J-C-A-G

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 331 (BIA 2025) Interim Decision #4143

Matter of J-C-A-G-, Applicant

Decided by Board September 19, 2025 1

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

The applicant, who cooperated with United States law enforcement against the cartel,

did not demonstrate a clear probability of torture where his fear is based on unsubstantiated

statements from a coconspirator and generalized evidence of cartel violence.

FOR THE APPLICANT: Nora Searle, Esquire, Bronx, New York

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: M. Neal Ward, Assistant

Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; MULLANE

and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges.

GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals the Immigration

Judge’s February 27, 2025, decision granting the applicant deferral of

removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 2 The applicant, a

native and citizen of Mexico, opposes the appeal. The appeal will be

sustained.

The applicant was convicted for his role in a cocaine distribution

conspiracy and sentenced to 30 months in Federal prison. He cooperated

with Federal law enforcement against his coconspirators, and the

Immigration Judge found that if the applicant returned to Mexico, the CJNG

drug cartel allegedly behind the conspiracy would more likely than not

torture him with the acquiescence of the government to punish him for

1

Pursuant to Order No. 6521-2025, dated December 8, 2025, the Attorney General

designated the Board’s decision in Matter of J-C-A-G- (BIA Sept. 19, 2025), as precedent

in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2025).

Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a

precedent.

2

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into

force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2025); 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a) (2020).

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“snitching” and to send a message that cooperation with law enforcement

will have consequences. The Immigration Judge also found that the Sinaloa

cartel or the Mexican police would more likely than not torture the applicant

because the cartels and Mexican police are known to target recent deportees

for kidnapping, extortion, and interrogation by torture.

First, the Immigration Judge’s determination that the applicant will more

likely than not be tortured by Mexican police or the Sinaloa cartel contains

clear factual and legal error. The Immigration Judge based this conclusion

on the applicant’s assertion that he gave information about a Sinaloa cartel

member to United States authorities, and general evidence of the cartel

infiltration of Mexican authorities and the participation of some Mexican

police officers in kidnapping recent deportees. But there is not sufficient

evidence in the record to show that anyone affiliated with the Sinaloa cartel

is aware of the applicant or his cooperation or that he ever received any

threats or harm from the cartel. The conclusion that the cartel will expend

resources to hunt down and torture the applicant upon his return is

speculative. See Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912, 917–18, 918 n.4

(A.G. 2006) (holding that an applicant’s eligibility for CAT protection

cannot be established by stringing together a series of suppositions to show

that it is more likely than not that torture will result if the evidence does not

establish that each step in the hypothetical chain of events is more likely than

not to happen).

As to the risk of harm from Mexican police, we agree with DHS that the

Immigration Judge conflated harms that may not amount to torture with those

that do. In support of her conclusion, the Immigration Judge cited evidence

that Mexican police “often target male deportees, ‘harassing, extorting,

beating, and jailing them without cause.’” While she noted that “the purpose

of the[] kidnapping is usually about information obtained through

interrogation and torture,” this evidence is simply too generalized to establish

a particularized, specific risk that the police will more likely than not torture

the applicant, rather than leave him unharmed or subject him to lesser harms

such as harassment or extortion, based on his status as a recent deportee who

cannot speak Spanish. See, e.g., Herrera-Martinez v. Garland, 22 F.4th 173,

187 (4th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that generalized reports of human rights

violations are insufficient to show that a particular person would likely be

tortured); Nolasco v. Garland, 7 F.4th 180, 191 (4th Cir. 2021) (explaining

that “the mere existence of a pattern of human rights violations in a particular

country does not constitute a sufficient ground” to sustain a CAT claim

(citation omitted)). Further, the fact that criminals or some Mexican police

officers may commit crimes against recent deportees, even routinely, is

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insufficient to establish that the applicant will more likely than not personally

be tortured. See id.

Second, we cannot affirm the Immigration Judge’s determination that the

CJNG cartel will more likely than not torture the applicant based on his

cooperation with United States authorities. The applicant testified that a

coconspirator and fellow detainee, “Ricardo,” who was affiliated with the

CJNG, told other detainees that the applicant was a “snitch.” Based on

country conditions evidence and expert testimony concerning CJNG’s

operations and influence, the Immigration Judge found that CJNG already

knows about the applicant’s cooperation with authorities, plans to target him

upon return, and will coordinate with other cartels to find and torture him no

matter where he goes in Mexico.

We find this conclusion insufficiently supported by record evidence. The

applicant’s fear rests in substantial part on his interactions with Ricardo. The

applicant’s knowledge of Ricardo’s CJNG connections is based on

representations that Ricardo made. Other than the statements Ricardo gave

to the applicant’s fellow detainees, nobody has indicated any desire to harm

or punish the applicant. The links in the evidentiary chain leading to the

applicant’s torture are too tenuous. We acknowledge the Immigration

Judge’s consideration of the country conditions and expert testimony, which

paint a picture of near-omnipotent cartels who can easily find and torture

anyone in Mexico whenever they wish. But the requirements for CAT

deferral are “exacting,” and even appreciable risks of torture will not qualify

unless they are more likely than not. Matter of A-A-R-, 29 I&N Dec. 38, 46

(BIA 2025). We conclude that the applicant’s cooperation with United States

law enforcement in a drug conspiracy case coupled with statements from an

alleged cartel associate that he is a snitch, even considering the expert and

country conditions evidence cited by the Immigration Judge, are insufficient

to establish a clear probability that he will be specifically hunted down and

tortured by that cartel wherever he relocates in Mexico.

We note that the applicant has never personally received any threats or

harm related to his cooperation in detention or in the several years after he

was released from prison. The Immigration Judge discounted this fact based

on expert testimony that the cartels try to avoid unnecessary violence in the

United States so as to not disrupt lucrative drug operations. But while this

evidence may not be dispositive in itself, it bears upon the seriousness and

credibility of the alleged threat. As DHS argues, in his initial Credible Fear

Interview, the applicant expressed a fear of the cartels killing or recruiting

him if he returned to Mexico, and disclaimed knowledge of the specific cartel

that Ricardo worked for.

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On our de novo review, we disagree with the Immigration Judge’s

conclusion that the applicant has satisfied his burden of proving that it is

more likely than not that he will suffer harm amounting to “torture” by, at

the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.

See Matter of A-A-F-V-, 29 I&N Dec. 118, 122 (BIA 2025) (recognizing that

the Board reviews de novo the ultimate question of whether the alien’s

predicted harm satisfies the legal definition of torture). The applicant may

face some risk of torture resulting from his participation in a potentially

cartel-related drug trafficking conspiracy. But the record before us,

ultimately predicated on jailhouse hearsay and absent of any actual threats

despite ample opportunity for their issuance, is insufficient to establish a

clear probability of torture even considering the general evidence that the

cartels operate in many areas of Mexico with impunity, have corrupted many

government officials, and inflict significant and serious violence on Mexican

citizens. See generally id. at 119–21 (reversing the Immigration Judge’s

determination that the alien established a clear probability of torture).

Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.

ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.

FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s order dated

February 27, 2025, granting deferral of removal under the CAT is vacated.

NOTICE: If an applicant is subject to a final order of removal and

willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the

order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents

necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the

time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any

action designed to prevent or hamper the applicant’s departure pursuant to

the order of removal, the applicant shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty

of up to $998 for each day the applicant is in violation. See section 274D of

the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R.

§ 280.53(b)(14) (2025).

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