Lewis v. Delgado

Case: 24-20484 Document: 75-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/07/2026

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

January 7, 2026

No. 24-20484 Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

Michael Lewis; Regina Armstead,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

John Delgado; Adam Vasquez; Arthur Love; John

Clausen; Matthew Newport,

Defendants—Appellants.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:22-CV-2593

______________________________

Before King, Jones, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge:

While searching for a group of armed suspects, police apprehended

and handcuffed plaintiff-appellee Michael Lewis for six minutes. During

those six minutes, a dialysis-related stent in Lewis’s forearm was damaged.

The district court refused to grant qualified immunity to the officers at the

summary-judgment stage. Because the officers did not violate any clearly

established law by handcuffing Lewis, we REVERSE.

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No. 24-20484

BACKGROUND

In November 2020, the Rosenberg, Texas Police Department

received a report that a group of armed suspects had pointed a firearm at

several bystanders. The report included a description of the suspects’

vehicle: a white Dodge Charger with black rims and tinted windows. Less

than ten minutes later, Officer Adam Vasquez, one of the defendant-

appellants, observed a car matching the vehicle’s description near the

location of the reported incident. Officer Vasquez pulled the car over and

radioed for backup. The other defendant-appellants—Officers John

Clausen, Matthew Newport, Arthur Love, and John Delgado—responded to

Officer Vasquez’s request for backup and arrived within several minutes.

Because the report had indicated the presence of multiple armed

suspects, the five defendant-appellants (“the Officers”) elected to proceed

with a “high-risk vehicle stop.” As part of the department’s standard

procedure for such stops, Officer Vasquez directed the occupants of the

Dodge Charger to throw the car keys out the vehicle’s window. The Officers

then directed the occupants of the vehicle to step out of the car one at a time,

slowly approach the Officers, and be handcuffed for the duration of the stop.

Officers Vasquez and Clausen recorded the stop on their body cameras. 1

Unbeknownst to the Officers, plaintiffs Regina Armstead and Michael

Lewis, an elderly couple, were the car’s only occupants. Lewis had a stent

implanted in his left forearm to accomplish dialysis. According to Lewis,

placing anything, including a pair of handcuffs, on Lewis’s left arm risked

damaging the stent.

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1

Officers Love and Delgado also recorded the stop on their body cameras, but

neither of them retained the footage.

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Police first ordered Armstead, who was driving, to exit the vehicle and

approach them. She complied with their instructions. As she did, she

informed Officer Newport that her husband was a dialysis patient. Police

then ordered Lewis to leave the car and approach them, which he did. Officer

Love handcuffed Lewis. Here, Lewis’s account diverges from that of the

Officers. Lewis states that he told the Officers he could not have anything

placed on his left arm both when he left his car and again immediately after

he was handcuffed. 2 The police contend that they only learned of Lewis’s

condition after he was handcuffed.

Based on video footage of the incident, Lewis appeared to be in some

discomfort after being handcuffed; he grunted and winced on his way to the

police car. After Officer Love secured Lewis in the back of a squad car, the

Officers demanded that any remaining passengers exit the Dodge Charger.

When no one else emerged, the Officers approached the car, verified the

absence of weapons or other passengers, and secured the scene. Within four

minutes, the police removed Lewis’s handcuffs. Including the time it took

police to secure the scene, Lewis remained in handcuffs for about six

minutes.

After the incident, Lewis experienced pain in his wrist. At his next

dialysis appointment, he discovered that his stent had been damaged. To

repair the stent, Lewis underwent surgery.

In August 2022, Lewis and Armstead filed suit on various claims,

including an excessive force claim, against the City of Rosenberg, the

Rosenberg Police Department, and the defendant Officers. Only a few of

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2

Lewis provided conflicting testimony about this timeline. He initially did not

contend that he disclosed his condition until after the police had handcuffed him and placed

him in a squad car. Only later did he state that he mentioned his condition twice as

described above.

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these claims, including Lewis’s claim for excessive force, survived the

defendants’ motion to dismiss. At the summary-judgment stage, all

defendants asserted qualified immunity. Adopting the recommendation of a

magistrate judge, the district court granted qualified immunity on all claims

except Lewis’s excessive force claim against the five defendant Officers. The

district court denied qualified immunity for the excessive force claim, finding

a genuine dispute of material fact existed about when Lewis informed the

Officers about his condition. The Officers appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a district court’s denial of qualified immunity at

the summary judgment stage de novo. Solis v. Serrett, 31 F.4th 975, 980 (5th

Cir. 2022) (quoting Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 2017)).

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “[A] district court’s

determination that a particular dispute is material is a reviewable legal

determination.” Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667, 675 (5th Cir. 2025)

(emphasis in original) (quoting Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir.

2010)). The materiality of a dispute depends on whether the disputed fact

“might affect the outcome of the suit.” Perry v. VHS San Antonio Partners,

LLC, 990 F.3d 918, 926 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986)).

DISCUSSION

Lewis and the Officers dispute whether the Officers had advance

notice of Lewis’s condition, either from Lewis and Armstead’s statements to

the officers or Lewis’s expressions of discomfort. Lewis contends that these

disputes are material and thus cannot be resolved on summary judgment. But

for these disputes to affect the outcome of the case, the applicability of

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qualified immunity would have to turn on whether the Officers received

advance notice of Lewis’s medical condition. It does not. With or without

notice, the Officers’ conduct does not amount to a violation of clearly

established law. 3 The district court should have granted qualified immunity

to the Officers.

Qualified immunity protects federal and state officials from certain

types of liability unless a plaintiff “show[s] (1) that the official violated a

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 735, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011). The burden of establishing these

factors rests solely on the plaintiff. Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 261 (5th

Cir. 2017) (en banc). A court may assess the two qualified-immunity prongs

in either order, and it need not address both prongs if one is dispositive. See

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009).

The analysis here begins and ends with whether the Officers violated

a “clearly established” right. “A right is clearly established only if relevant

precedent ‘ha[s] placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.’”

Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (alterations in original)

(quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S. Ct. at 2083). The Supreme Court

has specified that relevant precedent can include “controlling authority or a

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3

While the subsequent analysis proceeds under the assumption that the Officers

were aware of Lewis’s health condition before handcuffing him, there are reasons to be

skeptical of that assumption. Lewis offered conflicting testimony about his statements to

the Officers, and the only warning discernible in the body-camera footage is Armstead’s

statement that Lewis was a dialysis patient. Standing alone, that statement does not make

clear that handcuffing Lewis could result in injury.

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robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” 4 D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S.

48, 63, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018) (internal quotation marks removed)

(quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–42, 131 S. Ct. at 2084). When evaluating

precedent, courts must not “define clearly established law at a high level of

generality.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)

(quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S. Ct. at 2084). Because of that

stringent requirement, an officer’s violation of a right does not defeat

qualified immunity “unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite

that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood

that he was violating it.’” Rogers v. Hall, 46 F.4th 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023

(2014)).

To show that the Officers violated a clearly established right, Lewis

cites several precedents from this court. The facts in these cases bear little

resemblance to the case at issue here. See Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156

(5th Cir. 2009); Heitschmidt v. City of Houston, 161 F.3d 834 (5th Cir. 1998). 5

In Deville, during a routine traffic stop, police broke the plaintiff’s car

window, pulled her from her vehicle, threw her against the side of her car,

and then applied tight handcuffs. 567 F.3d at 162. The plaintiff suffered

significant injuries to her wrists, abdomen, jaw, and head, prompting the

court to deny qualified immunity. Id. at 168. A few years before, in

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4

The Supreme Court has never explicitly held that lower court opinions may create

clearly established law, nor has it determined a numerical threshold of cases necessary to

qualify as a “robust consensus.” See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 66 n.8, 138 S. Ct. at 591.

5

Lewis cites several other cases from courts in this circuit. See Ordonez v. Gonzalez,

No. EP-23-CV-99-KC, 2024 WL 5038700, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2024); LeCompte v.

Hendricks, No. CV 22-1355, 2023 WL 4687963, at *6–*7 (E.D. La. June 23, 2023). These

two unpublished district court opinions fall far short of establishing a consensus of

persuasive authority in this circuit.

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Heitschmidt, the plaintiff suffered “serious and permanent injury to his

wrists” after police left him in handcuffs for four and a half hours, ignoring

his repeated complaints that the handcuffs were too tight. 161 F.3d at 836.

Based on those facts, the court denied qualified immunity. Id. at 840.

Neither Deville nor Heitschmidt looks anything like this case. The

force applied in each case was significantly greater in either degree or

duration than the force used by the Officers here. On top of that, neither case

involved a high-risk stop or a search for armed suspects, during which officers

face a pressing need to secure the scene quickly. In contrast, the Officers

restrained Lewis for six minutes while searching for a group of armed

suspects. 6 Taken together, the exigency created by the high-risk stop, the

short duration of the handcuffing, and the minimal force applied mean that

the Officers’ conduct did not run afoul of Deville or Heitschmidt.

Unable to point to a case with facts closely analogous to those at issue

here, Lewis turns to the more general principle in this court’s case law that

police can use only minimal force on compliant suspects. Once again,

though, the cases Lewis cites involve a far greater degree of force than the

defendant Officers applied here. See Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 760

(5th Cir. 2012) (finding qualified immunity inappropriate where officers

struck a mostly compliant suspect with a baton thirteen times and tased him

three times during a traffic stop); Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 521 (5th Cir.

2016) (denying qualified immunity where an officer did not prevent a K9 unit

from biting a DUI suspect for several minutes); Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492,

496 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a qualified immunity defense where an officer

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6

In his brief, Lewis argues that, even under the circumstances, the Officers could

have used alternatives to handcuffs, such as “double” cuffs or body belts. Based on the

record, these alternatives do not appear to have been available to the Officers on the night

of the incident.

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allegedly shoved the plaintiff’s head against a car window hard enough to

break two of her teeth after she was already handcuffed); Ramirez v. Martinez,

716 F.3d 369, 379 (5th Cir. 2013) (refusing to grant qualified immunity where

police repeatedly tased someone who did not match the suspect’s

description). This array of inapposite precedent falls far short of

demonstrating that every reasonable officer would have concluded the

defendant Officers acted unconstitutionally in this case. Moreover, none of

these cases involves a question whether officers were aware of preexisting

health problems that rendered a plaintiff more susceptible to injury.

Lewis’s search for clearly established law among the opinions

produced by other circuits fares no better. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772,

774, 777 (3d Cir. 2004) (ten minutes of handcuffing a suspect who was not a

safety risk, complained of pain, and requested at least four times that the cuffs

be removed); 7 Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 517 (6th Cir.

2016) (suspect complained repeatedly about pain from handcuffs); Herzog v.

Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir. 2002) (DUI suspect was handcuffed

for over an hour); C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1030–31 (9th Cir.

2014) (sixth grader was handcuffed for over thirty minutes); Vondrak v. City

of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008) (suspect was handcuffed

for over an hour and a half and complained of pain multiple times). Aside

from being handcuffed for under six minutes, Lewis did not complain about

the handcuffs or tell the Officers he was in pain. Indeed, Lewis did not exhibit

any discomfort other than briefly grunting and wincing as an officer helped

him to his feet after handcuffing him. Even if the Officers observed these

signs of discomfort, and even if the discomfort resulted from the handcuffs

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7

The court in Kopec acknowledged that it might have reached a different result had

the officer “been engaged in apprehending other persons or other imperative matters.”

361 F.3d at 777. Here, the Officers were engaged in such conduct.

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rather than Lewis’s difficulty getting to his feet, this body language is a far

weaker indicator of pain than plaintiffs’ repeated complaints in Lewis’s cited

opinions. Taken together, these out-of-circuit cases do not create a

consensus that unambiguously condemns the Officers’ conduct. Nor do

these cases involve whether an officer had advance notice of a plaintiff’s

particular susceptibility to injury.

Finally, that Lewis remained in handcuffs for four minutes after the

Officers had secured the scene does not render qualified immunity

inapplicable. Four minutes in handcuffs does not compare to the duration of

handcuffing in cases denying qualified immunity based on the time a plaintiff

spent in handcuffs. See Martin v. Heidman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1310 (6th Cir.

1997) (thirty-five minutes); Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 2013)

(twenty-five minutes); Bastien v. Goddard, 279 F.3d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 2002)

(over four hours); Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1158–59 (10th Cir. 2020)

(twenty minutes and then handcuffed again for the duration of a ninety-five

mile drive); Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1322 (9th Cir.

1995) (thirty-five minutes).

Despite casting a wide net, Lewis turns up no cases sufficiently close

to the facts here to describe a clearly established right that these Officers

violated. Even if the Officers had notice of Lewis’s health condition, they

lacked notice that handcuffing Lewis would violate the law. None of our

cases prohibit briefly handcuffing a suspect during a high-risk stop while

officers strive to secure the scene, even if it takes the officers a few minutes

to remove the cuffs once the scene is secure. Lewis has thus failed to refute

the Officers’ qualified immunity defense. Because the absence of clearly

established law is dispositive, we do not separately assess whether the

Officers’ actions constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.

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CONCLUSION

Qualified immunity is appropriate here, and that finding does not

require us to resolve disputes of material fact. Accordingly, we REVERSE

the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

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