Wennermark

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT January 09, 2026

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

VICTORIA DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER WENNERMARK, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:24-CV-00031

§

DEWITT COUNTY, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss (D.E. 32, 34).

On November 6, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Julie K. Hampton issued a

Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R, D.E. 66), recommending that Defendant

Dewitt County’s motion (D.E. 32) be denied; Defendants Southern Health Partners, Inc.

(“SHP”), Jennifer Stinnett, Laurie Srubar Kiening’s (collectively Medical Defendants’)

motion be granted in part and denied in part; and Plaintiff be given an opportunity to amend

the complaint. Defendants timely filed their objections (D.E. 67, 69) and Plaintiff

responded (D.E. 70).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court conducts a de novo review of any part of a magistrate judge’s

disposition that has been properly objected to. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(3); Warren v. Miles, 230 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2000). “Parties filing objections

must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general

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objections need not be considered by the district court.” Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834

F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (discussing pro se petitioner’s objections to

M&R), overruled on other grounds by Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415

(5th Cir. 1996)). As to any portion for which no objection is filed, a district court reviews

for clearly erroneous factual findings and conclusions of law. United States v. Wilson, 864

F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

DISCUSSION

A. The County’s Objections

1. Sufficiency of § 1983/Fourteenth Amendment Claims

The County’s first objection is that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his Fourteenth

Amendment claims are conclusory with respect to any County policy and are therefore

insufficient under the federal pleading standard of Twombly/Iqbal. D.E. 67, pp. 2-4.

However, the County’s argument is based solely on the Magistrate Judge’s superseded

Memorandum and Recommendation and this Court’s decisions in other cases addressing

other fact scenarios and pleadings. In his response, Plaintiff defends the pleading of a

County policy to support liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658 (1978), relying on the factual allegations highlighted in the M&R and noting that prior

wrongful conduct is not required for a conditions of confinement scenario to support a

policy finding. D.E. 70, pp. 8-14.

The Magistrate Judge went to great lengths to discuss the pleading standard. She set

out the requirement of a policy, the different ways to prove a policy, the different types of

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policies, and the standard to apply when some relevant facts are solely within the

knowledge of the defendant. D.E. 66, pp. 14-19. There is no objection to this part of the

analysis and it is not clearly erroneous. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff had

pled sufficient facts to support a number of enumerated policies, specifying their factual

nature and relationship to the events in this case. Id., pp. 20-21. This, she concluded,

provided the County with sufficient notice of the claims made against it. The Court agrees.

What differentiates this case from those the County cited in its objections is the

breadth of the conduct. The policy allegations arise out of unsanitary conditions, refusal to

provide cleaning supplies, multiple failures over a long period of time to provide Plaintiff

with medical attention despite the obvious need, failing to transport Plaintiff to medical

appointments, as well as multiple facets of delayed, denied, and intentionally ineffective

medical care. Plaintiff’s diabetic condition is one that the County should expect to

encounter on a regular basis and its response should be routine. The fact that it is not—

across space, time, function, and personnel—is sufficient pleading of a basic policy-level

acceptance of constitutional violations. The County failed to address these allegations and

its objection is OVERRULED.

2. Sufficiency of Claim for Failure to Train

The County’s second objection argues that Plaintiff has not pled a sufficient failure

to train claim because he has not stated with particularity what part of the County’s training

program is deficient, given that the officers were properly certified or licensed under

TCOLE standards. D.E. 67, pp. 4-6. As a preliminary matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiff

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that the standard of review precludes any consideration of the County’s defensive assertion

that its employees are properly licensed or certified. See D.E. 70, p. 7. Otherwise, the

County asserts that Plaintiff’s claim is based on a single alleged wrongful act, which cannot

be extrapolated into a municipal policy or custom with respect to training.

Plaintiff responds to the County’s argument as follows:

The exception is called the single incident exception because

“even absent proof of pattern, deliberate indifference can still

be inferred if the factfinder determines that the risk of

constitutional violations was or should have been an ‘obvious’

or ‘highly predictable consequence’ of the alleged training

inadequacy.” Littell v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616,

624 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added); see also City of Canton,

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, n.10 (1989); Brown v.

Bryan Cnty., OK, 219 F.3d 450, 460 (5th Cir. 2000); Covington

v. City of Madisonville, Tex., 812 F. App'x 219, 225 (5th Cir.

2020).

The single incident exception is satisfied and a municipality

can be held liable for failure to train officers when (1) the need

for training “should have been obvious to” the policymaker,

(2) the violation was an obvious consequence of that lack of

training, and (3) the failure to train caused the constitutional

violation. Brown, 219 F.3d at 460.

D.E. 70, p. 15.

Plaintiff’s argument is premised on the fact that the County must be prepared to care

for inmates with diabetes because of its prevalence in the population. He argues that the

lack of training is clear from the fact that ordinary jail staff was given the gatekeeping

responsibility regarding an inmate’s need for medical care, without providing the necessary

medical training regarding the particular needs of inmates with diabetes—both with respect

to the conditions of confinement and the need for medication and care of wounds. The

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Court agrees. The County delegated actual medical care to SHP, but failed to provide any

means for medical triage of inmate complaints. The disconnect between the role of the

jailer and the role of medical staff is a sufficient factual allegation to support a deliberately

indifferent training policy decision at the County level.

3. Sufficiency of ADA/RA Claim

The County’s third objection is that the ADA/RA claim is factually insufficient.

D.E. 67, pp. 6-7. After quoting a passage from the M&R that demonstrates Plaintiff’s

disability and the County’s knowledge of it, the County argues that the Magistrate Judge

confused a deliberate indifference claim with a failure to accommodate claim. Id., p. 7.

However, the quoted facts regarding Plaintiff’s alleged disability go to both claims.

Plaintiff has a qualified disability of which the County knew.

With respect to the actual failure to accommodate, the allegations include that

Plaintiff was denied medical care in at least one instance because the County failed to

provide a wheelchair to transport Plaintiff to the medical clinic. By the County’s own

argument, participation in medical care is a public program included in the ADA/RA’s

requirements. Id., p. 7. And there is no dispute that a wheelchair is an accommodation he

was denied. As Plaintiff argues, medical care in general is a program for which the County

denied Plaintiff participation because of his disability. D.E. 70, p. 22. Plaintiff also argues

that safe, clean housing is a program denied to Plaintiff because of his disability-related

susceptibilities. Id. These are failure-to-accommodate claims.

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While Plaintiff addresses the vicarious liability of the County for its employees’

conduct, the County’s objection does not include that issue. See D.E. 70, p. 19. Therefore,

the Court need not, and does not, address it. The County’s objection to the ADA/RA claim

is OVERRULED.

B. The Medical Defendants’ Objections

The Medical Defendants begin by asserting in global terms that the Magistrate

Judge’s prior M&R was correct and that this Court should reinstate it. D.E. 69, pp. 1-2.

Because such a presentation does not point out with particularity any error in the Magistrate

Judge’s analysis, it does not constitute a proper objection and will not be considered. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003); Edmond v.

Collins, 8 F.3d 290, 293 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993).

SHP also appears to argue that the Magistrate Judge exceeded the scope of this

Court’s order recommitting the motions for reconsideration. This Court asked for

reconsideration of the motions in light of the objections filed and the scope of the order

recommitting the matter was not limited. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge did not exceed

her plenary scope of review.

As a final preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff did not file a response

to the Medical Defendants’objections.

1. Leave to Amend to State Vicarious Liability Under § 1983

The Magistrate Judge reviewed at length the competing arguments and the evolution

of the law regarding whether a private corporation is subject to liability under § 1983

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pursuant to a respondeat superior theory. D.E. 66, pp. 33-36. She ultimately concluded that

it is an open question of law in this circuit. Rather than make a definitive ruling at the Rule

12 stage, she recommends permitting Plaintiff to amend to add the claim so that it can be

determined after adequate time to conduct discovery. She chose this course because the

§ 1983 claim was recommended to survive on a Monell theory against SHP. While success

on that theory would render respondeat superior liability superfluous, the marginal

difference in permitting discovery on both theories was de minimis. Id.

SHP objects, seeking a definitive ruling that respondeat superior liability is

foreclosed in a § 1983 case against a private corporation under “well-settled” law. D.E. 69,

pp. 3-5. SHP takes issue with some of the Magistrate Judge’s reading of the law. It argues

that Shields v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 789-96 (7th Cir. 2014),

does not conclude that vicarious liability is a proper theory.1 D.E. 69, p. 4. While Shields

did apply Monell’s limitations on municipal liability to the private corporation before it,

the court reviewed Monell’s analysis in historical perspective and wrote:

For all of these reasons, a new approach may be needed for

whether corporations should be insulated from respondeat

superior liability under § 1983. Since prisons and prison

medical services are increasingly being contracted out to

private parties, reducing private employers' incentives to

prevent their employees from violating inmates' constitutional

rights raises serious concerns. Nothing in the Supreme Court's

jurisprudence or the relevant circuit court decisions provides a

sufficiently compelling reason to disregard the important

policy considerations underpinning the doctrine of respondeat

1 The court wrote about the state of the law and its circuit precedent limiting recovery to a Monell theory, saying:

“For reasons we explain below, however, Iskander and our cases following it on this point deserve fresh consideration,

though it would take a decision by this court sitting en banc or pursuant to Circuit Rule 40(e), or a decision by the

Supreme Court to overrule those decisions.” Shields, 746 F.3d at 789.

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superior. And in a world of increasingly privatized state

services, the doctrine could help to protect people from tortious

deprivations of their constitutional rights.

Shields, 746 F.3d at 795.

Openly considering issuing an opinion that would overrule its own precedent and

allow a respondeat superior theory against private corporations so that the Seventh Circuit

could consider it on rehearing and make a ruling en banc, the court noted that the plaintiff

had not asked for that result. Id. at 795-96. So it simply applied Monell pursuant to its

precedent. And, as the Magistrate Judge noted, the Seventh Circuit has not changed its law

since the 2014 Shields decision. D.E. 66, p. 35. So while Shields makes a solid case for

recognizing a respondeat superior theory in this case, its holding did not trigger a

reevaluation of the direction the cases have taken.

In the meantime, at least one Texas case applied respondeat superior to a case

involving SHP with respect to its medical care contract with a county: Belknap v. Leon

County, Texas, No. 622CV01028ADAJCM, 2023 WL 3604728, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 3,

2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 622CV01028ADAJCM, 2023 WL

3612345 (W.D. Tex. May 23, 2023), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Belknap v. Spinks,

No. 23-50465, 2025 WL 3014912 (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025) (on qualified immunity). SHP

does not challenge that case.

SHP does challenge the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on Hutchison v. Brookshire

Brothers, LTD., 284 F. Supp. 2d 459, 473 (E.D. Tex. 2003). D.E. 69, p. 4 (citing Vernier

v. Smith Cnty., Tex., No. 6:24-CV-00378-JCB-JDL, 2025 WL 2633208, at *10 (E.D. Tex.

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Apr. 30, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:24-CV-00378, 2025 WL

2491114 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2025). As SHP observes, Vernier distinguished Hutchison

on the basis of considerations unique to a private corporation’s acceptance of constitutional

duties as delegated by the county. However, it still stated, “Whether Plaintiff can hold a

private contractor vicariously liable under § 1983 has not yet been directly answered by

the Fifth Circuit.” Vernier, 2025 WL 2633208, at *10.

While SHP argues that the great weight of case opinions apply Monell rather than

vicarious liability, that does not make it “well-settled” in this circuit without a Fifth Circuit

opinion. It may be the safer bet, but that decision does not need to be made at this juncture.

And while SHP complains that the Court should eliminate this theory before the parties

incur increased discovery and costs, it has failed to controvert the Magistrate Judge’s

determination that any such differential is inconsequential—a finding that is not clearly

erroneous. For these reasons, the Court OVERRULES the objection without prejudice.

2. Sufficiency of Failure to Train Claim Against SHP

SHP’s second objection challenges the Magistrate Judge’s analysis that the

pleadings were factually sufficient to support a failure to train claim against it. D.E. 69, pp.

6-7. In particular, it argues that the pleading does not satisfy the rigors of the single-instance

analysis of a constitutional claim. It also argues that, because jail staff made the final

decisions regarding referral of inmates to off-site healthcare providers, SHP’s conduct did

not cause Plaintiff’s injuries. Id.

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The Magistrate Judge took into consideration all of the allegations, including SHP’s

agreement to the terms of its contract with the County, which removed some medical

decisions from medical personnel. In so doing, SHP agreed at the highest level to provide

incomplete medical services. On the treatment level, the M&R notes:

Among other allegations, Wennermark has alleged that SHP

employees: (1) did not properly treat his infection and gave

him treatment they knew would not be effective; (2) refused

additional treatment despite his obviously worsening infection;

(3) denied him use of a wheelchair and denied in-cell

treatment, instead forcing him to walk on his injured foot.

(D.E. 23 at 7-11). These factual allegations include misconduct

that occurred in the open by multiple SHP employees, which

is sufficient to give notice to SHP of what Wennermark’s

claims are.

D.E. 66, p. 31 (emphasis added). While this case involves a single patient, it does not

involve a single failed treatment, but addresses systemic failures in treating that patient for

an illness and complications that are routinely encountered in inmate populations and for

which SHP’s personnel must be prepared. These allegations are factually sufficient to

support a failure to train claim. The objection is OVERRULED.

3. Sufficiency of Deliberate Indifference Claim Against Individuals

Defendants Stinnett and Kiening object that the allegations of their state of mind is

conjectural and conclusory and therefore insufficient to support the deliberate indifference

claims against them. D.E. 69, pp. 8-9. As the Magistrate Judge observed, “Deliberate

indifference is an extremely high standard to meet but can be satisfied by a wanton

disregard for an inmate's serious medical needs.” D.E. 66, p. 17 (quoting Cope v. Cogdill,

3 F.4th 198, 207 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); see also,

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Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). Deliberate

indifference to medical needs is shown when officials “refused to treat him, ignored his

complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that

would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Domino, 239 F.3d

at 756 (citing Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985)).

Defendants Stinnett and Kiening do not take issue with the Magistrate Judge’s

listing of the serious allegations against them. See D.E. 66, p. 26. Their argument is that

the allegations amount to nothing more than medical negligence or a disagreement about

care. The Court disagrees. The allegations show subjective knowledge of Plaintiff’s

serious health risk, intentional mistreatment, delayed treatment, disclosing false or no

medical information to other providers, failure to follow the medical directions of outside

providers, and more. The objection is OVERRULED.

4. Sufficiency of § 1983/Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against SHP

Without addition or modification, SHP incorporates by reference the County’s

objection regarding this theory. D.E. 69, p. 2. Pursuant to the analysis above, the objection

is OVERRULED.

5. Sufficiency of ADA Claim Against SHP

Without addition or modification, SHP incorporates by reference the County’s

objection regarding this theory. D.E. 69, p. 2. Pursuant to the analysis above, the objection

is OVERRULED.

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CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations set

forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation, as well as

Defendants’ objections, and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made a

de novo disposition of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and

Recommendation to which objections were specifically directed, the Court OVERRULES

Defendants’ objections and ADOPTS as its own the findings and conclusions of the

Magistrate Judge. Accordingly:

• Defendant Dewitt County’s motion to dismiss (D.E. 32) is DENIED.

• Defendants SHP, Stinnet, and Kiening’s motion (D.E. 34) is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

o SHP’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART because

Wennermark’s allegation that SHP receives federal funding is

insufficient under Rule 8. However, the Court GRANTS

Wennermark leave to amend this allegation.

o In all other respects the Medical Defendants’ motion (D.E. 34) is

DENIED IN PART.

• The Court further GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend to

assert vicarious liability against SHP. However, this is without prejudice

to later challenges, including a challenge to the applicability of the theory

as a matter of law.

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ORDERED on January 9, 2026.

[ely GONZAIGS RAMOS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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