Reveles

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

URBANA DIVISION

ARTURO REVELES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:25-cv-02282-JEH

CAMPBELL, et al.,

Defendants.

Merit Review Order

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Menard

Correctional Center (“Menard”), filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). This case is before the Court for a

merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

I

In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true,

liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649-

51 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient.

Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). While the pleading standard does not require

“detailed factual allegations,” it requires “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 F. App’x 588,

589 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

II

Plaintiff files suit against Intelligence Officers A. Campbell and O’Blenis,

Lieutenant John Doe (assigned to the restrictive housing/segregation unit at

Danville), Adjustment Committee Chairperson Gregory Little, Adjustment

Committee Co-Chairperson Kelsey Smith, Pontiac Warden Mindi Nurse,

Defendant Lieutenant Hitchens (Security Specialist at Pontiac), Administrative

Review Board (“ARB”) Chairperson Ryan Nothangle, and Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”) Acting Director Latoya Hughes.

While incarcerated at Danville Correctional Center (“Danville”), Plaintiff

started Adult Basic Education Classes and signed a good time contract to receive

Earned Program Sentence Credit on February 13, 2024.

On March 31, 2024, Defendants O’Blenis and Campbell escorted Plaintiff to

restrictive housing in handcuffs.

On April 1, 2024, Defendant John Doe served Plaintiff with an Offender

Disciplinary Report for Investigative Status, or an “ISR.” Plaintiff alleges the ISR

incorrectly stated that Defendant O’Blenis was the serving employee. Plaintiff

alleges the ISR was incomplete and did not reasonably inform him of the subject

of the investigation. Later that day, Defendants O’Blenis and Campbell

interviewed Plaintiff. Defendant O’Blenis asked Plaintiff if he wrote a kite to

assault the warden and gave it to “KKrazy.” (Doc. 1 at p. 3). Plaintiff denied the

accusations and asked to see the kite to examine the handwriting. Defendant

O’Blenis informed Plaintiff he did not have the kite because the confidential source

flushed it. Plaintiff agreed to comply with the investigation and undergo a Voice

Stress Analysis (“VSA”). Plaintiff alleges the interview with the VSA examiner

“turned into an aggressive interrogation.” Id. at p. 5. Plaintiff alleges the examiner

informed him the VSA results indicated he was dishonest.

On April 2, 2024, Plaintiff was transferred to Pinckneyville Correctional

Center (“Pinckneyville”) with a tactical team and placed in a disciplinary pod. Id.

On April 17, 2025, the VSA examiner interrogated Plaintiff again, asked if

he wanted to confess, and informed him the confidential source passed his VSA.

Plaintiff reiterated he did not write the kite.

On April 30, 2024, Plaintiff was served a disciplinary report written by

Defendant Campbell. Id. at pp. 6-8.

On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff appeared before Adjustment Committee members

Defendants Little and Smith for a hearing. Plaintiff pled “not guilty.” Plaintiff

alleges Defendants Little and Smith did not present any evidence against him but

found him guilty of all charges.

On May 8, 2024, the warden of Pinckneyville signed off on Defendants Little

and Smith’s findings and recommendations. Plaintiff alleges he never received a

copy of the Adjustment Committee Final Summary Report.

On May 21, 2024, Plaintiff was transferred from Pinckneyville to Pontiac

Correctional Center (“Pontiac”). When Plaintiff arrived at Pontiac, he received a

new inmate identification card with the words “Staff Assaulter” printed on the

back. Id. at p. 9. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Lieutenant Hitchens and Warden

Nurse reclassified Plaintiff as a “Staff Assaulter” even though that action was not

recommended by Defendants Little and Smith.

On June 4, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a grievance regarding the disciplinary

report. On approximately September 16, 2024, Plaintiff received a notice from the

Prisoner Review Board (“PRB”) stating that a hearing was scheduled on

September 18, 2024. On the notice, the reason for the hearing was listed as

“Revocation.” Id. at p. 10.

On September 18, 2024, Plaintiff appeared before the PRB and was informed

that Defendants Little and Smith had recommended six months revocation of good

conduct credit (“GCC”).

On approximately October 1, 2024, Plaintiff received a new calculation

sheet, which showed his parole date had been set back six months pursuant to the

PRB’s decision, which was based on Defendants Little and Smith’s

recommendation.

On October 24, 2024, Defendant ARB Chairperson Nothangle denied

Plaintiff’s grievance, stating: “This office finds no violation of the grievant’s due

process in accordance with DR 504.80 and DR 504.30. This office is reasonably

satisfied the offense cited in the report was committed.” Id. at p. 11.

On November 20, 2024, Plaintiff’s correctional counselor submitted Plaintiff

for restoration of the revoked GCC.

