Opinion

Thomas

Court: District Court, E.D. California
Filed: Jan 6, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 38.0%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SHAN VALENCIA THOMAS, No. 2:25-cv-02113 WBS CSK

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING

15 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

STANISLAUS COUNTY, KYLE PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED

16 CHRISTIANSON, ERIC GARCIA, and COMPLAINT

DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants.

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20 This action arises out of events of alleged police

21 violence. On or about May 24, 2022, Stanislaus County Sheriff’s

22 Office (“SCSO”) deputies were searching for plaintiff. (Docket

23 No. 12 (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”)) at 5.) Upon locating him

24 sitting behind a fence, defendant Christianson tore down boards

25 of the fence, and defendant Garcia commanded his police dog to

26 attack plaintiff. (Id.) The dog bit plaintiff in the left leg,

27 tearing into his flesh. (Id.)

28 While the dog was attacking plaintiff, plaintiff placed

1 his hands above his head in a gesture of surrender. (Id.)

Christianson then grabbed plaintiff’s right wrist, which

plaintiff initially resisted. (Id.) Christianson responded to

plaintiff’s resistance by twisting and breaking his arm and

punching him in the head. (Id.)

Five deputies, including Christianson and Garcia, then

held plaintiff to the ground while continuing to permit the dog

to attack him. (Id. at 6.) After the dog had been attacking

plaintiff for about forty seconds, Garcia removed the dog from

him. (Id.)

Following the incident, plaintiff was left with

“[c]hunks of flesh h[anging] off his calf” as well as a broken

arm that required surgery. (Id.) Plaintiff was then charged

with, among other things, resisting an officer under Cal. Penal

Code § 69 (“Section 69”), to which he subsequently pled nolo

contendere. (Docket No. 14-1 at 6-7.)

Plaintiff now brings three claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (“Section 1983”) against defendants: (1) a Fourth Amendment

excessive force claim against Christianson, Garcia, and Officer

Does; (2) a municipal liability claim against Stanislaus County

(“the County”) under custom or policy, failure-to-train, and

ratification theories; and (3) a supervisory liability claim

against the Supervisor and Officer Does. (See generally FAC.)

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint

for failure to state a claim. (Docket No. 14-1.)

I. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for

1 dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

The inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the

allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint has stated “a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

a. Excessive Force Claim

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s excessive force claim

against Christianson, Garcia, and Officer Does is barred by Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), which prohibits a

plaintiff from maintaining a damages action under Section 1983 if

“a judgment in favor of [him] would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Specifically,

defendants contend that permitting plaintiff’s Section 1983

action to proceed would imply the invalidity of his conviction

under Section 69. (See Docket Nos. 14-1 at 5-7, 21 at 2-6.)

Defendants’ argument is foreclosed by King v. Villegas,

156 F.4th 979 (9th Cir. 2025). In King, the Ninth Circuit

established a categorical rule that “[Federal] Rule [of Evidence]

410(a) bars admission of a nolo contendere plea to show that a §

1983 plaintiff committed the crimes to which he pleaded nolo

contendere.” Id. at 984. The Ninth Circuit noted that its

conclusion was “consistent with the established understanding of

nolo pleas,” which are, “first and foremost, not . . .

1 admission[s] of factual guilt.” Id. at 985 (citation modified).

King involved markedly similar factual circumstances to

plaintiff’s. King filed a Section 1983 action against the

defendants alleging unlawful force under the Eighth Amendment.

See id. at 985. He subsequently entered a nolo contendere plea

to one count of violating Section 69. See id. The defendants

introduced evidence of King’s nolo contendere plea in attempt to

preclude King’s Section 1983 claim as barred by Heck. See id.

The district court “considered both evidence of [his] nolo

contendere plea and statements made during a proceeding on that

plea” in King’s civil case to conclude that his claim was indeed

barred by Heck. See id. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding

that the district court erred in considering such evidence. See

id.

Applying King straightforwardly to the present

situation, plaintiff’s nolo contendere plea and the facts

stipulated to therein are inadmissible to show that he committed

a violation of Section 69. See id. at 984-85. Therefore, “there

is no plausible basis for a conclusion that plaintiff's original

§ 1983 excessive force claim against [defendants] is Heck-

barred.” Warden v. B. Cowan, et al., No. 2:19-cv-00431 TLN AC P,

2025 WL 3563222, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2025) (applying King);

see also King, 156 F.4th at 984-85.

Defendants nevertheless argue that King does not

prohibit the admission of plaintiff’s nolo contendere plea and

its resulting conviction as evidence that he violated Section 69

because plaintiff did not make his plea pursuant to People v.

1 West, 3 Cal. 3d 595 (Cal. 1970). (See Docket No. 14-1 at 12-

13.)1 Therefore, defendants claim, plaintiff’s plea was a

conclusive admission of factual guilt that, under Heck, prohibits

him from maintaining a Section 1983 action. (See id. at 15.)

Defendants overextend King. While the King court noted

that its holding applies with particular force when “a defendant

in California state court couples a nolo plea with a plea

pursuant to [West],” it did not suggest that a West plea was a

necessary condition for its holding to apply at all. See 156

F.4th at 985. Thus, as King instructs, the court cannot rely on

plaintiff’s nolo contendere plea as evidence that his excessive

force claim is barred by Heck. See King, 156 F.4th at 985.

At oral argument, defense counsel also emphasized the

purported fact that the plaintiff in King pled nolo contendere to

a misdemeanor under Section 69, whereas plaintiff here pled nolo

contendere to a felony under Section 69. The implication being,

defense counsel contended, that because of this difference, King

does not foreclose reliance on plaintiff’s nolo contendere plea

as evidence of his guilt. But the court in King did not mention

-- much less rely on -- whether the plaintiff in that case pled

nolo contendere to a misdemeanor or a felony. Correspondingly,

this court will decline defense counsel’s invitation to “create

razor-thin distinctions to evade precedent's grasp.” Nat'l Lab.

1 “A West plea is a plea of nolo contendere, not admitting a

factual basis for the plea. Such a plea, also referred to as an

Alford plea . . . allows a defendant to plead guilty in order to

take advantage of a plea bargain while still asserting his or her

27 innocence.” Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 469, 474 n.3 (9th

Cir. 2016) (citation modified).

1 Rels. Bd. v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental, &

Reinforcing Iron Workers, Loc. 229, AFL-CIO, 974 F.3d 1106, 1117

(9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J., dissenting) (citation and

quotations omitted).

Moreover, as plaintiff’s counsel pointed out at oral

argument, the proceedings before the district court in King

confirm that the plaintiff in that case did in fact enter a nolo

contedere plea to a felony under Section 69. See ECF No. 106-1

at 2, King v. Villegas et al., 1:17-cv-00676 JLT EPG (E.D. Cal.

May 18, 2022).

Accordingly, the court will deny defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

b. Monell Claim

Plaintiff also brings a municipal liability claim

against Stanislaus County under custom or policy, failure-to-

train, and ratification theories. (See FAC at 8-14.) Because

plaintiff adequately alleges a Monell claim under a custom or

policy theory, it is “not necessary evaluate [his] failure-to-

train” and ratification theories “at this stage.” See Quinto-

Collins v. City of Antioch, No. 21-cv-06094 VC, 2022 WL 18574, at

*2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2022).

“A government entity may not be held liable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity

can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of

constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d

892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To impose

1 liability under a custom or policy theory, a plaintiff must show:

“(1) that [he] possessed a constitutional right of which he was

deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this

policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's

constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the ‘moving

force’ behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch.

Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)

(citation modified).

A plaintiff may establish the existence of a custom or

policy based on: “(1) conduct pursuant to a formal or expressly

adopted official policy; (2) a longstanding practice or custom

which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local

government entity; (3) a decision of a decision-making official

who was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy in the area of decision; or (4) an official with final

policymaking authority either delegating that authority to, or

ratifying the decision of, a subordinate.” Gonzalez v. Cnty. of

Merced, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1098 (E.D. Cal. 2017). “At the

pleading stage, plaintiff need not prove the existence of such a

custom”; all plaintiff must do is “allege sufficient facts to

make [his] claim plausible.” Doe v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, No.

2:24-cv-00899 WBS CKD, 2024 WL 3697555, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7,

2024).

Plaintiff has adequately alleged a Monell claim under a

custom or policy theory. Indeed, plaintiff has pled the

circumstances of ten incidents spanning the last decade of SCSO

1 deputies “unnecessarily inflict[ing] pain to punish subdued

and/or restrained arrestees at the scene of their arrest” to

establish that the County has tacitly adopted a custom or policy

of violating non-resisting arrestees’ Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. (See FAC at 8-11.) Five of these incidents

involved deputies using police dogs, specifically, to perpetuate

force against non-resisting arrestees. (See id.) Other

incidents involved holding an arrestee down, causing his death,

after he had been subdued (id. at 9); slamming an arrestee head-

first into the ground, causing him to become paralyzed, after he

had been subdued (id. at 10); and repeatedly punching a

restrained arrestee in the head (id. at 11). These incidents,

along with plaintiff’s incident, all appear to involve force one

might reasonably characterize as excessive.

Defendants argue that the frequency at which these

incidents occurred over the last several years is insufficient to

establish a custom or policy, but they do not explain why this

frequency is insufficient or provide any principles under which

the court may determine what frequency of allegations would be

sufficient to state such a claim. However, as former Chief Judge

O’Neill observed in Gonzalez, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 1099, it is

“difficult to discern from the caselaw the quantum of allegations

needed to survive a motion to dismiss” a Monell custom or policy

claim.

The only numerical requirement the court can glean from

the case law is that, generally, a plaintiff must plead more than

two sufficiently similar incidents to adequately allege a custom

1 or policy. See Trevino, 99 F. 3d at 918 (collecting examples);

cf. also French v. City of Los Angeles, No. ED-cv-20416 JGB SHKx,

2021 WL 6752229, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2021) (“Various

incidents (generally more than one or two) may permit the

inference of a policy, taking into account their similarity,

their timing, and subsequent actions by the municipality.”

(citation and quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff has far

exceeded that requirement.

Defendants also argue that the incidents plaintiff

alleges are not sufficiently similar and therefore do not

establish a uniform custom or policy of utilizing excessive force

to punish non-resisting arrestees. (See Docket No. 14-1 at 17-

18.) In particular, defendants point out that some of the

alleged incidents involved force exerted by police dogs, whereas

others did not. (See id.) This distinction is immaterial

because the custom or policy plaintiff identifies is that of

“unnecessarily inflict[ing] pain to punish subdued and/or

restrained arrestees at the scene of their arrest,” whether via

police dog or other means. (FAC at 8.)

Plaintiff has alleged “multiple, specific events in

which significant force was utilized by Stanislaus County

deputies in situations where the force used may plausibly be said

to have been excessive.” J.M. by & Through Rodriguez v. Cnty. of

Stanislaus, No. 1:18-cv-01034 LJO SAB, 2018 WL 5879725, at *6

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2018). He has also alleged that the incidents

occurred absent discipline, investigation, or retraining of the

deputies who deployed such force. (See FAC at 8.) Considered

1 together, and “[t]aking all of plaintiff's allegations as true

and drawing all reasonable inferences in [his] favor, as the

court must at this stage,” plaintiff has adequately pled a Monell

claim under a custom or policy theory. See Doe v. Cnty. of San

Joaquin, 2024 WL 3697555, at *4.

Accordingly, the court will deny defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s Monell claim.

c. Supervisory Liability Claim

Lastly, plaintiff brings a supervisory liability claim

against defendants Supervisor and Officer Does. (See FAC at 15.)

Defendants do not appear to directly contest this claim. (See

Docket Nos. 14-1, 21.)

Under Section 1983, “[s]upervisory liability is imposed

against a supervisory official in his individual capacity.”

Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991).

“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 if

there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the

constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)

(quotations omitted). “A supervisor is only liable for

constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the

violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff’s allegations that the Supervisor and Officer

Does “knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by [their

en nen ee OE IO IE OI, OEE OSE! IE II I EES eee

subordinates], which [they] knew or reasonably should have known

would cause [them] to inflict a constitutional injury,” Dubner v.

City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001),

are enough to establish “[t]he requisite causal connection”

° between these defendants’ wrongful conduct and the violation of

° plaintiff’s right to be free from excessive force, Starr, 652 F.

3d at 1207-08. Plaintiff also alleges that the Supervisor and

Officer Does personally participated in the deprivation of his

° constitutional rights through various means, which is

independently sufficient to state a claim for supervisory

liability. See id. at 1207.

Accordingly, the court will deny defendant’s motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss (Docket No. 14) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

Dated: January 6, 2026 tleom ah. A. be—~

M WILLIAM B. SHUBB

18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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