R. Walker v. PPB

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ronald Walker, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Parole Board, : No. 492 C.D. 2023

Respondent : Submitted: June 3, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COVEY1 FILED: January 7, 2026

Ronald Walker (Petitioner) petitions this Court for review of the

Pennsylvania Parole Board’s (Board) decision mailed May 4, 2023, denying his

request for administrative relief. Petitioner is represented in this matter by Centre

County Public Defender, David Crowley, Esquire (Counsel), who has filed an

Application to Withdraw as Counsel (Application) and submitted a no-merit letter

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) (Turner Letter),2 in

1

This matter was reassigned to the author on July 14, 2025.

2

Through this type of letter, an attorney seeks to withdraw from representation of a parole

violator because “the [violator’s] case lacks merit, even if it is not so anemic as to be deemed

wholly frivolous.” Com[monwealth] v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 722 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Such letters are referred to by various names by courts of

this Commonwealth. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Porter, . . . 728 A.2d 890, 893 [] n.2 ([Pa.] 1999) (referring

to such a letter as a “‘no merit’ letter” and noting that such

support thereof. After review, this Court grants Counsel’s Application and affirms

the Board’s decision.

Facts

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution

(SCI) Benner Township.3 On June 13, 2017, Petitioner pled guilty to

Manufacture/Sale/Deliver or Possess w/Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance and

Conspiracy to Manufacture/Sale/Deliver or Possess w/Intent to Deliver a Controlled

Substance, for which the Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court (Philadelphia

Common Pleas) sentenced him to 4 1/2 months to 2 years of incarceration, and a

Violation of Probation for which Philadelphia Common Pleas sentenced him to 1

day to 4 years of incarceration (Original Sentence). See Certified Record (C.R.) at

1. On August 1, 2018, the Board granted Petitioner parole from his Original

Sentence with a maximum sentence release date of December 2, 2020.4 See C.R at

5-6. The Board released Petitioner on parole on October 2, 2018. See C.R. at 8. On

January 25, 2019, the United States Marshals Task Force arrested Petitioner in

Burgaw, North Carolina and charged him with Possession w/Intent to

a letter is also commonly referred to as a “Finley letter,”

referring to the [Pennsylvania] Superior Court case

Commonwealth v. Finley, . . . 479 A.2d 568 ([Pa.] 1984));

Zerby v. Shanon, 964 A.2d 956, 960 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)

(“Turner [L]etter”); Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 936

A.2d 497, 499 (Pa. Super. [] 2007) (“Turner/Finley letter”).

Hughes v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 977 A.2d 19, 25 n.2 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2009).

Anderson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 237 A.3d 1203, 1204 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020).

3

See http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov (last visited Jan. 6, 2026).

4

When Philadelphia Common Pleas originally sentenced Petitioner on June 13, 2017, it gave

him credit for time he served pursuant to his sentencing orders.

2

Manufacture/Sale/Deliver Marijuana, Possession of Marijuana, and Manufacture of

Marijuana. See C.R. a 33. At that time, the Board had an absconder warrant for

Petitioner and the Philadelphia Police Department had an arrest warrant for

Petitioner for attempted murder. See id. On March 13, 2019, North Carolina

withdrew all charges against Petitioner and extradited him to Philadelphia on April

1, 2019. See id. On April 5, 2019, the Philadelphia Police Department arrested

Petitioner for the crimes he committed on December 19, 2018, including, inter alia,

the attempted murder charge (New Charges). See id. Also on that day, the Board

charged Petitioner with a technical parole violation for leaving the District without

permission and issued a detainer. See id.

On April 6, 2019, Philadelphia Common Pleas set bail at $500.00,

which Petitioner did not post. See C.R. at 69. On April 1, 2021, Philadelphia

Common Pleas convicted Petitioner of the New Charges and sentenced him to an

aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years of incarceration (New Sentence). See C.R. at

75-76. On June 9, 2022, the Board recommitted Petitioner as a Convicted Parole

Violator (CPV) and recalculated his maximum sentence release date to November

25, 2023. See C.R. at 88.

On July 12, 2022, Counsel filed an Administrative Remedies Form on

behalf of Petitioner, wherein he argued that the Board failed to credit Petitioner’s

Original Sentence with all the confinement time to which he was entitled.5 See C.R.

at 93. Specifically, Counsel asserted that Petitioner was detained on a Board warrant

from January 25, 2019 through December 2, 2020, and from December 1, 2021

through June 30, 2022. See id. On May 3, 2023, the Board modified Petitioner’s

maximum sentence release date to November 22, 2023. See C.R. at 91. On May 4,

5

Petitioner also filed an Administrative Remedies Form. See C.R. at 94.

3

2023, the Board responded to Counsel stating that the Department of Corrections

(DOC) would apply credit towards Petitioner’s New Sentence for any time that had

not been credited to his Original Sentence, and reversed its June 9, 2022 action with

respect to Petitioner’s maximum sentence release date. See C.R. at 98-99.

On May 19, 2023, Petitioner, through Counsel, timely appealed to this

Court.6 On September 13, 2023, Counsel filed with this Court the Turner Letter

stating therein that Petitioner’s issues lacked merit and the detailed basis therefor

and certified that he sent a copy of the Turner Letter to Petitioner. Simultaneously,

Counsel filed with this Court the Application with an attached Verification, wherein

Counsel certified under penalties relating to unsworn falsifications to authorities, see

Section 4904 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904, that the statements therein were

true and correct that he had notified Petitioner of his Application and that Petitioner

had the right to obtain new counsel or proceed pro se. By September 18, 2023 Order

(Order), this Court informed Petitioner that he may, within 30 days after service of

the Order on him by Counsel, either obtain substitute counsel at his own expense

and have new counsel enter an appearance and file a brief in support of the Petition

for Review, or file a brief on his own behalf.7

6

This Court’s “review of the Board’s decision denying administrative relief is limited to

determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, an error of

law was committed, or constitutional rights have been violated.” Fisher v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. &

Parole, 62 A.3d 1073, 1075 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).

7

On November 7, 2023, Counsel served the Order on Petitioner. Petitioner did not retain

new counsel or file a pro se brief.

4

Technical Requirements

Initially,

“[a] [Turner] letter must include an explanation of ‘the

nature and extent of counsel’s review and list each issue

the petitioner wished to have raised, with counsel’s

explanation of why those issues are meritless.’” Seilhamer

[v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole], 996 A.2d [40,] 43 [(Pa.

Cmwlth. 2010)] (quoting Turner, 544 A.2d at 928) (some

alterations omitted). As long as a [Turner] letter satisfies

these basic requirements, [this Court] may then review the

soundness of a petitioner’s request for relief. However, if

the [Turner] letter fails on technical grounds, [this Court]

must deny the request for leave to withdraw, without

delving into the substance of the underlying petition for

review, and may direct counsel to file either an amended

request for leave to withdraw or a brief on behalf of [his]

client.

Anderson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 237 A.3d 1203, 1207 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020)

(citation omitted). “[C]ounsel must fully comply with the procedures outlined in

Turner to ensure that each of the petitioner’s claims has been considered and that

counsel has [] substantive reason[s] for concluding that those claims are meritless.”

Hont v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 680 A.2d 47, 48 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). Counsel

is also required to “notify the parolee of his request to withdraw, furnish the parolee

with [] a copy of . . . [the] no-merit letter satisfying the requirements of Turner, and

inform the parolee of his right to retain new counsel or submit a brief on his own

behalf.” Reavis v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 909 A.2d 28, 33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

This Court must then “conduct its own independent review of the petition to

withdraw and must concur in counsel’s assessment before [it] may grant counsel

leave to withdraw.” Hont, 680 A.2d at 48.

Here, Counsel thoroughly discussed the nature of his review, identified

the issues raised in Petitioner’s administrative appeal, and explained why those

5

issues lack merit. See Turner Letter at 1-9. Counsel served copies of both the

Application and the Turner Letter on Petitioner and the Board. In addition, Counsel

certified that he informed Petitioner of his right to proceed pro se or with new

counsel. Accordingly, this Court concludes that Counsel complied with Turner’s

technical requirements for withdrawing from representation.8

The Dissent believes that Counsel did not fulfill the Turner technical

requirements because Counsel did not attach a copy of his statement to Petitioner

advising Petitioner of his right to proceed pro se or with new counsel. In Turner, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified the appropriate procedures under

8

The Dissent believes this Court should deny Counsel’s Application because Counsel

“baldly” averred therein that he notified Petitioner of Counsel’s request to withdraw and advised

Petitioner of his right to retain new counsel or raise any points that he may deem worthy of

consideration. Walker v. Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 492 C.D. 2023, filed January 7, 2026)

(Dumas, J., dissenting), slip op. at 6. Specifically, the Dissent declares that his averment is

insufficient because the Court must guess as to the details of when Counsel gave notice, in what

manner, and the substance of Counsel’s advice.

