Union Gospel Mission of Yakima Washington v. Brown

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF No. 24-7246

YAKIMA WASHINGTON,

D.C. No.

1:23-cv-03027-

Plaintiff - Appellee,

MKD

v.

OPINION

NICK BROWN, in his official

capacity as Attorney General of

Washington State; ANDRETA

ARMSTRONG, in her official

capacity as Executive Director of the

Washington State Human Rights

Commission; DEBORAH COOK, in

her official capacity as Commissioner

of the Washington State Human

Rights Commission; GUADALUPE

GAMBOA, in her official capacity as

Commissioner of the Washington

State Human Rights Commission;

JEFF SBAIH, in his official capacity

as Commissioner of the Washington

State Human Rights Commission;

HAN TRAN, in his official capacity

as Commissioner of the Washington

State Human Rights Commission,

Defendants - Appellants.

2 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Mary K. Dimke, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 3, 2025

Seattle, Washington

Filed January 6, 2026

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Daniel A. Bress, and Patrick

J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bumatay

SUMMARY *

First Amendment/Church Autonomy Doctrine

The panel affirmed the district court’s preliminary

injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the Washington

Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) against the Union

Gospel Mission of Yakima, Washington —a Christian

ministry—for preferring and hiring co-religionists for non-

ministerial roles.

WLAD prohibits employment discrimination based on

several protected grounds, including sexual

orientation. Because of its religious purpose, Union Gospel

requires its employees to agree with and live out its Christian

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 3

beliefs and practices, including “abstaining from any sexual

conduct outside of biblical marriage between one man and

one woman.” Union Gospel brought this pre-enforcement

action against the Washington State Attorney General and

the Washington State Human Rights Commission, alleging

violations of the First Amendment and requesting an

injunction prohibiting defendants from enforcing WLAD

against it.

The panel held that Union Gospel is likely to succeed on

the merits of its claim that enforcing WLAD against it for

hiring only co-religionists violates the church autonomy

doctrine, as established by the First Amendment’s Religion

Clauses. The church autonomy doctrine encompasses more

than just the ministerial exception. It forbids interference

with “an internal church decision that affects the faith and

mission of the church itself.” In this case, Union Gospel’s

co-religionist hiring policy constitutes an internal

management decision that is essential to the institution’s

central mission. It is uncontested that (1) Union Gospel is a

religious institution, (2) Union Gospel has a sincerely held

religious belief that only co-religionists may advance its

religious mission, and (3) Union Gospel’s co-religionist

hiring policy is based on that religious belief.

Under the church autonomy doctrine, Union Gospel may

decline to hire as non-ministerial employees those who do

not share its religious beliefs about marriage and

sexuality. But unlike the ministerial exception, the church

autonomy doctrine protects only Union Gospel’s non-

ministerial hiring decisions based on religious

beliefs. Union Gospel cannot discriminate on any other

ground. The panel emphasized that its decision was limited

to religious organizations like Union Gospel and that it did

not consider the scope of the doctrine on other types of

4 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

entities run by religious institutions, such as businesses or

hospitals.

The panel held that the remaining preliminary injunction

factors—irreparable harm, the public interest and balance of

the equities—favored Union Gospel.

COUNSEL

Jeremiah Galus (argued), Katherine L. Anderson, and Ryan

J. Tucker, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale,

Arizona; David A. Cortman and John J. Bursch, Alliance

Defending Freedom, Washington, D.C.; James A. Campbell

and Jacob E. Reed, Alliance Defending Freedom,

Lansdowne, Virginia; David K. Dewolf, Albrecht Law

PLLC, Spokane Valley, Washington; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Cynthia L. Alexander (argued) and Tera M. Heintz, Deputy

Solicitors General; Nicholas W. Brown & Robert W.

Ferguson, Washington Attorneys General; Office of the

Washington Attorney General, Olympia, Washington;

Daniel Jeon and David Ward, Assistant Attorneys General,

Office of the Washington Attorney General, Seattle,

Washington; for Defendants-Appellants.

Anastasia R. Sandstrom, Senior Counsel; Robert W.

Ferguson, Washington Attorney General, Office of the

Washington Attorney General, Seattle, Washington, for

Amicus Curiae Washington State Department of Labor &

Industries.

Joshua A. Block and Louise Melling, American Civil

Liberties Union Foundation, New York, New York; Aditi

Fruitwala and Daniel Mach, American Civil Liberties Union

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 5

Foundation, Washington, D.C.; Adrien Leavitt and La Rond

Baker, American Civil Liberties Union of Washington

Foundation, Seattle, Washington; Alex Luchenitser and

Jenny Samuels, Americans United for Separation of Church

and State, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae American

Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of

Washington, and Americans United for Separation of

Church and State.

Ian S. Speir I, Covenant Law PLLC, Colorado Springs,

Colorado, for Amici Curiae Colson Center for Christian

Worldview, et al..

Vince R. Eisinger, Cranfill Sumner LLP, Raleigh, North

Carolina, for Amici Curiae Professors Stephanie Barclay,

Robert F. Cochran Jr., David F. Forte, Richard Garnett,

Douglas Laycock, Michael W. McConnell, and Robert J.

Pushaw.

Michael P. Farris, National Religious Broadcasters,

Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae National Religious

Broadcasters.

Randall L. Wenger, Jeremy L. Samek, and Janice Martino-

Gottshall, Independence Law Center, Harrisburg,

Pennsylvania; Deborah J. Dewart, Hubert, North Carolina;

for Amicus Curiae Wyoming Rescue Mission.

Peter M. Torstensen Jr., Deputy Solicitor General; Christian

B. Corrigan, Solicitor General; Austin Knudsen, Montana

Attorney General; Office of the Montana Attorney General,

Helena, Montana; Steve Marshal, Alabama Attorney

General, Office of the Alabama Attorney General,

Montgomery, Alabama; Tim Griffin, Arkansas Attorney

General, Office of the Arkansas Attorney General, Little

Rock, Arkansas; John Guard, Florida Acting Attorney

6 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

General, Office of the Florida Attorney General,

Tallahassee, Florida; Raul R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney

General, Office of the Idaho Attorney General, Boise, Idaho;

Brenna Bird, Iowa Attorney General, Office of the Iowa

Attorney General, Des Moines, Iowa; Kris Kobach, Kansas

Attorney General, Office of the Kansas Attorney General,

Topeka, Kansas; Liz Murrill, Louisiana Attorney General,

Office of the Louisiana Attorney General, Baton Rouge,

Louisiana; Lynn Fitch, Mississippi Attorney General, Office

of the Mississippi Attorney General, Jackson, Mississippi;

Andrew Bailey, Missouri Attorney General, Office of the

Missouri Attorney General, Jefferson City, Missouri;

Michael T. Hilgers, Nebraska Attorney General, Office of

the Nebraska Attorney General, Lincoln, Nebraska; Dave

Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Office of the Ohio Attorney

General, Columbus, Ohio; Gentner F. Drummond,

Oklahoma Attorney General, Office of the Oklahoma

Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Alan Wilson,

South Carolina Attorney General, Office of the South

Carolina Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina;

Marty J. Jackley, South Dakota Attorney General, Office of

the South Dakota Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota;

Jonathan Skrmetti, Tennessee Attorney General, Office of

the Tennessee Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee; Ken

Paxton, Texas Attorney General, Office of the Texas

Attorney General, Austin, Texas; Derek E. Brown, Utah

Attorney General, Office of the Utah Attorney General, Salt

Lake City, Utah; Jason Miyares, Virginia Attorney General,

Office of the Virginia Attorney General, Richmond,

Virginia; John B. McCuskey, West Virginia Attorney

General, Office of the West Virginia Attorney General,

Charleston, West Virginia; for Amici Curiae State of

Montana and 19 Other States.

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 7

Steven T. McFarland, Christian Legal Society Center for

Law & Religious Freedom, Springfield, Virginia, for Amici

Curiae Christian Legal Society, the Center for Public Justice,

the Christian Medical and Dental Associations, Citygate

Network, CRISTA Ministries, the General Conference of

Seventh-Day Adventists, the Institutional Religious

Freedom Alliance, and the Islam and Religious Freedom

Action Team of the Religious Freedom Institute.

John T. Melcon, Taylor Huse, and Stuart Lark, Taft

Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for

Amici Curiae the Christian and Missionary Alliance,

Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, Grace to

You, Eco, A Covenant Order of Evangelical Presbyterians,

Church Educational System of the Church of Jesus Christ of

Latter-Day Saints, Alliance Redwoods Conference Grounds,

the Master's University and Seminary, Town & Country

Manor of the Christian and Missionary Alliance, and the

Fuller Foundation.

