Opinion

Hernandez, L. v. Zook, S.

  • 2026 Pa. Super. 2
Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Jan 6, 2026
Status
Published
On the bench
Kunselman
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.0%

The opinion

J-A24042-25

2026 PA Super 2

LUIS HERNANDEZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

SHARON ZOOK :

:

Appellant : No. 560 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered April 3, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Civil Division at No(s):

2024-CV-1155

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and BECK, J.

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 06, 2026

In this defamation case, Sharon Zook appeals as of right1 from the order

denying her Special Motion to Dismiss or for Entry of Judgment, filed under

Pennsylvania’s new Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (“UPEPA”).2

Because Ms. Zook’s special motion is untimely and she failed to show good

cause for her untimeliness, we affirm.

According to Ms. Zook, “On May 8, 2024, she sent an email to Lebanon

County Commissioners Robert Phillips, Michael J. Kuhn, and Jo Ellen Litz.”

Zook’s Brief at 11 (citing Reproduced Record at 172a-73a). The email also

went to the County Solicitor. It concerned Luis Hernandez, the owner of

various senior-care businesses in Lebanon County.

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.17 (permitting interlocutory appeals from orders

disposing of a Uniform Public Expression Protections Act special motion).

2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8340.11 – 8340.18.

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In her email, Ms. Zook accused Mr. Hernandez of violating Pennsylvania

laws and abusing elderly patients in his nursing homes. She further claimed

Mr. Hernandez had lawsuits and charges against him for failing to report taxes.

She also alleged that complaints against the nursing homes were being

forwarded to the city, where Mr. Hernandez an agent protecting him because

Mr. Hernandez is part of an organized crime network and is trafficking

undocumented immigrants. Finally, she implored the recipients of the email

to do something about Mr. Hernandez:

You have a duty to these older adults under PA law.

Since those within the county will not protect them, the law

obligates you to seek help from the state and federal

authorities. Any one of you could get [the Governor of

Pennsylvania,] Josh Shapiro, involved instead of standing

back and subjecting a house full of vulnerable adults to

abuse and neglect, knowing that the [District Attorney of

Lebanon County] plans to do NOTHING, and the city is

protecting organized criminals, not these older adults.

The DA irresponsibly sent my complaint to the city

(before I was told how this was going to be “handled”), and

into the hands of [Mr. Hernandez’s] agents . . . .

Complaint Ex. A at 1.

After learning about the email, Mr. Hernandez sued Ms. Zook for

defamation per se. He sought over $50,000 in damages and an injunction to

stop Ms. Zook from making further claims that he was a criminal. See

Complaint at 3-4.

On August 2, 2024, a deputy sheriff of Lebanon County served Ms. Zook

with Mr. Hernandez’s complaint. See Affidavit of Deputy Valdez at 1. Initially,

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Ms. Zook filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, which Mr.

Hernandez opposed.

While preliminary objections were pending, on October 29, 2024, Ms.

Zook filed a Special Motion to Dismiss or for Entry of Judgment under the

UPEPA. Therein, Ms. Zook conceded that her special motion was untimely,

because she had “not made [her motion] within the 60-day period” as

mandated in the statute. Zook’s Special Motion at 5.

Nevertheless, Ms. Zook contended that her time for bringing the special

motion should be extended due to “a showing of good cause.” Id. (quoting

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.16 (b)(2)). She alleged that “good cause” existed for her

delayed filing of the special motion, because (1) reaching the merits of the

special motion would avoid her having to file a separate action against Mr.

Hernandez under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8320.1; (2) neither party would suffer

prejudice, because the matter was still at the pleading stage; (3) “UPEPA was

very recently enacted[; hence, Ms.] Zook’s counsel only recently learned of

its passage”; and (4) allowing an untimely filing would be “consistent with the

General Assembly’s mandate of broad construction of UPEPA under 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.12(4).” Id. at 5-6.

Mr. Henandez opposed the special motion. Following oral argument, the

trial court denied Ms. Zook’s special motion on the merits. However, the court

did not consider the threshold issues of the motion’s untimeliness or whether

Ms. Zook made a good-cause showing such that her delay in the filing of the

UPEPA special motion was excused. This timely appeal followed.

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Ms. Zook raises three appellate issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Ms. Zook’s

special motion . . . in finding that [she] failed to show

that her email communication constituted protected

public expression [under UPEPA?]

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Ms. Zook’s

special motion . . . in finding Mr. Hernandez stated a

prima facie case . . . for defamation[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying Ms. Zook’s

special motion . . . in finding that Mr. Hernandez is

not a limited-purpose-public figure[?]

Zook’s Brief at 7.

When we review orders disposing of special motions arising under the

UPEPA, the General Assembly has directed this Court to apply the scope and

standard of review for summary judgment. “In ruling on a [special] motion

. . . the court shall consider the record as defined in Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.1

(relating to Motion for Summary Judgment. Definition), the special motion and

responses and the evidence which can be considered on a motion for summary

judgment under Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.2 (relating to motion).”

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.16(d)(4). “In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,

[the appellate] Court’s standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review

is plenary.” Bourgeois v. Snow Time, Inc., 242 A.3d 637, 649 (Pa. 2020).

Additionally, we have long held that an appellate court “may affirm a

trial court’s ruling on any basis supported by the record on appeal.” Lynn v.

Nationwide Ins. Co., 70 A.3d 814, 823 (Pa. Super. 2013). This is known as

“the right-for-any-reason doctrine . . . .” In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157,

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1175 (Pa. 2018). The rationale for the doctrine “is that appellate review is of

the judgment or order before the appellate court, rather than any particular

reasoning or rationale employed by the lower tribunal.” Id. at 1176.

Thus, before reaching the merits of Ms. Zook’s claims of error, we must

determine whether her untimely special motion was properly before the trial

court. If it was not, we may affirm the order denying her special motion on

this alternative, procedural basis under the right-for-any-reason doctrine.

The UPEPA took effect in Pennsylvania on July 17, 2024 – two weeks

before Mr. Hernanadez filed this suit. Our legislature adopted and Governor

Shapiro signed the UPEPA into law because:

(1) There has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits

brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of

protected public expression.

(2) It is in the public interest to encourage continued

participation in matters of public significance. This

participation should not be chilled through abuse of

the judicial process.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.12.

The Uniform Law Commission, which authored and promoted the UPEPA

for the several States to adopt, has stated that the UPEPA is an “anti-SLAPP

law.” “Although ‘SLAPP’ — an acronym for ‘Strategic Lawsuit Against Public

Participation’ — does not appear in the Act’s title, the [UPEPA] should be

considered an anti-SLAPP act.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.11 (Editor’s Note:

Uniform Law Comment).

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Although the typical SLAPP lawsuit is “filed by a large developer against

environmental activists or a neighborhood association intended to chill the

defendants’ continued political or legal opposition to the developers’ plans,

SLAPPs are by no means limited to environmental issues, nor are the

defendants necessarily local organizations with limited resources.” Id.

(quoting Hupp v. Freedom Communications, Inc., 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 919,

922 (Cal. App. 2013) (some punctuation omitted). “While SLAPP suits

‘masquerade as ordinary lawsuits’ the conceptual features which reveal them

as SLAPPs are that they are generally meritless suits brought by large private

interests to deter common citizens from exercising their political or legal rights

or to punish them for doing so.” Id.

To accomplish its legislative ends, the UPEPA allows any defendants who

think they may be victims of a SLAPP suit to file a so-called “special motion”

for summary judgment during the pleadings stage of the litigation. These

“special motions” are legislatively ordained under Section 8340.16 of the

UPEPA, titled “Pretrial Motion.”

That Section, which is the heart of the statute, creates new rules of civil

procedure for any lawsuit that the defendant believes is a SLAPP suit. Under

the rules of Section 8340.16:

(a) Authorization.--A party may file a special motion for

dismissal of or judgment on a cause of action, or part of a

cause of action, based on a party's protected public

expression immunity.

(b) Time.--A motion under subsection (a) must be made

as follows:

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(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), no later than 60

days after being served with a pleading asserting a cause

of action based on protected public expression.

(2) The court may extend the time under paragraph (1)

upon a showing of good cause.

