The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2726-23
HENRY GORDON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW MANNISTO,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________
Submitted November 6, 2025 – Decided January 8, 2026
Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. DC-
000160-24.
Henry Gordon, self-represented appellant.
Matthew Mannisto, self-represented respondent.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Henry Gordon sued defendant, Matthew Mannisto, seeking
damages for libel, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on a statement defendant made during litigation involving
plaintiff's son in a landlord-tenant dispute venued in Hawaii. The Law
Division judge dismissed the suit with prejudice concluding New Jersey courts
lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant and plaintiff failed to state a claim
upon which relief maybe granted because the alleged libelous statement was
protected by the litigation privilege. We affirm.
I.
Plaintiff's son, Jeffrey Gordon, 1 was sued in Hawaii for eviction, and
defendant represented the landlord in that action. Plaintiff attempted to hire
Robert Goldberg, an attorney in Hawaii, to represent Jeffrey but ultimately did
not retain him. Plaintiff is a former New Jersey attorney who voluntarily
relinquished his law license after improperly using trust funds and after he was
convicted of bank fraud. In an unrelated New Jersey Disciplinary Review
Board (DRB) opinion, plaintiff was incorrectly noted as having been convicted
of "bankruptcy fraud and bank robbery." 2
1
To differentiate between Jeffrey and plaintiff, we use first names where
necessary for clarity. We intend no disrespect with this informality.
2
This statement appears in the DRB discipline recommendation of Herbert M.
Korn, a New Jersey attorney (Docket No. DRB 97-428). In that proceeding,
Korn allegedly employed plaintiff, a disbarred attorney, in violation of Rule
1:20-20.
A-2726-23
2
On the day of the trial in the landlord-tenant litigation, Jeffrey requested
an adjournment to contact plaintiff because he recognized the presiding judge
in his matter was Goldberg. After Jeffrey informed Goldberg of this apparent
conflict of interest, the proceedings were halted to permit Jeffrey to move for
the judge's recusal.
In support of Jeffrey's application, plaintiff submitted a certification
attesting to his conversations with Goldberg about the landlord-tenant
litigation. Defendant, on behalf of the landlord, filed an opposing
memorandum in which he quoted the DRB's reference to plaintiff's prior
disciplinary and criminal history. Although Goldberg denied the motion and
declined to recuse himself, he later voluntarily withdrew from the case.
Based on the statement made in defendant's memorandum, plaintiff sued
defendant for libel, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress in New Jersey. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged defendant
knowingly and falsely attributed a conviction for bank robbery to plaintiff and,
in doing so, intended to cause plaintiff reputational harm.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint arguing New Jersey lacked
personal jurisdiction over him and since the statements at issue were made
during a litigation venued in Hawaii, they were protected by the litigation
A-2726-23
3
privilege. To substantiate his assertion that the court lacked jurisdiction,
defendant certified that he has not visited the State of New Jersey for
approximately ten years, has never been licensed to practice law here, has
neither solicited nor conducted business in New Jersey, owns no property in
this State, and does not have relatives residing here. During oral argument
before the trial court, defendant acknowledged the only contact he has with
New Jersey is that he employs Automatic Data Processing for his office's
payroll services and maintains a cellular telephone account with Verizon, both
companies located in New Jersey. Defendant asserted that these commercial
relationships constitute, at most, de minimis contacts with New Jersey.
Plaintiff opposed defendant's motion, arguing the court has personal
jurisdiction because defendant's alleged tortious conduct and statements caused
reputational and emotional harm to plaintiff in New Jersey, involved activities
that occurred only in New Jersey, and originated from sources in New Jersey.
Plaintiff also argued that the litigation privilege does not apply since the
statements were unrelated to the underlying Hawaii litigation.
The trial court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint
with prejudice. The court found no basis for exercising personal jurisdiction
over defendant, noting plaintiff's residence in New Jersey and the fact that the
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4
allegedly defamatory statements referred to plaintiff were insufficient, without
more, to establish minimum contacts with New Jersey. The trial court also
determined the litigation privilege applied to defendant's statements, requiring
dismissal of the complaint.
II.
Our review of a trial court's factual findings on jurisdiction "is limited to
determining whether '[its] findings are supported by substantial, credible
evidence in the record.'" D.T. v. Archdiocese of Phila., 260 N.J. 27, 41 (2025)
(quoting Rippon v. Smigel, 449 N.J. Super. 344, 358 (App. Div. 2017)).
However, the question as to whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a
defendant is a question of law which we review de novo. Ibid.
"New Jersey courts 'may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant "consistent with due process of law."'" Pullen v. Galloway,
461 N.J. Super. 587, 596 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Bayway Refining Co. v.
State Utils., Inc., 333 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 2000)). Due process
requires a defendant to have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum so the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
A-2726-23
5
"[W]hen the defendant is not present in the forum state, 'it is essential
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails [themselves]
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking
the benefit and protection of its laws,'" Baanyan Software Servs., Inc. v.
Kuncha, 433 N.J. Super. 466, 475 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Waste Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Admiral Ins., 138 N.J. 106, 120 (1994)) such that defendant can
reasonably anticipate being sued in this state. Dutch Run-Mays Draft, LLC v.
Wolf Block, LLP, 450 N.J. Super. 590, 599 (App. Div. 2017). This
"'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled
into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated
contacts." McKesson v. Hackensack Med. Imaging, 197 N.J. 262, 277 (2009)
(quoting Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323-24 (1989)).
Plaintiff bears the burden of proof to "allege or plead sufficient facts with
respect to jurisdiction" and such allegations or pleadings must be stated "with
specificity." Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 164 N.J. 38, 71 (2000).
Appling these principles, we conclude, as the motion court did, that New
Jersey courts lack personal jurisdiction over defendant because there are
insufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over him. The
record is devoid of any evidence that defendant purposefully availed himself
A-2726-23
6
of any activity in New Jersey, commercially or personally. He does not reside
in New Jersey, or own property here. His last visit to New Jersey was more
than a decade ago. He is not licensed to practice law in New Jersey and he
does not solicit clients from New Jersey. Since defendant does not maintain
any contacts with New Jersey, let alone minimum contacts, the trial judge
correctly dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
III.
Alternatively, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint asserting
that it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. R. 4:6-2(e).
We review a decision to grant the relief requested under this rule de novo.
Johnson v. City of Hoboken, 476 N.J. Super. 361, 371 (App. Div. 2023) (citing
State ex rel. Campagna v. Post Integrations, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 276, 279
(App. Div. 2017)).
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in finding the litigation
privilege barred his claims and in dismissing the complaint. Defendant
responds that any statements made were absolutely privileged because they
occurred during pending litigation in which defendant represented a party. We
agree with defendant.
A-2726-23
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The litigation privilege applies to "'any communication (1) made in
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have
some connection or logical relation to the action.'" Hawkins v. Harris, 141
N.J. 207, 216 (1995) (quoting Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 369
(1990)). "[L]awyers and litigants must 'be permitted to speak and write freely
without the restraint of fear of an ensuing defamation action.'" Loigman v.
Twp. Comm., 185 N.J. 566, 580 (2006) (quoting Fenning v. S.G. Holding,
Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 110, 117 (App. Div. 1957)). The privilege applies not
only to defamation claims, but to "a host of other tort-related claims." Id. at
583. The privilege is not limited to statements made in a courtroom but
applies "to all statements made 'in connection with' a judicial proceeding . . . ."
Williams v. Kenney, 379 N.J. Super. 118, 134 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting
Hawkins, 141 N.J. at 216). The litigation privilege does not reach the tort of
malicious prosecution nor malicious use of process; however, it does apply to
abuse of process claims. Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J. Super. 282, 297-98
(App. Div. 2001) (citations omitted).
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Because defendant meets all the requirements established in Hawkins,
we conclude the litigation privilege provides defendant with absolute
immunity from plaintiff's claims.
First, defendant's opposition certification was submitted directly in
response to Jeffrey's motion for recusal which sought to disqualify the trial
judge from overseeing his case. This motion resulted from the eviction
complaint filed in Hawaii by defendant's client, Jeffrey's landlord. Since
defendant's statements in the certification were made in this context, they are
considered part of a judicial proceeding.
Second, as counsel for Jeffrey's landlord, defendant fulfilled his
professional responsibility by responding to Jeffrey's motion. As the attorney
representing one of the primary parties to the action, defendant clearly
qualifies as an "other participant" under Hawkins.
Third, the specific statements and communications at issue were
included in defendant's certification opposing Jeffrey's motion. The purpose of
these statements was to contest the relief requested by Jeffrey and to support
defendant's client's position in the underlying eviction litigation. Accordingly,
these statements were made to further the objectives of the original legal
action.
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Finally, there is a logical and direct connection between the contested
statements and the original action. The statements were submitted in the
course of defending against a motion that was prompted by a perceived
conflict of interest that arose in the eviction action.
Furthermore, the content and context of the contested statement are
especially relevant to the immunity analysis. The statement at issue was not
something defendant invented. Rather, it was a direct quotation (even if
factually incorrect) taken from an opinion authored by the DRB. The trial
court correctly observed that this quotation was pertinent to an evaluation of
the credibility and truthfulness of plaintiff's statements. There is no indication
that defendant included the quotation for an improper or malicious purpose.
Rather, it was introduced as part of a legitimate advocacy on behalf of
defendant's client in a judicial setting.
To the extent we have not addressed a particular argument, it is because
either our disposition makes it unnecessary or the argument was without
sufficient merit to warrant any discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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