. and
J.V., were dead from a murder-suicide before he went to the residence. After
arriving, J.W. went to the backyard where he observed K.V. was deceased,
sitting on a bench with a self-inflicted gunshot head wound. He knew it was
"hopeless" from the injuries observed and immediately recalled that, months
earlier, he had spoken with K.V. about building the same bench. J.W. explained
the families were very close and spent significant time together. He also learned
J.V. was deceased inside the residence lying on a couch. J.W. did not enter the
residence, and after remaining at the scene for approximately thirty minutes, he
returned to the APD headquarters then went home. J.W. expressed how difficult
it was to tell his wife, children, and mother. After observing a news helicopter
over the residence, he called his brother to warn him of the media attention.
Later that day, J.W. went to spend time with his brother and sister-in-law.
The next day, J.W. returned to the residence while working to remove the
couch and clean up. Upon entering the residence, he realized it was too difficult
to be there and broke down crying. After Department of Public Works'
employees placed the couch J.V. was killed on in a trash truck and it was
A-0249-24
6
compressed, he became distressed after observing "all the blood . . . flying onto
the street." J.W. expressed feeling a great responsibility to C.W. and his brother.
The following day, he returned to the residence again, requested the trash truck,
and "got rid of the whole bench."
J.W. continued to work but recalled taking off one day. He became
concerned his gun would misfire when getting ready for work and curious about
"what it would feel like" to hold his gun to his head. On January 17, 2021, J.W.
responded to a call with C.G. regarding a "psychiatric patient who resided in
town." J.W. relayed that "[i]n the past," officers would "wait for [the man] to
come out" and he was "usually really good with talking to him." Upon arriving
at the residence, J.W. refused based on safety concerns to go inside and decided
"a SWAT team [needed] to handle the situation." J.W. expressed that after the
first incident, he felt "[v]ery panicky," had a heightened safety response to
"anybody with a mental issue," and was not effectively doing his job.
J.W. testified that another "critical incident" occurred on February 8,
which caused the APD to offer "psychological help to go see a counselor." He
and C.G. responded to a phone call from a colleague officer, M.M., requesting
they go to his residence to assist his daughter. In testifying about M.M.'s call
and suicide, J.W. explained he knew M.M. because they went to school together,
A-0249-24
7
worked together, and their children were the same age. J.W. stopped working
the next day.
After the second incident, on February 12, 2021, J.W. met Dr. Kelly for a
"critical incident stress debriefing." He remained in treatment with Dr. Kelly
for approximately a year and a half. She also referred him to a psychiatrist, and
he was prescribed Abilify, Ativan, Cymbalta, Trazodone, and other medication.
He testified to previously responding to over one hundred overdoses, ten
suicides, and two fatal traffic accidents. J.W. explained that while he responded
to numerous fatalities during his career, after the first incident, his sleep
decreased, relationship with his wife changed, "brain [felt] like mush all the
time," and focus diminished.
C.G. testified that she was the duty sergeant on the day of the first
incident. After J.W.'s brother called regarding the murder-suicide, she and J.W.
responded to the scene. C.G. knew the individuals involved were "somehow
related" to J.W. Upon arriving at the residence, she and J.W. went to the
backyard and observed a deceased male with an "apparent self-inflicted gunshot
wound to his face/head area." C.G. testified that she immediately observed J.W.
was "frantic" and "very upset." She explained that J.W. then "froze," was unable
to search the house, and was sent home.
A-0249-24
8
C.G. further testified that J.W. continued working and they both
responded to a call involving an emotionally disturbed person a few days after
the first incident. The individual had barricaded himself in an apartment,
threatened suicide, and was known to have weapons. She recounted that J.W.
did not want to breach the door, advised he was not entering the apartment, and
requested the "SWAT team to" respond. She agreed that the SWAT team was
"100%" necessary but conveyed that in the past, they would have entered the
apartment themselves.
Dr. Kelly was qualified as an expert in police and public safety
psychology and testified that she began treating J.W. after the APD referred him
for "therapy services." Dr. Kelly's first treatment record was for a February 22,
2021 office visit. She noted that J.W. was "seeking treatment following two
work-related critical incidents involving suicides of individuals close to him."
She originally diagnosed J.W. with acute stress disorder and later, on March 12,
diagnosed him with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). She confirmed
treating J.W. for approximately a year and a half and testified that "the bulk of
the treatment . . . and continuous therapy" involved the first incident. Dr. Kelly
found J.W. was experiencing "chronic" PTSD symptomatology, including
A-0249-24
9
anger, guilt, hypervigilance, overreacting, insomnia, and excessive startle
responses.