(c) Effect.--A motion under subsection (a) does not

preclude a party from asserting protected public expression

immunity through other pleadings and motions under the

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

(d) Procedure.--Upon motion under subsection (a), all of

the following apply:

(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the court shall

hear oral argument on the motion within 60 days after

the motion is filed.

(2) The court may extend the time period under

paragraph (1):

(i) to allow discovery under subsection (f)(2)(i); or

(ii) for good cause.

(3) If paragraph (2) applies, the court shall hear

argument as follows:

(i) For an extension under paragraph (2)(i):

(A) within 60 days after the court order allowing

the discovery; or

(B) for good cause, on the date specified by the

court.

(ii) For an extension under paragraph (2)(ii), on the

date specified by the court.

(4) In ruling on a motion under subsection (a), the court

shall consider the record as defined in Pa.R.C.P. No.

1035.1 (relating to Motion for Summary Judgment.

Definition), the special motion and responses and the

evidence which can be considered on a motion for

summary judgment under Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.2 (relating

to motion).

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(5) Within 60 days after hearing oral argument under

paragraph (1) or (3), the court shall:

(i) rule on a motion under subsection (a); and

(ii) place on the record a written opinion stating its

reasoning for its ruling.

(e) Stay.--If a motion under subsection (a) is made, all of

the following apply:

(1) Except as provided in subsection (f), all other

proceedings in the action are stayed. This paragraph

includes discovery and the moving party's obligation to

file a responsive pleading.

(2) A stay under paragraph (1) shall remain in effect until

the order ruling on the motion becomes final. This

paragraph includes an appeal of the order.

(f) Exceptions to stay.--During a stay under subsection

(e), all of the following apply:

(1) A party may challenge service of a writ or complaint,

personal or subject matter jurisdiction or venue.

(2) A court may take any of the following actions:

(i) Allow limited discovery if a party shows that

specific information:

(A) is necessary to establish whether a party has

satisfied or failed to satisfy a burden under section

8340.15 (relating to grant of immunity); and

(B) is not reasonably available unless discovery is

allowed.

(ii) Upon a showing of good cause, hear and rule on

a request for special or preliminary injunctive relief to

protect against an imminent threat to public health or

safety.

(iii) Upon a showing of good cause, permit a

proceeding relating exclusively to a cause of action:

(A) in response to which no party has asserted

protected public expression immunity; and

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(B) which does not implicate an issue relevant to a

party's assertion of protected public expression

immunity or to the cause of action for which that

immunity has been asserted.

(3) A party may voluntarily discontinue all or part of the

party’s action.

(4) A party may move to recover attorney fees, court

costs and expenses of litigation under section 8340.18

(relating to awards).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.16.

The UPEPA is clearly procedural in nature, and the legislature conceded

as much. “[T]he Act operates in a procedural manner – specifically, by

altering the typical procedure parties follow at the outset of litigation . . . .”

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.13 (Editor’s Note: Uniform Law Comment #2). Like all

of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the UPEPA’s purpose is to protect

“rights . . . substantive in nature.” Id. (emphasis removed).

Indeed, an “Anti-SLAPP law, at its core, is one by which a legislature

imposes external change upon judicial procedure, in implicit recognition

that the judiciary [itself] has not [] modified its own procedures to deal with

this specific brand of abusive litigation.” Uniform Law Commission, Uniform

Public Expression Protection Act: Prefatory Note at 1, 10/2/20.3 (emphasis

added).

____________________________________________

3 The Prefatory Note is available for download at:

https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/enactment-kit-

99?CommunityKey=4f486460-199c-49d7-9fac-

05570be1e7b1&tab=librarydocuments (last visited 12/7/25).

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Although the legislature’s motives for passing the UPEPA were assuredly

well intended, our review of the Editor’s Notes and legislative history reveals

that the constitutionality of the UPEPA is in doubt. On its face, the UPEPA

gives the very strong impression that this Act is the General Assembly’s latest

attempt at rewriting the Pennsylvania Rules of Court.

Historically in Pennsylvania, such attempts have been a source of friction

between the legislature and the judiciary, because procedural statues violate

our state charter’s separation-of-powers doctrine. The Constitution of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania reserves the power to promulgate Rules of

Civil Procedure to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. “The Supreme Court

shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure

and the conduct of all courts . . . .” Pa. Const. art. V § 10(c) (emphasis

added).

“Article V, § 10(c) states two principles relevant here: [the Supreme]

Court has the exclusive power to enact procedural rules, and a law

inconsistent with such a rule is suspended.” Commonwealth v. McMullen,

961 A.2d 842, 848 (Pa. 2008). “A procedural statute conflicting with a rule is

suspended under Article V, § 10(c). If, however, the legislature enacts a

procedural statute, that statute is unconstitutional.” Id. “Otherwise, a clearly

unconstitutional procedural statute would be constitutional unless [and until]

[the Supreme] Court promulgated a rule inconsistent with it.” Id.

Here, the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the UPEPA for national

adoption. The Commissioners and Committee Members intended it to be and

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to function as a purely procedural, anti-SLAPP law. Such a law may be fine in

other States, but the UPEPA’s constitutional viability is, at best, questionable

in this Commonwealth.

Fortunately, this Court can and will reserve that constitutional issue for

another day, because we may strictly apply the filing deadline for Ms. Zook’s

special motion. By doing so, we can avoid ruling on the constitutionality of

the UPEPA in this appeal. We are mindful that “courts should avoid

constitutional issues when the issue at hand may be decided upon other

grounds.” In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 909 (Pa. 1996).

The legislature mandated that the party seeking the protection of the

UPEPA must file a “special motion” to dismiss “no later than 60 days after

being served with a pleading asserting a cause of action based on protected

public expression.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.16(b)(1). Ms. Zook admitted in her

special motion that she missed the 60-day deadline for that motion. See

Zook’s Special Motion at 5.

The special motion was facially untimely, because the sheriff served the

complaint – the only pleading containing a cause of action – on August 2,

2024. Ms. Zook did not file the special motion until October 29, 2024, i.e.,

nearly 90 days after service of the operative pleading. Thus, the special

motion was untimely. By strictly enforcing the 60-time limit against Ms. Zook,

this Court may avoid a potential separation-of-powers problem permeating

the UPEPA.

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Nevertheless, Ms. Zook does not think that her special motion should be

dismissed as untimely. She claims her actions come within the “good cause”

exception to the 60-day filing period. “The court may extend the [60-day

period] upon a showing of good cause.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.16(b)(2). As

we explain, that subsection does not apply.

First, Ms. Zook claims good cause for being late, because, disposing of

her special motion on the merits would force her to file a separate lawsuit she

argues, would merely renew her claims of statutory immunity under the

UPEPA. Ms. Zook’s argument is a non sequitur. Eliminating a potential future

lawsuit is not good cause for an untimely filing in this action. In fact, it is not

a “cause” of Ms. Zook’s untimeliness at all. How she might elect to proceed

in the future cannot possibly have caused her tardiness in the present lawsuit,

because time does not run in reverse.

Second, Ms. Zook contends that neither party will suffer prejudice by

addressing the merits of her special motion, because the case was in the

pleading stage when she filed the untimely motion. In her view, because the

motion was not filed during discovery, it came close enough after the

complaint to satisfy the purpose of the 60-day time limit.

Obviously, Ms. Zook wouldn’t be prejudiced if this Court entertained her

motion, because she is the party seeking dismissal of the lawsuit. Hence, her

lack of prejudice is irrelevant.

Mr. Hernandez, by contrast, has suffered great prejudice from the

untimely motion. He has watched his case stagnate for over a year, while the

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special motion and a subsequent interlocutory appeal were heard. The case

has proceeded piecemeal through our appellate courts. He has not had a

chance to engage in real discovery (much less get his case before a jury),

because, under the legislature’s procedural rules, Ms. Zook’s special motion

imposed an automatic stay on all proceedings in the trial court. Mr. Hernandez

expected to have Ms. Zook’s preliminary objections resolved, and his case

move forward to discovery. But her untimely special motion has brought the

wheels of justice to a grinding halt.

Moreover, the UPEPA placed Mr. Hernandez on the horns of a procedural

dilemma. On the one hand, the special motion prevented him from engaging

in true and full discovery. On the other, it required him to make his prima

facie case based on a record that the UPEPA’s procedural rules prevented him

from developing in the first place. Thus, the untimely special motion deprived

him of his rights under the Rules of Civil Procedure (adopted in 1937), which

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania based on hundreds of years of practice

and have continually refined for the last eight decades. The special motion

under UPEPA turned this case from a methodical search for truth into a

procedural rush to judgment.

Ms. Zook’s claim that her demand for a snap judgment did not prejudice

Mr. Hernandez is untenable. She cannot make a good-cause showing at the

expense of Mr. Hernandez’s rights under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Third, Ms. Zook admits that, because the “UPEPA was very recently

enacted [her] counsel only recently learned of its passage . . . .” Zook’s

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Special Motion at 6. Hence, she believes that her attorney’s ignorance of the

new law was a viable excuse for not filing the special motion within the 60-

day period.

“For nearly two centuries, courts have held that ignorance of the law

furnishes no excuse to any person, either civilly or criminally; and,

consequently, a mistake in law cannot be relieved against, either in equity or

at law.” Matter of Peterson Fam. Irrevocable Tr., 333 A.3d 453, 460 (Pa.

Super. 2025). Thus, in this Commonwealth, the fact that Ms. Zook’s counsel

was ignorant of the newly adopted UPEPA does nothing to excuse her untimely

filing of the special motion.

In fact, a participant on the UPEPA Drafting Committee, in an article

regarding the UPEPA’s Special Motions, explained the “good cause” exception

to the 60-day filing period by way of two illustrations. His second example

illustrates this case in point:

Example #2: A Complaint falling within the scope [of the

UPEPA] is filed against a single defendant, but the

defendant’s counsel (who is unfamiliar with this practice

area) is unaware that a Special Motion is available until after

the 60-day period has expired. Several months into the

litigation, the lightbulb suddenly goes on in that counsel’s

head and a Special Motion is filed late. In this case, the

movant will not be able to show “good cause” to be able to

file a late Special Motion (assuming that inadvertence of

counsel does not rise to good cause within that particular

jurisdiction).

Jay Adkisson, “The Uniform Public Expression Protection Act: The Special

Motion,” FORBES MAGAZINE ONLINE (May 31, 2021), available at

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https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2021/05/31/the-uniform-public-

expression-protection-act-the-special-motion/ (last visited 12/7/25). The

lack of knowledge of the law by Ms. Zook’s counsel does not rise to “good

cause” in Pennsylvania.

Fourth and finally, Ms. Zook contends that she had “good cause” for her

untimely filing of the special motion, because overlooking her late filing would

be “consistent with the General Assembly’s mandate of broad construction of

UPEPA under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.12(4).” Zook’s Special Motion at 6. Again,

this is a non sequitur. Broadly interpreting the words of a statute has no

relationship to the cause of Ms. Zook’s untimely filing.

Furthermore, “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all

ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of

pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). The wording of 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

8340.16(b)(1) regarding the time for filing a special motion is clear and free

of ambiguity.

“A [special] motion under subsection (a) must be made . . . no later

than 60 days after being served with a pleading asserting a cause of action

based on protected public expression.” Id. No amount of broad construction

can be given to the plain language of this statute, so as to convert 60 days

into 90 days, as Ms. Zook requests. While the spirit of the UPEPA might have

tempted the trial court into addressing the merits of Ms. Zook’s untimely

special motion, it exerts no such allure for us.

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In sum, the trial court erred when it failed to address the threshold

question of whether Ms. Zook made a good-cause showing to excuse her

untimely special motion for dismissal under the UPEPA. However, we have

undertaken that inquiry in the first instance, because, at this quasi-summary-

judgment stage of the proceedings, where no factual findings have been made

or sought below, that threshold inquiry presented a pure question of law under

the UPEPA. See Bourgeois, supra. Therefore, we conclude that Ms. Zook’s

contention that she had “good cause” for missing the 60-day deadline for filing

her special motion fails, as a matter of law.

On this alternative basis, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the

special motion under the UPEPA. We dismiss Ms. Zook’s appellate issues as

moot.

Order affirmed. The UPEPA’s stay lifted. Case remanded for disposition

of preliminary objections.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2026

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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