However, this Court is not left to guess anything. This Court knows that Counsel notified

Petitioner that his claims were meritless and that Counsel would seek leave to withdraw on or

about September 13, 2023, at the latest, the date Counsel certified that he served Petitioner with a

copy of the Application and the Turner Letter. This Court also knows, at the very least, that

Counsel served the Application and the Turner Letter on Petitioner via first-class mail, as also

certified in both the Application and the Turner Letter. Finally, the substance of the notification

to Petitioner is the same as the substance of the notification to this Court as included in both the

Application and the Turner Letter. The purpose of the requirements is to guarantee that a petitioner

whose counsel wishes to withdraw is aware of the application therefor, and that he has a right to

obtain new counsel or to proceed pro se. Here, Counsel, an officer of the Court, averred in his

Application that he provided said notification to Petitioner. See Application ¶ 3. Further, the

Application includes a Verification, signed and dated September 13, 2023, wherein Counsel

certified under penalties relating to unsworn falsifications to authorities that the statements therein

were true and correct. See Section 4904 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904. Moreover,

Counsel served Petitioner with this Court’s Order reiterating Petitioner’s rights.

6

Pennsylvania law which govern withdrawal of appointed counsel in proceedings

under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA).9 The Turner Court held:

When, in the exercise of his professional judgment,

counsel determines that the issues raised under the PCHA

are meritless, and when the PCHA court concurs, counsel

will be permitted to withdraw and the petitioner may

proceed pro se, or by privately retained counsel, or not

at all. The same procedure should be followed at any

stage of the collateral proceedings, whether in a trial or

appellate court. Inasmuch as the United States Supreme

Court decided in Pennsylvania v. Finley, [481 U.S. 551

(1987),] that the federal constitutional considerations

underlying the tortuous procedures of Anders [v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),] do not apply under the

PCHA, [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] deem[s] these

less rigid requirements for withdrawal of counsel to satisfy

Pennsylvania law in collateral attacks on criminal

convictions.

Turner, 544 A.2d at 928-29 (emphasis added).

Thereafter, in Zerby v. Shanon, 964 A.2d 956 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), this

Court stated:

Turner/Finley counsel must [] submit a “no-merit” letter

to the trial court, or brief on appeal to this Court, detailing

the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the

case, listing the issues which the petitioner wants to have

reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit,

and requesting permission to withdraw.

Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of

the “no-merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition

to withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of

the right to proceed pro se or by new counsel.

Zerby, 964 A.2d at 960 (italics omitted; emphasis added). However, this holding

has not been interpreted as requiring a separate document advising petitioner of the

9

The PCHA is the predecessor to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

7

right to proceed pro se or by new counsel. Rather, this Court has consistently held

that a counsel’s statement in his Turner letter averring that he notified petitioner that

he has a right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief is sufficient to fulfill the

requirement. See Encarnacion v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 990 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2010) (Counsel served the petitioner with copies of his application to

withdraw “and no-merit letter . . . , in which he made clear his intention to withdraw

and that [the petitioner] had the option of either retaining counsel or filing a pro se

brief with this Court.”) (Italics omitted); see also Burford v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. &

Parole (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1388 C.D. 2010, filed Jan. 19, 2011);10 Staker v. Pa. Bd. of

Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 2191 C.D. 2011, filed July 10, 2012); Johnson v.

Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 707 M.D. 2012, filed Nov. 7, 2013);

Moye v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 2328 C.D. 2012, filed Nov. 14,

2013); Cole v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 475 C.D. 2014, Sept. 23,

2014).

Nonetheless, the Dissent maintains that this Court should follow the

Pennsylvania Superior Court’s (Superior Court) cases11 that deny applications to

withdraw for counsel’s failure to attach a separate statement notifying petitioners of

their rights to obtain new counsel or proceed pro se. However, the cases the Dissent

10

Pursuant to Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §

69.414(a), an unreported panel decision of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited

for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent. The unreported cases cited herein are cited

for their persuasive value.

11

This Court is “not bound by the Superior Court’s precedents although, where persuasive,

[this Court is] free to adopt the Superior Court’s reasoning.” Taylor v. Pa. State Police, 132 A.3d

590, 603 n.15 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Wertz v. Chapman Twp., 709 A.2d 428, 433 n.8 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1998), aff’d, 741 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 1999)).

8

relies upon do not hold what the Dissent proffers. In Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141

A.3d 509 (Pa. Super. 2016), the Superior Court denied counsel’s application to

withdraw because counsel’s letter to the petitioner stated: “Should the Superior

Court . . . grant my request to withdraw as counsel, you have the right to proceed

with your appeal with other new counsel or pro se (which means on your own

without counsel).” Id. at 511 (emphasis omitted). The Superior Court determined

that that statement improperly conveyed to the petitioner that he could not proceed

pro se or by privately retained counsel unless or until the Superior Court ruled on

counsel’s withdrawal request. See id. In Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748

(Pa. Super. 2005), the Superior Court denied counsel’s application to withdraw

because, therein, he explained “[the petitioner’s] right to new counsel.” Id. at 752.

The Superior Court determined that the wording incorrectly implied that the

petitioner was entitled to different court-appointed counsel, as opposed to being

entitled only to retain new counsel or to proceed pro se should he choose to do so.

See id. In Commonwealth v. Koubidina (Pa. Super. No. 249 MDA 2024, filed Sept.

24, 2024) (unreported), the Superior Court denied counsel’s application for two

reasons: (1) as in Muzzy, counsel notified the petitioner that he may proceed pro se

or with retained counsel, if the trial court granted the application to withdraw; and

(2) counsel did not include a proof of service upon the petitioner for either the Turner

letter or the application to withdraw. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Frazier, 330 A.3d

822 (Pa. Super. 2024), the Superior Court granted counsel’s application to withdraw,

not because she complied with the technical requirements, but so new counsel could

be appointed because the Superior Court had issued several orders directing counsel

to provide copies of the Turner letter and the application to the petitioner, which she

continued to ignore.

9

The Majority acknowledges that, in Millisock, the Superior Court

opined:

[T]he prudent course is to require counsel henceforth to

attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent

to their client advising him or her of their rights. Such a

requirement ensures proper notification to the client and

relieves th[e Superior] Court of having to make any

assumptions in circumstances similar to those in this case,

a burden inappropriate for a reviewing court.

Id. at 752.

Given the above issues in counsel’s notifications, the Majority does not

disagree with that advice. However, because a separate statement is not a mandated

requirement and, in the instant case, Counsel stated in his Application - which

included a proof of service upon Petitioner and a Verification wherein Counsel

certified under penalties relating to unsworn falsifications to authorities, see Section

4904 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904, that the statements therein were true

and correct: “[Counsel] has notified Petitioner of [Counsel’s] request to withdraw,

and advised Petitioner of his right to retain new counsel or raise any points that he

might deem worthy of consideration as required by Craig v. Pennsylvania Board of

Probation [&] Parole, . . . 502 A.2d 758 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1985)[,]” Application ¶ 3,

the Majority properly concludes that Counsel satisfied the technical requirements for

withdrawing from representation.

Denying the Application on the basis that Counsel did not attach a

separate statement notifying Petitioner of his rights when such is not required would

serve no purpose given the notification included in Counsel’s Application. Further,

it would delay this case while this Court waits for Counsel to serve an additional,

separate, redundant notification, and potentially confuse Petitioner as to the status of

his case when he previously received the Application and the Turner Letter from

10

Counsel. Moreover, this Court would expend further resources again addressing an

Application that was sufficient in the first instance. In addition, this Court must be

mindful and respectful of a public defender’s time and resources and not create

mandatory duplicative notification requirements.

Finally, this Court has an established practice of issuing an Order upon

receipt of an application to withdraw, stating:

NOW, . . . counsel for Petitioner (Counsel) having filed an

Application for Withdrawal of Appearance and Turner

Letter, which shall be considered by the Court along with

the merits of the Petition for Review, . . . (Petitioner) may,

within 30 days after service of this Order on Petitioner

by Counsel, either

(1) Obtain substitute counsel at his own expense and

have new counsel enter an appearance and file and

serve four copies of a brief in support of the Petition

for Review OR

(2) File and serve four copies of a brief on his own

behalf.

Counsel is directed to serve a copy of this Order upon

Petitioner and file a certificate of service on or

before . . . .

(Italics and bold emphasis added). Given this Court’s practice, there is no legitimate

fear that any petitioner whose counsel files an application to withdraw in this Court

will not be aware that he “may proceed pro se, or by privately retained counsel, or

not at all.”12 Turner, 544 A.2d at 928.

12

The Majority, however, does not rely upon said Order in making its determination that

Counsel fulfilled the technical requirements for withdrawal from representation.

11

Merits

Petitioner first argues that he did not receive credit for various custody

periods before and after his June 13, 2017 Original Sentence. Specifically, Petitioner

contends that he is entitled to credit for the periods from April 29, 2014 through July

22, 2014, August 23, 2016 through December 21, 2016, June 13, 2017 through

October 2, 2018, and January 25, 2019 through December 2, 2020.

Initially, Section 6138(a)(4) of the Prisons and Parole Code (Parole

Code) provides: “The period for which the offender is required to serve shall be

computed by the [B]oard and shall begin on the date that the parole violator is taken

into custody to be returned to the institution as an offender[,]” 61 Pa.C.S. §

6138(a)(4), and “[CPVs] must serve the backtime on their original state sentence

before they can begin to serve time on their newly-imposed state sentence under

Section 6138(a) of the [Parole] Code.” Wilson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 124

A.3d 767, 769 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).

“The general rule governing the allocation of credit for time served

awaiting disposition of new criminal charge[s] was established by our Supreme

Court in Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation [&] Parole, . . . 412 A.2d 568

([Pa.] 1980).”13 Armbruster v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 919 A.2d 348, 352 (Pa.

13

The Parole Code was consolidated and became effective on October 13, 2009. Gaito was

based upon Section 21.1 of what was commonly known as the Parole Act, Act of August 6, 1941,

P.L. 861, as amended, added by Section 5 of the Act of August 24, 1951, P.L. 1401, formerly 61

P.S. § 331.21a(a), repealed by the Act of August 11, 2009, P.L. 147. Section 21.1(a) of the Parole

Act similarly stated:

Any parolee under the jurisdiction of the [Board] released from any

penal institution of the Commonwealth who, during the period of

parole or while delinquent on parole, commits any crime punishable

by imprisonment, for which . . . he pleads guilty . . . in a court of

record, may, at the discretion of the [B]oard, be recommitted as a

12

Cmwlth. 2007). Pursuant to Gaito, “this Court consistently [has] held that once a

parolee is sentenced on a new criminal offense, the period of time between arrest

and sentencing, when bail is not satisfied [on the new criminal charge], must be

applied toward the new sentence, and not to the original sentence.”14 Armbruster,

919 A.2d at 352. “Gaito remains the general law in this Commonwealth respecting

how credit should be allocated for a [CPV] who receives a new sentence of

incarceration[.]” Smith v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 171 A.3d 759, 768 (Pa. 2017).

Accordingly, the Board does not have flexibility to determine the sentence to which

credit should be applied.

Section 6138(a)(5) of the Parole Code provides:

If a new sentence is imposed on the offender, the service

of the balance of the term originally imposed by a

Pennsylvania court shall precede the commencement of

the new term imposed in the following cases:

(i) If a person is paroled from a[n SCI] and the new

sentence imposed on the person is to be served in the

[SCI].

(ii) If a person is paroled from a county prison and

the new sentence imposed upon him is to be served

in the same county prison.

(iii) In all other cases, the service of the new term for

the latter crime shall precede commencement of the

balance of the term originally imposed.

parole violator. If his recommitment is so ordered, he shall be

reentered to serve the remainder of the term which said parolee

would have been compelled to serve had he not been paroled, and

he shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on parole . . . .

Former 61 P.S. § 331.21a(a) (repealed).

14

If the parolee met bail requirements for the new charges and was thus detained solely on

the Board’s detainer, time in custody is to be credited against the original sentence. See Smith v.

Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 133 A.3d 820 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (Smith I), rev’d on other grounds,

171 A.3d 759 (Pa. 2017) (Smith II); see also Gaito.

13

61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(5).

Here, Petitioner cannot challenge missing credit for the periods from

April 29, 2014 through July 22, 2014, and August 23, 2016 through December 21,

2016, which refer to time before his Original Sentence by appealing from his June

9, 2022 recommitment for violating parole.15

To the extent Petitioner is challenging whether the Philadelphia

Common Pleas credited his sentence for time served before his Original Sentence,

he should have made the claim pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).16

See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 595 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Menezes, 871 A.2d 204, 207 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“[A] challenge to

the trial court’s failure to award credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing

involves the legality of [the] sentence and is cognizable under the PCRA.”)). To the

extent Petitioner is challenging DOC’s computation of credit pursuant to the

Philadelphia Common Pleas’s sentencing order, he had to raise it in a mandamus

action, where relief is granted when the sentencing order clearly gives the petitioner

credit for the time period in question, and DOC’s computation does not comply with

that credit. See Foxe v. Dep’t of Corr., 214 A.3d 308 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). These

avenues of relief are separate and distinct from appeals from Board decisions, see

Section 73.1 of the Board’s Regulations, 37 Pa. Code § 73.1, as such appeals cover

different types of credit awards.

