Lewis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

LARRY EDWARD LEWIS CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-1890

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

JUDGE ALAN NORRIS MAG. JUDGE KAYLA DYE MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Larry Edward Lewis’ civil rights Complaint [doc. #1]

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lewis, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this

matter, seeks relief against the sole Defendant, Judge Alan “Jim” Norris (“Judge Norris”), a city

court judge in the city of West Monroe, Louisiana. Lewis further seeks service of his Complaint

by the United States Marshals Service. [doc. #5].

For reasons stated below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that all of Plaintiff’s claims except those

for injunctive and declaratory relief and any remaining state law claims be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE as frivolous, for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted, and for

seeking money damages against a defendant who is immune from suit. IT IS FURTHER

RECOMMENDED that Lewis’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and any remaining state

law claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. His motion for service [doc. # 5] is DENIED AS

MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND

Lewis brought this § 1983 action against Judge Norris, alleging violations of his rights

under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Counts 1-4) based on Judge Norris’

conduct during proceedings at West Monroe City Court on or about September 17, 2025. [doc.

#1, pp. 1-2]. Lewis further asserts claims against Judge Norris for “Violation of Oath of Office”

(Count 5) and “Action Under Color of Law (42 U.S.C. § 1983)” (Count 6). Id. at p. 2.

On the date alleged, Lewis appeared before Judge Norris on traffic citations for having

no driver’s license, no insurance, no registration, and no license plate. [doc. #1-2, p. 2]. Lewis,

who conveniently attached a copy of the purported transcript from the court proceeding, made

a “special appearance” only to challenge personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. [doc. #1, p.

2; doc. #1-2, p. 2]. According to the transcript, attached to his Complaint and thus incorporated,

Lewis stated that he was there to make a special appearance to “challenge the jurisdiction of

this Court.” [doc. #1-2, p. 2]. He refused to provide his date of birth, refused to enter a plea,

and stated that he would reserve his “rights under the Constitution of the United States of

America, under the Louisiana Constitution, under the Common Law and UCC 1-308.” Id. Judge

Norris noted his objection and then instructed him to “be quiet.” Id. at p. 3. Although a trial

date was apparently set for October 2025, Lewis makes no allegations of what took place, if

anything on that date.

On or about November 26, 2025, Lewis filed suit in this Court. On the bases of the

counts set forth above, Lewis seeks compensatory damages for emotional distress,

constitutional injury, and loss of due process. He further seeks punitive damages on the basis of

Judge Norris’ “intentional misconduct.” [doc. #1, p. 2]. Finally, he seeks declaratory relief that

his rights were violated and injunctive relief “to prevent future violations.” Id. Lewis demands a

jury trial for his claims.

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II. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Frivolity Review

The undersigned granted Lewis leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter.

Accordingly, his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides

for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint or any portion thereof if the court determines that it is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). The

statute applies to prisoner and non-prisoner cases. See Patel v. United Airlines, 620 F. App'x 352

(5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (applying Section 1915 to non-prisoner pro se litigant); James v.

Richardson, 344 F. App'x 982, 983 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“Section 1915(e)(2)(B) requires

dismissal of frivolous IFP actions even if those actions are brought by non-prisoner plaintiffs.”).

In reviewing Lewis’ Complaint and the attached transcript, which is incorporated

thereto, the Court must “accept[ ] all well-pleaded facts as true and view[ ] those facts in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff[].” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, a pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be

construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nevertheless, his

complaint may be dismissed as frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). “A complaint lacks an

arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the

complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Id., 112 F.3d at

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193 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in

fact “only if it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be

proven consistent with the allegations.” McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158,

160 (5th Cir. 1995).

B. Section 1983

Federal law provides a cause of action against any person who, under the color of state

law, acts to deprive another of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and

laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to hold the defendant liable, a plaintiff

must allege facts to show (1) that a constitutional right has been violated and (2) that the

conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of federal law; that is,

that the defendant was a government actor. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).

While Lewis asserts six causes of action, at least four causes of action appear to arise

under Section 1983. His sixth cause of action is not actually a separate cause of action, but

effectively a restatement that he is asserting a Section 1983 claim. Accordingly, the first four

causes of action will be addressed together.

1) Monetary Damages

First, to the extent he seeks damages from the sole Defendant, Judge Norris is entitled to

absolute immunity. “Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit and not just from the ultimate

assessment of damages.” Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Mireles v.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)). When assessing the entitlement to judicial immunity, the Fifth

Circuit has held that “[i]t is the Judge’s actions alone, not intent, that we must consider.” Malina

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v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993). Judicial immunity “can be overcome in two sets

of circumstances: (1) ‘a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions

not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity’; and (2) ‘a judge is not immune for actions, though

judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.’” Ballard, 413 F.3d at 515

(quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12). A judge’s actions are judicial in nature if they are “normally

performed by a judge” and the parties affected “dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)).1 In this case, it is

crystal clear that Judge Norris was acting in his capacity as a judge when attempting to obtain

information from Lewis in open court, entered a not guilty plea on his behalf, and subsequently

set a return court date for a trial on his traffic citations. While Lewis would like to characterize

this matter as one lacking in provable jurisdiction, he is plainly wrong.

