Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Dev.

[Cite as Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Dev., 2025-Ohio-5877.]

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

YVONNE WATSON Case No. 2023-00531JD

Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler

Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck

v.

DECISION

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF

DEVELOPMENT

Defendant

{¶1} Plaintiff, formerly an employee of Defendant, brings this action claiming that

Defendant unlawfully discriminated against her based on race and age and unlawfully

retaliated against her, resulting in the termination of her employment.

{¶2} On April 21, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant

to Civ.R. 56(B). The motion is now fully briefed and comes before the Court for a non-

oral hearing pursuant to Civ.R. 56 and L.C.C.R. 4. For the following reasons, the motion

shall be granted.

Standard of Review

{¶3} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows:

{¶4} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and

written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A

summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or

stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to

but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the

Case No. 2023-00531JD -2- DECISION

motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or

stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also Gilbert v. Summit Cty.,

2004-Ohio-7108, ¶ 6, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977).

{¶5} “The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing

the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Starner v. Onda, 2023-

Ohio-1955, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). “The

moving party does not discharge this initial burden under Civ.R. 56 by simply making

conclusory allegations.” Id. “Rather, the moving party must affirmatively demonstrate by

affidavit or other evidence allowed by Civ.R. 56(C) that there are no genuine issues of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “Once

the moving party discharges its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the

non-moving party does not respond, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56,

with specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists for trial.” Hinton v. Ohio Dept. of

Youth Servs., 2022-Ohio-4783, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), citing Dresher at 293; Vahila v. Hall, 77

Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997); Civ.R. 56(E).

Factual Background

{¶6} In support of its motion, Defendant submitted a transcript of Plaintiff’s

deposition in which she relates that she began working for Defendant on June 7, 2021, in

the role of Manager of Community Service Programs, in Defendant’s Office of Community

Assistance. (Watson Depo., p. 76.) Plaintiff explained that the office was responsible for

disbursing federal funds to local community action agencies throughout the state and

monitoring those agencies to ensure the funds were spent appropriately. (Id. at p. 80.)

{¶7} Plaintiff testified that for the first few months in this role, she reported to Megan

Meadows, but when Defendant promoted Meadows to be Chief of the Community

Services Division, Plaintiff began reporting to Latisha Chastang, Deputy Chief of the

Office of Community Assistance. (Id. at p. 98.)

{¶8} According to an affidavit that Plaintiff submitted in response to the Motion for

Summary Judgment, she received positive assessments of her work performance and

did not receive any discipline. (Watson Affidavit, ¶ 2.) It is undisputed, though, that

Case No. 2023-00531JD -3- DECISION

Plaintiff had difficulty completing certain work assignments, including “an assignment to

make corrections to the fiscal year 2020 CSBG Report”, and Meadows ultimately

removed Plaintiff from this assignment. (Response, pp. 3-4.) Chastang, in an affidavit

submitted by Defendant, authenticates an email exchange from August 2022 where she

communicated with Plaintiff about upcoming deadlines for certain projects and explained

that “[t]hese deadlines are firm”; in Plaintiff’s emailed response, Plaintiff stated that she

understood “the notion of Megan’s firm deadlines; however, the overall messaging

comes across as threatening, punitive, and disparate treatment”, and Plaintiff went on to

express her “concern about deadlines in general”. (Emphasis in original.) (Chastang

Affidavit, Exhibit A.)

{¶9} According to Plaintiff, she came to feel she was made a scapegoat, that she

was blamed for things beyond her control, that she was not given the support and

resources she needed, that deadlines were imposed on her in a way that she found

threatening, and that “as a black woman over 40 and counterparts that were Caucasian,

there was a difference being made” in how she was treated. (Watson Depo., p. 169.)

Plaintiff testified that, based on these concerns, on October 7, 2022, she sent an email to

Meadows’ supervisor, Deputy Director of Program Administration Mike Fraizer, with the

following message:

Good Morning Mike,

The purpose of my email is to share my concerns regarding my position as

Manager of Community Services.

I’m experiencing discriminatory harassment. I have several concerns

regarding Megan Meadows and her passive/aggressive microaggression,

and implicit bias demonstrated toward me; I identify my color as a black

woman and age as the reason.

I’ve shared my concern with Megan directly, noted as disparate treatment.

The culture I’ve experienced withholds knowledge and resources and

encourages division among staff. Megan has assigned tasks without

Case No. 2023-00531JD -4- DECISION

providing adequate training, clear guidance, or an opportunity to reach out

to other staff with questions. Moreover, Megan passes directives through

others that are presented to me with bullying overtones, intimidation,

questioning my abilities, and undermining of my work and delivered as

“Megan said.”

Mike, I am committed to the mission of empowering communities to

succeed and working alongside all those involved in helping individuals

achieve self-sufficiency. The work environment is hostile, and I wanted you

to be aware of my experiences thus far, as I am very concerned.

Thank you for your time.

(Id. at p. 168, Exhibit 8.)

{¶10} In a deposition transcript submitted by Defendant, its Deputy Director of

Administrative Operations, Susan Boothe, testified that she supervises Defendant’s

human resources department, among other responsibilities, and that she attended

Plaintiff’s second employment interview with Defendant and recommended hiring her.

(Boothe Depo., pp. 5, 9.) Boothe stated that the human resources department opened

an investigation into the internal complaint that Plaintiff made to Fraizer. (Id. at p. 13.)

The investigation was led by Human Resources Chief Maria Saliaris and Associate Legal

Counsel Brison Wammes and included interviews of both Plaintiff and Meadows, Boothe

stated. (Id. at pp. 16, 51.)

{¶11} Plaintiff stated that on or about November 9, 2022, during the pendency of

the human resources department’s investigation into her internal complaint, she

separately filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights

Commission (OCRC) relating to some of the same concerns as she raised in her internal

complaint. (Watson Depo., p. 248, Exhibit 16.) Plaintiff testified that during one of the

interviews with the officials investigating her internal complaint, she told them that she

had filed the OCRC charge of discrimination or was in the process of doing so. (Watson

Depo., pp. 249-250.) According to Boothe, OCRC notified Defendant’s legal department

of the charge of discrimination on December 7, 2022. (Boothe Depo., p. 17.)

Case No. 2023-00531JD -5- DECISION

{¶12} Boothe stated that at the conclusion of the human resources department’s

investigation into Plaintiff’s internal complaint, an investigation report was produced on

November 18, 2022, a copy of which she authenticated in her affidavit. (Boothe Depo.,

p. 13; Boothe Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 000097.) There is no dispute that the investigation

report concluded there was no evidence to support Plaintiff’s internal complaint.

{¶13} Matthew McClellan, Defendant’s Assistant Director, testified in a deposition

transcript submitted by Defendant that in November 2022 he learned that concerns about

Plaintiff’s handling of Defendant’s records and confidential information arose during the

human resources investigation into the internal complaint. (McClellan Depo., p. 11.)

McClellan stated that after the release of the November 18, 2022 investigation report

regarding the internal complaint, a separate investigation was opened to determine if

Plaintiff had violated Defendant’s data security policies. (Id. at pp. 23-25.)

{¶14} Boothe, in her affidavit, authenticated a copy of a December 12, 2022

investigation report, prepared by Wammes, titled “Acceptable Use of IT Resources and

Valid Access of Confidential Information”. (Boothe Affidavit, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.) It is explained

in this report that, during the human resources investigation of Plaintiff’s internal

complaint, Plaintiff’s email messages were accessed for the purpose of reviewing

communications between her and those whom she accused of inappropriate conduct in

the internal complaint. (Id.) (As stated above, the internal complaint alleged that

Meadows or her subordinates had discriminated against Plaintiff in several ways,

including in their communications with her.) The report provides that the review of

Plaintiff’s email messages revealed “a large number of emails containing possibly

sensitive information that were forwarded, not addressed to any person, blind copying

[Plaintiff’s personal email address]”, and this separate matter was then referred to

Defendant’s legal department “for possible review of Development Policy.” (Id.) Indeed,

Plaintiff acknowledged in her deposition that she transferred files to a personal email

account by forwarding or attaching them to blind carbon copy (BCC) emails from her work

email account. (Watson Depo., pp. 211; 219.) The legal department’s investigation report

found that Plaintiff sent numerous emails like this during the week of November 14, 2022,

and when limiting the investigation to the dates of November 17 and 18, 2022, when the

highest volume of emails were sent, it was concluded that Plaintiff had transferred “(1)

Case No. 2023-00531JD -6- DECISION

internal communications regarding confidential DOD procedures; (2) sensitive outside

communications with third-party contractors discussing both DOD procedures and third-

party procedures; (3) attachments containing both confidential and non-confidential

information.” (Boothe Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. ODD – 000094.) The report also found that

Plaintiff had transferred personal information such as the names of grantees or clients.

(Id. at ODD – 000096.)

{¶15} The legal department’s investigation was issued on December 12, 2022, and

was addressed to Chief Legal Counsel Jack Christopher, Saliaris, and Boothe. (Boothe

Affidavit, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.) McClellan recalled that he too learned the results of the legal

department’s investigation on December 12, 2022, and that he met with other senior

management officials later that day to discuss the matter. (McClellan Depo., pp. 11-12,

14; 23; 18-19.) McClellan stated that, because the legal department’s investigation

established “that there was sensitive information that was being sent out that shouldn’t

have been”, he recommended at the meeting that Plaintiff’s employment be terminated,

and Boothe recalled in her affidavit being at the meeting and concurring with the

recommendation, based on what she had seen in the report, as it demonstrated that

Plaintiff violated department policy. (Id. at pp. 16, 18-19; Boothe Affidavit, ¶ 4.) McClellan

testified that after this meeting, he went to Defendant’s director with the recommendation

to terminate Plaintiff’s employment, and after discussing the matter with the director, she

agreed with the recommendation and gave the final approval to move ahead with the

termination. Later that day, Plaintiff was instructed to come to the office the next day,

McClellan stated. (McClellan Depo., p. 15.)

{¶16} Plaintiff testified that she came to the office as instructed on December 13,

2022, and attended a meeting with Boothe and Assistant Chief of Legal Services

Benjamin LaGrosso where she was told that McClellan had asked for her resignation.

(Watson Depo., p. 213.) Plaintiff explained that she signed a letter of resignation that

same day because she understood that if she did not do so her employment would have

been terminated. (Id. at p. 217.) Plaintiff stated that she was not given a reason at the

meeting for why she was being asked to resign, and Boothe stated that it was Defendant’s

standard practice at a meeting of this nature to not discuss the reason. (Id. at p. 218.;

Boothe Depo., p. 36.)

Case No. 2023-00531JD -7- DECISION

{¶17} Plaintiff, who was born in 1967 and identifies as African American, brings

this action under R.C. Chapter 4112 claiming that the termination of her employment

constituted unlawful discrimination based on her race and age and unlawful retaliation

based on her complaining of discrimination and harassment both internally and with the

OCRC. (Complaint, ¶ 11-12.)

Law & Analysis

Race & Age Discrimination

{¶18} Counts I and II of the complaint set forth claims of race and age

discrimination under R.C. Chapter 4112. R.C. 4112.02 provides, in part:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:

(A) For any employer, because of the race. . .[or] age. . .of any person, to

discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate

against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to

employment.

{¶19} “A plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent to prevail on a race or age

discrimination claim.” Drummond v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2022-Ohio-1096, ¶ 13

(10th Dist.). “Absent direct evidence of retaliatory intent, Ohio courts analyze retaliation

claims using the evidentiary framework established by the United States Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d

668, a case involving claims of racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, Title 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq.” Veal v. Upreach LLC, 2011-Ohio-5406, ¶ 16

(10th Dist.); see also Little Forest Med. Ctr. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm., 61 Ohio St.3d

607, 609-610 (1991) (“federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

Section 2000(e) et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code, is generally applicable to cases involving

alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112.”).

{¶20} To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, “a plaintiff must

demonstrate that he or she: (1) was a member of the statutorily protected class,

(2) suffered an adverse employment action, (3) was qualified for the position, and (4) was

replaced by a person outside the protected class or that the employer treated a similarly

Case No. 2023-00531JD -8- DECISION

situated, non-protected person more favorably.” Nelson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2017-Ohio-

514, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.).

{¶21} Similarly, with respect to age, “[a] prima facie case of employment

discrimination may be established by proof that the plaintiff-employee: ‘(1) was a member

of the statutorily protected class, (2) was discharged, (3) was qualified for the position,

and (4) was replaced by, or the discharge permitted the retention of, a person of

substantially younger age.’” Pettay v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 2021-Ohio-1380, ¶ 22 (10th

Dist.), quoting Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. N.A., 2004-Ohio-723, ¶ 20. “Alternatively,

a plaintiff can establish the fourth prong by demonstrating that a ‘comparable non-

protected person was treated better.’” Bowditch v. Mettler Toledo Intl., Inc., 2013-Ohio-

4206, ¶ 15, quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir.1992).

{¶22} “Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case [of race or age

discrimination], the employer is required to set forth some legitimate, non-discriminatory

basis or bases for its action.” Bogdas v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2009-Ohio-6327,

¶ 9 (10th Dist.). “If the employer is able to meet this burden, the plaintiff is then afforded

an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons

offered by the employer were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.”

Id. “The ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff . . . . In order to

show pretext, a plaintiff must show both that the reason was false, and that discrimination

was the real reason.” Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-4774, ¶ 27 (10th

Dist.).

{¶23} As to the claim of race discrimination, Defendant assumes for purposes of

its Moton for Summary Judgment that Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case. But as

to the claim of age discrimination, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima

facie case. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that she was

replaced by someone substantially younger or that Defendant treated a similarly situated,

non-protected employee more favorably.

{¶24} There is no dispute that Defendant hired someone who was 62 years of

age—older than Plaintiff—to fill the Manager of Community Services Program role after

Plaintiff’s departure. As to whether there were any similarly situated employees who were

treated more favorably, in her deposition Plaintiff identified Claudia Torres, Brandy

Case No. 2023-00531JD -9- DECISION

Kolattukudy, and Keri Harris as Caucasian persons under the age of 40 who received

more favorable treatment in the workplace, such as being included in more meetings.

(Watson Depo., pp. 148, 175.) But “[w]here a plaintiff in a discrimination claim contends

his or her employer provided more favorable treatment to a non-protected similarly

situated person, the individual with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his treatment

must be similar in all relevant respects.” Tanner v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025-

Ohio-1149, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.). Here, Plaintiff does not point to evidence suggesting that

these individuals engaged in the same conduct that Defendant identifies as the basis for

terminating her employment, i.e. violating Defendant’s data security policies. See Id.

(“Courts must consider whether the proffered individual . . . engaged in the same

conduct”). And Plaintiff stated in her deposition that these individuals held different

positions and did not report to the same supervisor that she did, and their positions were

at the level of Plaintiff’s supervisor, not Plaintiff’s level. (Watson Depo., pp. 119, 142,

148-149, 175-176.) Therefore, Plaintiff was not similarly situated to Torres, Kolattukudy,

or Harris.

{¶25} Defendant met its burden of coming forward with evidence to affirmatively

show that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. In her

Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff offers no argument in support

of the age discrimination claim, much less point to evidence demonstrating a genuine

issue of material fact on the claim. Plaintiff thus did not meet her reciprocal burden of

showing that a genuine issue exists for trial. See Meredith v. ARC Indus., 2024-Ohio-

4466, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.), quoting Heimberger v. Zeal Hotel Group Ltd., 2015-Ohio-3845, ¶

14 (10th Dist.), quoting Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 293 (“If the moving party has satisfied

its initial burden under Civ.R. 56(C), then the non-moving party ‘“has a reciprocal burden

outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall

be entered against the nonmoving party.”’”). Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment

on Plaintiff’s claim of age discrimination.

{¶26} Defendant further argues that, whether or not Plaintiff could establish a prima

facie case of age discrimination, it is entitled to summary judgment on the claims of both

race and age discrimination because there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

Case No. 2023-00531JD -10- DECISION

terminating her employment, i.e. her “mishandling of the Department’s confidential

records”. (Motion, p. 1.)

{¶27} In a deposition transcript submitted by Defendant, McClellan testified that he

made the recommendation to Defendant’s director to remove Plaintiff from her position,

and that he did so based upon the results of the legal department’s investigation into

Plaintiff’s potential violation of Defendant’s data security policies, and after meeting with

other senior management officials to consider the matter. (McClellan Depo., pp. 15, 18.)

The reason for removing Plaintiff, according to McClellan, was that the legal department’s

investigation showed “there was sensitive information that was being sent out that

shouldn’t have been.” (Id. at p. 16.) Boothe, one of the officials who met with McClellan

to discuss the results of the investigation, stated that she too was in favor of removing

Plaintiff from employment because Plaintiff’s conduct constituted “a violation of policy.”

(Boothe Depo., p. 22.)

{¶28} As context for the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment over such

concerns, Defendant points out that, as Plaintiff acknowledged in her deposition, she

reviewed the Development Team Handbook soon after she began working for Defendant.

(Watson Depo., p. 90.) Included in the Handbook was a section titled “Information

Technology (IT) Resources and Acceptable Use”. (Id. at Exhibit 13.) There is no dispute

that in the “Operation and Maintenance” subpart of this section, it provided that

“Confidential or sensitive data should never be stored on a personal flash drive or

personal storage media. When it is necessary to save confidential or sensitive data to

storage media, Development-issued storage media formatted as prescribed by the IT

Director must be used.” (Id. at Exhibit 13, p. ODD-001615.) Another subpart, titled “File

Transfer”, stated, in part: “Do not transfer files by e-mail to a personal device.” (Id. at

Exhibit 13, p. ODD-001616.) And under the subpart titled “PERSONAL DEVICES”, it

stated, in part:

1. The use of a personal device for state business must be approved by the

IT Division in advance.

2. Only apps approved by the IT Division may be used to access state data

or information.

Case No. 2023-00531JD -11- DECISION

3. Downloading or saving state information directly to a personal device is

prohibited.

(Id. at Exhibit 13, p. ODD-001617.)

{¶29} Defendant also notes that when Plaintiff was hired she signed a “Data

Confidentiality Agreement” which stated, in part: “You must not remove or cause to be

removed any record, report, or file from the location where it is kept except as necessary

for you to perform your duties in accordance with the policies of [Defendant] and your

agency.” (Id. at p. 132, Exhibit 13, p. ODD-001344.) Defendant also argues that it

“considers confidentiality when making daily business decisions”, and as one example of

that it points to a time when Plaintiff sought to perform her job via teleworking from a

tutoring center but the request was denied “due to confidentiality reasons.” (Id. at p. 127,

Exhibit 6.)

{¶30} The evidence identified by Defendant demonstrates that the security and

confidentiality of its records and data was a priority, as demonstrated in its written policies

and organizational practices, which generally required that electronic data only be stored

on and accessed from Defendant’s computer network or other media issued or approved

by Defendant’s IT Division. Moreover, Defendant has presented evidence showing that

the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment was based on concerns that her sending

Defendant’s records and confidential data to a personal email account violated

Defendant’s policies, which did not permit transmitting records from Defendant’s

computer network onto a personal email account, accessing records through a personal

email application, nor storing them there. Defendant thus met its burden of showing that

Plaintiff’s failure to follow organizational policies constituted a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken by Defendant. See Goldblum v. Univ. of

Cincinnati, 62 F.4th 244, 252 (6th Cir. 2023) (“an employee’s . . . failure to follow company

policies constitute legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons to terminate employment”).

{¶31} The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether the reason proffered by Defendant was merely pretext

for discrimination based on race or age.

{¶32} Plaintiff argues that she “can clearly show ODD’s claimed reason for its

termination of her is pretext for discrimination . . . .” (Response, p. 14.)

Case No. 2023-00531JD -12- DECISION

{¶33} Plaintiff argues that Defendant “first claimed it had no reasons for terminating

[her]. Then it asserted it had a valid basis for its action, namely the emailed documents.”

(Response, p. 14.) According to Plaintiff, citing Cicero v. Borg-Warner, 280 F.3d 579,

592 (6th Cir. 2002), these represent “changing rationales” that demonstrate pretext.

While Plaintiff asserts that Defendant “claimed it had no reasons” for the action, what

Plaintiff described in her deposition was that at the meeting where she was asked to

resign, she “asked what was the purpose for this decision, and [Susan Boothe] said there

was no purpose.” (Watson Depo., p. 214.) Boothe explained in her deposition that she

responded that way because it is Defendant’s policy to not provide reasons or background

information to employees who are asked to resign in lieu of termination; rather, she only

relays Defendant’s decision to the employee, as it is “not a time to negotiate or talk

through the details.” (Id. at p. 36.) The fact that Boothe, consistent with this policy, would

not identify the reason for Defendant’s decision during the meeting does not controvert

the evidence presented by Defendant that establishes that it had already decided to

terminate Plaintiff’s employment based on her violation of Defendant’s data security

policies. The authority on which Plaintiff relies, Cicero, is distinguishable, as in that case

the employer claimed that it terminated the employee for poor performance but provided

no contemporaneous evidence of performance concerns, and, to the contrary, it was only

after the termination that the employer “raised serious complaints about his performance,

and even then, it gave shifting justifications for his discharge.” Cicero at 591-592. Here,

Defendant has provided contemporaneous evidence of concerns about Plaintiff

mishandling records and confidential information, and while it was Defendant’s policy to

not identify those concerns to Plaintiff when she was asked to resign, the uncontroverted

evidence shows that those concerns have been Defendant’s reason all along for ending

her employment. Plaintiff points to no evidence suggesting that there was any reason for

the action other than the one identified by Defendant.

{¶34} Plaintiff next argues that when she sought unemployment benefits following

her tenure with Defendant, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services “rejected”

Defendant’s explanation for her separation from employment. (Response, p. 14.) But

the decision of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services on Plaintiff’s application

for unemployment benefits is not relevant to the claims of employment discrimination and

Case No. 2023-00531JD -13- DECISION

retaliation at issue herein. See Morningstar v. Circleville Fire & EMS Dept., 2018 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 131291 (S.D.Ohio Aug. 6, 2018), citing Blumensaadt v. Standard Products

Co., 744 F.Supp. 160, 163 (N.D.Ohio 1989).

{¶35} Next, Plaintiff argues that “there exists no clear written policy against

emailing documents to a personal email address.” (Response, p. 14.) And Plaintiff

argues that “the Handbook is enormous and [Plaintiff] did not read it thoroughly.” (Id. at

p. 7.) Plaintiff acknowledged in her deposition that the Handbook was available to her

and she recalled looking at it, but even if it is assumed that Plaintiff did not read the

Handbook thoroughly, this does not controvert Defendant’s proffered reason for

terminating Plaintiff’s employment. (Watson Depo., pp. 87-90.) Defendant’s Handbook

provided, in part, that “[c]onfidential or sensitive data should never be stored on . . .

personal storage media”, that employees shall “not transfer files by e-mail to a personal

device”, and that “[o]nly apps approved by the IT Division may be used to access state

data or information.” (Watson Depo., Exhibit 13, pp. ODD-001615-ODD-001617.) It is

undisputed that Plaintiff transferred files and information by email from Defendant’s

secure computer network to a personal email account outside Defendant’s network,

accessible from a third-party email application, without approval of the IT Division. Under

the language of the Handbook, Plaintiff was not permitted to store such files, nor access

such files, in this manner.

{¶36} Moreover, even if one could construe Defendant’s policies to not have

specifically barred the conduct in question, “so long as the employer honestly believed in

the proffered reason given for its employment action, the employee cannot establish

pretext even if the employer’s reason is ultimately found to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or

baseless.” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998). “The inquiry,

therefore, must focus on whether the employer’s reasons for its decision were honestly

held, not on whether the employer’s reasons were right.” Smith v. Ohio Dept. of Pub.

Safety, 2013-Ohio-4210, ¶ 78 (10th Dist.). “In order for an employer to claim an honest

belief in its proffered reason, the employer must establish its reasonable reliance on

particularized facts that were before it at the time it made the adverse employment

decision.” Kenner v. Grant/Riverside Med. Care Found., 2017-Ohio-1349, ¶ 30 (10th

Dist.). Here, Defendant established through the deposition testimony of McClellan and

Case No. 2023-00531JD -14- DECISION

Boothe that the decision to request Plaintiff’s resignation was based on the results of the

legal department’s investigation into Plaintiff’s alleged violation of Defendant’s data

security policies. Plaintiff has not identified evidence contravening the testimony of

McClellan and Boothe as to their having an honestly held belief, at the time of the

decision, that Plaintiff had acted improperly in emailing Defendant’s records and

confidential data to a personal email account.

{¶37} Plaintiff also argues that she had “implicit permission” or “tacit permission”

from Chastang and Meadows to email documents to herself. (Response, pp. 9, 15.)

Plaintiff stated in her deposition that when working in Defendant’s offices she was able to

print documents from Defendant’s printers, but when working from home as part of her

hybrid work schedule, she occasionally emailed documents to her personal email account

in order to print them from her personal printer. (Watson Depo., pp. 205, 208.) Although

Plaintiff does not assert that Chastang and Meadows expressly permitted this, she argues

that it “was well known by Ms. Chastang and Ms. Meadows” that she and others did so.

(Response, p. 9.)

{¶38} Plaintiff does not argue, nor point to evidence, however, that Chastang and

Meadows were involved in the decision to terminate her employment. McClellan, who

was a decisionmaker and took his recommendation to Defendant’s director, testified in

his deposition that he was not aware of any employees transferring records or confidential

information to personal email accounts to print at home, nor was he aware of any

employees having permission to do so. (McClellan Depo., pp. 14, 25.) Boothe testified

similarly that she did not know of any such practice, nor did she have any knowledge of

Chastang or Meadows approving of such a practice. (Boothe Depo., pp. 22-23.) Plaintiff

has not identified countervailing evidence demonstrating that the decision to terminate

her employment was made by anyone with knowledge of any such practice among

employees or knowledge of any supervisors approving of such a practice.

{¶39} Even if it is assumed for Civ.R. 56 purposes that Plaintiff had permission

from Chastang and Meadows to transfer documents to her personal email account, the

uncontroverted evidence is that Defendant’s senior management decided to terminate

Plaintiff’s employment, based on the particularized facts known to them, with no

knowledge of this, and “‘so long as the employer has established its honest belief, ‘the

Case No. 2023-00531JD -15- DECISION

employee cannot establish pretext even if the employer’s reason is ultimately found to be

mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.’” Tibbs v. Calvary United Methodist Church, 505

Fed.Appx. 508, 513-514 (6th Cir. 2012), quoting Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tele. Co., LLC,

681 F.3d 274, 286 (6th Cir. 2012).

{¶40} Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s proffered reason for terminating her

employment is “undermined” by the fact that Defendant did not investigate whether other

employees transferred Defendant’s records or confidential information to their personal

email accounts, and that the decision to terminate her employment was made by “people

who did not know her at all . . . and who never asked her why she emailed the documents

to herself . . . .” (Response, pp. 10, 15.) Yet, Defendant has presented uncontroverted

evidence as to the facts on which the decision was made, namely the legal department’s

investigation and the conclusion that Plaintiff’s actions violated Defendant’s data security

policies, and “in determining whether an employer reasonably relied on the particularized

facts before it, [courts] do not require that the decisional process used by the employer

‘be optimal or that it left no stone unturned. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the

employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse

employment action.’” Tillman v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 545 Fed.Appx. 340, 349 (6th Cir.

2013), quoting Seeger, 681 F.3d at 285, quoting Smith, 155 F.3d at 807; see also Davis

v. Landscape Forms, Inc., 640 Fed.Appx. 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2016) (“An employer’s

investigation . . . does not have to be perfect or exhaust all possibilities.”).

{¶41} Plaintiff also argues that she did not share Defendant’s records or

confidential information with any third parties and that there is no evidence of any third

party accessing the data. (Response, p. 15.) But Plaintiff’s employment was terminated

for violating Defendant’s data security policies, and the “[v]iolation of a company policy .

. . constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for terminating an employee.”

Morrissette v. DFS Servs., LLC, 2013-Ohio-4336, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.); see also Goldblum v.

Univ. of Cincinnati, 62 F.4th 244, 252 (6th Cir. 2023) (“an employee’s insubordination and

her failure to follow company policies constitute legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons to

terminate employment.”). Whether actual harm occurred is immaterial to the pretext

analysis. See Carter v. PNC Bank, N.A., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130448, *20 (N.D. Ohio

Case No. 2023-00531JD -16- DECISION

Sept. 22, 2016) (“Whether or not the customer was harmed is irrelevant to the pretext

analysis.”).

{¶42} Finally, according to Plaintiff, Defendant asserts “that [Plaintiff’s] being told

she could only telework out of her home, rather than at a tutoring center that she runs,

due to confidentiality concerns shows she understood that she could not email documents

to herself. (MSJ, p. 2). This is a non sequitur. All that it showed was ODD was concerned

about confidential information being heard or seen by third parties.” (Response, p. 8, fn.

2.) But in the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant expressly notes that this was

simply one “example” of how Defendant “considers confidentiality when making daily

business decisions.” (Motion, p. 2.) As Plaintiff concedes, this shows that Defendant

“was concerned about confidential information being heard or seen by third parties.”

(Response, p. 8, fn. 2.) Rather than demonstrating an issue of fact, this concern is

consistent with Defendant’s proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment.

{¶43} Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has failed to identify a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Defendant met its

burden of proffering evidence that the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment was

for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Plaintiff did not meet her reciprocal burden of

coming forward with evidence showing that Defendant’s proffered reason was false and

that discrimination because of race or age was the true reason. Reasonable minds can

therefore only conclude that Plaintiff cannot prevail on her claims that the termination of

her employment constituted unlawful discrimination because of race or age.

Hostile Work Environment

{¶44} Defendant argues in its Motion for Summary Judgment that, to the extent the

complaint may be construed to raise claims of race or age-based discrimination on a

hostile work environment theory pursuant to R.C. 4112.02, Plaintiff cannot establish all

the necessary elements of any such claim.

{¶45} A prima facie case of discrimination under a hostile work environment theory

based on race or age is established by showing that the employee (1) was a member of

a protected class, (2) was subjected to unwelcome harassment because of race or age,

(3) that had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the employee’s work performance

Case No. 2023-00531JD -17- DECISION

and creating an objectively intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. Hinton v.

Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 2022-Ohio-4783, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.) (race discrimination); Hoyt

v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2005-Ohio-6367, ¶ 68 (10th Dist.) (age discrimination).

{¶46} Plaintiff’s internal complaint, as well Plaintiff’s complaint in this lawsuit,

included allegations of “harassment” directed toward Plaintiff. Plaintiff was asked in her

deposition how she came to feel that she was harassed, and the examples she cited

included supervisors telling her that “if you don’t get it done, it’s going to be a problem”,

supervisors asking her to make corrections to reports, and “being left out of meetings,

[and] not given the support and the resources to do the job effectively.” (Watson Depo.,

pp. 140-144.) Defendant argues, among other things, that there is no evidence that such

instances were based on race or age.

{¶47} In her Response, Plaintiff did not address the subject of a hostile work

environment claim, much less point to evidence that would demonstrate a genuine issue

of material fact on such a claim. Looking at the deposition testimony cited by Defendant,

there is no suggestion that the examples of harassment that Plaintiff identified were based

upon race or age. “Harassment does not constitute a discriminatory practice under R.C.

4112.02(A) unless based on a protected classification.” Hinkle v. L Brands, Inc. World

Headquarters, 2021-Ohio-4187, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). Based on the uncontroverted evidence

submitted by Defendant, reasonable minds can only conclude that Plaintiff cannot prevail

on a hostile work environment claim under R.C. 4112.02.

Retaliation

{¶48} In Count III of the complaint, Plaintiff claims that she “was terminated

because she had opposed discriminatory practices and she engaged in protected EEO

activity.” (Complaint, ¶ 22.)

{¶49} “It is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee for opposing

discriminatory workplace practices or for making a charge, testifying, assisting, or

participating in a Title VII or R.C. Chapter 4112 investigation, proceeding, or hearing. 42

U.S.C. 2000e-3(a); R.C. 4112.02(I). “Because of the similarities between R.C. 4112.02(I)

and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Ohio courts look to federal case law for

Case No. 2023-00531JD -18- DECISION

assistance in interpreting retaliation claims under R.C. 4112.02(I).” Moody v. Ohio Dept.

of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 2021-Ohio-4578, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.).

{¶50} A plaintiff may prove a retaliation claim through either direct or circumstantial

evidence that unlawful retaliation motivated the employer’s adverse employment

decision.” Smith, 2013-Ohio-4210, at ¶ 47 (10th Dist.). “Direct evidence is that evidence

which, if believed, requires no inferences to establish that unlawful retaliation was the

reason for the employer’s action.” Id. In this case, Plaintiff relies on circumstantial

evidence. (Response, p. 11.) “The McDonnell Douglas framework governs claims of

retaliation based on circumstantial evidence.” Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d

516, 523 (6th Cir. 2008).

{¶51} To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, “a plaintiff must establish that (1) they engaged in protected activity; (2) the

defending party knew the plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (3) the defending party

took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection

between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Childs v. Kroger Co., 2023-Ohio-

2034, ¶ 99 (10th Dist.). “The burden of proof at the prima facie stage is minimal; all the

plaintiff must do is put forth some credible evidence that enables the court to deduce that

there is a causal connection between the retaliatory action and the protected activity.”

Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007).

{¶52} “Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the

employer to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for its actions.” Veal,

2011-Ohio-5406, at ¶17 (10th Dist.), quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. “If the

employer satisfies this burden, the burden shifts back to the complainant to demonstrate

‘that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.’” Id.,

quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).

{¶53} Defendant argues that “Plaintiff cannot establish that her separation was

retaliatory because she cannot demonstrate that her protected activity is causally

connected to her employment separation.” (Motion, p. 14.) Plaintiff, on the other hand,

contends that “[t]he causal link can be established because of the very short time from

her internal discrimination complaint and her OCRC Charge until her discharge.”

(Response, pp. 12-13.) Plaintiff argues that “in the middle of investigating [her] internal

Case No. 2023-00531JD -19- DECISION

claim of discrimination [Defendant] decided to investigate her for emailing documents to

her personal email account – even though it was a common practice of [Defendant’s]

employees during the time of remote work – and then terminated her less than a week

after learning she filed a Charge of Discrimination, again solely on the basis of the

specious claim that she violated clearly established rules on safekeeping confidential

documents.” (Response, p. 13.)

{¶54} “To establish a causal connection, the plaintiff ‘must produce “sufficient

evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the adverse action would not have

been taken had the plaintiff not filed a discrimination action.”’” Childs, 2023-Ohio-2034,

at ¶ 107 (10th Dist.), quoting Smith v. Superior Prod., LLC, 2014-Ohio-1961, ¶ 32, quoting

Gibson v. Shelly Co., 314 Fed.Appx. 760 (6th Cir.2008). “Whether protected activity was

the but-for cause of an adverse employment action depends upon the context in which

that action occurs.” Kenney v. Aspen Techs., Inc., 965 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2020).

{¶55} “Temporal proximity alone generally is not sufficient to establish causation.”

Id.; see also Sells v. Holiday Mgmt. Ltd., 2011-Ohio-5974, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.) (“temporal

proximity between protected activity and an adverse employment action is generally

insufficient, without other indicia of retaliatory conduct, to establish the causation element

in a retaliatory discharge claim.”).

{¶56} “It is especially true that mere temporal proximity between a protected

activity and an adverse employment action, without other indicia of retaliatory conduct, is

generally insufficient to establish a causal connection when the evidence demonstrates

intervening performance concerns.” Sells at ¶ 35. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has

“held that ‘an intervening legitimate reason’ to take an adverse employment action

‘dispels an inference of retaliation based on temporal proximity.’” Kuhn v. Washtenaw

Cty., 709 F.3d 612, 628 (6th Cir. 2013), quoting Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682

F.3d 463, 472 (6th Cir. 2012).

{¶57} It is undisputed that on October 7, 2022, Plaintiff engaged in protected

activity by emailing her internal complaint to Deputy Director of Program Administration

Mike Fraizer, which was investigated by Defendant’s human resources department. It is

also undisputed that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by filing the charge of

Case No. 2023-00531JD -20- DECISION

discrimination with OCRC on or about November 9, 2022. (Watson Depo., p. 248, Exhibit

16.)

{¶58} Defendant has presented uncontroverted evidence that, during the human

resources investigation of the internal complaint, Plaintiff’s email account was accessed

to review the communications between her and those whom she accused of inappropriate

conduct, and in this process it was discovered that during the week of November 14,

2022, Plaintiff sent a large number of “blind copy” emails to her personal email account,

potentially transferring confidential information. (Boothe Affidavit, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.) This

separate matter was then referred to Defendant’s legal department for review, and in the

resulting investigation report issued on December 12, 2022, it was confirmed that Plaintiff

did, in fact, transmit Defendant’s records and confidential information to her personal

email account in violation of Defendant’s Handbook. (Id. at p. 5.) McClellan’s

uncontroverted deposition testimony established that he learned the results of the legal

department’s investigation on December 12, 2022, and after meeting with others in senior

management later that same day he recommended to Defendant’s director that Plaintiff’s

employment be terminated. The following day, December 13, 2022, Plaintiff resigned her

employment in lieu of termination.

{¶59} Plaintiff contends that the temporal proximity between the protected activity

and the termination of her employment is sufficient to demonstrate a causal connection,

but “‘[i]t is important to emphasize that it is causation, not temporal proximity itself, that is

an element of plaintiff’s prima facie case.’” Newton v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. –

Toledo Corr. Inst., 496 Fed.Appx. 558, 567 (6th Cir. 2012), quoting Dixon, 481 F.3d at

335 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Vereecke v. Huron Valley School Dist., 609 F.3d 392, 401

(6th Cir. 2010) (“we have rarely found a retaliatory motive based only on temporal

proximity”). Plaintiff points to no additional evidence beyond temporal proximity to

establish a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

(Response, p. 13.)

{¶60} Furthermore, Plaintiff’s intervening violation of Defendant’s data security

policies, which occurred after her protected activity, dispels any inference of causation.

See Lisan v. Wilkie, 835 Fed.Appx. 831, 835 (6th Cir. 2020) (“An ‘intervening legitimate

reason’ between the protected activity and the adverse employment action undermines

Case No. 2023-00531JD -21- DECISION

any suggestion of retaliation based on temporal proximity.”); Wasek, 682 F.3d at 472 (6th

Cir. 2012) (employee who complained about sexual harassment to his superiors, but

subsequently left his worksite without authorization, had engaged in an intervening event

that gave his employer a legitimate reason to discipline him); Kuhn, 709 F.3d at 628 (6th

Cir. 2013) (employee’s extended leave and failure to return to work caused a staffing

shortage and constituted an intervening reason to terminate employment); Green v. Cent.

Ohio Transit Auth., 647 Fed.Appx. 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Even if Hancock discovered

the charges prior to the initiation of the timecard investigation, Green’s falsification of her

time records constitutes an intervening legitimate reason for the adverse employment

action, thus dispelling any inference of retaliation based on the temporal proximity

between her filing of the June OCRC and EEOC charges and her termination three

months later.”).

{¶61} While there is no dispute that Plaintiff transferred Defendant’s records and

confidential information to her personal email account in the intervening time between her

internal complaint and the termination of her employment, she argues that Defendant did

not learn of her OCRC charge of discrimination until December 7, 2022, six days before

she was asked to resign, and after she transmitted the records and confidential

information to her personal email account. In her deposition, Susan Boothe explained

that Defendant’s legal department received formal notice of the charge of discrimination

on December 7, 2022. (Boothe Depo., p. 17.) Plaintiff stated in her deposition that she

had notified the chief of human resources and other officials several weeks earlier that

she had filed or was in the process of filing the charge of discrimination, when they

interviewed her during the human resources investigation into her internal complaint.

(Watson Depo., pp. 248-249.) Regardless, even if it were assumed that Defendant did

not know about the charge of discrimination until December 7, 2022, there is no question

that Defendant’s legal department was in the process of investigating her for violating

Defendant’s data security policies at that time, and “‘[e]vidence that the employer had

been concerned about a problem before the employee engaged in the protected activity

undercuts the significance of the temporal proximity’”). Tanksley v. Howell, 2020-Ohio-

4278, ¶ 46 (10th Dist.), citing Hervey v. Cty. of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711, 723 (8th Cir.

2008), quoting Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 2002).

Case No. 2023-00531JD -22- DECISION

{¶62} Finally, Plaintiff asserts that that “the only reason [Defendant] learned that

[Plaintiff] had forwarded documents from her work email to her personal email was

because of [Plaintiff’s] October 7 complaint of discrimination” and that this amounts to

“but for causation”. (Response, p. 7, fn. 1.) Plaintiff does not point to evidence, though,

to dispute the evidence submitted by Defendant establishing how the investigation by its

human resources department into the internal complaint revealed that Plaintiff had

transferred Defendant’s records and confidential information. The uncontroverted

evidence upon which Defendant relies shows that Plaintiff’s email account was accessed

for an appropriate purpose, i.e. reviewing her communications with others whom she

accused of discriminating against her, and in this process the “blind copy” emails that

Plaintiff sent to her personal email account were discovered. Moreover, as explained

earlier, the intervening nature of Plaintiff’s violation of Defendant’s data security policies

dispels any inference of causation between Plaintiff’s internal complaint and her

termination, and she has not identified other evidence of causation beyond temporal

proximity.

{¶63} Accordingly, reasonable minds can only conclude that Plaintiff cannot

establish a causal connection between her protected activity and the termination of her

employment and thus cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation under R.C.

4112.02.

{¶64} Furthermore, for the sake of argument, even if Plaintiff were able to

demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation, as explained earlier Defendant presented

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment.

{¶65} “An employee may rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by

the employer in support of its decision to take an adverse employment action against an

employee by making one or more of three showings: “(1) the employer’s stated reason

for terminating the employee has no basis in fact, (2) the reason offered for terminating

the employee was not the actual reason for the termination, or (3) the reason offered was

insufficient to explain the employer’s action.’” Bishop v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.,

529 Fed.Appx. 685, 695 (6th Cir. 2013), quoting Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc.,

515 F.3d 531, 545 (6th Cir. 2008). “Still, ‘the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of

producing sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably reject the defendants’

Case No. 2023-00531JD -23- DECISION

explanation and infer that the defendants intentionally [retaliated] against him.’” Herrera

v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 503 (6th Cir. 2013), quoting Johnson v.

Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2003).

{¶66} Plaintiff’s arguments about pretext as to both the discrimination and

retaliation claims are combined in her Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment

and were addressed above in the analysis of her discrimination claims. As explained

earlier, evidence has not been presented to show that the proffered reason for terminating

Plaintiff’s employment either had no basis in fact, was not the actual reason, or was

insufficient to explain Defendant’s action. In short, there is no evidence from which it may

be inferred that the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment was made in retaliation

for her protected activity.

{¶67} Accordingly, reasonable minds can only conclude that Plaintiff cannot show

that Defendant retaliated against in her violation of R.C. 4112.02.

Conclusion

{¶68} Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that there are no genuine

issues of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment shall be granted and judgment

shall rendered in favor of Defendant.

LISA L. SADLER

Judge

[Cite as Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Dev., 2025-Ohio-5877.]

YVONNE WATSON Case No. 2023-00531JD

Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler

Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck

v.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF

DEVELOPMENT

Defendant

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

{¶69} A non-oral hearing was conducted in this case upon Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently herewith,

the Court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As a result, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED and judgment is rendered in favor of Defendant. All previously

scheduled events are VACATED. Court costs are assessed against Plaintiff. The clerk

shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.

LISA L. SADLER

Judge

Filed December 23, 2025

Sent to S.C. Reporter 1/6/26