Vasallo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WILLIE WASHINGTON (N51271), )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 23 C 2525

v. )

) Hon. Manish S. Shah

D. VASALLO, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Willie Washington brings this pro se civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. §

1983, alleging that an officer from Stateville Correctional Center used excessive force

in securing him to a chair following surgery at UIC Hospital in August of 2022.

Defendant Officer David Vasallo argues that he is entitled to summary judgment

because no excessive force was used and he is entitled to qualified immunity. For the

reasons that follow, the motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1

Local Rule 56.1 governs the procedures for filing and responding to motions for

summary judgment in this court. The rule is intended “to aid the district court, which

does not have the advantage of the parties’ familiarity with the record and often

cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,

in determining whether a trial is necessary.” Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895,

899 (7th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Local Rule 56.1(a)(2) requires the moving party to

provide a statement of material facts that complies with Local Rule 56.1(d). Local

Rule 56.1(d)(2) requires that “[e]ach asserted fact must be supported by citation to

the specific evidentiary material, including the specific page number, that supports

it. The court may disregard any asserted fact that is not supported with such a

citation.”

The opposing party must then respond to the movant’s proposed statements of

fact. Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005); LR 56.1(e).

In the case of any disagreement, “a party must cite specific evidentiary material that

controverts the fact and must concisely explain how the cited material controverts

the asserted fact. Asserted facts may be deemed admitted if not controverted with

specific citations to evidentiary material.” LR 56.1(e)(3). A response may not set forth

new facts or legal arguments. LR 56.1(e)(2). “[M]ere disagreement with the movant’s

asserted facts is inadequate if made without reference to specific supporting

material.” Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, Defendant served him with a Local Rule

56.2 Notice to Unrepresented Litigants Opposing Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 55.)

Plaintiff responded by submitting a memorandum in opposition to the motion (Dkt.

No. 59), various exhibits (Dkt. Nos. 61-65), including a Declaration (Dkt. No. 62 at

pgs. 9–21), and a response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts (Dkt. No. 60).1

Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts consists largely of an

attempt to add additional facts, as his response often indicates “controverted as

1 Plaintiff later submitted a motion to supplement his response with an ultrasound report

showing what appeared to be a ganglion cyst on his left wrist (Dkt. No. 68), and an amended

response, another memorandum of law, and another declaration after briefing had concluded

and without leave of court. (Dkt. Nos. 72–74.)

incomplete.” Although this is not a proper way of asserting additional facts, LR 56.1

(b)(3), (e)(2), the Court will consider Plaintiff’s factual statements to the extent they

are supported by the record, or to the extent he could properly testify about the

matters asserted. See Sistrunk v. Khan, 931 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854 (N.D. Ill. 2013).

Where Plaintiff has not properly disputed a fact, the Court will accept it as true.

Smith, 321 F.3d at 683.

Plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with Local Rule 56.1 is not a basis for

automatically granting Defendant’s motion. Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483

(7th Cir. 2021). Rather, the Court is mindful that the moving party has the “ultimate

burden of persuasion” to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Raymond

v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006).

B. Relevant Facts

Plaintiff Willie Washington was in the custody of the Illinois Department of

Corrections, Stateville Correctional Center. (See Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶¶ 1–2;

Pl’s. Resp. to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was at that time, and is at

present, ineligible for parole due to a mandatory life sentence. (Id.) Stateville was a

maximum-security prison. (Id.) Plaintiff adds that he was a medium security inmate

(Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶ 2.) Defendant David Vasallo was a

correctional officer at Stateville from November 2019 through December 2024. (Def.’s

SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff was held at the Northern Reception and Classification Center at

Stateville on a medical furlough because of its proximity to UIC Hospital. (Pl.’s Resp.

to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶ 2.) A prisoner on medical furlough is still within the

custody of IDOC. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 5.) Thus, correctional officers are

required to continuously supervise prisoners on medical furlough for the safety of the

prisoner, for the safety of any civilians who may interact with the prisoner, and to

prevent escape. (Id.)

Security personnel are trained to use a three-point restraint system to restrain

individuals in custody. (Id. at ¶ 9.) This consists of one wrist being secured to a solid

metal point on the securing furniture (hospital bed, chair, etc.) while the individual

in custody remains restrained at both wrists, and a waist chain or black box chain

secured to a set of leg irons applied to the individual in custody’s legs and attached to

a metal point on the securing furniture. (Id.)

Each time an individual in custody is secured, the escorting personnel must

notify the shift supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff contends that this policy was not

uniformly followed. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶ 10; see also Pl.’s

Decl., Dkt. No. 62, at pg. 12, ¶¶ 16-23.)

In an outside medical facility, security restraints can be removed only for

medical reasons when requested by the attending physician or the emergency room

staff. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 11.) Once escorting personnel receive an order to

unfasten restraints from the qualified medical staff, they must contact and receive

approval from the shift supervisor before removing the restraints. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff, again, does not dispute this, but indicates that this policy was not always

followed. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶ 11; Pl.’s Decl., Dkt. No. 62 at

pg. 11, ¶¶ 10-12.)

Plaintiff was admitted to UIC Hospital on Aug. 16, 2022, to undergo surgery

to remove a cyst in his jaw. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 13.) The surgery was

conducted on Aug. 17, 2022, which involved a procedure where Plaintiff’s mandible

was reconstructed with tissue from his fibula, along with repair of damaged nerves.

(Id.) Plaintiff was discharged from UIC Hospital on Aug. 23, 2022. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s post-operative treatment plan included physical therapy for one

hour daily while he was hospitalized. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Doctors indicated that Plaintiff

should not be restrained during his physical therapy sessions. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Doctors

also issued an order for Plaintiff to have modified bed rest sitting up in a chair

because Plaintiff had reported difficulties breathing while laying flat in his bed. (Id.

at ¶ 16.)

On or about Aug. 20, 2022, Officer Vasallo reported to UIC Hospital to monitor

Plaintiff in relief of Officer Johnson. (Id. at ¶ 17.) When Officer Vasallo first saw

Plaintiff on that day, it was his understanding that Plaintiff was not restrained

because he had just finished physical therapy. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Officer Vasallo informed

Plaintiff that he would need to put Plaintiff’s restraints back on and secure them to

the chair in which he was sitting. (Id. at ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff denies having physical therapy while at the hospital and contends

that he had a handcuff on his left wrist when Officer Vasallo first encountered him

on the day of the incident. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶¶ 14, 19.) He

also contends that Officer Vasallo had monitored him the day before, on Aug. 19,

2022, when Plaintiff was in a hospital bed without restraints on his legs. (Pl.’s Resp.

to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶¶ 17-18.)

According to Officer Vasallo, as he put the restraints on, Plaintiff became

visibly upset. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 20.) Officer Vasallo reiterated the

necessity for restraints and went ahead with applying them, consistent with his

training and understanding of IDOC policy. (Id.) Officer Vasallo put a wrist cuff on

Plaintiff that was secured to a metal point on the chair, and a leg iron on the non-

operative leg away from any attached medical devices. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶

21.) He determined that leg irons would not fit over the bandaging on Plaintiff’s

operative leg, so he did not attempt to apply one. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff remained in

the chair throughout this interaction. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 23.)

Nurses in the room noticed Plaintiff being restrained, either because Plaintiff

pressed the emergency button or because they were nearby. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54,

at ¶ 24.) The nurses told Officer Vasallo that they did not think restraints were

appropriate. (Id.)

Officer Vasallo told the nurses that the restraints could be removed only upon

request by a doctor and after approval by his shift supervisor. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No.

54, at ¶ 25.) Officer Vasallo also told the nurses he needed to follow the procedures

for his job if they wanted the restraints removed. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Soon after, a nursing

tech entered the room and joined the chorus expressing dissatisfaction with the

continued need for restraints on Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Officer Vasallo understood

that none of these individuals were attending physicians or doctors. (Id. at ¶ 28.)

After the nurses objected, Officer Vasallo called his supervisor, Major Shashonna

Cole, to update her on the situation. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 29.) Major Cole

ordered Officer Vasallo to keep Plaintiff properly restrained until he heard from a

doctor. (Id. at ¶ 30.)

When a nurse gave Officer Vasallo a note from a doctor to have the restraints

removed about 20 minutes later, Officer Vasallo immediately called Major Cole back

to update her in accordance with his training. (Id. at ¶ 31.) Major Cole then directed

Officer Vasallo to comply with the doctor’s request, which he did immediately. (Id. at

¶ 32.)

Plaintiff recounts a different version of events. As Officer Vasallo restrained

him, he began to cry due to “excruciating pain” in his left wrist, both legs, and the

site of his tracheotomy. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff

contends that Officer Vasallo told him, “You’re getting your fucking ass back in bed.”

(Id.) Officer Vasallo then tried to put leg irons on both legs, causing him to cry.

Because Plaintiff’s left leg was swollen, Officer Vasallo “zip-tied” it. (Pl.’s Resp. to

Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶¶ 21-22.) Plaintiff asserts that Officer Vasallo

“attempted” to move him to the hospital bed (see id. at ¶ 23), although it does not

appear that he actually did so. (See Pl.’s Dep., Dkt. No. 54-2, at 23:2-4.)

Plaintiff adds in his Declaration that Officer Vasallo applied most of his weight

to Plaintiff’s post-operative leg by leaning on that leg as he adjusted the restraints.

(See Pl.’s Decl., Dkt. No. 62, pg. 16, at ¶ 40.) He further states that when Officer

Vasallo tightly re-fastened the handcuff on his left wrist, Plaintiff made grunting

sounds and pointed to his legs and wrists. (Id.) Plaintiff also contends that Officer

Vasallo started moving his legs around, “lifting up my lower extremities and shaking

me.” (Id. at ¶ 41.) He contends that Officer Vasallo moved him around “so harshly

that he disturbed my tracheotomy.” (Id.)2

Plaintiff contends he should not have been restrained in the first place because

a doctor issued an order on Aug. 17, 2022, for no restraints to be placed on his post-

operative leg. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶ 28.) He points to a note from

Dr. Isaac Ellison stating the following: “Mr. Willie Washington . . . is under our care

after undergoing a fibula free flap procedure. It is necessary that Mr. Washington has

a cam boot and wound dressings for a minimum of 5 days from today 8/17/2022 for

proper healing. Please don’t place any restraints on this leg.” (Dkt. No. 57 at pg. 212.)

Someone, presumably the doctor, handwrote “left leg” under “this leg.” (Id.) Plaintiff

argues that Defendant Vasallo was aware of this order before restraining him but

2 Defendant argues that the Court should disregard these additional statements in Plaintiff’s

Declaration as inconsistent with his deposition testimony. (See Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot.

for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 69, at pg. 5.) The “sham-affidavit rule” prohibits a party from

submitting an affidavit that contradicts his prior sworn testimony. James v. Hale, 959 F.3d

307, 316 (7th Cir. 2020). The rule reflects the principle that “a genuine issue of material fact

cannot be conjured out of nothing.” Id. (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, the rule must be

applied carefully “because summary judgment is not a tool for deciding questions of

credibility.” Clemons v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 106 F.4th 628, 634 (7th Cir. 2024)

(cleaned up). Statements should not be excluded as a sham unless the witness has “given

clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of

material fact.” Id. The rule does not apply where the affidavit builds upon and amplifies facts

already in the record, see id. at 635, which is the case here. The Court will therefore consider

Plaintiff’s description of events as set forth in his Declaration.

does not point to any evidence in the record supporting this proposition. (See Pl.’s

Brief in Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 59, at pg. 2.)

Plaintiff contends that although Officer Vasallo removed the leg restraints

after receiving a doctor’s order, he did not adjust the left handcuff. (Pl.’s Resp. to

Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶ 32.) He estimates that the incident took about 45

minutes. (See Pl.’s Decl., Dkt. No. 62, pg. 20, at ¶ 56.) Officer Johnson, who returned

to supervise Plaintiff after this incident, loosened the handcuff on his left hand. (Id.

at ¶ 60.)

Plaintiff contends the handcuff on his wrist created a “knot” and “killed the

nerve on [his] hand.” (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 33.) Plaintiff’s medical file from

May 2022 to November 2022 does not include any record showing that Plaintiff

complained to a medical provider about this or a diagnosis for any injury to his hand.

(Id. at ¶ 34.) Plaintiff states that he complained about numbness in his left hand in

February and March 2023. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶ 34; Dkt.

No. 62 at pg. 22.) Plaintiff also points to an ultrasound that he had on his left hand

in February 2024. (Dkt. No. 62 at pg. 24.) Plaintiff later submitted a copy of that

ultrasound report along with a motion to supplement his response. (Dkt. No. 68.)3

The ultrasound report indicates a lump on Plaintiff’s left wrist that may be a ganglion

cyst. (See id.) The report contains no indication as to when or how the lump developed.

Plaintiff does not have any professional medical training, as his highest level

of education is completing the ninth grade. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 35.) Even

3 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the record and has considered the

ultrasound report of Plaintiff’s left wrist in ruling on this motion.

so, Plaintiff testified that Officer Vasallo did something to his leg, because “the

muscle is pulling me now, and that’s never supposed to happen.” (Id. at ¶ 36.)

Plaintiff’s medical file from May 2022 to November 2022 does not include any record

indicating that Plaintiff complained to a medical provider about this issue or received

a diagnosis concerning an injury to his leg. (Id. at ¶ 37.) Plaintiff disputes this by

contending that he complained about leg pain due to this incident in March and May

2024. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 60, at ¶ 37; see Dkt. No. 62 at pg. 25.)

Plaintiff also attributes difficulties with eating and swallowing food to Officer

Vasallo moving him around. (Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 38.) Plaintiff’s medical file

from May 2022 to November 2022 does include references to Plaintiff’s impaired

ability to eat. (Id. at ¶ 39.) There is no diagnosis or opinion from a medical

professional that this symptom is traceable to Officer Vasallo’s conduct. (Id.)

As a result of Officer Vasallo’s “attack,” Plaintiff reported elevated blood

pressure (for which he takes medication to treat), wheezing, and hard breathing that

“could have killed [him].” (Id. at ¶ 40.) Plaintiff’s medical file from May 2022 to

November 2022 does include records showing a prescription for Amlodipine to treat

high blood pressure. (Id. at ¶ 41.) However, there is no diagnosis or opinion from a

medical professional that this symptom is traceable to Officer Vasallo’s conduct. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s medical file from May 2022 to November 2022 also does not include any

records showing that he experienced life-threatening wheezing and difficulty

breathing traceable to Officer Vasallo’s conduct. (Id. at ¶ 42.)

When Plaintiff was transported back to the Northern Reception and

Classification Center on Aug. 23, 2022, IDOC medical staff evaluated him and

completed a Health Status Transfer Summary. (Id. at ¶ 43.) During that evaluation,

Plaintiff made no complaints other than that he was afraid of the wounds from his

procedure getting infected. (Id. at ¶ 44.) There were no complaints of any new injuries

he received while at UIC Hospital. (Id.)

II. Analysis

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). To determine when a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court must

assess the evidence in the record as presented in depositions, documents, affidavits

or declarations, and other materials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); A.V. Consultants, Inc. v.

Barnes, 978 F.2d 996, 999 (7th Cir. 1992).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the

grounds for his motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once he

has done so, “the burden shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence of specific

facts creating a genuine dispute.” Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012).

“A genuine issue of material fact exists only if ‘there is sufficient evidence favoring

the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’” Brown v.

Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).

The Court construes all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draws all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. Nat’l Athletic

Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008). “A court’s role

is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or

to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a

genuine issue of triable fact.” Id. However, a bare contention by the non-moving party

that an issue of fact exists does not create a factual dispute, Bellaver v. Quanex Corp.,

200 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2000), and the non-moving party is “only entitled to the

benefit of inferences supported by admissible evidence, not those supported by only

speculation or conjecture,” Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir.

2017) (cleaned up).

Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because he did not

use excessive force and alternatively, that qualified immunity bars this claim because

the undisputed facts do not demonstrate the violation of any clearly established

right.4

B. Excessive Use of Force

A correctional officer’s use of excessive force violates a prisoner’s Eighth

Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). When assessing the use of restraints during medical care, a court

4 This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and venue is appropriate under 28

U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this claim occurred within

the Northern District of Illinois while Plaintiff was in the custody of IDOC at Stateville. (See

Def.’s SOF, Dkt. No. 54, at ¶ 4.)

must ask whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, while

considering such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship

between the need and the amount of force that was used, and the extent of injury

inflicted. Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)).

In the specific context presented here, “courts must be reluctant to interfere

with security measures instituted by prison officials, especially when the issue is

transport outside the prison facility. Such measures do not violate the Eighth

Amendment absent a showing that they ‘constitute[ ] a wanton infliction of pain that

is totally without penological justification.’” Verser v. Smith, No. 14 C 1187, 2017 WL

528381, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2017) (quoting Hanna v. Lane, 610 F. Supp. 32, 35

(N.D. Ill. 1985)); see Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1269 (7th Cir. 1984) (collecting

cases and observing that prison officials “must be accorded wide-ranging deference in

the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed

to preserve internal order and discipline to maintain institutional security.”). The

deference due to prison officials applies not only to actions taken in response to an

active security threat, but those taken as preventative measures to prevent security

threats from arising. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986).

Defendant argues that Officer Vasallo applied force in a good-faith effort to

maintain discipline. It is undisputed that IDOC policy requires three-point restraint

of an individual in custody on a medical furlough, and that such restraints can be

removed for medical reasons when requested by the attending physician. Once an

officer receives such an order from qualified medical staff, the officer must contact

and receive approval from the shift supervisor before removing the restraints. The

undisputed evidence is that Officer Vasallo contacted Major Cole when Plaintiff and

the nurses objected to the restraints. Major Cole instructed Officer Vasallo to keep

Plaintiff properly restrained until he heard from a doctor. When a nurse gave Officer

Vasallo an order from a doctor to remove the restraints, he immediately called Major

Cole, who directed him to comply with the doctor’s instructions, which he did.

Plaintiff contends that he should not have been restrained in the first place

because Officer Vasallo had knowledge of an order for him not to be restrained,

apparently referring to Dr. Ellison’s order that restraints should not be placed on his

post-operative leg for five days. Plaintiff argues that Officer Vasallo must have known

of this order because he supervised Plaintiff the day before the incident. (See Pl.’s Br.

in Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 59, at pg. 2.) But Plaintiff points to no

evidence that Officer Vasallo had received a copy of this order. And Plaintiff does not

dispute that Officer Vasallo needed permission from Major Cole to remove the

restraints.

Several factors are relevant to determining whether a defendant applied force

in good faith or for the purposes of causing harm, including the need for force, the

amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the officer, efforts made to

temper the severity of the force, and the extent of the injury caused by the force. Lewis

v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).

There was a need for application of force in order to restrain Plaintiff. Although

Plaintiff was recovering from surgery, and did not pose an active threat, security

remained an ongoing issue throughout his hospitalization. See Hoyte v. Wagner, No.

07-4138, 2009 WL 215342, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 2009) (unreported) (prison officials

“have a legitimate and important security interest in restraining those in their

custody while they receive off-site medical care in unsecured hospitals.”); Willis v.

Pfister, No. 18-cv-333, 2024 WL 216672, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2024) (observing

that handcuffs and shackles “are a necessary part of incarceration” and “there is

nothing ‘cruel and unusual’ about restraining prisoners, especially when they’re

outside the prison walls.”); Morissette v. Godinez, No. 94 C 19, 1994 WL 30965, at *1

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 1994), aff’d, 103 F.3d 133 (7th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases holding

that the use of physical restraints on inmates being transported inside and outside of

the prison does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment).

The third factor, the threat reasonably perceived by the officer, weighs in favor

of Plaintiff, as Plaintiff contends that Officer Vasallo handled him roughly during the

application of restraints at a time when he was in a weakened state due to surgery.

In regard to the fourth factor, any effort to temper the severity of force used, this

weighs in favor of Defendant, as it is undisputed that Officer Vasallo contacted his

supervisor in response to the complaints made by Plaintiff and nurses and removed

the leg restraints once he received a doctor’s order and his supervisor’s approval.

Compliance with prison policy weighs in favor of a finding that Defendant tempered

his use of force and acted in good faith. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 766 (4th

Cir. 1996); see also Wilson v. Cooper, 922 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1996)

(granting summary judgment in favor of officer who used metal restraints to restrain

prisoner until he could verify doctor’s order to use leather restraints).

The second factor, the amount of force used, is more complicated. Taking the

evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant applied his weight to

Plaintiff’s post-operative leg, tightly re-fastened the handcuff on his left wrist, and

moved Plaintiff around so harshly that he disturbed Plaintiff’s tracheotomy site.

Plaintiff’s testimony suggests that Officer Vasallo used more force than necessary in

this interaction. Even so, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to

a federal cause of action.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. In particular, the infliction of pain

in the course of carrying out a prison security measure “does not amount to cruel and

unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of

force authorized or applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and hence

unnecessary in the strict sense.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. Rather, the Court is

cognizant that “[a]n inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no

discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.”

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38 (cleaned up). The conduct must either involve “significant

force,” or if the force used was de minimis, it must be “repugnant to the conscience of

mankind.” Holloway v. Doe, No. 22-2717, 2023 WL 7412949, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 8,

2023) (unreported). While Plaintiff has evidence that Officer Vasallo treated him

more harshly than necessary, he has not brought forth evidence suggesting that

Officer Vasallo used significant force or that his use of force was repugnant to the

conscience.

In this regard, the extent of the injury weighs heavily in favor of Defendant.

Plaintiff has brought forth no evidence that Officer Vasallo’s actions caused or

exacerbated any injuries suffered by Plaintiff. While Plaintiff complains about nerve

damage in his hand, a muscle “pulling” in his leg (it is unclear what he means by

this), and difficulties swallowing and eating, he points to no evidence that a medical

professional diagnosed him with these issues or attributed them to Officer Vasallo’s

conduct. Plaintiff’s complaints of numbness in his left hand in February and March

2023, about six months after the incident at issue in this case, without any evidence

indicating that numbness was caused by Officer Vasallo’s conduct, are insufficient to

support Plaintiff’s claim of severe injuries. The same is true as to the apparent

ganglion cyst on Plaintiff’s left wrist shown in the February 2024 ultrasound—no

evidence links this issue to Officer Vasallo’s use of force in August of 2022, and

Plaintiff is not qualified to opine that it was caused by Officer Vasallo. See Williams

v. Roark, No. 2:21-cv-00128, 2024 WL 198392, at *12 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 18, 2024)

(prisoner with no medical training or expertise was not qualified to testify that he

suffered head trauma, memory loss, or nerve damage due to use of force); Sistrunk,

931 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (layperson may not testify about matters involving medical or

other specialized knowledge).

Plaintiff is competent to testify that Officer Vasallo’s alleged tight handcuffing

and pulling on him caused him pain and discomfort. The issue, however, is that it is

undisputed that state regulations required Plaintiff to be restrained while on medical

furlough, and that such restraints can be removed for medical reasons only when

requested by the attending physician and approved by a shift supervisor. Some

physical force invariably was necessary in order to restrain Plaintiff, and that it

caused Plaintiff pain and discomfort does not support a constitutional violation. See

United States v. Waldman, 835 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2016) (“A prisoner cannot

prevail under the Eighth Amendment because he reasonably believed his handcuffs

were too tight causing momentary interruption of his circulation.” ) (cleaned up);

Smith v. Butler, No. 21-3082, 2023 WL 3706544, at *4 (7th Cir. May 30, 2023)

(unreported) (“[E]ven ‘deliberately’ and ‘unnecessarily’ inflicting a slight increase in

pain during legitimate security measures does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”)

(citing Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 839–40 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also Verser, 2017

WL 528381, at *6 (collecting cases indicating that handcuffing may result in minor

injury or discomfort without any excessive use of force). Particularly in the Eighth

Amendment context, where the security interests of the prison are “always high,”

courts must be skeptical in addressing handcuffing claims without any proof of

serious injury. Verser, 2017 WL 528381, at *7; see Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d

661, 666 (7th Cir. 2006) (in Fourth Amendment context, relying in part on lack of

injury to find that force used in handcuffing was not excessive).

Plaintiff has not brought forth sufficient evidence by which a reasonable jury

could find that Officer Vasallo acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,

rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain discipline. Defendant therefore is

entitled to summary judgment.

C. Qualified Immunity

Next, Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because the

undisputed facts do not demonstrate the violation of any clearly established

constitutional right.

“State correctional officers are immune from liability for conduct that does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Smith v. Kind, 140 F.4th 359, 369 (7th Cir. 2025) (cleaned

up). For law to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the

constitutional question beyond debate. Id. Except for the rare obvious constitutional

violation, the plaintiff must identify a case that every reasonable official would

interpret as establishing the rule he seeks to apply. Id. In excessive force cases, where

it can be difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrines apply to

the factual situation at hand, correctional officers are entitled to qualified immunity

“unless existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue.” Id. at 370.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense. Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725,

737 (7th Cir. 2021). Once raised, it is the plaintiff’s burden to defeat it. Id. To do so,

the plaintiff must identify case law that has articulated the right at issue and applied

it to factual circumstances similar to the ones at issue. Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734

F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013).

Whether qualified immunity exists turns on two questions: (1) whether the

facts presented, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, describe a violation

of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the federal right at issue was clearly

established at the time of the violation. Finkley, 10 F.4th at 737 (citing Tolan v.

Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655–56 (2014) (per curiam)). If either question is answered in

the negative, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

As the Court found above, the facts taken in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff do not describe a violation of a constitutional right. Nor was the federal right

at issue clearly established at the time of the violation. The use of overly restrictive

and unnecessary security measures, including physical restraints, can violate the

Eighth Amendment. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (handcuffing subdued

prisoner to hitching post for seven hours in the heat without water or bathroom

breaks obviously violated the Eighth Amendment); see Ajala v. Tom, 658 F. App’x

805, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (clearly established that using restraints

to inflict prolonged, unnecessary pain violates the Eighth Amendment). But Plaintiff

has not pointed to an analogous case in which a court found that a convicted prisoner

had a right to be free from unwanted and painful physical contact arising from the

placement of restraints on him pursuant to prison policy during a medical furlough.

Plaintiff did not address the issue at all in his original response to the motion. He

later submitted a revised brief (Dkt. No. 73) without leave of court to address the

qualified immunity issue. But even if the Court considers this brief, Plaintiff points

only to cases establishing the principle that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. (See id. at pg. 4 (citing, inter alia, Gregg

v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). He does not point to a Supreme Court or

Seventh Circuit opinion that would have put Officer Vasallo on notice that his

conduct violated the Constitution. In fact, Seventh Circuit precedent cuts against

Plaintiff’s position. See Stewart, 14 F.4th at 764 (observing that prisoners who are

taken to outside medical providers can pose a security threat, and courts should give

deference to preventative measures meant to address this risk). Because Plaintiff has

not identified a violation of a clearly established right, Defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Final judgment will be

entered. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court

within thirty days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). If Plaintiff

appeals, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the appeal’s

outcome. See Evans v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 150 F.3d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1998). If the

appeal is found to be non-meritorious, Plaintiff could be assessed a “strike” under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g). If a prisoner accumulates three “strikes” because three federal cases

or appeals have been dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or for failure to state a

claim, the prisoner may not file suit in federal court without pre-paying the filing fee

unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Ibid. If Plaintiff seeks

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, he must file a motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis in this Court stating the issues he intends to present on

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1).

Il. Conclusion

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [52] is granted. Plaintiff's motion

to supplement [68] is granted to the extent that the Court has considered the attached

medical record in ruling on this motion. The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment

and send a copy of this order to Plaintiff.

ENTER:

Date: January 6, 2026 bah Sid

Manish 8. Shah

United States District Judge

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