GRAY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

CARTIER GRAY,

Plaintiff, Civ. A. No. 25-5982

(RMB/EAP)

v.

GT AUTO SALES, MEMORANDUM OPINION

& ORDER

Defendant.

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court upon the Complaint [Docket No. 1] and

Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) [Docket No. 1-2] by Plaintiff Cartier

Gray (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff alleges that he entered into a contract to purchase a vehicle

from Defendant GT Auto Sales (“Defendant”) and tendered full payment using a bill

of exchange, yet Defendant failed to properly reject the payment or deliver the vehicle.

[Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 10–11.] He claims that he is owed the full amount paid for the vehicle

– $80,500.00 – due to Defendant’s breach of contract. [Id. ¶ 18.]

I. IFP APPLICATION

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 54.3, “the Clerk shall not be required to enter any

suit, file any paper, issue any process, or render any other service for which a fee is

prescribed . . . unless the fee is paid in advance.” Under certain circumstances,

however, this Court may permit an indigent plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis.

A court may permit a litigant to proceed without prepayment of fees if he

submits a proper IFP application and establishes that he is unable to pay the requisite

fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Courts within the Third Circuit only grant leave to

proceed IFP “based on a showing of indigence.” Douris v. Newtown Borough, Inc.,

207 F. App’x 242, 243 (3d Cir. 2006). While IFP status is not reserved solely for the

“absolutely destitute,” the litigant “must establish that he is unable to pay the costs of

his suit.” Hurst v. Shalk, 659 F. App’x 133, 134 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Walker v. People

Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989)). The litigant seeking IFP status

bears the burden “to provide the Court with the financial information it needs to make

a determination as to whether she qualifies for IFP status.” Freeman v. Edens, 2007

WL 2406789, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2007) (cleaned up). “[A] plaintiff must state the

facts concerning [his] poverty with some degree of particularity, definiteness or

certainty.” Gross v. Cormack, 2013 WL 5435463, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting

Simon v. Mercer Cnty. Comm. College, 2011 WL 551196, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2011)).

While Section 1915 “is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have

meaningful access to the federal courts,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989),

proceeding IFP “is a privilege, not a constitutional right.” Atl. Cnty. Cent. Mun. Ct. Inc.

v. Bey, 2024 WL 1256450, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2024). “Failure to submit a

completed financial affidavit renders an IFP application incomplete and this defect

warrants the application’s denial.” Id. (citing Rohn v. Johnston, 415 F. App’x 353, 355

(3d Cir. 2011)).

In his IFP application, Plaintiff states that he is unemployed, has zero income

and zero assets, and that he does not expect any future income. He notes that he has

$38.00 in a checking account. Plaintiff claims to have zero monthly expenses for

housing, utilities, home maintenance, medical and dental expenses, recreation,

insurances, taxes, or installment payments. But he offers no explanation as to

“how he subsists without paying any [of these] expenses.” Hedgepeth v. Cap. Health,

2023 WL 6579821, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2023) (denying IFP application where

plaintiff claimed to have “no assets, no income, and no expenses,” much like Plaintiff

here). His only claimed expenses are food, clothing, laundry, and transportation. Yet

he does not explain how he covers these expenses with no income whatsoever.1

Plaintiff’s IFP application is patently deficient. A litigant seeking IFP status

cannot claim indigency by merely marking zeros across the board in an IFP

application. See, e.g., Afshar v. Rutgers Univ., 2024 WL 4476154, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 11,

2024) (denying IFP application, finding plaintiff did not make “a good faith effort to

state his income and assets” where plaintiff wrote “‘0’ for every single box” in IFP

application). That is essentially what Plaintiff has done here. Based upon Plaintiff’s

submission, the Court cannot properly determine Plaintiff’s financial status and

whether he is eligible to proceed IFP. Accordingly, the Court will deny his IFP

application without prejudice.

1 The Court questions how Plaintiff supposedly purchased a vehicle for over

$80,000 only a month prior to applying for IFP status given what he has represented

about his finances.

II. SCREENING FOR DISMISSAL

Although the Court has denied Plaintiff’s IFP application, the Court will

nonetheless review the merits of the Complaint. See Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 660

(3d Cir. 2019) (holding that “a court has the authority to dismiss a case at any time,

regardless of the status of a filing fee; that is, a court has the discretion to consider the

merits of a case and evaluate an IFP application in either order or even

simultaneously.”) (internal citation omitted). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),

a court reviewing a complaint filed IFP must dismiss claims that are: (1) frivolous or

malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Courts must liberally

construe pleadings that are filed pro se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This

requirement, however, does not excuse pro se plaintiffs from pleading the essential

elements of their claims or otherwise conforming to the standard rules of civil

procedure. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Thakar v. Tan,

372 F. App’x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010) (a plaintiff is “not absolved from complying with

Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds

pro se.”).

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Complaint adequately pleads a breach of

contract claim under New Jersey law. That being said, the Court cannot assure itself

of its subjection matter jurisdiction over this claim. Courts can sua sponte raise the issue

of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward Trucking

Corp., 48 F.3d 742, 750 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[F]ederal courts have an ever-present

obligation to satisfy themselves of their subject matter jurisdiction and to decide the

issue sua sponte[.]”). Federal courts “are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Royal Canin

U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 26 (2025). As such, federal courts have

“subject matter jurisdiction over civil action arising under ‘the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States’ (federal question jurisdiction) and civil actions between

citizens of different states with the amount in controversy exceeding the sum or value

of $75,000 (diversity jurisdiction).” Rockefeller v. Comcast Corp., 424 F. App’x 82, 83

(3d Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a)).

Plaintiff contends that this Court has jurisdiction over his breach of contract

claim based upon diversity of citizenship. [Compl. ¶ 3.] Plaintiff is a citizen of

New Jersey. [Id. ¶ 1.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is “a motor vehicle dealership

located” in Tacoma, Washington. [Id. ¶ 2.] Based on this alone, Plaintiff claims that

Defendant is a citizen of Washington.

But this is insufficient. The citizenship of each party must be specifically

alleged. Martin v. Aurora Fin. Grp., Inc., 2024 WL 1485461, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2024)

(citing S. Freedman & Co. v. Raab, 180 F. App’x 316, 320 (3d Cir. 2006)). Defendant is

clearly not an individual, yet Plaintiff does not set forth what type of entity Defendant

is – for example a corporation or a limited liability company (“LLC”) – or the

information required to ascertain the citizenship of the entity. The citizenship of a

corporation is determined by its state of incorporation and its principal place of

business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Unlike a corporation, the citizenship of an LLC is

determined by the citizenship of each of its members, not where it has a principal place

of business, where it operates, or under which state’s law it is established. See Zambelli

Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2010). Plaintiff, as the party

asserting diversity jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing its requirements. Here,

Plaintiff has failed to do so. Accordingly, based on the pleadings before it, the Court

cannot satisfy itself of its subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim. Accordingly, the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his pleadings to

adequately establish Defendant’s citizenship.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY, on this 8th day of January 2026,

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s IFP Application [Docket No. 1-2] is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further

ORDERED that, within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff

shall submit an amended complaint that properly establishes the basis for this Court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, accompanied by either the requisite $405 filing fee or

a renewed IFP application; and it is further

ORDERED that, in the event that Plaintiff does not timely submit an amended

complaint accompanied by either the filing fee or a renewed IFP application, the Court

will close the file in this matter without further notice and subject to reopening only

upon good cause shown; and it is finally

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall MAIL a copy of this

Memorandum Opinion and Order to Plaintiff via regular U.S. mail and NOTE the

completion of same on the docket.

s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

Chief United States District Judge