Gatlin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER GATLIN, )

)

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 4:25-CV-43-ACL

)

vs. )

)

MATTHEW WELLE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Christopher Gatlin filed this civil rights action against Defendants Matthew Welle,

Matthew Shute, Cody Goodwin, St. Louis County, and City of St. Louis on January 13, 2025.

(Doc. 1.) Gatlin alleges various federal and state law claims—including municipal liability claims

under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)—related to

the Defendants’ alleged misuse of facial recognition technology.

Presently pending before the Court is Defendant City of St. Louis’s (“City”) Motion to

Substitute the State of Missouri (“State”) as a named defendant in this matter for the City.

(Doc. 53.)

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Background

On March 26, 2025, subsequent to the filing of the Complaint in this action, the Missouri

General Assembly enacted a law transferring control of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police

Department from the City to the State. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 84.325.

In response to the new legislation, the City and non-party the St. Louis Board of Police

Commissioners (“Board”) each filed separate motions to substitute parties. The Board, through

the Missouri Attorney General’s office, filed a Motion to Substitute the Board and its individual

members for the City (Doc. 49); whereas the City moved to substitute the State of Missouri for

the City (Doc. 53).

On October 9, 2025, the Board moved to withdraw its motion to substitute, citing the

recent decision of this Court in Clark v. City of St. Louis, et al., 4:21-cv-00788-JMD, where

United States District Judge Joshua M. Divine denied the Motion to Substitute the Board for the

City. (Doc. 60.) The Board stated that it was moving to withdraw the substitution rather than

“re-litigate an issue this Court has already decided.” Id. at 1. The Board described the transfer

of control of the police force as a “complex situation at best, in which Counsel is attempting to

respond appropriately.” Id. The Court granted the motion and withdrew the Board’s motion to

substitute. (Doc. 78.) The City’s motion to substitute the State for the City remains pending.

Plaintiff (Doc. 64) and Defendant Welle (Doc. 62) both oppose the City’s motion to

substitute. On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. (Doc. 75.)

Plaintiff notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the City’s

request to appeal Judge Divine’s order denying the motion to substitute in the Clark case cited

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above. (Doc. 75-1.) Additionally, Plaintiff cites a recent state circuit court decision—James Pence

v. Ramelle Wallace, et al., (2422-CC00923)—denying the City’s motion to reconsider the denial

of its request to substitute the Board for the City. (Doc. 75-2.) The City filed a Response to

Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority. (Doc. 79.)

Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25, in the event of a transfer of interest, “the

action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the

person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the

original party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c). The rule is designed to allow an action to continue

unabated when an interest in a lawsuit changes hands, rather than requiring the initiation of an

entirely new lawsuit. ELCA Enters., Inc. v. Sisco Equip. Rental & Sales, Inc., 53 F.3d 186, 191

(8th Cir. 1995) (citing Gen. Battery Corp. v. Globe-Union, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 258, 261 (D. Del.

1982)). Whether substitution is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c) falls within the trial

court’s discretion. Fronings, Inc. v. Johnston Feed Serv., Inc., 568 F.2d 108, 111 n.4 (8th Cir.

1978).

Discussion

The City argues that, as a result of the transfer of control of the police department, the State

accepted all responsibility and liability arising from the City’s prior operation of the police

department. The City contends that the State is, therefore, the real party in interest and the

appropriate defendant in this action.

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The State responds that the plain reading of the statute would only transfer to the State

contractual obligations and other lawful obligations. The State argues that the legislature did not

intend for every liability to transfer, but only the specifically enumerated liabilities.

Plaintiff argues that substitution is improper in this case where a dispute exists regarding

whether a transfer of liabilities has taken place.

The statute provides as follows, in relevant part: “Upon the assumption of control by the

board of police commissioners under subsection 1 of this section, the state shall accept

responsibility, ownership, and liability as successor-in-interest for contractual obligations and

other lawful obligations of the municipal police department.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 84.325.3.

In Clark, Judge Divine first examined the plain text of Section 84.325.3, and noted that it

transferred to the State only the police department’s liabilities, not the City’s liabilities. 4:21-cv-

00788-JMD, Doc. 212 at 3-4 (emphasis added). Judge Divine next considered the City’s

argument that the Court should deviate from this interpretation of the statute, because the police

department had no liabilities in its name; every liability related to the police department was held

in the name of the City. Id. at 4. The City argued that applying the most natural meaning of the

text would therefore give the text no effect at all, as there would be no liabilities to transfer. Id.

Judge Divine agreed that “departing from the most natural reading might be justified to transfer

some of the City’s liabilities,” but found that “it does not follow that the statute transfers all City

liabilities related to the police force.” Id. (emphasis in original). Applying established statutory

construction principles, Judge Divine found that, “[a]t most, the statute transfers those liabilities

related to contracts, debts, utilities, and the like.” Id. at 5. Judge Divine found that Monell

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liabilities differ from the other liabilities enumerated above, because they originate not from the

police department but arise from actions done by the City. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). Judge

Divine concluded that the statute did not transfer Monell liabilities:

The Court need not—and cannot, on this record—enumerate all liabilities

that might plausibly be transferred under this statute. It is enough to conclude that

if the statute transfers liabilities incurred by the police department in the name of

the City, those liabilities are contractual liabilities, utilities, obligations, and the

like. The text transferring only liabilities ‘of the municipal police department’

cannot be stretched to include the ‘City’s’ liabilities for injuries caused by the

City’s policies.

Id. at 7. Finally, Judge Divine found that the doctrine of sovereign immunity cautioned against

substitution of parties due to the potential of the Board members raising this defense and

preventing the suit from continuing. Id. at 9-10.

The City, in its Response to Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority, argues that the

undersigned is not bound by Judge Divine’s ruling in Clark or by the state circuit court decision

cited by Plaintiff. The City further argues that the Eighth Circuit’s denial of the City’s petition

for an interlocutory appeal in Clark was not a substantive decision and creates no precedential

value. The City urges the undersigned to instead exercise its own, independent discretion in

ruling on the City’s motion to substitute.

Although the Clark decision is not binding precedent, the undersigned finds Judge

Divine’s reasoning persuasive. Judge Divine undertook a thorough analysis of Mo. Rev. Stat. §

84.325.3, invoking well-established principles of statutory construction. The conclusion that the

statute did not transfer all of the City’s liabilities to the State is well-reasoned. Neither the

Eighth Circuit nor the state appellate courts have ruled on this issue. Due to the unsettled nature

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of the law on this complex issue and the discretion that Rule 25(c) affords this Court, the

undersigned will deny the City’s motion to substitute the State for the City.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant City of St. Louis’s Motion to Substitute

Parties (Doc. 53) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant City of St. Louis’s Motion for Extension

of Time to File an Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 63) is granted in that

Defendant City of St. Louis’s Answer is due no later than January 20, 2026.

/s/ Abbie Crites-Leoni

ABBIE CRITES-LEONI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated this 6th day of January, 2026.

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