Dr. Kelly opined that J.W.'s response to the murder-suicide of family
members was "extremely traumatic," "a violent crime . . . that would be horrific
and difficult to manage," and "very unique." She further opined the first incident
"shook him to the core" and caused him to be mentally disabled, explaining it
falls within the "category . . . call[ed] 'moral injury.'" During cross-examination,
Dr. Kelly acknowledged that J.W. had worked consistently after the first
incident, began treatment with her after the second incident, and had stopped
working after "the second suicide." When Dr. Kelly was asked if the second
incident "exacerbate[d] emotional reactions in [J.W.] . . . from the first incident,"
she stated, "Yes. That[ is] part of my opinion."
Dr. LoPreto was qualified as an expert in clinical psychology. He testified
to meeting J.W. for approximately an hour and a half, which included
psychological testing. They discussed the two critical incidents occurring
within approximately four weeks of each other. Dr. LoPreto opined within a
"reasonable degree of psychological" certainty that J.W. had PTSD and his
mental disability was directly caused by the second incident. He noted that J.W.
had responded to the first incident involving his family members after the
A-0249-24
10
murder-suicide had occurred and that J.W. continued working until the second
incident.
Dr. LoPreto found it relevant that the second incident was more active.
J.W. and C.G. responded to the colleague officer's phone call requesting their
assistance for his sick daughter. After J.W. remained with the officer's family
and the APD "pinned [the officer's] cell phone," the officer was discovered to
have committed suicide. Dr. LoPreto testified that J.W. had explained being
friends with the officer as they attended school together, lived in the same town,
worked together, and participated in their children's sports together. J.W. had
remained with the officer's family. After calling his brother, C.W. came to the
residence because she was friendly with the officer's wife.
Dr. LoPreto testified that he was "not minimizing the first incident," but
opined that the second incident was the cause of J.W.'s disability when viewed
from "a functional capacity perspective." He found it relevant that J.W.: was
working after the first incident; did not seek "mental health treatment after the
first incident"; "got rid of his guns" only after the second incident; started
treatment after the second incident and his Chief had sent him for a critical
incident stress debriefing; and left the APD's employment after the second
incident. Regarding "direct causality," Dr. LoPreto opined that "the cause of
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11
[J.W.'s] disability, the cause of his inability to do his job, the cause of his work
stoppage, the cause of his need for psychotherapy was after the second incident."
He noted that J.W. was more "involved in" the second incident and thereafter
had "broken down and could[ not] handle [working] anymore." Dr. LoPreto
opined that "the objective documentation shows" J.W. had "significant
functional impairment" after the second incident and not the first incident.
On July 8, 2024, the ALJ issued an initial decision affirming the Board's
denial of J.W.'s ADR benefits. The ALJ noted the experts disagreed "on
causation" regarding the traumatic event that resulted in J.W.'s disability. The
ALJ observed that Dr. Kelly attributed J.W.'s disability to the first incident and
that Dr. LoPreto determined his "disabling psychological condition is the
culmination of several events," including the second incident and "not solely"
the first incident. While the ALJ found both experts credible, he specifically
found Dr. LoPreto's "testimony to be more persuasive and supported by the facts
and the records in this case." Regarding Dr. Kelly's testimony, the ALJ found
it significant that she "did not see [J.W.] until after the second incident." The
ALJ found that Dr. LoPreto better addressed J.W.'s "continuant associative
effect" of the incidents that caused his disability. Further, the ALJ considered
Dr. LoPreto's medical conclusion was more "persuasive in" addressing that J.W.
A-0249-24
12
"suffered a mentally disabling condition that was the accumulation of several
traumatic events."
The ALJ determined that J.W. failed to meet his burden of demonstrating
the first incident was "the type of qualifying event envisioned by Patterson."2
The ALJ reasoned it was relevant regarding the first incident that J.W. did not
"directly witness the murder or suicide," "describe being terrified" by an active
dangerous scene, "describe a fear or terror of being in imminent danger for his
life," nor express a "threat" existed to "another person." The ALJ found the first
incident was not a qualifying "horrific event."
In considering all the ADR factors "de novo," the ALJ also "disagree[d]
with the Board's position that the [first incident] . . . was 'undesigned and
unexpected.'" The ALJ found the first incident was not an "external event with
unanticipated consequences that were extraordinary or unusual."
On appeal, J.W. contends the ALJ erred in: misapplying Patterson and
finding that the first incident did not meet the traumatic event threshold; finding
that the first incident was not the direct cause of his disability; and improperly
considering and finding that the first incident was undesigned and unexpected.
2
Patterson v. Bd. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 194 N.J. 29, 48 (2008).