Further, regarding the period of time from his Original Sentence to his

parole release on October 2, 2018, it appears that Petitioner was serving a state parole

15

According to Petitioner’s March 8, 2018 Sentence Status Summary, credit for time served

was properly awarded in accordance with the sentencing orders. See C.R. at 1-4.

16

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

14

recommitment related to an earlier state sentence, which expired on February 26,

2018. See C.R. at 1-4. Consequently, the Board did not credit his Original Sentence

for that time period. If Petitioner believed his backtime on that earlier sentence was

misapplied, he should have filed a timely administrative appeal to challenge the

Board’s calculation when it occurred. See 37 Pa. Code § 73.1.

Relative to Petitioner’s contention that he is owed credit from January

25, 2019 through December 2, 2020, because he did not post bail, he is only entitled

to credit toward his Original Sentence for time served exclusively under the Board’s

warrant, before any bail was set, and not for any period after bail became available.

See Gaito. Petitioner properly received 71 days of credit from January 25, 2019

through April 6, 2019, when Philadelphia Common Pleas set bail. Any time

Petitioner served that is not applied to his Original Sentence will be applied to

Petitioner’s New Sentence. See id. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner

did not receive credit for time served.

Petitioner also argues that the Board erred because his recommitment

should not have started on December 1, 2021. Because December 1, 2021, marks

both the sentencing on his New Charges and the point at which Petitioner became

available to the Board for recommitment as a CPV, the Board correctly treated it as

Petitioner’s recommitment effective date. The Board awarded Petitioner 71 days of

credit for time he served exclusively on the Board’s detainer from January 25, 2019,

the date the Board issued the warrant, to April 6, 2019, the date the Philadelphia

Police Department arrested him on the New Charges.17

17

The Board did not give Petitioner credit for time spent at liberty on parole. See C.R. at

98.

15

At the time of his October 2, 2018 release on parole, Petitioner had 792

days remaining on his Original Sentence. After subtracting Petitioner’s 71 days of

credit for time served on the Board’s detainer, 721 days remained on Petitioner’s

Original Sentence. Adding those 721 days to the recommitment effective date of

December 1, 2021, yields a new maximum sentence release date of November 22,

2023. Accordingly, the Board properly calculated Petitioner’s new maximum

sentence release date.

Conclusion

Because this Court agrees that Petitioner’s claims have no merit,

Counsel’s Application is granted, and the Board’s order is affirmed.

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

16

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ronald Walker, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Parole Board, : No. 492 C.D. 2023

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 7th day of January, 2026, David Crowley, Esquire’s

Application to Withdraw as Counsel is GRANTED, and the Pennsylvania Parole

Board’s May 4, 2023 decision is AFFIRMED.

The Prothonotary is directed to serve a copy of this Opinion and Order

on Petitioner Ronald Walker.

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ronald Walker, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Parole Board, : No. 492 C.D. 2023

Respondent : Submitted: June 3, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

DISSENTING OPINION BY

JUDGE DUMAS FILED: January 7, 2026

Respectfully, I dissent. In my view, David Crowley, Esq. (Counsel)

has failed to meet the technical requirements for withdrawal, first recognized by this

Court in Scott v. Jacobs, 463 A.2d 110 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983). While the substantive

requirements of appointed counsel’s advocacy have evolved, the technical

requirements have remained the same.1 Before any request to withdraw may be

1

Initially, appointed counsel was required to file an Anders brief, which included a neutral

presentation of the legal issues. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.

McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v.

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Later, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that the

substantive Anders requirements did not apply where there was no constitutional right to counsel,

see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a

less stringent standard in which appointed counsel was required to provide a “no-merit” letter,

“which details the nature and extent of the attorney’s review and lists each issue the petitioner

wished to have raised, with counsel’s explanation of why those issues are meritless.” Zerby v.

Shanon, 964 A.2d 956, 959 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (discussing Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d

considered, appointed counsel must: (1) notify the client of his request to withdraw,

(2) furnish the client with a copy of his no-merit letter, and (3) advise his client of

his right to retain new counsel or raise any points he may deem worthy of

consideration in a pro se brief. See, e.g., White v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 276

A.3d 1247, 1254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022); Zerby v. Shanon, 964 A.2d 956, 959 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2009); Craig v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 502 A.2d 758 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1985).

