H.E. Brown v. L. Harry, PA Sec'y. of Corrections

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Herbert E. Brown, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Laurel Harry, Pennsylvania Secretary :

of Corrections; Tina Walker, SCI :

Fayette Superintendent; Sandra :

Calloway, SCI Fayette Inmate :

Accounting; and Warren County Ohio :

Enforcement, : No. 547 M.D. 2023

Respondents : Submitted: December 8, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: January 7, 2026

Before this Court are the Preliminary Objections filed by the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) Secretary, Laurel Harry (Harry);

State Correctional Institution at Fayette’s (SCI-Fayette) Superintendent, Tina

Walker (Walker); SCI-Fayette’s inmate accountant, Sandra Colloway (Colloway);

and Warren County Ohio Enforcement (collectively, Respondents) to the pro se

Petition for Review (Petition) filed by Herbert E. Brown (Brown) in this Court’s

original jurisdiction. After thorough review, we sustain the Preliminary Objection

challenging subject matter jurisdiction and dismiss Brown’s Petition.

I. Background1

By order, Warren County Ohio Enforcement directed SCI-Fayette to

withhold money from Brown’s inmate account to satisfy his child support

arrearages.2 See Pet. for Review at 2 & 6.3 The Ohio Department of Job and Family

Services advised Brown of his right to request administrative review of his child

support order after 36 months of the date of the most recent order, or earlier than 36

months if he provided proof that he met one of the listed criteria. Id. at 7. This

notice stated, in pertinent part:

This notice is to advise you of your right to request an

Administrative Review of your child support . . . order

and, if appropriate, adjust the child support order to be

consistent with the Ohio Child Support Guidelines set

forth in Chapter 3119 of the Ohio Revised Code[.]

Id. (emphasis added).

In 2023, at least 36 months after his most recent child support order,

Brown filed a Request for Administrative Review with Warren County Ohio

Enforcement. See Request for Admin. Review at 1. In relevant part, he argued under

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, and Rule 1910.19(f) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Pa.R.Civ.P.

1910(f), which permits a court to terminate or modify a child support order when a

parent is incarcerated and unable to pay. Pet. for Review at 6. However, on May

1

The following facts are as alleged by Brown in the Petition, which lacks substantial detail.

2

On August 11, 2016, the Court of Common Pleas in Bucks County sentenced Brown to

life in prison. See Exhibit at 1.

3

All record references are to electronic pagination.

2

16, 2023, the Warren County, Ohio Court Administrative Hearing Officer denied

any relief and informed Brown that Ohio is not bound by Pennsylvania law. Id.

On November 27, 2023, Brown filed his Petition with this Court in its

original jurisdiction. Pet. for Review at 1. Brown argued that Pennsylvania law

supports termination of his Ohio child support obligations due to his incarceration

and inability to pay. Id. (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.19(f)). He further asserted that

SCI-Fayette’s deduction of both his child support arrears and interception of his

COVID-19 stimulus checks deprived him of his property without due process of law.

Id. at 6. On April 1, 2025, Respondents filed Preliminary Objections with this Court.

See Preliminary Objections at 8.

II. Issues

Before this Court, Brown argues that he “is entitled to termination of

the child support arrears deduction obligation and remittitur of the arrears already

paid” due to his incarceration and indigent status. Pet. for Review at 1; see also

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.19(f). Specifically, Brown avers that reimbursement is justified

because he was unable to pay the arrears previously due to a “pre-incarceration event

. . . beyond his capacity to control” that prevented him from “having his day in

court.” Id. at 2. As a result, Brown requests termination of his child support

obligation, as well as injunctive relief to prevent further deductions from his inmate

account. Id. He further maintains that he is entitled to a reimbursement of all money

paid to Warren County Ohio Enforcement, including the COVID-19 stimulus checks

that were intercepted to pay for his child support arrears. Id.

In their Preliminary Objections, Respondents first argue that Brown has

failed to establish a clear right to injunctive relief to prevent the DOC from

3

complying with the Ohio child support order. Preliminary Objections at 3.

Secondly, Respondents assert that Brown failed to plead facts that would allow this

Court to modify or terminate his child support order. Lastly, Respondents argue that

the Respondents are not proper parties for a child support modification order and

that such a matter is outside this Court’s original jurisdiction. Id. at 7. As such,

Respondents maintain that Brown’s Petition should be dismissed. See id. at 1.

Because the jurisdictional issue is dispositive, we address it first.

III. Discussion

Pennsylvania law is well settled that

[when] ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept

as true all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition

for review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced

therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions

of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative

allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain

preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that

the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be

resolved by a refusal to sustain them.

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits

every well-pleaded fact in the [petition for review in the

nature of a] complaint and all inferences reasonably

deducible therefrom. It tests the legal sufficiency of the

challenged pleadings and will be sustained only in cases

where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for

which relief can be granted. When ruling on a demurrer,

a court must confine its analysis to the [petition for review

in the nature of a] complaint.

4

Beaver v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 674 M.D. 2018, filed December 6, 2019) (slip

op. at 3) (quoting Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)).4 When

deciding preliminary objections, Pennsylvania courts have determined that a

“[c]ourt’s analysis is limited to the [petition for review] and any attachments

thereto.” Id. at 4; see also Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2014) (stating that courts reviewing preliminary objections may also consider any

documents or exhibits attached to the complaint).

Respondents argue that this Court lacks original jurisdiction over the

issue of terminating Brown’s Ohio child support order. Pursuant to the Judicial

Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9914, “[t]he Commonwealth Court shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings[] [a]gainst the Commonwealth

government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity . . . .” 42

Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1). An action is construed as “[a]gainst the Commonwealth

government” where the petitioner seeks “judicial relief of any kind against the

[Commonwealth].” In re Petition for Enf’t of Subpoenas Issued by Hearing Exam’r

in a Proceeding Before the Bd. of Med. (Appeal of M.R.), 214 A.3d 660, 664 (Pa.

2019). Pennsylvania case law has further established that this Court can exercise

original jurisdiction pursuant to Section 761(a)(1) only if the Commonwealth is “an

indispensable party to the action.” See id. at 665. If not, the matter generally falls

within the general jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas. See 42 Pa.C.S. §

931(a) (“Except where exclusive original jurisdiction . . . [is] vested in another court

of this Commonwealth, the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original

jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings[.]”).

4

Under Rule 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedure,

unreported decisions of the Commonwealth Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited for

their persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

5

Here, it is undisputed that Respondents—with the exception of Warren

County Ohio Enforcement—are Commonwealth government actors. See 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 102 (“[The Commonwealth government] include[es] . . . the departments, boards,

commissions, authorities and officers and agencies of the Commonwealth[.]”).

However, the Commonwealth is not an indispensable party because Brown is not

seeking judicial relief against the Commonwealth; he is instead requesting that this

Court extinguish his support obligations to the obligee in Ohio. As such, this issue

falls outside the original jurisdiction of this Court.

Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code provides that “[a] matter which is

within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court . . . of this Commonwealth but which is

commenced in any other tribunal of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the

other tribunal to the proper court.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a). However, when an

indispensable party is not joined, the court must either transfer the matter to a court

with jurisdiction or order joinder of the indispensable party. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1032(b).

“A party is indispensable when his or her rights are so connected with the claims of

the litigants that no decree can be made without impairing those rights.” Sprague v.

Casey, 550 A.2d 184, 189 (Pa. 1988) (citing Tigue v. Basalyga, 304 A.2d 119 (Pa.

1973)). If joining an indispensable party is impossible, the court must dismiss the

action. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1032(b).

An obligee’s rights are directly connected to child support termination

actions because they are the recipient of the support as the custodial parent. In Barr

v. Barr, 749 A.2d 992, 997 (Pa. Super. 2000),5 the Pennsylvania Superior Court

determined that an obligor could not contest the validity of a non-registered, out-of-

5

While not binding on this Court, decisions of the Superior Court may be cited as

persuasive where they address analogous issues. Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180

A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

6

state income withholding order in Pennsylvania if Pennsylvania courts did not have

“jurisdiction over either the obligee or the support order.” Here, Pennsylvania does

not have jurisdiction over the support order; the DOC is merely garnishing Brown’s

wages to pay Warren County, Ohio. Pet. for Review at 2; see also Barr, 749 A.2d

at 996 (stating that garnishment of wages by an employer to be paid to another state

does not create jurisdiction over the order). Further, Brown neglected to join the

Ohio obligee and failed to plead any facts that would suggest that the Ohio resident

has any minimum contacts with Pennsylvania. As such, joinder of an indispensable

party is impossible because Pennsylvania cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over

the obligee. Therefore, the action cannot be transferred and must be dismissed.

Because we lack subject matter jurisdiction over Brown’s claim, we do

not address the other preliminary objections or Brown’s opposition thereto.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion, Respondents’ Preliminary

Objections are sustained in part and Brown’s Petition is dismissed.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

7

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Herbert E. Brown, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Laurel Harry, Pennsylvania Secretary :

of Corrections; Tina Walker, SCI :

Fayette Superintendent; Sandra :

Calloway, SCI Fayette Inmate :

Accounting; and Warren County Ohio :

Enforcement, : No. 547 M.D. 2023

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 7th day of January, 2026, the Preliminary Objections filed by

the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Secretary, Laurel Harry; State

Correctional Institution at Fayette’s (SCI-Fayette) Superintendent, Tina Walker;

SCI-Fayette’s inmate accountant, Sandra Calloway; and Warren County Ohio

Enforcement to Herbert E. Brown’s (Brown) Petition for Review are SUSTAINED

in part, and Brown’s Petition for Review is DISMISSED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge