Braunskill

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

RALPHIELL BRAUNSKILL, : Case No. 1:24-cv-374

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

:

BROWN COUNTY SHERIFF DEPT, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

Plaintiff has filed a prisoner civil rights case in this Court. (Doc. 3). The Undersigned

subsequently issued a Report and Recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims and

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims. The

initial Complaint was brought against Defendants the Brown County Sheriff’s Department and

Brown County. In the Report and Recommendation, it was recommended that Plaintiff’s federal

claims against the Brown County Defendants be dismissed because the Brown County Sheriff’s

Department is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Plaintiff failed to

plausibly suggest that his injuries were the result of an unconstitutional policy or custom of the

County. See Doc. 4. The Undersigned further determined that Plaintiff failed to set forth a viable

conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

In response to the Report and Recommendation, which remains pending, Plaintiff has

filed Objections, as well as a Supplemental Amended Complaint. (Doc. 5, 6). In the Amended

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to the Report and Recommendation.

Complaint Plaintiff adds Sergeant Singleton as a Defendant to this action. (See Doc. 6, PageID

54).

This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the Complaint, as amended, to

determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from

a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804,

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)(2)2 as part of the statute, which

provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

2 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e) requires

sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or

malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands

on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d

502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of

considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the

defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds

pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett

v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits;

“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,

482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989)).

B. Allegations in the Supplemental Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that on July 2, 2022, he was arrested by Defendant Sergeant Singleton.

Plaintiff further alleges that Singleton intruded and seized money, phones, and other items without

a search warrant. According to Plaintiff, the value of the property exceeded $20,000 and that he

had a reasonable expectation of privacy within the searched premises. Id. Plaintiff further alleges

that the Defendants3 conspired to deprive him of equal protection of the laws by allegedly

tampering with evidence and falsely promising Plaintiff asylum.

Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff divides his claims into three counts. First,

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff claims Singleton violated his Equal Protection, Due Process, and

Fourth Amendment rights. In Count Two, Plaintiff claims Singleton engaged in a conspiracy to

deprive him of Equal Protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Finally, in Count Three, Plaintiff asserts

a state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at 56. See also Doc. 1, Complaint at

PageID 7-8.

3 Although the Amended Complaint lists Singleton as the sole Defendant, Plaintiff repeatedly refers to “Defendants”

in the Complaint and incorporates portions of the original Complaint. (See Doc. 6, PageID 54-56).

C. Analysis.

At this juncture in the proceedings, without the benefit of briefing by the parties to this

action and out of an abundance of caution, the Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff may proceed

with his Due Process and Fourth Amendment claims against Defendant Singleton, as well as his

supplemental state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff’s claims are

deserving of further development and may proceed at this juncture.4 Plaintiff’s remaining claims

should be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).

As recommended in the pending Report and Recommendation (see Doc. 4), Plaintiff’s

claims against Brown County, the Brown County Sheriff’s Department, and his conspiracy claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 should be dismissed. For the reasons previously detailed (see Doc. 4,

PageID 43-46), Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that his alleged injuries were the result of

an unconstitutional policy or custom of Brown County or that any Defendant conspired against

him. The Amended Complaint does not cure the identified deficiencies. Accordingly, consistent

with the prior Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff’s claims against the Brown County Sheriff’s

Department, Brown County, and his conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 should be

dismissed.

Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim should also be dismissed against Defendant Singleton.

“The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by government which either burdens a

fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than others

similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference.” Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of

Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681–82 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395

4 The Court has not made a determination as to the merits of the claims or potential defenses thereto, nor is defendant

precluded from filing a motion to dismiss, motion for more definite statement, or other appropriate motion under the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wiley v. Austin, No. 8:20CV220, 2020 WL 6204382, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct.

22, 2020).

F.3d 291, 312 (6th Cir. 2005)). To state a claim for discrimination under the Equal Protection

Clause, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that a state actor intentionally discriminated

against him because of his membership in a protected class. Simpson v. Ameji, 57 F. App’x 238,

239 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990)).

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that “Defendants violated Plaintiff’s equal protection of the laws

under the Fourteenth Amendment” is insufficient to plausibly suggest that Singleton—or any

Defendant—treated Plaintiff differently or denied him any rights because of his membership in a

protected class. Such “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” fail to meet the

basic pleading standard under Twombly. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

557) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim should therefore be

dismissed.

Accordingly, in sum, Plaintiff may proceed with his Due Process, Fourth Amendment, and

supplemental state-law claims against Defendant Sergeant Singleton. However, Plaintiff has failed

to provide summons and U.S. Marshal forms for service. It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff,

within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, submit completed summons and U.S. Marshal

forms for Defendant Sergeant Singleton. Once the Court receives the requested forms the Court

will order service of process by the United States Marshal. Plaintiff is ADVISED that failure to

comply with this Order may result in the dismissal of this action for want of prosecution.

Having found that the remaining claims alleged in the Complaint and Supplemental

Amended Complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Plaintiff’s remaining

claims should be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The pending Report and Recommendation (Doc. 4) be ADOPTED

to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Brown

County Sheriff’s Department and Brown County, as well as his

conspiracy claims be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

2. The Supplemental Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) be DISMISSED,

with the exception of Plaintiff’s Due Process, Fourth Amendment,

and supplemental state-law claims against Defendant Sergeant

Singleton.

3. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the

foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and

Recommendation would not be taken in good faith, and therefore,

deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

Plaintiff, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, submit

completed summons and U.S. Marshal form for service on

Defendant Sergeant Singleton. Once the Court receives the

requested summons and United States Marshal forms, the Court will

order service of process by the United States Marshal.

January 6, 2026 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections

to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served

with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either

side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to,

and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall

respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy

of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit

rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947

(6th Cir. 1981).