A-0249-24
13
II.
Our review of an agency determination is limited. Russo v. Bd. of Trs.,
PFRS, 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011). "An agency's determination on the merits 'will
be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" Saccone v. Bd. of Trs.,
PFRS, 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo, 206 N.J. at 27). "The 'search
for arbitrary or unreasonable agency action' may involve the question 'whether
the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did
the agency follow the law . . . .'" Bowser v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 455 N.J. Super.
165, 170 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 143 N.J. 22,
25 (1995)). "We are not, however, 'bound by an agency's interpretation of a
statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue, particularly when that
interpretation is inaccurate or contrary to legislative objectives.'" Mount v. Bd.
of Trs., PFRS, 233 N.J. 402, 418-19 (2018) (quoting Russo, 206 N.J. at 27)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we review de novo "an agency's
interpretation of a statute or case law." Russo, 206 N.J. at 27.
N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7 prescribes the permanent and total disability
requirements a member must meet to receive ADR benefits. To qualify for ADR
benefits, an employee must demonstrate he or she "is permanently and totally
A-0249-24
14
disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result
of the performance of his [or her] regular or assigned duties." Mount, 233 N.J.
at 419 (quoting N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1)). ADR benefits "entitle[] a member to
receive a higher level of benefits than those provided under an ordinary
disability retirement." Patterson, 194 N.J. at 43.
"[A] traumatic event is . . . an unexpected external happening that directly
causes injury and is not the result of pre-existing disease alone or in combination
with work effort." Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS., 192 N.J. 189, 212 (2007).
To establish entitlement to ADR benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1), the
Supreme Court has elucidated that a member must prove:
1. that he [or she] is permanently and totally disabled;
2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is
a. identifiable as to time and place,
b. undesigned and unexpected, and
c. caused by a circumstance external to the
member (not the result of pre-existing disease
that is aggravated or accelerated by the work);
3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a
result of the member's regular or assigned duties;
4. that the disability was not the result of the member's
willful negligence; and
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15
5. that the member is mentally or physically
incapacitated from performing his usual or any other
duty.
[Mount, 233 N.J. at 421 (quoting Richardson, 192 N.J.
at 212-13).]
Our Court has concluded that the words "traumatic event" and "direct
result" in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7 reflect the Legislature's intent "to make the granting
of an accidental disability pension more difficult." Kasper v. Bd. of Trs. of the
TPAF, 164 N.J. 564, 575-76 (2000). Whether a member's disability is the direct
result of a traumatic event is within the ambit of expert medical opinion, which
must establish "the requisite degree of medical causation between the claimant's
disability and the [alleged] traumatic event[]." Korelnia v. Bd. of Trs., PERS,
83 N.J. 163, 171 (1980). In addressing whether an event is "undesigned or
unexpected," the event should be considered as well as the member's "job
description, training, and prior experience." Mount, 233 N.J. at 427. The Court
has also defined regularly assigned duties as "all activities engaged in by the
employee in connection with his or her work." Kasper, 164 N.J. at 585-86.
Further, the Legislature has clearly extended accidental disability
"coverage for mental injuries" to members. Patterson, 194 N.J. at 44. To
substantiate a covered traumatic mental injury, the member must demonstrate
"that the disability resulted from a 'direct personal experience of a terrifying or
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16
horror-inducing event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury,
or a similarly serious threat to the physical integrity of the member or another
person.'" Mount, 233 N.J. at 424 (quoting Patterson, 194 N.J. at 34). "That
event must be 'of consequence and objectively capable of causing a reasonable
person to suffer a disabling mental injury.'" Id. at 426 (quoting Russo, 206 N.J.
at 31). "If the event meets the Patterson test, the court then applies the
Richardson factors to the member's application." Ibid. (quoting Russo, 206 N.J.
at 32-33).
Our Court has provided "examples of retirement system members who
'could vault the traumatic event threshold,' . . . cit[ing] 'a permanently mentally
disabled policeman who sees [their] partner shot; a teacher who is held hostage
by a student; and a government lawyer used as a shield by a defendant.'" Id. at
423 (quoting Patterson, 194 N.J. at 50). "[A] member who seeks accidental
disability benefits must prove a disabling permanent mental injury and, in so
doing, must produce such expert evidence as is required to sustain that burden."
Patterson, 194 N.J. at 50-51.
III.
J.W. contends reversal of the Board's FAD is warranted because the first
incident vaults the traumatic event threshold and directly resulted in his mental
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disability. After a review of the trial record and Board's FAD, which adopted
the ALJ's findings regarding the Patterson test, we disagree.
We recognize that the Board's adoption of the ALJ's credibility findings
is afforded deference. Further, we note J.W. bears the burden of demonstrating
that the first incident was a "qualifying traumatic event" that "in fact, caused
him to be permanently and totally disabled." Russo, 206 N.J. at 32 (emphasis
omitted).
The ALJ found Dr. LoPreto's testimony—that the first incident was not
the cause of J.W.'s disability, but rather that the second incident was the
triggering event—to be more persuasive as it was substantially supported by the
evidence. In responding to the first incident, it is undisputed that J.W.: did not
directly witness the murder-suicide; did not respond to a crime in progress;
never expressed personally being afraid for his safety or having a fear of "danger
for his life"; and did not experience a threat of harm to any other person. The
ALJ further credited Dr. LoPreto's observation that J.W. had responded to the
first incident involving family members only after the crime had occurred and
thereafter only stopped working, went for counseling, and disposed of his guns
after the second incident. The Board's adoption of the ALJ's finding—that J.W.
failed to establish the first incident was "the type of qualifying event envisioned
A-0249-24
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by Patterson"—is sufficiently supported by the record. Further, the record
supports the conclusion that the first incident was not: (1) a "direct personal
experience of a terrifying or horror-inducing event that involved actual or
threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to . . . another
person"; and (2) "objectively capable of causing a reasonable person in similar
circumstances to suffer a disabling mental injury."
Additionally, we are unpersuaded by J.W.'s argument that his response to
his brother's in-laws' home after the murder-suicide satisfies the traumatic event
threshold because it is substantially similar to the Supreme Court's traumatic
event examples recited in Mount. We note the ALJ considered the Court's
examples of members who were disabled from directly experiencing active
threats, such as witnessing a partner's shooting, being a held hostage, and being
used as a shield by a defendant. Mount, 233 N.J. at 424. In each example, the
member directly experienced an active traumatic event that involved an actual
threat of death or serious injury to the member or another person. In each
example, the members were unable to remove themselves from experiencing the
traumatic events. The ALJ noted that the "pivotal issue" was whether J.W. had
experienced a direct personal experience of a terrifying or horror inducing event.
While J.W. responded honorably and suffered mental repercussions from the
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first incident, we discern no error in the Board's determination that the second
incident was largely the cause of his disability rather than the first incident.
We next consider J.W.'s argument that it was improper for the ALJ to
consider and conclude that the first incident was "undesigned and unexpected."
Based on the present record, we agree. We note, however, the ALJ's finding
does not change the fact that J.W. failed to meet the Patterson factors. We
nevertheless address the merits of J.W.'s argument.
We agree the ALJ incorrectly considered whether the first incident was
undesigned and unexpected. While an ALJ conducts a de novo review, the
Board has not cited authority supporting that an ALJ is not generally bound by
parties' lawful stipulations about the denial of ADR benefits. In the present case,
the record indicates counsel agreed before the ALJ as to the limited issues
presented. Cf. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(g) (allowing "parties in a contested case" to
"stipulate to the factual record, and agree that there are no genuine issues of
material fact to be adjudicated" and permitting agencies to "render [an FAD] . . .
without obtaining the prior input" from an ALJ).
We also note N.J.S.A. 52:14B-9(b)(3) provides that a notice shall be
provided in a contested case that includes "reference to the particular sections
of the statutes and rules involved." The notice shall also include "[a] short and
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plain statement of the matters asserted. If the agency or other party is unable to
state the matters in detail at the time the notice is served, the initial notice may
be limited to a statement of the issues involved." N.J.S.A. 52:14B-9(b)(4).
While N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.6(h) authorizes an ALJ to "render any ruling or order
necessary to decide any matter presented to him or her which is within the
jurisdiction of the transmitting agency," it does not preclude the parties from
limiting the issues presented. Thus, at the inception of the trial, the better course
to follow, is for the ALJ to confirm the parties' stipulations and to clarify the
issues presented on the record. If an ALJ is going to decide issues outside of
the parties' stipulations and fairly presented evidence, the parties should be
provided notice and an opportunity to present further evidence and arguments.
In sum, having considered J.W.'s arguments in light of the record and
applicable law, we affirm the Board's FAD denying his ADR benefits claim.
Substantial credible evidence in the record supports the Board's adoption of the
ALJ's determination that J.W.'s disability did not meet the Patterson factors and
arise "as a direct result of a traumatic event." Mount, 233 N.J. at 419 (quoting
N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1)). The Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable and did not constitute a mistake of law. Therefore, we discern
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no reason to disturb the Board's FAD affirming the denial of J.W.'s ADR
benefits.
Affirm.
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