I concede that the manner in which appointed counsel must “notify”

and “advise” his or her client has not been clearly defined by this Court. This has

engendered a certain flexibility in our analysis. Compare, e.g., Deck v. Pa. Parole

Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 215 C.D. 2023, filed May 13, 2025) (accepting a letter that

included a statement of the petitioner’s rights, addressed to the petitioner and

attached to counsel’s application to withdraw), with Brown v. Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa.

Cmwlth., No. 793 C.D. 2023, filed Oct. 9, 2024) (accepting counsel’s no-merit letter,

which was addressed to this Court, but which included a statement of rights directed

to the petitioner), and Mills v. Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 255 C.D. 2023, filed

April 10, 2024) (accepting counsel’s averment detailing when and how counsel

advised petitioner of his rights), and Moy v. Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 259

C.D. 2023, filed Sept. 18, 2024) (accepting counsel’s bald averment that he had

informed the petitioner of his rights).2

928 (Pa. 1988)) (cleaned up). In this case, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Counsel has

thoroughly discussed the nature of his review, identified the issues in Petitioner’s administrative

appeal, and explained why those issues lack merit.

2

Although not definitive, a snapshot of older cases illustrates a more consistent approach.

See, e.g., Stroud v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 196 A.3d 667 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (No. 1241 C.D.

2017, Appl. to Withdraw, Ex. A) (letter to petitioner providing statement of rights); Staton v. Pa.

Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 171 A.3d 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (No. 1765 C.D. 2015, Mot. to Withdraw,

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However, I believe clear guidelines, consistently enforced, would better

help to ensure the rights of indigent litigants, promote the diligent efforts of counsel,

and facilitate the more efficient resolution of these cases. With those goals in mind,

the Zerby Court’s general overview of this subject and its formulation of these

technical requirements are useful. In Zerby, this Court stated that “[c]ounsel must

also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the ‘no-merit’ letter/brief; (2) a copy of

counsel’s petition to withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right

to proceed pro se or by new counsel.” 964 A.2d at 960 (quoting Commonwealth v.

Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 2007)) (emphasis added); see also

Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. 2011) (clarifying that these

technical requirements survived scrutiny by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in

Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2009)).

Although the focus of the Zerby Court’s analysis was the substance of

appointed counsel’s no-merit letter, 964 A.2d at 961-63, I find the Court’s citation

to Wrecks useful. See Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545,

550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (noting that Superior Court decisions can be particularly

persuasive where they address analogous issues). Moreover, while the third

requirement, i.e., a statement advising the petitioner of pertinent rights, “is not

explicitly commanded by Turner,” former Chief Justice Castille reasoned that it

“better ensures notice to the [petitioner]” and “the additional specified

documentation will make it easier for the [petitioner] to respond and raise objections

Ex. A) (same); Oliphant v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1775 C.D. 2012, filed

Aug. 28, 2013) (Turner Letter, Ex. A) (same); Fisher v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth.,

No. 415 C.D. 2010, filed Dec. 30, 2010) (“by letter dated June 10, 2010, [c]ounsel . . . advised [the

petitioner] of his right[s]”); Encarnation v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 990 A.3d 123, 126 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2010) (“Counsel in this case served [the petitioner] with copies of his application to

withdraw and no-merit letter . . . in which he made clear his intention to withdraw and that [the

petitioner] had the option of either retaining counsel or filing a pro se brief with this Court.”).

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. . . .” Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 881-82 (Pa. 2009) (Castille, C.J.,

concurring).3

These distinct, technical requirements are firmly established in the

jurisprudence of our sibling, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which has extensive

experience evaluating similar requests from appointed counsel who seek to withdraw

their representation from clients seeking relief in criminal matters, whether by direct

appeal from a judgment of sentence or pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. In particular, I note that the Superior Court

routinely denied petitions from appointed counsel who fail to document their

provision of accurate information to indigent clients in a statement of rights. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 511-12 (Pa. Super. 2016) (denying

PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw because counsel’s statement to appellant was

deficient); Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 751-52 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(citing the procedural requirements adopted by Anders and McClendon,

disapproving counsel’s failure to attach to his petition a copy of his letter to client,

and “opin[ing] that the prudent course is to require counsel henceforth to attach to

their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her

of their rights”); Commonwealth v. Koubidina, 328 A.3d 520 (Pa. Super. 2024), 2024

WL 4275122, at *2 (disapproving PCRA counsel’s incorporation of a statement of

rights in counsel’s no-merit letter and explicitly denying counsel’s application to

withdraw because counsel had failed to attach to her petition a copy of the letter

purportedly sent to client outlining his rights); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v.

3

The majority maintains that a separate statement is not a court-mandated requirement. As

recognized by former Chief Justice Castille, the absence of any explicit requirement in Turner

should not be prohibitive. In my view, we should clearly embrace the procedural requirements

outlined in Zerby.

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Frazier, 330 A.3d 822, 824-25 (Pa. Super. 2024) (noting that the court would

normally deny a petition to withdraw filed by counsel when counsel has not attached

to her application a letter/statement to client advising client of his rights but instead

granting the petition and remanding to the lower court for the appointment of new

counsel in the interests of judicial economy).4

Finally, I note this Court’s long-standing practice of issuing orders that

may reiterate the rights of an indigent petitioner and further impose a schedule

limiting the time within which that petitioner can secure new counsel or file a pro se

brief. See, e.g., Encarnation v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 990 A.2d 123 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2010) (No. 1677 C.D. 2009) (docket sheet indicating such an order was

filed on December 1, 2009); Zerby, 964 A.2d 956 (No. 1179 C.D. 2008) (docket

sheet similarly indicating such an order was filed October 22, 2008). Nevertheless,

these technical requirements are imposed on appointed counsel, not the Court, whose

role is to review counsel’s efforts and, “[o]nce counsel fully complies with the

procedural and substantive requirements to withdraw, . . . then independently review

the merits of the petitioner’s claims.” White, 276 A.3d at 1254. Therefore, I must

caution against any suggestion or implication that this Court may serve as surrogate

counsel to a petitioner and supplement an appointed counsel’s efforts.5

4

We can cite as persuasive unpublished decisions of this Court filed after January 15, 2008,

and unpublished decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b);

210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). The majority offers reasons to distinguish these decisions but, in my

view, misses the broader point: consistent enforcement of clearly delineated procedural

requirements is useful and appropriate. These simple requirements provide a clear framework

within which to efficiently consider an appointed counsel’s assertions that an indigent litigant’s

claims lack merit while ensuring that litigant’s rights.

5

Regrettably, on occasion, this Court has referenced a scheduling order in analyzing whether

an appointed counsel has met the technical requirements for withdrawal. See, e.g., Brady v. Pa.

Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 262 C.D. 2018, filed Aug. 7, 2018), slip op. at 6, 2018

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In this case, Counsel has baldly averred that he “notified Petitioner of

[Counsel’s] request to withdraw[] and advised Petitioner of his right to retain new

counsel or raise any points that he may deem worthy of consideration . . . .” Appl.

for Withdrawal of Appearance, 9/12/23. In my view, this is insufficient. Absent

from this averment is any detail describing Counsel’s notification or advice. Thus,

the Court is left to guess: (1) when Counsel notified Petitioner that his claims were

meritless and that Counsel would seek leave to withdraw; (2) the manner of

Counsel’s notification; and (3) the substance of Counsel’s advice. Further, it has

long been accepted that appointed counsel must promptly inform a client. See, e.g.,

Craig, 502 A.2d at 760 (“[T]he prisoner must be given a reasonable opportunity to

respond to that motion by securing substitute counsel or filing a pro se brief.”). Here,

however, the Court is left with the rather unsettling possibility that Petitioner did not

learn of Counsel’s intentions until Counsel had served the application and no-merit

letter on Petitioner. Most importantly, Counsel has not attached a copy of his

statement to Petitioner, and Counsel’s bald averment lacks any objective evidence

to support it. For these reasons, I would deny without prejudice Counsel’s

application to withdraw and instruct Counsel to file an advocate’s brief or refile his

no-merit letter and application to withdraw with proper support by attaching his

WL 3733442, at *3 (accepting counsel’s service of this Court’s scheduling order upon litigant as

sufficient compliance with counsel’s technical requirements).

In this case, the Court directed Counsel to serve a copy of the order on Petitioner and file a

certificate of service on or before October 3, 2023. See Order, 9/18/23. Counsel did not comply

with this order. Rather, based on his amended certificate of service, Counsel did not serve our

order on Petitioner until November 7, 2023. Thus, any remedial benefit that our order could have

served was undermined by this dilatory service.

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statement to Petitioner. 6 See Muzzy, 141 A.3d at 511-12; Millsock, 873 A.2d at 751-

52; Koubidina, 2024 WL 4275122, at *2.

For these reasons, I dissent.

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

6

To be clear, I do not question Counsel’s sincerity; Counsel’s averments speak for themselves.

Further, I am sensitive to the limited resources available to the Commonwealth’s public defenders,

both financial and temporal. See Maj. Op., slip op. at 11. Any delay caused by the proper

disposition of this case will surely produce benefits prospectively.

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