Ladd

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

TROY D. LADD, : Case No. 2:25-cv-947

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Michael H. Watson

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

:

MAILROOM STOREKEEPER :

JONATHAN BLACKFORD, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

ORDER AND

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Pickaway Correctional Institution (PCI), has filed a pro se civil

rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1-2). By separate Order, Plaintiff has been

granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the Complaint to determine

whether the Complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner, and is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss

the Complaint, or any part of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & § 1915A(b). Complaints by pro se litigants are to be construed

liberally and held to less stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin v. Overton,

391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004). But this leniency is not boundless, and “it is not within the

purview of the district court to conjure up claims never presented.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482

F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012).

In reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage, the Court must construe it in his favor,

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). But the Court is not required to accept factual allegations that are “clearly irrational

or wholly incredible.” Ruiz v. Hofbauer, 325 F. App’x 427, 429–30 (6th Cir. 2009). Rather, “[a]

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although “detailed factual

allegations” are not required, the Court must dismiss the Complaint “if it tenders naked assertions

devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662. (internal quotation and quotation

marks omitted). In the end, “basic pleading essentials” are still required. Wells v. Brown, 891

F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

II. COMPLAINT

Plaintiff brings this action against the following three Defendants: PCI Mailroom

Storekeeper Jonathan Blackford, PCI Inspector Shelley Clemmons, and Perry County, Ohio,

Probate Court Judge Luann Cooperrider. (Doc. 1-2 at 2–3). Although Plaintiff asserts that all

three Defendants violated his constitutional rights, exhibits attached to his Complaint make clear

that his claims, at base, stem from challenges to the legal-mail policy of the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC). (Id. at 18). This policy requires control numbers to be

placed on all legal mail. See Fishman v. Williams, No. 14-cv- 4823, 2016 WL 11484591, at *7

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2016) (“When screening a pro se plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A, the Court may consider facts drawn from the complaint and supporting exhibits attached

thereto.”). Plaintiff’s allegations are set forth in the following five claims:

In Claim One, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Blackford violated the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution by failing to treat certified mail from the Perry

County Probate Court as legal mail because it lacked a control number. (Doc. 1-2 at 5). Although

Plaintiff’s core allegations concern the mishandling of legal mail sent to him by the Probate Court

in October 2023 (id.), exhibits to Plaintiff’s Complaint assert additional incidents of improperly

handled legal mail after that time. (Id. at 26–27, 31). In regard to the October 2023 incident,

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Blackford failed to timely deliver him a hearing notice from

the Probate Court regarding an adoption proceeding involving his son. (Id. at 5–6). He says that

Blackford violated ODRC policy requiring mail to be processed within 48 hours, and that he

prevented Plaintiff from objecting to the adoption. (Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that Blackford

misleadingly told him that he notified the Probate Court of the delay on December 8, 2023, but the

notification never arrived and, as a result, the Court was unaware that Plaintiff had not received

the hearing notice until Plaintiff later sought a new hearing. (Id. at 5–7).

In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Clemmons violated his First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by failing to adequately investigate his grievance concerning Blackford’s

mishandling of his legal mail and by failing to disclose a December 11, 2023 email from Blackford

regarding the letter he allegedly sent to the Probate Court. (Id. at 6–7).

In Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges that Clemmons was deliberately indifferent to his rights

when she failed to contact the Perry County Probate Court to ensure that Blackford’s letter had

arrived. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff alleges that both Clemmons and Blackford knew or should have known

that Plaintiff would rely on representations by them that the letter had been sent. (Id.).

In Claim Four, largely duplicative of Claim Three, Plaintiff asserts that Clemmons’ and

Blackford’s alleged actions violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment. (Id. at 8).

In Claim Five, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Judge Cooperrider was biased against him

due to prior juvenile proceedings in which Plaintiff was a party. (Id. at 8–9). Plaintiff asserts that

Judge Cooperrider violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by adjudicating the

adoption proceeding, notwithstanding this alleged bias, and by “dismiss[ing] the Notice of Appeal”

he “incidentally” sent her. (Id.). Although not entirely clear from his allegations, it appears that

Plaintiff did ultimately appeal from the Probate Court proceedings because he asserts that the

“Court of Appeals stood on Defendant Cooperrider’s claim that [Plaintiff] failed to contact her and

tell her what had taken place.” (Id. at 9).

With respect to all five claims, Plaintiff indicates that he is proceeding against Defendants

in an individual capacity (id.) and is seeking both money damages and injunctive relief in the form

of a new adoption hearing (id. at 10).

III. ANALYSIS

Having reviewed the Complaint and without the benefit of briefing by the parties, the Court

concludes, in an abundance of caution, that Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment legal mail

and access to the courts claims against Defendant Blackford may proceed at this juncture. See

Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that “when the incoming mail is ‘legal

mail,’ [the Court has] heightened concern . . . because a prison’s security needs do not

automatically trump a prisoner’s First Amendment right to receive mail, especially correspondence

that impacts upon or has import for the prisoner’s legal rights, the attorney-client privilege, or the

right of access to the courts”). In so finding, the Court is aware that at least some of Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendant Blackford may implicate limitations placed on federal courts in child-

custody matters. See, e.g., Edelstein v. Flottman, No. 24-3156, 2025 WL 609487, at *2 (6th Cir.

Jan. 10, 2025) (addressing “domestic relations exception” to federal court jurisdiction); Pryor v.

Hurley, No. 2:05-cv-936, 2006 WL 2711677, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2006) (“[I]t appears that

plaintiff’s underlying state action related to custody issues of a minor child, a category of action

for which the constitutional right of access to the courts offers no protection.”). The Court finds,

however, that such issues will benefit from being addressed after Defendant Blackford is served

and has an opportunity to respond. In this regard, the Court advises Plaintiff that the Court’s

determination that these claims may proceed for purposes of this preliminary screening does not

preclude Defendant Blackford from filing a motion to dismiss, a motion for more definite

statement, or other appropriate motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g.,

Wiley v. Austin, No. 20-cv-220, 2020 WL 6204382, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2020).

For the reasons below, however, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and ODRC policy violation

claims against Defendant Blackford, as well as Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Clemmons

and Judge Cooperrider fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).

A. Eighth Amendment Claims against Blackford

The Court turns first to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant Blackford.

Plaintiff alleges that Blackford acted with deliberate indifference to his rights in violation of the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when he told Plaintiff that

he had sent a letter to the Probate Court on Plaintiff’s behalf, even though the letter was never

received by the Court. (Doc. 1-2 at 6–8).

The Eighth Amendment imposes an obligation to provide prisoners with reasonably

adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).

The failure to provide such necessities is a violation of an inmate’s right to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment. Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1984). To establish a violation

of his Eighth Amendment rights, Plaintiff must show that Blackford acted with deliberate

indifference to those rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A claim of deliberate

indifference under the Eighth Amendment has both an objective and subjective component.

Rouster v. Cty. of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff generally satisfies the

objective component by alleging that he had a need that was “sufficiently serious.” Id. (quoting

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). A plaintiff satisfies the subjective component “by

alleging facts which, if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts

from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that

he then disregarded that risk.” Id. The requisite intent must be more than mere negligence. Id.

Here, the Complaint contains no allegations from which the Court can plausibly infer that

Blackford acted with deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff’s rights in his contact with the

Probate Court. Plaintiff’s assertions that Blackford “purposefully and knowingly lied” to him

about sending the letter (Doc. 1-2 at 7) are merely conclusions, which are insufficient to state a

claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662. Further, in an exhibit attached to the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts

that Blackford “sent in a letter to the courts” but “used [Plaintiff’s] son[’]s name instead of

[Plaintiff’s].” (Id. at 29). At best, such allegations suggest negligence on Blackford’s part, which

is insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Blackford should be

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

B. Grievance Procedure and Failure to Investigate Claims against Clemmons

The Court next addresses Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Clemmons. Plaintiff alleges

that Clemmons violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to properly

investigate his grievance regarding the handling of his legal mail and by misleading him as to the

steps Blackford took to contact the Probate Court regarding the delay in the delivery of his mail.

(Id. at 6–8). These allegations are insufficient to state a constitutional claim.

Although raised under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, Plaintiff’s claims

against Clemmons are properly considered under the First Amendment, which guarantees “the

right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend.

I. A prisoner has the right to file grievances against prison officials. Heyward v. Cooper, 88 F.4th

648, 657 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000)). The

First Amendment, however, does not impose an affirmative obligation on the government to

consider, respond to, or grant any relief on a petition for redress of grievances. Thompson v.

Marietta Educ. Ass’n, 972 F.3d 809, 814 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Smith v. Ark. State Highway

Emps., Loc. 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979) (per curiam)). In other words, an inmate has

neither a constitutionally protected interest in a jail or prison grievance procedure, nor the right to

an effective procedure. Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007) (“There is no

statutory or common law right, much less a constitutional right, to an investigation.”); Argue v.

Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases).

This means that the failure to investigate another person’s alleged improper conduct

“do[es] not constitute ‘active [un]constitutional behavior’ as required and thus, [is] not actionable”

under § 1983. Frodge v. City of Newport, 501 F. App’x 519, 532 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bass v.

Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)). An official’s purported failure to investigate or

take corrective action does not constitute personal involvement in the underlying alleged

unconstitutional conduct. Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1014 (6th Cir. 1992). Likewise, a prison

official’s alleged failure to adequately investigate claims of misconduct does not rise to the level

of “encouragement” that would make the official liable for such misconduct. Id. (quoting Bellamy

v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)).

Plaintiff does not allege any facts to indicate that Clemmons herself actively participated

in the delayed delivery of his legal mail. At most, Plaintiff alleges that Clemmons’ investigation

was ineffective and that she erred in telling Plaintiff that Blackford had contacted the Probate Court

about the delay. (See Doc. 1-2 at 7–8, 18). But, as the Court earlier found, there are no alleged

facts supporting an inference that Blackford deliberately failed to notify the Probate Court of the

delay. And an inadequate investigation does not give rise to a § 1983 claim. Mitchell, 487 F.3d

at 378; Argue, 80 F. App’x at 430.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Clemmons should be DISMISSED for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

C. Judicial Immunity Protections for Judge Cooperrider

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Judge Cooperrider are considered next. These claims

are barred by judicial immunity. Judicial immunity shields judges, and other public officers, “from

undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity

is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502

U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judicial immunity is overcome only if the actions taken were not in the judge’s

judicial capacity and if the actions taken were in absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 11–12.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Judge Cooperider was biased against him and improperly

dismissed an appeal he “incidentally” sent her. (Doc. 1-2 at 8–9). But Judge Cooperrider’s alleged

conduct was indisputably judicial in nature, and Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly

suggesting she acted in the absence of all jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s allegations of bias do not change

this result. See, e.g., King v. McCree, 573 F. App’x 430, 441 (6th Cir. 2014) (“To the extent

plaintiff may be alleging bias on the part of defendants that infected the fairness of their rulings

and proceedings, plaintiff's allegations of bias or misconduct do not render the actions of

defendants non-judicial.”); Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (“[I]immunity applies even when the judge is

accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (“A

judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done

maliciously, or was in excess of his authority”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Cooperider are barred by judicial immunity

and should be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. See Boddie v. Van Steyn, No. 2:15-cv-06,

2015 WL 631490, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2015) (noting that a claim that is barred by judicial

immunity fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).

D. ODRC Policy Violations against Blackford

In addition to his constitutional claims, Plaintiff alleges that Blackford’s delay in

processing his mail violated ODRC policy. (Doc. 1-2 at 3, 6). Although this allegation may form

part of the background for Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, a § 1983 claim cannot be based on a

violation of prison policy. See Williams v. Burgess, No. 5:21-cv-99, 2021 WL 5816830, at *4

(W.D. Ky. Dec. 7, 2021) (citing Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 580 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007)) (“The

purpose of § 1983 is to remedy violations of federal law, not state law.”); Lewellen v. Metro. Gov't

of Nashville, 34 F.3d 345, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Unless a deprivation of some federal constitutional

or statutory right has occurred, § 1983 provides no redress even if the plaintiff's common law rights

have been violated and even if the remedies available under state law are inadequate”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff ODRC policy violation claims against Blackford should be

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Complaint (Doc. 1-2) should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A(b)(1), with the exception of Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment legal mail

and access to the courts claims against Defendant Blackford.

One other issue. The summons form Plaintiff has provided for Defendant Blackford is

incomplete in that it fails to include Defendant Blackford’s name in the section of the form titled

“To: Defendant’s name and address.” Plaintiff instead includes only the Defendant’s address. It

is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, submit to

the Court a corrected summons form for Defendant Blackford. Plaintiff is advised that failure

to comply with this Order may result in the dismissal of this action for want of prosecution.

Plaintiff, however, need not provide a corrected U.S. Marshal form for this Defendant.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The Complaint (Doc. 1-2) be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1), with the exception of Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth

Amendment legal mail and access to the courts claims against Defendant Blackford.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of this Order, Plaintiff SHALL submit a

corrected summons form for Defendant Blackford, including his name in the section of the form

titled “To: Defendant’s name and address.”

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff a blank summons form for

this purpose. Upon receipt of the corrected summons form, the Court ORDERS service of process

by the United States Marshal in this case as directed by Plaintiff.

3. Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants Blackford or, if an appearance has been

entered by counsel, upon his attorney(s), a copy of every further pleading or other document

submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed

with the clerk of court a certificate stating the date a true and correct copy of any document was

mailed to Defendant Blackford or counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate

judge which has not been filed with the clerk or which fails to include a certificate of service will

be disregarded by the court.

4. Plaintiff shall inform the Court promptly of any changes in his address which may

occur during the pendency of this lawsuit.

Date: January 7, 2026 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS:

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response

to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to

the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation

omitted).