Lavana Wilson v. Board of Review

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4024-23

LAVANA WILSON,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW,

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and

AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES LLC,

Respondents.

_______________________________

Argued November 19, 2025 – Decided January 7, 2026

Before Judges Smith and Jablonski.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of

Labor, Docket No. 328278.

Lavana Wilson, appellant, argued the cause on

appellant's behalf.

Kaitlyn McDonald, Deputy Attorney General, argued

the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney

General, attorney; Christopher Weber, Assistant

Attorney General, of counsel; Ryne A. Spengler,

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Lavana Wilson appeals from a final decision of the Board of

Review, New Jersey Department of Labor (Board), which disqualified her

from receiving unemployment benefits. We reverse and remand for further

fact-finding and a decision on petitioner's claim because both the Appeal

Tribunal (Tribunal) and the Board failed to consider medical testimony

relevant to its determination that she left her employment voluntarily without

good cause attributable to her work as required by N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1.

I.

Petitioner was employed as a fraud analyst by AT&T Mobility Services,

LLC (AT&T). During her tenure, AT&T instituted a seasonal policy

mandating overtime. Petitioner advised her supervisor she could not comply

with these overtime requirements due to insufficient childcare. Although she

suggested alternate arrangements, AT&T rejected them. Petitioner ultimately

satisfied the overtime requirement by taking intermittent leave under the

Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2654.

During this period, petitioner was diagnosed with depression and anxiety

by her physician, which she attributed to personal circumstances, including a

stressful relationship with her child's father and her recent brain surgery. She

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informed her supervisor of her mental health struggles, who directed her to

AT&T's Human Resources (HR) department. HR referred her to the Employee

Assistance Program (EAP) and she received therapy through it.

Petitioner additionally claimed she experienced a difficult work

environment and described incidents of micro-management and unprofessional

behavior, such as verbal altercations during a fire drill and a manager yelling

on the office floor. Although she verbally raised these concerns with

management and her union, she did not file a formal complaint.

Petitioner's last working day was January 17, 2023. After using her

accrued vacation days, she resigned on February 20, 2023. When she

departed, she was not subject to disciplinary action nor was her position

threatened. Her record did not reflect any performance issues.

Petitioner applied for unemployment benefits on February 19, 2023. The

Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) denied her claim, concluding

she had voluntarily resigned without good cause attributable to her work on

January 15, 2023. Petitioner then appealed to the Tribunal which upheld the

Division's determination but corrected the disqualification date to February 19,

2023. She appealed to the Board.

The Board remanded the matter to the Tribunal, noting:

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there [was] a need for additional testimony from the

[petitioner] and the employer about whether the

[petitioner's] condition of health was attributable to

the work, whether working conditions were adverse

and duly grieved prior to her leaving, and thus

whether [petitioner] had good cause attributable to the

work for leaving.

At the outset of the remand hearing, the Appeals Examiner (examiner)

gave preliminary instructions about the hearing process:

So, all- now, all testimony during the hearing will be

recorded. It will be taken under oath. I'm going to

begin by reading, identifying information into the

record, and then I'm going to administer the oath to

the [petitioner]. After I swear you in . . . , I'll be

asking specific questions of you. And once we've

completed my questions, [the employer representative]

you'll have an opportunity to question [the petitioner]

as well. Then I believe I swear in [the employer

witness], I will ask any questions that I have of [him]

after I swear him in. Then [the employer

representative], followed by [petitioner] will have an

opportunity to question [the employer witness] as

well. And then we'll allow for both [the employer

representative] and [petitioner] to address the record

in closing. The closing statements will end the

hearing, and at the end a decision will be made in

writing and sent to all parties by mail.

Notably, petitioner was not advised she could present additional

witnesses nor could she introduce evidence to support her claim. There was no

mention of her ability to provide medical testimony.

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At the remand hearing, the examiner stated the issues were the "potential

voluntary leaving of work" and "refusal of suitable work." Despite the Board's

directive, the examiner did not specifically identify petitioner's mental health,

nor whether these conditions or the exacerbation of the conditions were

attributable to her work as an issue to be addressed.

Nevertheless, the issue of petitioner's mental health was raised:

EXAMINER: So I believe that there was a

discussion or testimony provided of a diagnosis of

anxiety and depression. Is that correct, Ms. Wilson?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, that is correct.

EXAMINER: Ok. And do you recall when that

was initially diagnosed by any chance?

[PETITIONER]: It was in October of 2022.

EXAMINER: Okay. And would you be able to . .

. be able to briefly identify the known cause of the

anxiety and depression.

[PETITIONER]: Yes.

EXAMINER: Okay, if you can. I'm ready for you.

[PETITIONER]: Okay, [t]he main reason for me

leaving the company was due to my mental health [].

And that was the reason why I appealed it, because in

my end, the decision that you made . . . you never

even mentioned.

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EXAMINER: Well, hold up. Hold on one second.

I'm not asking you to speak openly about the process.

I'm asking you very specifically to identify the causes

of the anxiety and depression.

[PETITIONER]: Okay. So, the cause had came a

year before I had gotten brain surgery. After my brain

surgery, I have recently had a baby. So, I you know,

due to, you know, personal reasons between my

child's dad and I, things started to spiral out of control.

I went to my doctor. I explained to him what I was

feeling, what I was going through. He wound up

diagnosing me with the depression the anxiety. He

even put me on medication. When I went into work, I

did feed this information to my immediate supervisor .

. . . When I explained to her what I was going

through. She had –

EXAMINER: Hold on one second. Not to cut you

off, but just when you said you—you mentioned this

now to your- to your supervisor. Can you give me a

reference as to when that was?

[PETITIONER]: I mentioned it to my supervisor. It

was like around October, November of 2022 when I

mentioned this to her.

....

[PETITIONER]: I told her everything.

Petitioner was referred to AT&T's EAP 1 and received five therapy

sessions. She also applied for FMLA leave, which AT&T granted. The

1

Employee Assistance Program.

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examiner summarized the document authorizing FMLA, which included

petitioner's physician's conclusions about her mental health:

Okay. Very Good. So we'll make this claimant

Exhibit 1. The first page is just a notice of eligibility

on October 22, [2022] you notified us of your need to

take family medical leave of your own health

condition. You notified us that you need this leave

beginning 10/21/22 except as explained below, your

eligibility has been reviewed and you are eligible for

leave under the following policies. . . . FMLA 12

weeks starting availability, and it just kind of explains

. . . the rights under that. So, the second page, . . . so

it's signed by the employee on October 24, 2022.

....

I just want to know that on page two, part A, at the

bottom, is medical facts. It says, [d]oes the patient's

condition qualify as serious health condition under

FMLA? And the part is yes or no and yes is checked

off and yes has a serious health condition, which is an

illness, injury impairment or physical or mental

condition that involves inpatient care as defined and or

continuing treatment by a health care provider as

defined in. And so I just wanted to note the serious

health care condition was checked off.

....

Okay. So I'm on page three. It just states, a serious

health condition means illness, injury, impairment or

physical. Again, that involves the following and then

checked off is chronic conditions requiring treatment.

Approximate date condition commenced October 21 [],

2022. Probable duration of condition. Three months.

Was the patient admitted for overnight? No. . . .dates

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of last visit for this condition? 11/2/22. Would the

patient need to have treatment visits at least twice per

week? At least twice per year due to the condition?

Yes. Was medication other than over-the-counter

prescribed? Yes. Was the patient referred to any

other health care provider for evaluation and

treatment? Yes.

....

Is the employee unable to perform any of his/her job

functions during- due to this? Due to the condition?

Yes. If yes, identify the job functions. The employee

is unable to perform mandatory overtime.

....

Will the employee be incapacitated for a single

continuous period of time due to his or her medical

condition, including any time for treatment and

recovery? Yes. If yes, provide the beginning and end

dates. 10/21/22 and 1/31/23. Estimated return to

work date, 2/1/23.

....

Cause episodic flare ups. Yes and no is checked off.

It looks like yes may have been liked checked in more

because it's darker. But it goes on to explain. So, is it

medically necessary for the employee to be absent

from work during the flare ups? Yes. And then it

says, and a 15-minute, 15-minute breaks every hour

and then two days per week. So it looks like maybe

that's two days off per week and then 15-minute

breaks every hour.

....

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Okay. And if yes, estimate the frequency of flare ups.

Frequency; two episodes per week. Duration eight

hours. Additional information. Recommend extra

breaks at work plus two days. Okay, two extra days

off per week to help her relieve stress and recover.

When asked whether AT&T followed her doctor's recommendations,

petitioner responded:

Honestly, not necessarily[.] [T]hey complied because

it was paperwork, that these were the conditions. But

it [] was made very hard for me to have it. . . . I was

being ridiculed for what [] I had to adhere to, which is

the additional breaks and things like that.

The examiner explored this issue further, and petitioner explained she

encountered resistance and ridicule when trying to take the breaks required

under her FMLA accommodations. When asked whether she possessed

medical documentation confirming her working conditions were impacting or

aggravating her mental health condition, petitioner replied: "No. There is no

paperwork from the doctor with that, no."

In its written decision, the Tribunal summarized the hearing testimony,

reviewed the relevant law, and concluded petitioner was disqualified from

receiving benefits, finding:

[Petitioner] voluntarily left her employment with the

employer of record, effective 02/20/2023, due to

mental health issues and because she was dissatisfied

with the working conditions. While the claimant was

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well within her right in leaving the job, she has not

shown good cause attributable to the work for leaving

gainful employment to join the ranks of the

unemployed.

[Petitioner] did not provide any medical evidence to

support that the job either caused or aggravated her

mental health condition. Also, the claimant contended

that she was bullied and targeted by way of micro-

management. However, she had no warnings or

disciplinary action taken against her, and she was

under no threat of termination. Her contention is

rejected as unfounded.

Petitioner administratively appealed, and the Board affirmed the

Tribunal's decision in a written order, stating:

Although the reasoning in the OPINION section of the

decision of the Appeal Tribunal lacked depth, we

nonetheless agree that the record, which we now find

to be both complete and sound does not reflect that the

claimant has lifted the burden upon her (N.J.A.C.

12:17-9.1(c)) of demonstrating she had "good cause

attributable to [the] work" (N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)) for

leaving such work voluntarily. That is, she has not

shown that her condition of mental health was

attributable to the work by the standards set forth in

N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3, nor has she shown that she was

subjected to abnormal working conditions which were

"so compelling as to give [her] no choice but to leave

the employment." (N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b)).

On appeal, petitioner asserts her resignation was medically necessary

and represents good cause attributable to the work under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(a)

and (b). She contends that a proper review of the record, with particular

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emphasis on the substantial medical evidence and her FMLA documentation,

compels a finding that her departure was not wholly "voluntary" under the

applicable statute and regulation, and that both the Tribunal and the Board

erred in denying her benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).

The Board maintains that petitioner resigned voluntarily and without

good cause, arguing petitioner made a "unilateral decision to resign despite no

threat of termination, no disciplinary actions, and the continued availability of

her position. There is no evidence that [petitioner] was having abnormal

working conditions so severe that she was deprived of the choice of remaining

at her job."

II.

Our review of administrative agency final decisions is limited with

petitioners carrying a substantial burden of persuasion. In re Stallworth, 208

N.J. 182, 194 (2011); Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 218 (1997). An

agency's determination must be sustained "unless there is a clear showing that

it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or that it lacks fair support in the

record." Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27

(2011) (citing In re Hermann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)).

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"[I]f substantial evidence supports that agency's decision, a court may

not substitute its own judgment for the agency's even though the court might

have reached a different result." In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2006)

(quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)).

"However, the exercise of such deference is premised on our confidence that

there has been a careful consideration of the facts in issue and appropriate

findings addressing the critical issues in dispute." Bailey v. Bd. of Rev., 339

N.J. Super. 29, 33 (App. Div. 2001).

The burden of proof rests with the employee to establish a right to

collect unemployment benefits. Brady, 152 N.J. at 218. Under N.J.S.A.

43:21-5(a), a person is ineligible for unemployment benefits if they leave work

voluntarily, without "good cause attributable to such work", defined by

N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) as a "reason related directly to the individual's

employment which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but

to leave the employment." "The decision to leave employment must be

compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary,

trifling and whimsical ones." Domenico v. Bd. of Rev., 192 N.J. Super. 284,

288 (App. Div. 1983) (citations omitted). "Mere dissatisfaction with working

conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does

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not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily." Ibid. (quoting

Medwick v. Bd. of Rev., 69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961)). A

petitioner who leaves work for a personal reason, no matter how compelling, is

subject to disqualification. Self v. Bd. of Rev., 91 N.J. 453, 460 (1982). The

employee's reason for quitting must be directly related to the employment and

"so compelling as to give [the employee] no choice but to leave the

employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b).

A determination whether an individual is disqualified for benefits for

leaving work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work under

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) requires a fact sensitive determination. Haley v. Bd of

Rev., 245 N.J. 511, 521 (2021). The Court explained "the [Unemployment

Compensation Law (UCL)], [N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -71], 'must be construed

liberally in favor of an allowance of benefits.'" Haley, 245 N.J. at 520 (citing

McClain v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 237 N.J. 445, 461-62 (2019)). This

is done to comport with the UCL's remedial purpose of "'providing[ing] some

income for the worker earning nothing, because [the worker] is out of work

through no fault of [their] own.'" Ibid. (quoting Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194

N.J. 534 (2008)).

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Despite the Board's instruction to consider "additional testimony"

regarding whether petitioner's "condition of health was attributable to the

work," we conclude the Tribunal failed to conduct the necessary fact-sensitive

analysis of the petitioner's diagnosed mental health condition. Specifically,

the Tribunal did not sufficiently analyze how living with this condition,

combined with AT&T's alleged resistance to her requested accommodation,

may have influenced her decision to leave her employment. Consideration of

this contention is essential for a proper resolution of her claim. Consequently,

the Board was deprived of this information and analysis when it conducted its

review of the Tribunal's decision.

Further, in its preliminary remarks as to how the hearing was to proceed,

the Tribunal limited the scope of the hearing only to the testimony of the

petitioner, the employer witness, and argument:

I'll be asking specific questions of you. And once

we've completed my questions, [the employer

representative] you'll have an opportunity to question

[the petitioner] as well. Then I believe I swear in [the

employer witness], I will ask any questions that I have

of [him] after I swear him in. Then [the employer

representative], followed by [petitioner] will have an

opportunity to question [the employer witness] as

well. And then we'll allow for both [the employer

representative] and [petitioner] to address the record

in closing. The closing statements will end the

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hearing, and at the end a decision will be made in

writing and sent to all parties by mail.

In not providing instructions for a full hearing, nor even inquiring about

whether petitioner would wish to call other witnesses or provide

documentation to meet the Boards requirement that "additional testimony" be

taken, including, but not limited to her therapist or the medical professional

who authorized her FMLA leave to substantiate her claims, the examiner

improperly limited the hearing and consequently deprived petitioner of the

opportunity to provide a complete presentation of her case. DeBartolomeis v.

Bd. of Rev., 341 N.J. Super. 80, 87 (App. Div. 2001); Rivera v. Bd. of Rev.,

127 N.J. 578, 583 (1992) (petitioner must "be given a real chance to present

[their] side of the case before a government decision becomes final."). The

"touchstone of [an] adequate [adjudicative] process is not an abstract principle

but the needs of a particular situation." Ibid.

Additionally, the examiner only superficially acknowledged petitioner's

medical issues. The examiner did not substantively analyze those challenges

in light of the other testimony from the employer's witness in the Tribunal's

written decision. The Board itself acknowledged this deficiency, observing

that the Tribunal's analysis lacked "depth."

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The record before us does not demonstrate careful consideration of the

relevant facts, nor does it contain appropriate findings addressing the core

issue in dispute. Petitioner is entitled to a full evaluation of all of the proofs

available before a ruling is made on the validity of her claim. Therefore, we

remand for a new hearing toward that end.

At that hearing, petitioner is entitled to submit further medical proofs of

her own and the Tribunal should specifically analyze that proof to ascertain

whether these conditions constituted legal justification for petitioner to leave

her employment voluntarily. Combs v. Bd. of Rev., 269 N.J. Super. 616, 624

(App. Div. 1994) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Rev., Div. of Employment Sec.

Department of Labor and Industry, 117 N.J. Super. 399, 404 (App. Div. 1971)

(holding that in certain circumstances where there is a lack of medical

evidence, the "interests of justice" might require a remand to the Board for a

supplemental hearing.)).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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