Lewis argues that he did not “consent” to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. [doc. #1 &

doc. #1-2]. He further apparently demanded that Judge Norris “place jurisdiction on the record

before proceeding,” but Judge Norris “refused to address or establish jurisdiction and instead

proceeded.” [doc. #1, pp. 1-2].

To the extent that Lewis is arguing that Judge Norris is not entitled to immunity because

he acted in “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–7 (1978),

1 Courts consider four factors: (1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2)

whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge’s chambers; (3)

whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose

directly out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity. Ballard, 413 F.3d at 515. “These factors are broadly

construed in favor of immunity.” Id. “Immunity may be applied even if one or more of these factors is not

met.” Morrison v. Walker, 704 F. App'x 369, 373 (5th Cir. 2017).

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his argument fails. State law unequivocally confers jurisdiction upon city courts to adjudicate

state law offenses that are committed within their jurisdictions, and which are not punishable

by imprisonment at hard labor. LA. R.S. § 13:1894; State v. Ryan, 446 So.2d 554, 555–6 (La. App.

3d Cir.1984) (city court had subject matter jurisdiction over state law criminal offense). In this

case, Lewis is charged with several traffic violations, over which Judge Norris enjoyed at least

“some” basis for subject matter jurisdiction, which is all that is needed to retain judicial

immunity. See also Kastner v. Lawrence, 390 Fed. Appx. 311, *2 (5th Cir. July 23, 2010)

(unpubl.) (judge entitled to absolute immunity, despite his failure to follow certain procedures).

Indeed, generally a judge acts in exception of jurisdiction only if he acts purely in a private and

non-judicial capacity. Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

Clearly, those circumstances are not present here where Lewis’ interactions with Judge Norris all

occurred on the record in City Court. See Jackson v. Louisiana Tech Univ., CIV.A. 11-0524, 2011

WL 6749014, at *7 (W.D. La. Nov. 22, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, CIV.A. 11-

0524, 2011 WL 6749044 (W.D. La. Dec. 22, 2011).

If Lewis is contending that Judge Norris lacked personal jurisdiction over him in this

criminal matter, La. C. Cr. P. arts. 16 and 17 recognize the criminal jurisdiction of courts. State v.

Otkins-Victor, 15-340, p. 82 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/16); 193 So.3d 479, 535, writ denied sub nom.

State ex rel. Otkins-Victor v. State, 2016-1495 (La. 10/15/18); 253 So.3d 1294; see also

Du Bois v. Warne, 336 Fed. App’x. 407, 409 (5th Cir. 2009).

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In addition, given the language used and the type of arguments Lewis has made in

this Court, it appears that he is making a claim of sovereign citizenship (e.g., “I am Lewis [sic]

Edward Lewis, the living man.”). His arguments are also frivolous on that basis.

The “Sovereign Citizens” movement is based on a theory where [Sovereign

Citizens] view the “USG [U.S. Government] as bankrupt and without tangible

assets; therefore, the USG is believed to use citizens to back U.S. currency.

Sovereign citizens believe the USG operates solely on a credit system using

American citizens as collateral.” El v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc., 710 F.3d 748,

750 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Cooper v. United States, 104 Fed.

Cl. 306, 313–314 (2012) (explaining that “an individual who identifies with the

Sovereign Citizen Movement considers himself to be his own sovereign, not a

United States citizen, and therefore ‘believe[s] that [he is] not subject to

government authority.’ Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (2011).

Members of this movement think that [t]he federal government ... has tricked

the populace into becoming U.S. citizens by entering into ‘contracts’ embodied in

such documents as birth certificates and social security cards. With these

contracts, an individual unwittingly creates a fictitious entity (i.e., the U.S. citizen)

that represents, but is separate from, the real person. Through these contracts,

individuals also unknowingly pledge themselves and their property, through their

newly created fictitious entities, as security for the national debt in exchange for

the benefits of citizenship.”).

United States v. Graham, 452 F. Supp. 3d 871, 881 n.2 (D. Minn. 2020), aff'd, 2020 WL 6326339

(8th Cir. June 4, 2020). Despite the continued attempts to rely on these arguments, as a sister

court in Texas has observed,

Courts routinely dismiss sovereign citizen claims . . . Berman v. Stephens, No.

4:14-CV-860-A, 2015 WL 3622694, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 10, 2015) (collecting

cases) (“His reliance on the UCC or a so-called ‘sovereign citizen’ theory that he is

exempt from prosecution and beyond the jurisdiction of the state or federal

courts is frivolous. The same or similar arguments have been repeatedly rejected

by other courts and are rejected by this Court.”); see also, e.g., Mason v.

Anderson, No. CV H-15-2952, 2016 WL 4398680 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2016).

Davis v. Weatherford Mun. Ct., No. 4:19-CV-00502-P-BP, 2019 WL 7484130, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec.

20, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:19-CV-00502-P-BP, 2020 WL 59511 (N.D.

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Tex. Jan. 6, 2020); see also Berman v. Stephens, No. 4:14-CV-860-A, 2015 WL 3622694, at *2

(N.D. Tex. June 10, 2015) (collecting cases rejecting the same or similar arguments and stating

that a plaintiff/petitioner’s “claimed status as a secured-party creditor or a sovereign citizen”

does not render him “beyond the jurisdiction of the courts” or entitle him to relief) (citation

omitted).

In a variation on the sovereign citizen theme, the undersigned and other courts are now

made to listen to the argument that courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over an individual unless

the courts “prove” that they have a bond. These claims, too, are legally frivolous. A court's

jurisdiction is not based on whether it has a bond or can provide the name of the bonding

company or policy number, but on the laws and constitution of the state in which it operates.

Accordingly, it will be RECOMMENDED that Lewis’ claims be dismissed for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and as legally frivolous for

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

2) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Further, to the extent that Lewis seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, the Court cannot

exercise jurisdiction over these claims. Lewis provides evidence that Judge Norris set his traffic

violation for trial in October 2025, but it is not clear whether the trial went forward or if the

traffic charges remain pending. In either case, this Court cannot intervene. If the case is

ongoing, then, under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts must decline to

interfere with state criminal (or, in this case, traffic citation) proceedings “except in

extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.”

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Rodriguez v. Salazar, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188892, 2019 WL 5624756, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 31,

2019). The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that the federal court must abstain from exercising

jurisdiction over a dispute when (1) the dispute involves an ongoing state judicial proceeding,

(2) the subject matter of the dispute implicates important state interests, and (3) the ongoing

state proceedings afford adequate opportunities for raising the constitutional challenges.

Louisiana v. Ashworth, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233021, *1 (W.D. La., Dec. 19, 2024) (citing

Wightman v. Tex. Sup. Ct., 84 F.3d 188, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1996)). Of course, the State of Louisiana

has an important interest in enforcing its laws and regulations, including traffic laws. Id. at *2.

Lewis may raise his challenge in the state court through its appeal and writ processes.

Additionally, he has not shown any type of extraordinary circumstances which would support

intervention.

If, on the other hand, the state court proceedings are now complete and Lewis seeks to

challenge a ruling or judgment of the West Monroe City Court through this federal lawsuit, he is

barred from doing so by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine prevents district courts

from reviewing “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-

court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district

court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Lewis’ challenges to his

traffic citation. See, e.g., Erlandson v. Northeglenn Mun. Court, 528 F.3d 785, 789-90 (10th Cir.

2008) (concluding that the court, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over § 1983 challenges to municipal court conviction for littering); Algoe v.

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State of Texas, Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-1162-D (consol. with 3:15-CV-1204-D), 2016 WL

6902154, at *8-9 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 29, 2016), rec. accepted 2016 WL 6893682 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 21,

2016) (concluding that court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the

plaintiff “sought review and oversight of three state municipal traffic cases in which he was

found guilty.”), rec. accepted 2016 WL 6893682 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 21, 2016).

Accordingly, it will be RECOMMENDED that Lewis’ claims for injunctive and declaratory

relief be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

C. Oath of Office

To the extent that Lewis seeks relief against Judge Norris for his alleged violation of his

Oath of Office, his claim fares no better than the rest. Even if Judge Norris “violated” his oath of

office, “[a] violation of state law is not cognizable under § 1983.” Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch.

Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994). If Lewis is attempting to tie this claim to his other stated

causes of action under Section 1983, the analysis would be the same as set forth above, and,

like the others, subject to dismissal.

D. Any Remaining State Law Claims

Finally, “[w]hen . . . all claims which confer federal subject matter jurisdiction are

dismissed, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law

claims.” Bears Towing & Recovery of Ouachita Inc. v. Team Hosey Express LLC, 2024 WL

1707295, at *2 (W.D. La. Apr. 4, 2024) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v.

HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (“A district court’s decision whether to exercise

[supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is

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purely discretionary.”). In considering factors such as “judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

and comity,” the Fifth Circuit has held that district courts should “decline to exercise jurisdiction

over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial.”

Manyweather v. Woodlawn Manor, Inc., 40 F.4th 237, 242 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Heggemeier v.

Caldwell County, Texas, 826 F.3d 861, 872 (5th Cir. 2016)).

In this case, it appears that all of Lewis’ claims are actually asserted under Section 1983,

but he refers to both Judge Norris’ oath of office and the Louisiana Constitution, so, out of an

abundance of caution, the undersigned will recommend dismissal of any remaining state law

claims without prejudice.

III. CONCLUSION

For reasons stated above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that all of Lewis’ claims except those for

injunctive and declaratory relief and any remaining state law claims be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE as frivolous, for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted, and for

seeking money damages against a defendant who is immune from suit. IT IS FURTHER

RECOMMENDED that Lewis’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and any remaining state

law claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Lewis’ motion for service [doc. # 5] is DENIED AS MOOT in

light of the recommendation that his claims be dismissed.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and

Recommendation to file written objections with the Clerk of Court. Failure to file written

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objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in

this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of receipt shall bar an aggrieved

party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District

Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 79

F.3d 1415, 1429-30 (5th Cir. 1996).

MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 8 day of December, 2025.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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