On December 12, 2024, Plaintiff was released from segregation and three

months of his GCC were restored.

On January 2, 2025, Plaintiff was transferred to Menard Correctional Center

(“Menard”), a maximum-security facility. Plaintiff alleges the transfer to Menard

was most likely a disciplinary transfer. Plaintiff states he still had not received a

Final Summary Report from the disciplinary hearing.

III

The review of a procedural due process claim requires a two-part analysis:

whether the plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, and

if so, what process was due. Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 1996).

In other words, if a constitutional right is identified, then procedural due process

must be provided. Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000). A

due process violation may be implicated if “the defendants deprived [plaintiff] of

a liberty interest by imposing an ‘atypical and significant hardship on [him] in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” McCoy v. Atherton, 818 F. App’x

538, 541 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).

Merely placing a prisoner in segregation does not amount to an atypical or

significant change in circumstances. Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 607-11 (7th Cir.

2005). “[A] liberty interest may arise if the length of segregated confinement is

substantial and the record reveals that the conditions of confinement are unusually

harsh.” Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009)

(emphasis in original) (characterizing up to 90 days in segregation a relatively

short period, depending on the conditions imposed); Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d

640, 644 (7th Cir. 1997).

Here, Plaintiff alleges he spent 255 days in segregation, but he does not

describe the conditions in segregation. Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to

state a due process claim based on his disciplinary segregation. See Williams v.

Brown, 849 F. App’x 154, 156 (7th Cir. 2021) (only lengthy period of segregation

and harsh conditions will violate due process).

Plaintiff alleges he faced a disciplinary transfer to a much more restrictive

maximum-security facility. Plaintiff’s transfer to a maximum-security institution

does not implicate his federal due process rights, as “[a] prisoner has no due

process right to be housed in any particular facility.” Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d

527, 532 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)); Wilkinson

v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005). Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim

regarding his alleged disciplinary transfer.

Plaintiff alleges he lost six months of GCC when Defendants Little and

Smith found him guilty during the disciplinary hearing on May 3, 2024. Once a

state awards good conduct credits to an inmate, the inmate has “a constitutionally-

protected liberty interest in being released from prison before the end of his term

. . . .” Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Torres v. Brookman,

155 F.4th 952, 956 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Prisoners generally have a cognizable liberty

interest in earned credit-time and other benefits that decrease their sentence

length, so the threatened loss of good time credits triggers a cognizable liberty

interest.”) (internal citation omitted). A “state may not deprive inmates of [earned]

good-time credits without following constitutionally adequate procedures to

ensure that the credits are not arbitrarily rescinded.” Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717,

719 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (“But the

State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its

deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner’s interest

has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment

‘liberty’ to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the

circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-

created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.”).

That being said, Plaintiff cannot pursue a § 1983 claim until the guilty

finding has been overturned. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997) (“[A] state

prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff would ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of his conviction

or sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence

has previously been invalidated.”) (construing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487

(1994)). Plaintiff does not allege that his finding of guilt based on the disciplinary

report was overturned in some manner. See Sims v. Hocker, No. 4:23-CV-04221-JEH,

2025 WL 1943385, at *4 (C.D. Ill. July 15, 2025). In fact, he alleges the PRB upheld

the Adjustment Committee’s decision, and his grievance regarding the

disciplinary report was denied. Plaintiff states three months of his GCC were

restored on December 12, 2024, but it is unclear from the Complaint why this

occurred. Id. at p. 11, ¶ 73. Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim based on the

revocation of his GCC.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s sparse allegations are insufficient to proceed on a

due process claim against Defendants Lieutenant Hitchens and Warden Nurse,

who allegedly reclassified him as a “Staff Assaulter” when he arrived at Pontiac.

Finally, Defendant Hughes cannot be liable based only on her supervisory

role as Acting Director of the IDOC, as there is no respondeat superior liability under

§ 1983. See Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Officials are

accountable for their own acts; they are not vicariously liable for the conduct of

subordinates. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701

F.3d 193, 203-05 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant

Hughes was personally involved in any constitutional violation. See Vance v.

Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based

on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach

unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional

deprivation.”).

Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to

state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. The Court will allow Plaintiff a final opportunity to file an Amended

Complaint within 30 days of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file a timely Amended

Complaint, or if the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for relief, his case

will be dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure

to state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court will allow Plaintiff a final opportunity

to file an Amended Complaint within 30 days of this Order. If Plaintiff

fails to file a timely Amended Complaint, or if the Amended Complaint

fails to state a claim for relief, his case will be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint will replace Plaintiff's Complaint in its

entirety. The Amended Complaint must contain all allegations against all

Defendants. Piecemeal amendments are not accepted.

2) Plaintiff's Motion for Status [6] is MOOT.

It is so ordered.

Entered: January 9, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge