The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
S. T., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25-03235-CV-S-LMC
)
OREGON COUNTY AMBULANCE )
DISTRICT, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym (Doc. #4).
Defendants consent to Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. ## 15, 16.) For the following reasons, this Court
will grant Plaintiff’s request.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that she met Defendant Kenneth McKenzie, who was the
Executive Director of the Oregon County Ambulance District, in one of her classes to become an
EMT. (Doc. #1 at 1, 5-6.) Defendant McKenzie pursued and eventually hired Plaintiff as his
assistant. (Doc. #1 at 1, 6.) Plaintiff alleges that her employment was conditioned on Plaintiff
agreeing to a sexual relationship with Defendant McKenzie. (Doc. #1 at 1, 6.) When Plaintiff
subsequently tried to end the sexual relationship, she was threatened with “violence, discharge and
death.” (Doc. #1 at 1, 7-8.) During one episode of threats, Defendant McKenzie repeatedly told
Plaintiff she was fired. (Doc. #1 at 8.) Plaintiff informed the Oregon County Ambulance District
Board of Directors of Defendant McKenzie’s conduct, including the threats and provided proof of
the relationship and the threats. (Doc. #1 at 2, 9.) Plaintiff was suspended and eventually
terminated from employment. (Doc. #1 at 2, 9-10.) Thereafter Plaintiff filed the instant action
alleging sex discrimination under both the Missouri Human Rights Act (Count I) and Title VII
(Count II), retaliation under both the Missouri Human Rights Act (Count III) and Title VII (Count
IV), sex discrimination in a place of public accommodation under the Missouri Human Rights Act
(Count V), a violation of RSMo. § 105.055 (Counts VI), First Amendment retaliation (Count VII),
and assault (Count VIII). (Doc. #1.)
Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the “title of the complaint must name
all the parties[,]” which has led to a presumption against the use of pseudonyms. AB v. HRB Pro.
Res. LLC, 2020 WL 12675330, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2020). Nevertheless, courts have
discretion as to whether to permit a party to proceed under a pseudonym. T.S.H. v. Nw. Missouri
State Univ., 2019 WL 5057586, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 8, 2019). Ultimately, “the Court must
determine whether the plaintiff ‘has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and
constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.’” W.G.A. v. Priority
Pharmacy, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 616, 617 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (quoting Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323
(11th Cir.1992)). In making such a determination, relevant factors that weigh in favor of granting
a request to proceed via pseudonym include whether “(1) the party seeking anonymity was
challenging government activity; (2) identification threatened to reveal information of a sensitive
and highly personal nature; and (3) a party would be required, absent anonymity, to admit an
intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution[,]” as well as “the
danger of retaliation[.]” Cajune v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 194, 105 F.4th 1070, 1077 (8th Cir. 2024).
Factors weighing against granting a motion to proceed under a pseudonym include “whether the
party’s requested anonymity poses a unique threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant,
whether the public’s interest in the case is furthered by requiring that the litigants disclose their
identities, and whether there exist alternative mechanisms that could protect the confidentiality of
the litigants.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff asserts that being required to use her real name “poses a potential threat to
Plaintiff’s wellbeing and safety” due to further trauma and potential “reputational harm,
embarrassment, and humiliation to Plaintiff and her family.” (Doc. #4 at 3-4.) Plaintiff points out
that the Defendants are aware of her identity and it will thus not prejudice the Defendants. (Doc.
#4 at 4.) Defendants have consented to Plaintiff’s request to proceed under a pseudonym. (Doc.
## 15, 16.)
This case presents a mixed bag. Due to the allegations in this matter, there is a high
potential that “information of a sensitive and highly personal nature” could be revealed. Courts in
the Eighth Circuit have permitted the use of a pseudonym in cases involving sex-based
employment discrimination and retaliation. See Doe v. Univ. of Nebraska, 2025 WL 1580919, at
*1 (D. Neb. June 4, 2025); Doe v. Univ. of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2025 WL 1331700, at *1 (D. Neb.
May 7, 2025); but see J.H. v. McLarty Auto. Grp., LLC, 2025 WL 2969086, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Oct.
20, 2025) (rejecting a request to proceed under pseudonym where allegations of employment
discrimination and violations of Missouri law were based on her status as a victim of domestic
violence). Additionally, at least one court has found that a Plaintiff alleging that she suffered from
mental health repercussion due to the conduct at issue, and that disclosure of her name would add
to “exacerbate [her] emotional distress[,]” favors a finding that a pseudonym is appropriate. Doe
v. Sutton, 2025 WL 871656, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2025). Finally, Defendants have consented
to the Plaintiff’s request and will thus not be hindered by permitting Plaintiff to proceed via
pseudonym. See Doe v. Heartland Ivy Partners LLC, 2025 WL 26643, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 3,
2025) (finding that “Defendants implicitly concede that allowing Plaintiff to proceed under a
pseudonym will not unfairly prejudice them” where Defendants have stated they do not oppose
the motion).
On the other hand, the Complaint indicates that Plaintiff attended an Oregon County
Ambulance District Board of Directors meeting and informed Defendant Underwood and
Defendant Oregon County Ambulance District of the allegations against Defendant McKenzie.
(Doc. #1 at 8 ¶¶ 74-83.) There is no indication that these allegations were provided to the
Defendants in a closed board meeting. If the allegations were revealed in an open meeting, such
public disclosure would weigh against permitting the Plaintiff to proceed via pseudonym. See
Does 1-8 v. Presley, 2024 WL 4108015, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 6, 2024) (disclosure on podcasts
negates need to proceed under a pseudonym). The Court points out one other factor which at this
point neither weighs in favor nor against Plaintiff’s request, but is nevertheless important to point
out, which is that the Probable Cause Statement and the news article attached the Plaintiff’s Motion
to Proceed Under Pseudonym appear to indicate that a female coworker who had developed a
sexual relationship with Defendant McKenzie at the time of Defendant McKenzie’s alleged
embezzlement received “thousands of dollars in cash and gifts, including plants, furniture, and
payments for taxes and credit card debt.” (Doc. #4-1 at 3; Doc. #4-2 at 4-5.) The Probable Cause
Statement indicates that when questioned where the money was coming from, Defendant
McKenzie states that “he made a lot of money.” (Doc. #4-2 at 5.) Without more information as
to whether Plaintiff is the individual referenced in both sources and whether she was aware of
Defendant McKenzie’s wrongdoing, this fact is essentially neutral; however, if Plaintiff was aware
of Defendant McKenzie’s wrongdoing and did not report such to the Board or Defendant
Underwood, this fact may weigh against permitting Plaintiff to proceed via pseudonym.
Given the sensitive and highly personal nature of the matters alleged, as well as the trauma
Plaintiff has already experienced, the Court will grant the request to proceed via pseudonym during
the discovery period and will reconsider the matter if the case goes to trial. Doe v. Sutton, 2025
WL 871656 at *6.
It is therefore
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym (Doc. #4) is GRANTED.
/s/ Lajuana M. Counts
LAJUANA M. COUNTS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE