Payton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JONATHAN PAYTON * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 25-1481

LAMARQUE FORD * SECTION “A” (2)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND

ORDER AND REASONS DENYING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Before me is Plaintiff Jonathan Payton’s Motion to Appoint Counsel. ECF No. 11.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jonathan Payton filed a complaint Defendant Lamarque Ford asserting a deceptive

practices claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 45 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-

58. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that, upon receiving his 2013 Ford Taurus after a full-service

oil change and car wash, Defendant stated that his vehicle was running without issue, yet the

vehicle began to leak water and coolant within two weeks. Id. at 5.

This Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis but directed that

issuance of summons be withheld pending completion of the statutorily mandated frivolous

review. ECF No. 7. In that same Order, the undersigned directed that Plaintiff show cause, on or

before October 20, 2025, why his complaint should not be summarily dismissed as frivolous and

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 5. Plaintiff failed to comply with that Order. Instead,

it appears that Plaintiff moved to another location and failed to notify the Clerk of Court of his

new address until December 4, 2025. ECF Nos. 9, 10, 12.

In Plaintiff’s current motion for appointment of counsel, Plaintiff simply asserts that he has

limited financial resources and that counsel will help with filings and motions. ECF No. 11.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Appointment of Counsel

A litigant has no constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney in a civil case.1 A court

may, however, appoint counsel “if doing so would advance the proper administration of justice.”2

Appointment of counsel under § 1915(e)(1) should not occur as a matter of course or

ordinary practice.3 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a court has the authority to request an attorney

to represent a person unable to afford counsel. To request counsel under § 1915(e)(1), the plaintiff

must establish the existence of “exceptional circumstances.”4 Although the Fifth Circuit has

declined to articulate a comprehensive definition of “exceptional circumstances,”5 it has identified

various factors that a court should consider in determining whether exceptional circumstances

warrant the appointment of counsel:

(1) the type and complexity of the case;

(2) whether the indigent plaintiff is capable of adequately presenting the case;

(3) whether the indigent plaintiff is in a position to investigate and adequately

prepare the case;

(4) whether the evidence will consist in large part of conflicting testimony so as to

require skill in presentation of evidence and in cross-examination; and

(5) the likelihood that appointment will benefit the petitioner, the court, and the

defendants by shortening the trial and assisting in just determination.6

1 See F.T.C. v. Assail, Inc., 410 F.3d 256, 267 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is inapplicable

in civil cases.” (citations omitted)).

2 Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1989).

3 See Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 126 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Hadd v. LSG-Sky Chefs, 272

F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 353–54 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that

there is no automatic right to appointment of counsel in civil rights cases)); Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793, 799

(5th Cir. 2015) (citing Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982)).

4 See Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982); Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213.

5 Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213 (quoting Branch, 686 F.2d at 266).

6 Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1992); Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213.

In addition, the court should consider the extent of a plaintiff's attempts to secure private counsel

independently.7 Thus, even when demonstrably indigent, a plaintiff asserting civil claims for

damages is not entitled to appointed counsel as a matter of right.8

Before addressing whether exceptional circumstances exist for purposes of § 1915(e)(1),

the court should generally screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),9 which considers

whether it is (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;

or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). This process requires the court to assess whether the plaintiff’s claims

meet a threshold level of plausibility, which “embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion,

but also the fanciful factual allegation.”10 Thus, an indigent plaintiff must first demonstrate that

the asserted claim meets “a threshold level of plausibility” and then show “exceptional

circumstances” before the court considers requesting appointed counsel.11

In addition to § 1915(e)(1), the court has extra-statutory, inherent authority to compel an

attorney to represent a party when exceptional circumstances exist and efforts to secure non-

compulsory representation are unsuccessful.12 The power to compel appointment of counsel,

however, is a power of last resort and is not to be invoked unless all other options have been

7 Naranjo, 809 F.3d at 799 (citing Jackson, 864 F.2d at 1242).

8 Thompson v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 67 F.4th 275, 283 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Naranjo, 809 F.3d at 799 (citing

Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 212)).

9 Cf. April 22, 2014 Resolution of the En Banc Court (permanently adopted on October 5, 2016), Section 3(d). The

screening review process applies to in forma pauperis cases filed by both prisoners and non-prisoners. See Newsome

v. E.E.O.C., 301 F.3d 227, 231-33 (5th Cir. 2002) (dismissing non-prisoner case under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) for

frivolity and failure to state a claim); Malone v. La Dep't of Safety & Corr., No. 17-CV-1025, 2017 WL 4106244, at

*1 (W.D. La. Aug. 25, 2017) (finding that §1915(e)(2) applies equally to prisoners and non-prisoners).

10 Naranjo, 809 F.3d at 799 (citations omitted); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 325, 327-28 (1989) (stating

that a claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” and lacks an arguable basis in fact when

it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios”); see also Howard v. Langston, 544 F. App'x 427, 427 (5th Cir. 2013)

(“A court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous where the facts alleged are ‘clearly baseless,’ such as when the

allegations are fanciful, fantastic, or delusional.” (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992))).

11 Naranjo, 809 F.3d at 799.

12 Id. at 804.

exhausted.13 Before ordering mandatory or compelled representation, the court may consider

additional circumstances, including:

(1) an attorney’s assessment that the claims are meritless;

(2) whether taking the case could subject the attorney to discipline;

(3) plaintiff’s antagonistic behavior toward previous counsel;

(4) whether the attorney has good cause to decline; and

(5) any change in circumstances.14

III. ANALYSIS

A. Failure to Comply With Show Cause Order

Plaintiff failed to respond to the Court’s Order requiring him to show cause before October

20, 2025, why his complaint should not be dismissed. ECF No. 7. Because that Order was issued

before Plaintiff notified the Clerk of Court of his change of address, the undersigned will assume

Plaintiff did not receive a copy of that Order. Plaintiff, however, is obligated to notify the Clerk

of Court of any change of address promptly, and in signing his Complaint, acknowledged that his

failure to do so may result in the dismissal of his case.

As previously explained, 15 U.S.C. § 45 does not provide Plaintiff with a private cause of

action that would support the Court’s exercise of federal question jurisdiction.15 Despite Plaintiff’s

failure to timely respond to the show cause, the undersigned will provide Plaintiff with another

opportunity to respond, on or before February 25, 2026. Failure to timely respond may result in a

recommendation that this case be dismissed.

13 Id.; see also Byrd v. Lindsey, 736 F. App’x 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2018) (re-affirming inherent authority to appoint

counsel).

14 Naranjo, 809 F.3d at 805-06.

15 Gaubert v. NCMIC Fin. Corp., No. 10-1844, 2010 WL 4026385, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2010) (Vance, J.)

(“There is no private right of action under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. Thus, subject

matter jurisdiction cannot be based on federal question in this case.” (citing Norris v. Fairbanks Cap. Corp., 178 F.

App’x 401, 403 (5th Cir. 2006); Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1248 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978))).

B. Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff does not address whatsoever, much less establish, the exceptional circumstances

necessary to justify appointment of counsel under § 1915(e)(1). “Every civil lawsuit is in some

ways complex, but not every lawsuit warrants court appointed counsel. It is only those

extraordinarily complex cases that require such extraordinary measures.”16 This case does not

appear to be particularly complex, and Plaintiff has not provided any basis to conclude that he is

incapable of investigating, preparing or adequately presenting the case. Further, he has not

identified any efforts he has undertaken to secure private counsel.

IV. CONCLUSION

On its face, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim and appears to lack any

basis for subject matter jurisdiction, subjecting it to summary dismissal under § 1915(e)(2).

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to establish exceptional circumstances necessary to justify appointed

counsel under § 1915(e)(1) or identified any efforts taken to secure private counsel.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that, for the reasons set forth above and more fully in the Order and

Reasons dated September 25, 2025 (ECF No. 7), on or before Wednesday, February 25, 2026,

Plaintiff Jonathan Payton SHOW CAUSE why his Complaint should not be summarily dismissed

as frivolous and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in response to this show cause order, Plaintiff shall file

a response containing a written statement setting forth the specific facts upon which she relies to

establish a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over her claim. PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE

16 LaBranche v. Nestor I LLC, No. 18-8399, 2019 WL 3891555, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2019) (Morgan, J.) (citing

Hudson v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 441 F. App'x 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2011)).

TO RESPOND IN WRITING AS DIRECTED HEREIN MAY RESULT IN THE

DISMISSAL OF HIS COMPLAINT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there will be no oral hearing on Wednesday, February

25, 2026, but the matter will be taken under advisement on the written filings on that date.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of January, 2026.

ou Melly CURRAULT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE