Kleger

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

CINDY KLEGER, et al., *

Plaintiffs, *

v. * Civil Case No: 1:24-cv-00095-JMC

DORCHESTER COUNTY,

MARYLAND, et al.,

*

Defendants.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, Cindy Kleger (individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of

Wyatt Allan Young) and Roger Allan Young, initiated the present lawsuit on January 10, 2024,

against Dorchester County, Maryland (“Dorchester County”), Don Satterfield,1 Davion Jammal

Batson, Marquet Robinson, Arthur Nelson,2 and “additional unidentified officers” alleging

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, negligence, gross negligence,

wrongful death, survivorship, and negligent supervision. (ECF No. 1). Before the Court are several

motions: (1) Defendant Batson’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 94); (2) Defendant

Dorchester County’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 96); (3) Defendant Robinson’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 97); (4) Plaintiffs’ Conditional Motion to

Amend/Correct the Complaint (ECF No. 120); and (5) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike, or in the

alternative, for Limited Discovery and a Sur-Reply. The motions are fully briefed (ECF Nos. 94,

96, 97, 102, 104, 106, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 124, 127) and no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R.

1 The Court previously approved Plaintiffs’ notice of voluntary dismissal regarding Defendant Satterfield. See (ECF

Nos. 53, 54).

2 The Court previously approved Plaintiffs’ notice of voluntary dismissal regarding Defendant Nelson. See (ECF Nos.

87, 88).

105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons that follow, Defendant Dorchester County’s Motion for

Summary Judgment will be denied; Defendant Batson’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be

denied; Defendant Robinson’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied; Plaintiffs’

Conditional Motion for Leave to Amend/Correct will be granted; and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike

will be denied in part and granted in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Parties

Plaintiff Kleger is the surviving parent of Wyatt Allan Young (“Mr. Young”). (ECF No.

102-35 at 13-14). Plaintiff Roger Allan Young was the natural father of Mr. Young. (ECF No. 1

at 4). Defendant Dorchester County is “an entity of local government of the State of Maryland”

that owns and operates the Dorchester County Detention Center (“DCDC”) through its Department

of Corrections (“DOC”). Id. at 2, 4. Defendants Batson and Robinson were correctional officers

with the DCDC. (ECF Nos. 102-37 at 10, 106-36 at 9-10).

B. Factual Background

i. Traffic Accident, Missing Person Report, and Arrest

In January 1, 2021, Mr. Young stopped going to work and began behaving out of his usual

character. (ECF No. 102-35 at 14). Plaintiff Kleger was concerned about the changes in Mr.

Young’s behavior to the extent that she reached out to Mr. Young’s employer to ask about him.

Id. Specifically, Plaintiff Kleger “started to think he had a drug problem.” Id. at 17. Then on

January 8, 2021, at 8:59 a.m., the Wicomico Sheriff’s Office (“WSO”) responded to the scene of

an apparent hit and run accident. (ECF No. 102-6 at 3). The responding officer found Mr. Young’s

wallet, containing his driver’s license, in an abandoned vehicle with front-end damage. Id.

Dispatch provided the officer with Plaintiff Kleger’s address, who was the registered owner of the

abandoned vehicle. Id. Thereafter, he met with Plaintiff Kleger. Id. According to the WSO’s

police report, Plaintiff Kleger “advised that she had not heard from her son since…yesterday but

that she believes he…relapsed on drugs due to him missing work and disappearing for sometime

[sic] not answering calls or responding to her messages.” Id. She further indicated “she believe[d]

Young may be suicidal due to prior statements he has made to her due to being embarrassed from

relapsing on some form of drug.” The officer told Plaintiff Kleger that Mr. Young “was in a very

serious car accident and the car was totaled and he just missed the telephone pole and nobody

could find him.” (ECF No. 102-35 at 18).

After that conversation, Plaintiff Kleger filed a petition for an emergency evaluation to be

performed on Mr. Young in the Wicomico County District Court because she was worried for his

mental health and physical well-being. (ECF No. 102-9 at 8-9). Judge Wade of that court granted

the emergency petition by way of a court order (the “Emergency Order”). Id. Thereafter, the

Wicomico County Sheriff’s office (“WCSO”) issued a “Missing Person Report Form” for Mr.

Young that indicated he “was involved in a hit and run,” “has not been seen since the accident,”

and “is using CDS again and has possible made suicidal statements.” Id. The district court held a

hearing on Plaintiff Kleger’s Emergency Order at 1:30 p.m. on January 9, 2021. (ECF No. 102-

10). Judge Wade issued an order, finding “probable cause to believe that [Mr. Young] has shown

the symptoms of a mental disorder and presents a danger to the life or safety of [himself] or others

and therefore ORDERS that any peace officer take into custody and transport [him] to the nearest

emergency facility for examination by a physician within six hours after arrival at the facility.”

(ECF No. 102-9 at 2).

After Judge Wade issued the Emergency Order, Maryland State Police informed the WSO

that they located a stolen vehicle that “was just involved in a motor vehicle crash.” (ECF No. 102-

6 at 6). At that time, the Maryland State Police suspected that Mr. Young was the individual

operating the stolen vehicle and subsequently took him “into custody…for [a] DUI and the stolen

vehicle.” Id. at 6. Specifically, Trooper Zed Grafton arrested Mr. Young and transported him to

the Maryland State Police detachment for processing, which is a separate office maintained by the

Maryland State Police. (ECF No. 94-4 at 7-8). While in custody there, Maryland State Police

attempted to interview Mr. Young in connection to an unrelated investigation, at which point Mr.

Young invoked his Miranda rights. Id. at 12.

After the Maryland State Police received a copy of the Emergency Order by fax, the police

transported Mr. Young to DCDC rather than the hospital. (ECF Nos. 94-9, 94-10). Before Mr.

Young appeared before a district court commissioner by telephone, the police submitted a

statement of probable cause, which contained no reference to the Emergency Order. (ECF No. 94-

12). The District Court Commissioner committed Mr. Young to DCDC pending a hearing. (ECF

No. 94-13). There is also no reference to the Emergency Order in the commitment document. See

id.

ii. Custody at Dorchester County Detention Center

Thereafter, Trooper Grafton transported Mr. Young to the Dorchester County Detention

Center (“DCDC”). (ECF No. 102-31 at 20). Trooper Grafton’s supervisors directed him “not to

take [Mr. Young] to the hospital and take him straight to jail.” Id. at 23. Mr. Young arrived at

DCDC around 6:05 p.m. on January 9, 2021. (ECF Nos. 102-16 at 1, 102-18 at 2). Defendant

Robinson was the shift supervisor at that time. (ECF No. 102-8 at 41). Trooper Grafton provided

“a copy of all of Mr. Young’s paperwork,” including the Emergency Order, when he transferred

Mr. Young to Defendant Robinson’s custody. (ECF No. 102-31 at 20). Trooper Grafton does not

recall the precise details of the conversations he had with DCDC employees that day. See id.

When asked whether he was confident that he told DCDC about the concerns that Mr. Young was

suicidal, Trooper Grafton responded, “Yes, that’s what I told them.” Id. at 96. Defendant Robinson

indicated he “received the paperwork” from Trooper Grafton and discussed with Trooper Grafton

that Mr. Young “was in a commitment and he had drugs in his system.” (ECF No. 102-36 at 19).

Defendant Robinson “went through” the paperwork and indicated “everything was appropriately

placed in there.” Id. Neither Defendant Robinson nor another employee at the DCDC transported

Mr. Yong to the hospital. See id. Rather, they brought Mr. Young to the facility and began to

process him. Id.

Upon processing, Mr. Young tested positive for marijuana, methadone, and morphine.

(ECF No. 102-4). During processing, DCDC “ask the law enforcement agency that is bringing the

detainee in if there [are] any active warrants because they would have ran it at their precinct.”

(ECF No. 94-14 at 14). Accordingly, “any knowledge of any warrants would have come from the

law enforcement agency itself.” Id. Mr. Young was not screened as a suicide risk. (ECF No. 94-

16). Then, DCDC staff placed Mr. Young in a medical cell and not on suicide watch. See (ECF

No. 102-33 at 43-44). In a suicide watch or detox cell, there exist greater harm-prevention features

like bedsheets are “fairly tearproof” such that the “design juts allows you not to tie knots” to

prevent a person from harming himself. (ECF No. 102-8 at 59-60). Further, individuals would

wear a tearproof smock rather than regular clothing. Id. at 59. Suicide watch and detox cells also

require officers to conduct fifteen-minute in-person checks and requires live-feed camera

streaming monitored by officers in the control center. (ECF Nos. 102-8 at 32, 70; 102-20). Such

measures are not present in standard cells for processing and in medical cells. (ECF No. 102-8 at

21-23). Further, medical cells require thirty-minute security checks as opposed to fifteen-minute

checks. Id.

According to Officer Arthur Nelson, when an officer transfers an individual and either has

an Emergency Order or indicates that one exists, DCDC officers have a “responsibility” to “turn

them away so they could take them to the hospital for their evaluation because…that’s a legal court

document [by] which they have to abide…” Id. at 28. If the DCDC officers relied on “word of

mouth,” they would “make a telephone call to the chief of security” to obtain the Emergency Order

record. Id. at 30. If the individual were to remain in DCDC custody, “it would come from a higher

authority than the shift supervisor has at that point.” Id. Moreover, corrections officers do not

require medical sign-off permissions to place an individual on suicide watch, as it is considered a

“security measure.” Id. at 118. If an individual is placed in a non-suicide watch cell, the individual

must be moved to a detox cell “without hesitation” if “a family member calls in” with a report that

the individual is suicidal. Id. at 26.

At some point after Mr. Young was processed for placement in the medical cell, the 7:00

a.m. to 7:00 p.m. corrections officer shift changed, and officers working the 7:00 p.m. shift to 7:00

a.m. shift took command. (ECF No. 104-3). During that shift change, Corrections Officer Nelson

replaced Defendant Robinson as the Shift Supervisor. (ECF No. 102-11 at 1). During the

changeover, Defendant Robinson did not tell Corrections Officer Nelson about the Emergency

Order or that Mr. Young was suicidal. (ECF No. 102-8 at 46).

iii. Plaintiff Kleger’s Call to DCDC

Plaintiff Kleger learned that Mr. Young was transported to DCDC from one of Mr.

Young’s friends. (ECF No. 102-36 at 39). Thereafter, she called DCDC’s main phone number at

8:27 a.m. on January 10, 2021. (ECF No. 102-23 at 2; 102-36 at 40). That phone call lasted

approximately seven minutes. (ECF No. 102-23 at 2). Plaintiff Kleger’s husband recalls hearing

Plaintiff Kleger “pleading her case that there was an EP in place, [Mr. Young] should be put in

some sort of suicide watch or where he should have gotten help that he needed.3” (ECF No. 102-

34 at 16-17). During that phone call, Corrections Officer Jazmyne Sampson was assigned to the

control center and was responsible for answering phones. (ECF No. 102-26 at 13, 17). Though

C.O. Sampson did not recall this specific phone call, she indicated she would have responded to

the report that Mr. Young was suicidal by “transfer[ing] it to [her] immediate supervisor

immediately.” Id. at 22. At that time, C.O. Sampson’s immediate supervisor was Defendant

Batson. Id. at 25. She indicated she did not have the authority to place an inmate on suicide watch

and that “Sergeant Davion Batson who would have been who [she] transferred [her] call to.” Id.

According to Plaintiff Kleger, she “told them that he has an EP. I said this so many times. He has

an EP. It’s an emergency evaluation and you have to take him to the hospital.” (ECF No. 102-35

at 40). At that time, Plaintiff Kleger spoke with a woman who told her to call back the following

Monday. Id. Then, the operator transferred the call to a man after Plaintiff Kleger said multiple

times, “he’s suicidal, he’s suicidal, you have to take him to the hospital.” Id. She indicated that in

total, she called five times that day. Id. at 49.

iv. Mr. Young’s Suicide in DCDC Custody

On January 10, 2021, around 10:05 a.m., Mr. Young was seen alive in his medical cell.

(ECF No. 102-16 at 1-2). While conducting rounds, Defendant Robinson and a nurse witnessed

Mr. Young “laying on his bed with his eyes open.” Id. Defendant Robinson again conducted a

3 Of some concern is the spoliation doctrine. (ECF No. 104 at 17 n.4). Plaintiffs indicate they sent a preservation

letter to DCDC. (ECF No. 104-24). Indeed, the preservation letter seeks “preservation of all evidence relating to this

incident” including “telephone logs.” Id. According to DCDC personnel, all call logs are stored for eighteen to twenty-

four months, meaning the letter was sent greater than a year before any call logs pertaining to the incident would have

been routinely deleted. (ECF No. 25 at 8). DCDC failed to preserve the telephone records, including those relating

to Plaintiff Kleger’s conversation with Officer Sampson. (ECF No. 27). At this juncture, the Court declines to make

a ruling on spoliation, as it is not a central issue to summary judgment. However, Plaintiffs may request a jury

instruction for the Court’s consideration should it become necessary.

“tier check” around 10:40 a.m.4 According to the surveillance footage, Defendant Robinson

observed Mr. Young’s cell for approximately ten seconds before leaving the medical tier

approximately a minute and a half later. (ECF No. 98-1 at 11:40:07-11:41:40). During that check,

Mr. Young was behind the door near the corner of the cell. (ECF No. 102-17 at 4).

The next check occurred about thirty minutes later, when Defendant Robinson returned to

the medical tier with the afternoon meals. (ECF No. 102-3 at 2). At that time, Defendant Robinson

observed Mr. Young hanging by the door hinge near the corner of his cell. (ECF No. 102-16 at

1). Mr. Young “had tied a piece of sheet around his neck” in such a manner that was “tied…[to]

obstruct his airway.” Id. Defendants called 911 around 11:45 a.m., and he was pronounced

deceased around 12:00 p.m. on January 10, 2021. (ECF Nos. 102-2 at 2; 102-18 at 2).

Afterwards, an inmate named Gregory Oeschner submitted a written statement to the

Dorchester County Sheriff’s Department. (ECF No. 102-14). Mr. Oechsner was housed in the cell

directly across from Mr. Young’s cell and was able to see into it. (ECF No. 102-3 at 2). In his

statement, Mr. Oechsner indicated that Mr. Young “was at his window with a noose in his hand

for about 5-10 minutes.” (ECF No. 102-14). Mr. Young’s autopsy report concluded that Mr.

Young died due to “asphyxia by hanging.” (ECF No. 102-12 at 1, 5).

C. Relevant Procedural Background

The record is well-developed. Plaintiff filed the instant case on January 10, 2024. (ECF

No. 1). Defendant Dorchester County filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on April

24, 2025. (ECF No. 30). Defendant Batson filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

or in the alternative, for summary judgment on May 14, 2024. (ECF No. 40). Thereafter, the Court

4 The parties have noted a discrepancy between the contemporaneous written documentation regarding this time check

and the time stamp on surveillance footage. (ECF Nos. 94-28 at 7 n.1, 102 at 19 n.6). The Parties agree that the

surveillance footage timestamp is incorrect and that the tier check occurred at 10:40 a.m.

granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 70). Defendants answered on

August 22, 2024, August 26, 2024, and August 29, 2024. (ECF Nos. 75, 76, 80). After discovery,

Defendants filed the presently pending motions for summary judgment on August 12, 2025. (ECF

Nos. 94, 96, 97). Thereafter, on October 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Conditional Motion for Leave

to Amend the Complaint based on several of Defendant Robinson’s summary judgment arguments.

(ECF No. 120). Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Strike Defendant Robinson’s Reply in Support of

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 119), or in the Alternative, for Limited Discovery and a Sur-Reply.

(ECF No. 121). After thorough review, the Court will address each of the pending motions at this

juncture.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the Court to “grant summary judgment if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” A dispute as to a material fact “is genuine if the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” J.E. Dunn Const. Co. v.

S.R.P. Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 115 F. Supp. 3d 593, 600 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A nonmoving party “opposing a properly supported

motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his]

pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)).

The Court is “required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to” the nonmoving party. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007)). However, the Court must also “abide by the ‘affirmative

obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding

to trial.’” Heckman v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799–800 (D. Md. 2013)

(quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993)). Consequently, a party cannot

create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences.

See Deans v. CSX Transp., Inc., 152 F.3d 326, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1998). “[I]n the face of conflicting

evidence, such as competing affidavits, summary judgment ordinarily is not appropriate, because

it is the function of the fact-finder to resolve factual disputes, including matters of witness

credibility.” Angelini v. Balt. Police Dep't, 464 F. Supp. 3d 756, 776 (D. Md. 2020).

III. ANALYSIS

A. There Exist Genuine Issues of Material Fact Underlying Defendant Batson’s

Knowledge of Mr. Young’s Suicidal Ideation and Therefore He is Not

Entitled to Public Official Immunity.

Defendant Batson again seeks public official immunity based on the argument that his

actions were within the scope of his employment and without gross negligence, as a matter of law.

(ECF No. 94-28 at 8). As stated at the motion to dismiss stage, “public official immunity is

recognized both at common law and by statute.” Balt. Police Dep’t v. Cherkes, 140 Md. App. 282,

328 (2001). Under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-507, “[a]n official of a municipal

corporation, while acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice, and within the scope of the

official’s employment or authority shall be immune as an official or individual from any civil

liability for the performance of the action.” Id. § 5-507(a)(1). The doctrine aims to “permit

[public] officers . . . to make the appropriate decisions in an atmosphere of great uncertainty”

because “holding [public] officers liable in hindsight for every injurious consequence would

paralyze the functions of law enforcement.” Cherkes, 140 Md. App. at 328. For common law

public official immunity to apply:

(1) the actor must be a public official, rather than a mere government employee or

agent; (2) the conduct must have occurred while the actor was performing

discretionary, as opposed to ministerial acts; and (3) the actor must have performed

the relevant acts within the scope of his official duties.

City of District Heights v. Denny, 123 Md. App. 508, 516 (1998).

“If those three conditions are met, the public official enjoys a qualified immunity in the

absence of ‘malice. 5’” Id. Maryland’s highest court then expanded this “exception” to public

official immunity to include “gross negligence” in Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 723–24

(2015). Cooper defined “gross negligence” as follows:

[A]n intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the

consequences as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a

thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any effort to

avoid them. Stated conversely, a wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence or acts

wantonly and willfully only when he [or she] inflicts injury intentionally or is so

utterly indifferent to the rights of others that he [or she] acts as if such rights did

not exist.

Id. at 708. “Whether or not gross negligence exists necessarily depends on the facts and

circumstances in each case[,] and is usually a question for the jury and is a question of law only

when reasonable [people] could not differ as to the rational conclusion to be reached.” Id. at 708–

09 (citing Romanesk v. Rose, 248 Md. 420, 423 (1968)).

Little has changed since the motion to dismiss stage. Defendants place great emphasis on

the discovery revelation that Defendant Robinson conducted the 30-minute wellness checks as

required. (ECF No. 94-28). However, this is not the only basis upon which the Complaint and the

other evidence support an allegation of gross negligence. Discovery also shows Plaintiff Kleger

called DCDC on the morning of January 10, 2021 and spoke with an employee for approximately

seven minutes. (ECF No. 102-23 at 2). During that phone call, Plaintiff Kleger was “Kleger

“pleading her case that there was an EP in place, [Mr. Young] should be put in some sort of suicide

5 The Court disposed of the actual malice issue at the motion to dismiss stage. See generally (ECF No. 69).

watch or where he should have gotten help that he needed.” (ECF No. 102-34 at 16-17). C.O.

Sampson, the officer assigned to answer the phones, indicated she would have responded to such

information by transferring the phone call to her immediate supervisor. (ECF No. 102-26 at 13,

17). Plaintiff Kleger recalled speaking with a man, and she also told that individual, “he’s suicidal,

he’s suicidal, you have to take him to the hospital.” (ECF No. 102-35 at 40). To that end, there

exists a factual dispute as to whether that employee was Defendant Batson or another employee in

a supervisory capacity.6 Thus, there exists a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Defendant

Batson’s knowledge of Mr. Young’s suicidal ideation. Based on Plaintiff Kleger’s, her husband’s,

and C.O. Sampson’s testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Batson knew Mr.

Young was a suicide risk and ignored Plaintiff Kleger’s indications about Mr. Young’s emergency

order. It could be true that a jury is unpersuaded and finds in favor of Defendants. But affording

all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, there exists, at the very least, a genuine issue

of material fact with respect to gross negligence.7 Indeed, Defendant Batson’s concern with certain

credibility issues are not for the Court to resolve at summary judgment. Angelini, 464 F. Supp. 3d

at 776. Therefore, Defendant Batson’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 94) is DENIED.

B. Defendant Robinson’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied Because the

Record Contains Multiple Genuine Issues of Material Fact Concerning

Defendant Robinson’s Knowledge that Mr. Young Presented a Risk of Suicide.

1. There Exist Genuine Issues of Material Fact Regarding Defendant

Robinson’s Knowledge that Mr. Young Posed a Suicide Threat.

6 See supra Section III.A.

7 There exists some additional dispute as to whether DCDC’s policies conferred upon Defendant Batson a ministerial

or discretionary duty to place Mr. Wyatt in a suicide risk cell. (ECF Nos. 102 at 26, 118 at 6). However, because

there exists a genuine fact dispute as to whether Defendant Batson had knowledge of Mr. Young’s suicidal ideation,

the Court declines to make a determination on this issue.

Defendant Robinson first seeks summary judgment under Count I because, as he contends,

“Defendant Robinson had zero awareness that Mr. Young presented a risk of suicide until he was

unresponsive in his cell…” (ECF No. 97-1 at 24). But a defendant’s subjective knowledge is no

longer the only path to establishing liability. The jurisprudence reflecting this expansion is

extensive. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389

(2015); Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 97–98 (4th Cir. 2017); Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th

593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023). Indeed, “[a] pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect

claim” was previously “analyzed under the two-pronged inquiry set forth in Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825 (1994).” State v. Wallace, Nos. 0164 & 0642, September Term, 2021, 2022 WL

2282705, at *17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 23, 2022), cert. granted, 482 Md. 142 (2022), and case

dismissed, 483 Md. 262 (2023). Under Farmer, the analysis required a plaintiff prove (1)

objectively, “the prisoner must be exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm”; and (2)

subjectively, “the prison official must know and disregard that substantial risk to the inmate’s

health or safety.” Thompson, 878 F.3d at 97–98. Thereafter, Kingsley v. Henderson eliminated

the subjective requirement to prove a Fourteenth Amendment violation under a theory of failure

to protect a pretrial detainee. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Short again clarified that the case

law “repudiates a subjective requirement for pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment claims and

permits pretrial detainees to state Fourteenth Amendment claims . . . on the purely objective basis

that the governmental action they challenge is not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive

governmental purpose or is excessive in relation to that purpose.” Short, 87 F.4th at 611. Under

the present objective test,

[t]he plaintiff no longer has to show that the defendant had actual knowledge of the

detainee’s serious medical condition and consciously disregarded the risk that their

action or failure to act would result in harm. That showing remains sufficient, but

it is no longer necessary. Now, it is sufficient that the plaintiff show that the

defendant’s action or inaction was, in Kingsley’s words, ‘objectively unreasonable,’

that is, the plaintiff must show that the defendant should have known of that

condition and that risk, and acted accordingly.

Id. (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397).

Alternatively, a pretrial detainee plaintiff may prevail under the Fourteenth Amendment

“if they can meet the more demanding Eighth Amendment standard.” Id. at 612. Under this

standard, a plaintiff may prevail under a deliberate indifference test, which includes both of the

objective and subjective components previously applied during the Farmer era. Id. at 608, 612.

(“The Supreme Court’s ruling in Kingsley v. Hendrickson upends the assumption that Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process claims should be treated the same as Eighth Amendment claims . . .

Though the Supreme Court instructed in Kingsley that an objective test is proper for pretrial

detainees’ claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee can still state a claim if

they can meet the more demanding Eighth Amendment standard.”). As stated at the motion to

dismiss stage, “[t]he subjective element requires that the prison official acted with deliberate

indifference to inmate human health or safety, meaning that the official ‘had actual subjective

knowledge of both the inmate’s serious medical condition and the excessive risk posed by the

official’s action or inaction.’” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014)).

Thus, at this juncture, the Court is satisfied that summary judgment depends in large part

on whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding Defendant Robinson’s

knowledge that Mr. Young was suicidal. See id. As stated above, the Court does not find that the

revelation of Defendant Robinson’s timely checks defeats all genuine issues of material fact

underlying knowledge. A reasonable jury could believe either of Plaintiffs’ theories underlying

knowledge; if a jury were to believe that Trooper Grafton included a copy of the Emergency Order

in the paperwork he provided Defendant Robinson, a jury could very well find that Defendant

Robinson knew or should have known of Mr. Young’s suicidal ideation. Similarly, were a jury to

believe that Trooper Grafton told Defendant Robinson that Mr. Young was suicidal, an inference

of knowledge could reasonably follow. Defendant Robinson’s emphasis on inferences in his favor

are unavailing. (ECF No. 97-1 at 17). While it is possible a jury could agree that Defendant

Robinson’s mere presence at the Sallyport with Trooper Grafton does not necessitate an inference

that he knew or should have known that Mr. Young was suicidal, that possibility is not dispositive.

Defendant Robinson’s emphasis on the Incident Report (ECF No. 97-15) and his own testimony

(ECF Nos. 97-13, 97-20); is well taken but is similarly non-dispositive. To grant summary

judgment based on these arguments would require the Court to disregard the reasonable inferences

that can be drawn from Trooper Grafton’s testimony8 in favor of those that can be drawn from

Defendant Robinson’s. While a jury could very well do so, the Court cannot. Angelini, 464 F.

Supp. 3d at 776. Moreover, it cannot be said that Trooper Grafton’s testimony constitutes only a

scintilla of evidence. Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477

U.S. at 252). At the very least, it is clear that there exists some fact dispute as to Defendant

Robinson’s subjective knowledge that Mr. Young was suicidal. Short, 87 F.4th at 611-12. It then

follows that are also genuine issues of material fact with respect to deliberate indifference

considering the parties disputes over (1) the quality of the checks; (2) the responsibilities under

8

…is it fair to say that you are confident that you verbally told the detention center about the concerns

that this man may be suicidal and the emergency protection order? [objections omitted]

A. Yes, that's what I told them.

(ECF No. 102-31 at 96).

Trooper Grafton also provided “a copy of all of Mr. Young’s paperwork,” including the Emergency Order, when he

transferred Mr. Young to Defendant Robinson’s custody. (ECF No. 102-31 at 20). Defendant Robinson indicated he

“received the paperwork” from Trooper Grafton and discussed with Trooper Grafton that Mr. Young “was in a

commitment and he had drugs in his system.” (ECF No. 102-36 at 19).

the DCDC policies; (3) why Mr. Young was not transported to the hospital; and (4) what was

communicated to CO Nelson during the supervisory shift change. (ECF No. 106 at 22). Finally,

the Court is not persuaded that the issue of harm has been removed from trial after reviewing the

record before it. Contrary to Defendant Robinson’s argument that there can be no causation

because he performed a cell check 30 minutes before discovering Mr. Young’s suicide, the

foregoing analysis demonstrates several factual disputes that also relate to whether Defendant

Robinson’s conduct caused Mr. Young harm. Therefore, Defendant Robinson’s motion for

summary judgment with respect to Count I is DENIED.9

2. Defendant Robinson is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity or Public

Official Immunity.

Defendant Robinson also argues he is entitled to qualified immunity under Count I and

public official immunity under the remaining common law tort claims. (ECF No. 97-1 at 25, 27).

Defendant Robinson correctly states that qualified immunity protects government officials from

civil liability “unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Based on the Court’s analysis regarding the

existing genuine issues of material fact underlying Defendant Robinson’s knowledge, the Court

declines to find that Defendant Robinson is entitled to qualified immunity under Count I. Similarly,

and consistent with the Court’s reasoning as to Defendant Batson’s public official immunity, the

Court declines to grant summary judgment on this basis in light of the fact disputes concerning

9 Plaintiff correctly points out that Maryland’s Constitutional requirements are more demanding of its municipalities

than the United States Constitution. Prince George’s County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 492-93 (2011). Thus,

Defendant Robinson’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Count II is also denied.

knowledge.10 Therefore, Defendant Robinson’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of

immunity is denied.

C. Defendant Dorchester County is an Active Defendant Under Count II Based

on a Theory of Respondeat Superior and There Exist Genuine Issues of

Material Fact Regarding DCDC Employee Knowledge that Mr. Young

Presented a Suicide Risk and the Constitutionality of Their Responses to Such

Knowledge.

Defendant Dorchester County argues its “liability is solely derivative of the claims against

the individual Defendants and under State law only.” (ECF No. 96-1 at 1). Accordingly, it asserts

the “County is a purported ‘indemnor’ with respect to the common law tort claims, and is an ‘active

Defendant’ only in the state constitutional claim under Article 24.” Id. That much is not disputed.

Nevertheless, Defendant Dorchester County seeks summary judgment based on the arguments set

forth in Defendant Robinson’s and Defendant Batson’s motions for summary judgment, ultimately

contending if neither individual defendant can be held liable, the claims against Dorchester County

must be dismissed. Id. Plaintiffs argue there exists an independent basis upon which a jury may

hold Defendant Dorchester County liable for the wrongs of any employees, named or unnamed in

this case, who acted within the scope of their employment based on a theory of respondeat

superior. (ECF No. 104 at 20). In its reply, Defendant Dorchester County argues “both the

Maryland Supreme Court and this Court have made clear that for a local government to be liable

under a theory of respondeat superior, there must be a predicate finding of liability on behalf of

an individual defendant.” (ECF No. 116 at 1-2) (citing DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 48 (1999)).

Defendant Dorchester County emphasizes that at the motion to dismiss stage, this Court “has

10 Given that there is an embedded question of gross negligence considered under the public official immunity inquiry,

it follows that granting summary judgment on the issue of gross negligence is also inappropriate. See supra Section

III.A.

already ruled, pursuant to well-established Maryland law, that the County’s liability may only be

predicated on a finding of liability by an individual defendant here.” (ECF No. 116 at 1).

Contrary to Defendant Dorchester County’s characterization of the holding at the motion

to dismiss stage, the Court did not rule that “the County’s liability may only be predicated on a

finding of liability by an individual defendant here.” (ECF No. 116) (emphasis added). In support

of this characterization, Defendant cites to the entirety of the Court’s motion to dismiss analysis

concerning Dorchester County rather than a specific proposition to that effect. To be sure, the

Court dismissed Counts I and III through VII on the basis that (1) there exists no vicarious liability

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) Defendant Dorchester County is immune from suit under Counts

III through VII. (ECF No. 69 at 10-13; ECF No. 70). However, the Court did not dismiss Count

II against Defendant Dorchester County. See id. Nor did the Court conclude that Plaintiffs’ state

constitutional claims depend on a finding of Defendant Robinson’s or Defendant Batson’s liability.

Id. Rather, the Court noted that that the Plaintiffs conflated “Dorchester County’s duty to defend

and indemnify its employees in a tort suit with a waiver of governmental immunity” with respect

to Counts III through VII, the common law tort claims. Id. at 13. Thus, the Court dismissed the

common law tort claims—not the state constitutional claims—reasoning that there may exist

indemnification liability down the line on Counts III through VII, if Defendants Batson and

Robinson are liable on the common law tort claims. See id. at 12-13 (citing Rodwell v. Wicomico

Cnty., Maryland, No. CV DKC 22-3014, 2024 WL 1178202, at *9 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2024)). That

considered, the motion to dismiss left a door open to summary judgment arguments regarding the

constitutional claims set forth under Count II. See (ECF No. 69 at 10-13). Under Count II, which

the Court did not dismiss, Plaintiff seeks recovery under Articles 16, 19, 24, 25, and 26 of the

Maryland Declaration of Rights.11 Based on the Court’s review of the summary judgment

memoranda (ECF Nos. 96, 204, 116), the operative disputes are (1) whether Defendant Dorchester

County is an active defendant under the state constitutional claims and (2) whether Defendant

Dorchester County’s potential respondeat superior liability under state constitutional claims may

be predicated on the conduct of employees not named in the case. See (ECF Nos. 96-1, 104, 116).

1. Maryland Law Clearly Distinguishes Respondeat Superior Liability in

Common Law Tort Claims and State Constitutional Claims.

Both parties point to DiPino v. Davis in support of their respective positions on this issue.

(ECF Nos. 96-1 at 1, 104 at 23, 116 at 2) (citing DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 47-48 (1999)).

There, the court considered claims arising under Articles 21, 24, 25, 26, and 40 of the Declaration

of Rights. DiPino, 354 Md. at 50 n.7. Defendant Dorchester County relies on the court’s common

law tort analysis in support of its position a “local government’s liability for a state constitutional

violation is purely derivative” and “an individual employee must first be found liable for the entity

to be liable” (ECF No. 116 at 2) (citing DiPino, 354 Md. at 48 (analyzing state common law and

not constitutional torts)). No such statement appears in DiPino. DiPino, 354 Md. at 48. To that

extent, Defendant Dorchester County inserts language favorable to its position where none exists.

With respect to the constitutional tort claims, the DiPino court recognized that “neither the local

government nor a local governmental entity has available any governmental immunity in an action

based on rights protected by the State Constitution.” Id. at 50. (citing Clea v. Mayor & City Council

of Balt., 312 Md. 662, 672–73 (1988), superseded by statute, Md.Code (1984, 2004 Repl.Vol.), §

11 To begin, “Article 24 is construed in pari materia with the Fourteenth Amendment, Article 26 is construed in pari

materia with the Fourth Amendment, and Articles 16 and 25 are construed in pari materia with the Eighth

Amendment.” Id.; see also Telep v. Stickney, No. 1:23-CV-02379-JMC, 2024 WL 2114761, at *9 (D. Md. May 10,

2024) (collecting cases for the proposition that claims under the Maryland Declaration of Rights are analyzed in pari

materia with federal constitutional claims). Defendant Dorchester County concedes that it is an active defendant

with respect to Article 24. (ECF No. 96). However, it still seeks summary judgment based on Defendant Robinson’s

and Defendant Batson’s summary judgment motions. Id.

12–101(a) of the State Government Article, as recognized in Houghton v. Forrest, 412 Md. 578,

588–89 (2010)). Likewise, the court noted, “[a]lthough we have consistently applied respondeat

superior liability to local governmental entities for Constitutional violations committed by their

officials, we have never actually articulated the doctrine in that context.” Id. Plaintiffs correctly

point to the court’s conclusion on this issue: “We shall now dispel any doubt in the matter and

make clear, as a matter of common law, that local governmental entities do, indeed,

have respondeat superior liability for civil damages resulting from State Constitutional

violations…” Id.; see also Albero v. Worchester Cnty. Bd. of Commr’s, Civil No.: JKB-24-1100,

2025 WL 462588, at *10 (D. Md. Feb. 11, 2025) (dismissing only two state constitutional claims

against a defendant county when the plaintiff sought to hold the county liable for their conduct

under a theory of respondeat superior); Palmer v. Maryland, Civil No. 1:22-0899-CDA, 2024 WL

4349730, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2024) (“Maryland law has a broader reach and ‘imposes

respondeat superior liability on municipalities for [] State constitutional violations of its

employees,’ while Monell claims do not.”) (citations omitted); McMahon v. Cnty. Comm’rs of

Kent Cnty., No. CIV. JFM-13-490, 2013 WL 2285378, at *5 (D. Md. May 21, 2013) (“Maryland,

unlike the United States, [ ] imposes respondeat superior liability on local government entities for

civil damages resulting from State [c]onstitutional violations committed by their agents and

employees within the scope of the employment.”). Thus, to the extent that the County seeks

summary judgment for claims predicated on the individual defendants’ conduct, Defendant’s

Motion is denied based on the analysis above. See supra Sections III.A-III.B.

2. Plaintiffs’ State Constitutional Claims against Defendant Dorchester

County Raise Genuine Issues of Material Fact Under a Theory of

Respondeat Superior.

Of greater focus on the parties’ arguments is Defendant Dorchester County’s argument that

its respondeat superior liability must stem from the wrongful conduct of a named defendant, as

Defendant repeatedly insists that any liability is predicated on Defendant Robinson’s and

Defendant Batson’s conduct. (ECF No. 116 at 2) (citing Albero, 2025 WL 462588, at *10).

However, Defendant’s case law is unavailing. In Albero, this Court dismissed two particular

respondeat superior claims against a county when the plaintiff failed to state a claim for the two

state constitutional claims against the claims’ corresponding two county officials. Albero, 2025

WL 462588, at *10. Indeed, this Court noted “Plaintiffs fail to state an Article 24 claim against

either [county official] directly…And without an underlying Article 24 violation by an individual,

there can be no corresponding respondeat superior liability on the part of a municipality.” Id.

However, the Albero Court did not dismiss the remaining respondeat superior claims against the

county because the Court did not consider the conduct of the remaining individuals at that juncture.

Id. (“And because respondeat superior liability turns on a finding of unlawful conduct by an

individual who reports to a superior person or entity…it would be inappropriate to dismiss the

respondeat superior claim in full before considering the Article 24 claims against all individual

[d]efendants.”). Thus, contrary to the County’s assertions, it cannot be said that Albero supports

the proposition that a defendant county is liable under a theory of respondeat superior only for the

conduct of other named defendants. See id. Rather, the claims were dismissed insofar as they

were attributed to the conduct of two particular officials and the complaint failed to state a claim

against them. See id.

Defendant also points to Willey v. Board of Education of St. Mary’s County, which states

“the respondeat superior theory of liability rests upon a plaintiff sufficiently alleging a tort or state

constitutional violation by an employee.” Willey v. Bd. of Educ. of St. Mary’s Cnty., 557 F.Supp.3d

645, 671 (D. Md. 2021) (emphasis added). There, the Court dismissed without prejudice and with

leave to amend a respondeat superior claim because the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege a state

constitutional violation by an employee. Id. Willey did not require that any such employee be

named in the case. See id. Thus, Willey, much like Albero, does not support the proposition that

an individual defendant must be named in order to impose respondeat superior liability upon an

entity. See id.; Albero, 2025 WL 462588, at *10.

Indeed, “[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is jointly and severally

liable for the torts committed by an employee acting within the scope of his employment.” Jordan

v. Western Distributing Co., 286 F. Supp.2 d 545, 548 (D. Md. 2003) (quoting Baltimore Police

Dep't v. Cherkes, 140 Md.App. 282 (2001)); see also Holland v. Prince George’s County, Md.,

Civil Action No. DKC 09–2737, 2011 WL 530559, at *7-*8 (D. Md. Feb. 8, 2011) (denying a

defendant’s motion for summary judgment under Article 24 based on a theory of respondeat

superior against a defendant county when also granting summary judgment with respect to two

unnamed individual guards, thereby leaving the county as the only defendant in the case). Based

on the analysis above, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims are

attributed solely on the conduct of Defendants Robinson and Batson. Thus, like at the motion to

dismiss stage, the Court declines to grant summary judgment under Count II.12 Moreover, even if

the Court were to accept Defendant’s position that any respondeat superior liability must be

attributable to the individual defendants, the Court has already determined there exist multiple fact

disputes regarding Defendant Batson’s and Defendant Robinson’s liability. Thus, the respondeat

12 Plaintiff emphasizes that there is some basis upon which a jury could find that an employee other than Defendant

Robinson or Defendant Batson acted within the scope of employment and engaged in a state constitutional violation,

which will be analyzed in greater detail above. (ECF No. 104). To that end there exists, at the very least, a factual

dispute only a jury can resolve.

superior claims based on their conduct are necessarily denied. Therefore, Defendant Dorchester

County’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 96) is DENIED.

D. Plaintiffs’ Conditional Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint is Granted

Because the Court is Satisfied that the Amendment Relates Back to the

Complaint and Does Not Present Unfair Prejudice.

After the parties submitted their summary judgment memoranda, Plaintiffs filed a

Conditional Motion for Leave to Amend, seeking an amendment to the Complaint by interlineation

were the Court to be persuaded that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on the

revelation that Defendant Robinson did conduct thirty-minute cell checks. (ECF No. 120) (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). Courts freely grant leave to amend the complaint when justice requires.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 187, 182 (1962). Indeed, Courts

freely allow amendment of the pleadings so long as there exists no prejudice, undue delay, bad

faith, or futility. Forman, 371 U.S. at 182. Whether an amendment is prejudicial “will often be

determined by the nature of the amendment and its timing.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427

(4th Cir. 2006).

While the Court does not find that the discovery revelation of timely tier checks defeats all

genuine issues of material fact underlying Defendant Robinson’s knowledge, the Court recognizes

that the Complaint does rest on allegations the parties agree to be false. (ECF Nos. 1, 119, 120).

After thorough review, the Court is satisfied that the allegations set forth in the Complaint fairly

theorize wrongful conduct such that an amendment by interlineation would not pose any unfair

prejudice. (ECF No. 1at 16) (“Defendants acted with deliberate indifference and/or

unreasonableness to Mr. Young’s established rights…when they failed to assign adequate

protection for him in the first place upon entry to DCDC”).). Although discovery has concluded,

Plaintiffs seek an amendment that would clarify the Complaint’s allegations to incorporate the

“new” fact that Defendant Robinson performed 30-minute checks. Of course, the Complaint

presently includes an allegation to the contrary. Id. As explored above, even if such checks were

timely performed, discovery exposed fact disputes as to the quality of Defendant Robinson’s tier

checks and adequacy Defendant Robinson’s response to the sallyport conversation in which he

may or may not have learned that Mr. Young presented a suicide risk. See supra Section III.B.

Moreover, the Court trusts Plaintiff’s assertion that she alleged the facts she believed to be true at

the time of filing. (ECF No. 120 at 22). Although the Complaint does allege that certain abuses

resulted from failure to conduct thirty-minute tier checks, there are enough clear allegations of

wrongdoing in other instances such that the Court cannot conceive of any prejudice that might

result from an amendment. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Conditional Motion for Leave to Amend the

Complaint is granted to the extent it is necessary to clarify the allegations against Defendant

Robinson.

E. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike is Denied, but Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Limited

Discovery Should Either Mr. Aaron or Mr. Bolden Intend to Testify.

The Court has greater concern for the issues raised in Plaintiffs’ second post-summary

judgment motion, the Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 121). Plaintiffs ask this Court to strike Mr.

Bolden’s and Mr. Aaron’s affidavits (ECF Nos. 97-14, 119-1). (ECF No. 121). Alternatively,

Plaintiffs ask for limited discovery such that Plaintiffs may depose them. Id. Plaintiffs also assert

a sur-reply is appropriate because Mr. Bolden’s affidavit raises new arguments. Id. Plaintiffs urge

the Court to strike the affidavits, in part due to their assertion that neither Mr. Bolden nor Mr.

Aaron has personal knowledge of the matters to which they have testified and that the contents are

not relevant. (ECF No. 121).

As an initial matter, the Court is not persuaded to strike Mr. Bolden’s and Mr. Aaron’s

affidavits based on Plaintiffs’ evidentiary concerns. Of course, “[t]he court and the parties have

great flexibility with regard to the evidence that may be used on a [summary judgment]

proceeding.” Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 538

(4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 2721 (3d ed. 1998)). “The court may consider materials that would

themselves be admissible at trial, and the content or substance of otherwise inadmissible materials

where ‘the party submitting the evidence show[s] that it will be possible to put the information ...

into an admissible form.’” Id. (quoting 11 James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice §

56.91[2] (3d ed. 2015)). Put simply, the operative question is whether the information submitted

has a pathway to admissibility, not whether it is admissible in its current form. At the very least,

the affidavits present testimony regarding Mr. Aaron’s and Mr. Bolden’s knowledge of DCDC

procedure, what they recall of their interactions with DCDC personnel and Trooper Grafton, and

the usual practices of prisoner transport. (ECF Nos. 97-14, 119-1). While each particular statement

within each affidavit and the affidavits themselves may not be admissible, the Court declines to

disregard them at the summary judgment posture. Humphreys, 790 F.3d at 538. Moreover,

considering that the Court denies Defendants’ summary judgment motions, a sur-reply is

unnecessary. Thus, the Court declines to strike the affidavits and authorize a sur-reply. To that

extent, the Motion to Strike (ECF No. 212) is DENIED in part.

The Court does, however, find it pertinent to address the issue of disclosure and the extent

to which Defendant Robinson complied with Plaintiffs’ interrogatory requests. Plaintiffs

characterize the relevant discovery events as follows:

On January 17, 2025, long before the filing of Defendant Robinson’s motion for

summary judgment, Plaintiff served a First Set of Interrogatories that required him

to respond to several interrogatories regarding identification of potential witnesses.

Interrogatories 3, 5, 8, 15, 22, Exhibit A (Interrogatories) at 4-8. These

interrogatories were “continuing in character,” and Defendant Robinson was

obligated to “promptly file supplementary answers if you receive further or

different information before trial.” Id. at 1. “Identifying” an individual required

Defendant Robinson to state the “full name, home address, business address and

telephone numbers at home and business” for the individual. Id. at 2.

…

Defendant Robinson did not identify a single potential witness in discovery,

including Mr. Bolden and Mr. Aaron. To sufficiently identify Mr. Bolden or Mr.

Aaron, Defendant Robinson would have had to, at a minimum, identify the witness

by full name, home address, business address, and telephone number, and provide

a statement regarding the subject matter that Defendant Robinson alleges he

possesses. Defendant Robinson did not do so.

…

Even if Defendant Robinson were to attempt to shield himself behind any other

Defendant’s interrogatory responses—which he cannot, as such response was not

incorporated within his own and could not have absolved him of his own obligation

to respond completely and appropriately to discovery requests—neither Mr. Bolden

or Mr. Aaron were ever identified as a witness to any relevant matter on January 9,

2021, when Mr. Young was booked into DCDC. Defendant Dorchester County,

similar to Defendant Robinson, simply responded by citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)

and adopting and incorporating other Defendants’ responses. Exhibit D (County

Response). Defendant Batson identified Mr. Bolden as follows: Corrections Officer

Timothy Bolden: C.O. Bolden assisted Defendant Batson in performing CPR until

EMS arrived.

Exhibit E (Batson Response) at 3. In other words, Defendant Batson solely

identified Mr. Bolden as having discoverable information related to his actions on

January 10, 2021, after Mr. Young’s body was discovered. In any event, Defendant

Batson also failed to properly identify Mr. Bolden, including nothing more than his

name.

As for Mr. Aaron, no defendant ever identified him as a witness with any relevant

discoverable information.

(ECF No. 121 at 9-12) (emphasis in original).

Defendant Robinson filed a combined memorandum in opposition to both of Plaintiffs’

post-summary judgment motions. (ECF No. 124). There, Defendant Robinson argues that

disclosure was sufficient because “Plaintiff had the same documents that Robinson and the other

defendants had. The critical incident review report that Plaintiff refers to in his Motion to Strike

(that Plaintiff obviously had), was the same document from which the defense identified Officers

Aaron and Bolden as potential witnesses.” Id. at 16.

It is worth addressing that Defendant Robinson uses both affidavits to challenge the issue

of Defendant Robinson’s knowledge that Mr. Young presented a risk of suicide when Trooper

Grafton met him at the Sallyport. (ECF Nos. 97-14, 119-1). While their testimony is not

dispositive at the summary judgment phase, the Court recognizes that such testimony is a central

issue in the case. See supra Section III.A-III.B. Indeed, the disputed issue of knowledge that Mr.

Young presented a suicide risk is of great important to many of the present claims. The Court

trusts Defendant’s representations regarding his good faith efforts to comply with the discovery

rules and provide accurate and continuing responses to Plaintiffs’ interrogatories. However, it is

clear that at the very least, whether Defendant Robinson properly responded to Plaintiffs’

interrogatories is a matter of controversy. (ECF Nos. 121, 127). Thus, if Defendants intend to call

Mr. Bolden or Mr. Aaron to testify, Plaintiff shall have an opportunity to engage in limited

discovery to explore the contents of the affidavits.

In sum, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 121) is DENIED in part and GRANTED in

part, such that Plaintiffs may depose Mr. Aaron and Mr. Bolden, shall either be a potential witness

at trial.

IV. CONCLUSION

(1) For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Batson’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF

No. 94) is DENIED;

(2) Defendant Dorchester County’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 96) is

DENIED;

(3) Defendant Robinson’s Motino for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 97) is DENIED;

(4) Plaintiffs’ Conditional Motion to Amend/Correct (ECF No. 120) is GRANTED;

(5) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike, or in the alternative, for Limited Discovery and a Sur-Reply

(ECF No. 121) is GRANTED in part such that Plaintiff may conduct limited discovery

if Defendants intend to call Mr. Aaron and Mr. Bolden to testify, and it is otherwise

DENIED; and

(6) The parties are hereby directed to confer and jointly inform the Court within fourteen

(14) days from the date of this Memorandum Order and Opinion whether there is

mutual desire to participate in another settlement conference with Judge Austin before

proceeding to schedule a trial and related dates.

Date: January 7, 2026 /s/

J. Mark Coulson

United States Magistrate Judge