Eric N. Kniffin, Ethics & Public Policy Center, Colorado

Springs, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Ethics & Public

Policy Center.

George M. Ahrend, Ahrend Law Firm PLLC, Spokane,

Washington, for Amici Curiae American Association of

Christian Schools, Association for Biblical Higher

Education, Association of Christian Schools International,

and Association of Classical Christian Schools.

8 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

OPINION

BUMATAY, Circuit Judge:

The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment protect

religious institutions from government interference over

their internal affairs involving faith and doctrine. Known as

the church autonomy doctrine, the Clauses work in tandem

to prohibit state meddling in the religious matters of

religious organizations. Under the ministerial exception, the

church autonomy doctrine bars the government from

intruding in religious organizations’ choice of ministers and

clergy. The freedom of religious institutions to establish

their own doctrine and faith is so fundamental that they may

categorically hire and fire their ministers without regard to

anti-discrimination laws—even if the termination is for non-

religious reasons. Simply, the government has no business

in policing who spreads the word on behalf of churches,

synagogues, mosques, religious organizations, and other

similar institutions.

But the church autonomy doctrine is not so narrowly

drawn. The First Amendment may also shield religious

institutions’ hiring of non-ministerial employees when it

involves matters of faith and doctrine. For example, a

religious institution may decide that its religious mission is

best served by hiring only employees who adhere to and

follow its religious beliefs—even for those not acting in

ministerial roles. The religious institution may also believe

that it can more effectively promote its view of moral and

spiritual well-being if its own employees do not lead lives

contrary to the institution’s teachings. And a religious

institution may conclude that it would undermine the

institution’s identity and mission as a religious organization

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 9

if its own employees contradict or disavow the tenets it

teaches.

Hiring based on religious criteria may conflict with laws

prohibiting employment decisions based on protected

characteristics. Ordinarily, even religious institutions must

follow generally applicable employment laws. But if state

law were to prevent religious institutions from employing

only co-religionists, those institutions could be forced to hire

employees who openly flout and disagree with their religious

principles. This, the First Amendment doesn’t tolerate.

Because who a religious organization hires may go to the

very character of its religious mission, the church autonomy

doctrine protects the decision to hire co-religionists for non-

ministerial roles if that decision is based on the

organization’s sincerely held religious beliefs.

Applying these principles, we hold that the district court

correctly enjoined enforcing the Washington Law Against

Discrimination against Union Gospel Mission of Yakima,

Washington—a Christian ministry—for preferring and

hiring co-religionists for non-ministerial roles. This is a

narrow ruling. Under the church autonomy doctrine, Union

Gospel may decline to hire as non-ministerial employees

those who do not share its religious beliefs about marriage

and sexuality. But unlike with the ministerial exception, the

church autonomy doctrine only protects Union Gospel’s

non-ministerial hiring decisions based on religious beliefs.

So Union Gospel cannot discriminate on any other ground.

And our decision is limited to religious organizations like

Union Gospel. We do not consider the scope of the doctrine

on other types of entities run by religious institutions, such

as businesses or hospitals.

10 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

Finally, and importantly, we emphasize that what Union

Gospel seeks here is already protected under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) and many other

state anti-discrimination laws, which likewise exempt

religious organizations from general prohibitions on

religious discrimination. Indeed, we address this question

here only because Washington has narrowly construed a

similar exemption in its own anti-discrimination law. But

Washington cannot override the First Amendment’s church

autonomy doctrine, and so the district court’s injunction

must be affirmed.

I.

Background

A.

The Washington Law Against Discrimination

(“WLAD”) prohibits employment discrimination based on

several protected grounds, including sexual orientation. See

Wash. Rev. Code §§ 49.60.030(1)(a), 49.60.180(1)-(3).

Since its enactment in 1949, WLAD establishes that,

It is an unfair practice for any employer: To

refuse to hire any person because of . . .

sexual orientation. . . . To discharge or bar

any person from employment because of . . .

sexual orientation. . . . To discriminate

against any person in compensation or in any

other terms or conditions of employment

because of . . . sexual orientation.

Id. § 49.60.180(1)-(3). WLAD defines “sexual orientation”

to mean “heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and

gender expression or identity.” Id. § 49.60.040(29). The

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 11

law further prohibits employers from inquiring into

protected grounds or from publishing job advertisements

containing hiring limitations based on protected grounds. Id.

§ 49.60.180(4). WLAD also prevents employers from

“[r]equir[ing] an employee to disclose his or her sincerely

held religious affiliation or beliefs.” Id. § 49.60.208(1).

WLAD empowers the Washington State Human Rights

Commission to investigate and evaluate complaints filed by

aggrieved parties. Id. §§ 49.60.120(4), 49.60.140,

49.60.230. At the Commission’s discretion, complaints can

be resolved through “conference, conciliation, and

persuasion” or, failing that, through an enforcement action

before an administrative law judge. Id. §§ 49.60.240(3),

49.60.250. The attorney general may also enforce WLAD.

See State v. Sunnyside, 550 P.3d 31, 41-45 (Wash. 2024) (en

banc). So can private parties. Wash. Rev. Code

§ 49.60.030(2).

By its terms, WLAD exempts nonprofit religious

organizations from its definition of “employer.” Id.

§ 49.60.040(11) (“Employer . . . does not include any

religious or sectarian organization not organized for private

profit.”). In 2021, however, the Washington Supreme Court

interpreted this exemption narrowly to avoid a perceived

conflict with the state constitution’s Privileges and

Immunities Clause. See Woods v. Seattle’s Union Gospel

Mission, 481 P.3d 1060, 1067 (Wash. 2021) (en banc), cert.

denied, 142 S. Ct. 1094 (2022) (limiting the protection to

“ministers” as defined in the U.S. Supreme Court’s First

Amendment jurisprudence). So after the Washington

Supreme Court’s decision, WLAD applies to nonprofit

religious organizations in their hiring of non-ministerial

employees.

12 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

The Union Gospel Mission of Yakima is a private,

nonprofit religious organization whose mission is to “spread

the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ.” By its constitution and

bylaws, Union Gospel provides “Christ[-]centered rescue,

recovery and restoration to men, women and children in

need.” Union Gospel also seeks to “follow Christ” by

“helping people move from homelessness to wholeness.” To

these ends, it operates a homeless shelter, faith-based

recovery programs, health clinics, and meal services.

According to Union Gospel, in one year, it provided 30,167

nights of shelter to adults and children, gave out 141,629 free

meals, and helped dozens regain sobriety.

Union Gospel maintains that its religious purpose infuses

all its work. It encourages everyone that it helps to “develop

a relationship with Jesus Christ”—thus, the Gospel is shared

with “everyone at all times.” To Union Gospel, “spiritual

welfare carries more weight than physical assistance.”

Because of its religious purpose, Union Gospel requires

its employees to agree with and live out its Christian beliefs

and practices, including “abstaining from any sexual conduct

outside of biblical marriage between one man and one

woman.” It expects its employees to further its evangelical

mission and provide an example to others of a proper

Christian life. To help facilitate this fellowship, employees

attend daily prayers and weekly chapel services, and are

encouraged and expected to pray for one another and share

devotionals.

Before applying for a job with Union Gospel, the

organization notifies applicants of its religious mission and

its requirement that its employees comply with its religious

tenets. On receiving an offer of employment, applicants

must sign and agree to comply with Union Gospel’s

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 13

statement of faith, core values, and job duties and

requirements. Every year, Union Gospel receives

applications from those who express disagreement with—

and sometimes hostility to—its religious beliefs, particularly

those about marriage and sexuality. Union Gospel screens

out those applications.

Ordinarily, Union Gospel operates with just over 150

employees. In 2023, when this litigation started, Union

Gospel anticipated needing to fill more than 50 positions,

including an IT technician and an operations assistant. The

IT technician serves the IT needs of Union Gospel’s

employees, such as configuring and troubleshooting

computers, printers, and phones; assisting employees with

hardware and software issues; and creating keycards and

operating the access control system. Likewise, the

operations assistant serves a traditional administrative

role—running errands and acquiring supplies, performing

administrative tasks, and generally helping the

organization’s operations. Neither the IT technician nor

operations assistant act as official clergy for the organization

and their roles are mostly “inward” facing—largely assisting

Union Gospel employees, not the members of the public

helped by the organization. Because of this, Union Gospel

doesn’t consider these jobs as ministerial positions and

doesn’t claim them to be protected by any ministerial

exception.

B.

In early March 2023, Union Gospel brought this pre-

enforcement action against the Washington State Attorney

General and the Washington State Human Rights

Commission (collectively, “the State”). Union Gospel

sought a declaratory judgment that WLAD violated its First

14 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

Amendment rights of (1) hiring only co-religionists for non-

ministerial positions, (2) free exercise, (3) expressive

association, (4) free speech, and (5) freedom from excessive

governmental entanglement. It also requested an injunction

prohibiting the State from enforcing WLAD against it.

The district court first dismissed Union Gospel’s

complaint for lack of standing and denied its motion for a

preliminary injunction as moot. Union Gospel appealed, and

we concluded that Union Gospel’s claims satisfied Article

III standing and remanded to the district court. See Union

Gospel Mission of Yakima v. Ferguson, 2024 WL 3755954,

at *1–3 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2024). On remand, the district

court held that Union Gospel was likely to succeed on the

merits of its free exercise claim. It ruled that WLAD treats

other secular employers—small businesses—more

favorably and thus must satisfy strict scrutiny under Tandon

v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61, 62 (2021) (per curiam). Under

strict scrutiny, the district court concluded that the law was

not the least restrictive means available to the State and that

it was impermissibly underinclusive. It then entered a

preliminary injunction, enjoining the State from enforcing

WLAD against Union Gospel for preferring and hiring only

co-religionists for its non-ministerial positions.

The State now appeals.

II.

Justiciability

Before turning to the merits, we start with the State’s

justiciability arguments. The State argues that Union Gospel

now lacks standing to obtain a preliminary injunction

because it has expressly disclaimed enforcement of WLAD

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 15

against Union Gospel for its hiring of an IT technician or

operations assistant. We disagree.

Because “standing is determined as of the

commencement of litigation,” Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d

1182, 1203 (9th Cir. 2015) (simplified), we take the State’s

argument to be grounded in mootness doctrine. A claim is

moot if it “has lost its character as a present, live

controversy.” Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 823 (9th Cir.

2007) (simplified). “The basic question is whether there

exists a present controversy as to which effective relief can

be granted.” Vill. of Gambell v. Babbitt, 999 F.2d 403, 406

(9th Cir. 1993) (simplified). “Defendants bear a heavy

burden to establish mootness at the appellate stage.” Ctr. for

Biological Diversity v. Exp.-Imp. Bank of the United States,

894 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2018) (simplified). It must be

“absolutely clear that [the defendant’s] allegedly wrongful

behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528

U.S. 167, 189 (2000).

After the case was remanded to the district court but

before entry of the preliminary injunction, the State

stipulated that it will not enforce WLAD against Union

Gospel in connection with the hiring of the positions

explicitly referenced in its complaint—the IT technician and

operations assistant positions. The State argues that this

stipulation moots this case. But this disavowal provides little

assurance to Union Gospel. It only covers two positions, and

the State has expressly refused to disavow enforcing WLAD

against Union Gospel for the hiring of other non-ministerial

positions. Recall that Union Gospel anticipated needing 50

new hires in 2023. Open positions included a wide range of

non-ministerial roles, such as people to work at its thrift

stores, to run its soup kitchens, and to help provide its

16 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

healthcare services. Thus, while we may take the State at its

word that it won’t sue Union Gospel for hiring its IT and

operations support roles, the State has not confirmed what it

will do if Union Gospel seeks to fill its cashiers, cooks, or

nurses roles with members of its religion.

So the State’s disavowal does not grant Union Gospel the

relief it seeks. Union Gospel sought assurances that it could

prefer and hire co-religionists for all its non-ministerial

positions without threat of a WLAD investigation. The

examples of the IT technician and operations assistant

openings in its complaint are only that—examples of the

type of positions Union Gospel sought to hire. The

complaint didn’t limit Union Gospel’s requested relief to

these particular positions. Because the threat of state

enforcement of WLAD for many non-ministerial positions

still exists, Union Gospel’s requested relief can still be

granted. And because effective relief can be granted, this

case is not moot.

III.

Preliminary Injunction Factors

We now turn to the merits of the disputed preliminary

injunction. Under the familiar preliminary injunction

factors, a plaintiff must establish (1) a likelihood of success

on the merits, (2) likely irreparable harm absent an

injunction, (3) that the equities tip in his favor, and (4) that

an injunction benefits the public interest. Fellowship of

Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ., 82 F.4th 664, 683–84 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc).

When a government entity opposes injunctive relief, “the

third and fourth factors—the balance of equities and the

public interest—merge.” Id. at 695 (simplified). We review

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 17

the grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.

Id. at 680.

A.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

While the district court concluded that Union Gospel was

likely to succeed on the merits of its free exercise claim

under Tandon, we affirm because Union Gospel is likely to

succeed under the church autonomy doctrine. See Enyart v.

Nat’l Conf. of Bar Exam’rs, Inc., 630 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th

Cir. 2011) (“We may affirm . . . on any ground supported by

the record.”).

Whether the church autonomy doctrine permits a

religious institution to favor co-religionists in its hiring of

non-ministerial employees is largely a question of first

impression. That’s likely because “Congress has long

exempted religious employers from federal employment

laws that would otherwise interfere with their ability ‘to

define and carry out their religious missions’ by imposing

‘potential liability’ for hiring practices that favor co-

religionists.” See Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission v. Woods,

142 S.Ct. 1094, 1094 (2022) (Alito, J., respecting the denial

of certiorari) (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church

of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,

335–36 (1987)). Because of “federal statutory exemptions

and their state analogs,” the Supreme Court has “yet to

confront whether freedom for religious employers to hire

their co-religionists is constitutionally required.” Id.

Although the WLAD contains a similar exemption for

religious employers as federal law, the Washington Supreme

Court narrowly limited that exemption to ministers to avoid

what it concluded would be a conflict with the State’s

constitution. See id. at 1094, 1096. Thus, while the church

18 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

autonomy doctrine protects Union Gospel’s hiring of co-

religionists over and above the WLAD, this protection

overlaps considerably with what it would have already

enjoyed under federal and state employment laws.

We first consider the church autonomy doctrine’s scope

in the hiring context and then apply the doctrine to Union

Gospel’s claims.

i.

Church Autonomy Doctrine

a.

The Doctrine’s Deep Roots

The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and Free

Exercise Clause bar laws “respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S.

Const. amend. I. From this wellspring, the Religion Clauses

establish the church autonomy doctrine. Under the doctrine,

religious institutions have “the right . . . ‘to decide for

themselves, free from state interference, matters of church

government as well as those of faith and doctrine.’” Our

Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732,

736 (2020) (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of

Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116

(1952)). That’s because the Free Exercise Clause guarantees

religious groups the right “to shape [their] own faith and

mission,” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &

Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012), and the

Establishment Clause “prohibits government involvement in

. . . ecclesiastical decisions,” id. at 189. So any government

interference with matters of faith and doctrine both

“violate[s] the free exercise of religion” and “constitute[s]

one of the central attributes of an establishment of religion.”

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 19

Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 746. Simply, the

Religion Clauses take “matters of faith and doctrine” out of

the sphere of “government intrusion.” Id. (simplified).

The church autonomy doctrine has deep roots in our

Nation’s historical tradition. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S.

at 182–85; see also Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisc.

Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 605 U.S. 238, 257 (2025)

(Thomas, J. concurring). And the Supreme Court first

examined the doctrine over 150 years ago. See Watson v.

Jones 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733–34 (1871). That case

involved a congregational schism and dispute over the right

to use church property. Id. at 726. Watson noted that when

a matter “concerns theological controversy, church

discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of

the members of the church to the standard of morals required

of them,” courts may not get involved. Id. at 733. So courts

must abstain from deciding “questions of discipline, or of

faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.” Id. at 727.

The Court revisited the doctrine 80 years later. Kedroff,

344 U.S. at 116. Kedroff tied the church autonomy doctrine

to the First Amendment—recognizing it as “part of the free

exercise of religion.” Id. It recognized the constitutional

moorings of the Watson holding, explaining that the doctrine

“radiate[d] . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations,

an independence from secular control or manipulation,” and

provided churches the “power to decide for themselves, free

from state interference, matters of church government as

well as those of faith and doctrine.” Id.

Almost 50 years ago, the Court emphasized that, under

the Constitution, “religious controversies are not the proper

subject of civil court inquiry.” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese

v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976). Instead, “the First

20 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious

organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for

internal discipline and government” and “the Constitution

requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding

upon them.” Id. at 724–25.

And more recently, in considering the ministerial

exception, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine in Hosanna-

Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe. See 565 U.S. at 185–90;

591 U.S. at 746–51.

Thus, it’s well established that the church autonomy

doctrine protects religious institutions’ independence in

matters of faith and doctrine.

Today, the church autonomy doctrine is most often

invoked in the employment context. It is widely recognized

that religious institutions may appoint their spiritual leaders

and clergy without any government interference. See

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 185–88. Under this

“ministerial exception,” “it is impermissible for the

government to contradict a church’s determination of who

can act as its ministers.” Id. at 185. So religious institutions

may select or terminate their ministers regardless of any

federal or state employment laws. See id.; see also Our

Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 747 (“[A] church’s

independence on matters ‘of faith and doctrine’ requires the

authority to select, supervise, and if necessary, remove a

minister without interference by secular authorities.”). As

the Court explained, “[r]equiring a church to accept or retain

an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do

so” would “interfere[] with the internal governance of the

church” and “depriv[e] the church of control over the

selection of those who will personify its beliefs.” Hosanna-

Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. “[I]mposing an unwanted minister,”

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 21

then, would frustrate free exercise by diminishing “a

religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission

through its appointments.” Id. And it would create an

establishment if the state had “the power to determine which

individuals will minister to the faithful.” Id. at 189. So the

ministerial exception applies whenever an employee

performs “‘vital religious duties’ at the core of the

organization’s mission.” McMahon v. World Vision Inc.,

147 F.4th 959, 977 (9th Cir. 2025) (simplified).

Thus, given the central role they provide in shaping a

religious organization’s mission and character, any

government interference into who may serve as a “minister”

is an inherently religious undertaking barred by the First

Amendment. That’s why the ministerial exception does not

require any additional showing that the employment action

was “made for a religious reason.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565

U.S. at 194. Once an employment dispute involves “an

employee [who] qualifies as a minister,” id. at 190, the First

Amendment commands courts to abstain. For example, even

if a church employment decision is alleged to be

“pretextual,” the government still may not interfere with

church governance. Id. at 194–95. Rather, the overriding

principle is that “the authority to select and control who will

minister to the faithful . . . is the church’s alone.” Id. at 195.

Thus, “religious organization[s] need not provide any

religious justification to invoke the ministerial exception.”

Markel v. Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of Am.,

124 F.4th 796, 808 (9th Cir. 2024).

b.

The Doctrine’s Scope

But the church autonomy doctrine is broader than the

ministerial exception. That exception is only a “component”

22 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

of church autonomy. See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S.

at 746; see also Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel Int’l, 36 F.4th

1021, 1028–29 (10th Cir. 2022) (“The ‘ministerial

exception’ is a narrower offshoot of the broader church

autonomy doctrine; it only precludes employment

discrimination claims brought by a ‘minister’ against his

religious employer.”). Indeed, none of the three

foundational Supreme Court cases—Watson, Kedroff, and

Milivojevich—“exclusively concerned the selection or

supervision of clergy.” Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at

747. While the ministerial exception protects a religious

organization’s narrow right to select its ministers, the church

autonomy doctrine more generally prohibits “government

interference with an internal church decision that affects the

faith and mission of the church itself.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565

U.S. at 190 (emphasis added). Thus, the First Amendment

forbids government intrusion into the “internal management

decisions that are essential to the institution’s central

mission.” Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 746.

We conclude that these “internal management decisions”

may include a religious organization’s policy of hiring co-

religionists for non-ministerial roles. Deciding who can

work non-ministerial roles for a religious organization may

be a matter of religious faith and doctrine. For example,

religious organizations may rely on their non-ministerial

personnel to advance their religious mission and message.

Take Union Gospel. It insists that hiring only co-religionists

in non-ministerial roles is critical to serving its mission and

spreading its message. That’s because its non-ministerial

employees foster a community and support system for its

outward-facing ministry. They do this by supporting one

another in their faith journeys, praying for each other,

sharing Scripture, and setting an example of how to live a

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 23

Christian life. Union Gospel also maintains that employing

likeminded believers in non-ministerial roles helps ensure

that it communicates a united and consistent religious

message to the public. At the very least, its employment

policy prevents Union Gospel’s own employees from openly

undermining its religious message. And the policy helps

shield employees and the public it serves from what it

perceives to be sinful habits or behaviors. Indeed, if a

religious organization were forced to hire those who flout

and disregard its religious beliefs, it may forgo engagement

with the public in the first place. See Seattle’s Union Gospel

Mission, 142 S. Ct. at 1096 (Alito, J., respecting the denial

of certiorari) (“To force religious organizations to hire

messengers and other personnel who do not share their

religious views would undermine not only the autonomy of

many religious organizations but also their continued

viability.”).

As the adage goes, “personnel is policy.” Demkovich v.

St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 3 F.4th 968, 979 (7th Cir. 2021)

(en banc). This applies perhaps even more so for religious

organizations. Indeed, selecting what “activities are in

furtherance of an organization’s religious mission” and

requiring that “only those committed to [its] mission should

conduct them” is one way “a religious community defines

itself.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring). See

also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200–01 (Alito, J., joined

by Kagan, J., concurring) (observing that some religious

group’s “very existence is dedicated to the collective

expression and propagation of shared religious ideals,” and

“there can be no doubt that the messenger matters”).

And direct interference with a religious organization’s

“faith and doctrine” conflicts with the First Amendment.

Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 746 (simplified). If a

24 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

religious institution sincerely believes that its non-

ministerial employees must adhere to and live according to

its religious principles to accomplish its religious mission,

the only way a court could adjudicate a dispute for a plaintiff

would be to rule that the religious institution cannot seek that

“mission” or that the hiring policy isn’t necessary to that

“mission”—inherently religious questions. Such a ruling

would violate the institution’s free exercise rights to “shape

[its] own faith and mission” and would improperly establish

an “ecclesiastical decision” for the institution. See Hosanna-

Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89. And if the institution were

forced to disregard or alter its religious mission to satisfy

secular law, that could limit or remove its mission from the

public sphere altogether. And so, in some cases, we may

permit “a religious organization . . . to condition

employment,” even non-ministerial employment, “on

subscription to particular religious tenets.” Amos, 483 U.S.

at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).

c.

The Doctrine’s Limits

Of course, the church autonomy doctrine has its limits.

It “does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a general

immunity from secular laws.” Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591

U.S. at 746.

First, as we’ve said, the First Amendment only protects

“sincerely held religious belief” and acts “rooted in religious

belief.” Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994)

(quoting in part Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215

(1972)). So the church autonomy doctrine has no place

when a religious organization’s actions are “patently devoid

of religious sincerity” or based on “‘purely secular’

philosophical concerns.” Id. (simplified). See also Bryce v.

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 25

Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657

(10th Cir. 2002) (“The church autonomy doctrine is not

without limits . . . and does not apply to purely secular

decisions, even when made by churches. Before the church

autonomy doctrine is implicated, a threshold inquiry is

whether the alleged misconduct is ‘rooted in religious

belief.”’ (simplified)); see also Lael Weinberger, The Limits

of Church Autonomy, 98 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1253 (2023).

And because the hiring of non-ministerial positions is not

necessarily a religious matter, the church autonomy doctrine

only protects religious institutions’ non-ministerial hiring

policy on a showing that the employment decision was

“rooted in religious belief” that was “sincerely held.” Malik,

16 F.3d at 333 (simplified). Succinctly, the church

autonomy doctrine applies to “closely linked matters of

internal government,” Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at

747, which may include a religious organization’s decision

to hire co-religionists for non-ministerial roles when the

hiring decision rests on the institution’s sincerely held

religious beliefs. Of course, this doesn’t mean that courts

may question the veracity of sincerely held religious views.

See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450

U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“[I]t is not within the judicial function

and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner . . .

correctly perceived the commands of [his] common faith.”);

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,

584 U.S. 617, 639 (2018) (“It hardly requires restating that

government has no role in deciding or even suggesting

whether the religious ground for Phillips’ conscience-based

objection is legitimate or illegitimate.”).

Second, the church autonomy doctrine in the context of

hiring of non-ministerial employees differs in some

important respects from the ministerial exception. While the

26 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

ministerial exception immunizes religious organizations

from all employment-discrimination laws in the case of

ministers, see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188; Our Lady of

Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 747, the protection for other

employees is more limited. The church autonomy doctrine

protects a religious organization from an employment-

discrimination suit only to the extent the hiring of co-

religionist non-ministerial employees is based on sincerely

held religious beliefs. Unlike with the broader protection of

the ministerial exception, a religious organization cannot

discriminate on other grounds, and the religious motivation

cannot be a “pretext[]” for non-religious discrimination. Cf.

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194–95.

Finally, our decision today is limited to religious

ministries, like Union Gospel, which plainly qualify for

protection under the church autonomy doctrine. We do not

consider whether other types of entities under the umbrella

of a religious organization, such as commercial businesses

or hospitals, would receive similar First Amendment

protection in the hiring of co-religionists.

d.

The State’s Arguments Fail

Contrary to the State’s argument, there is no “wall of

Circuit authority” categorically excluding the hiring of non-

ministerial employees from the protection of the church

autonomy doctrine. Indeed, the opposite is true.

Start with Seattle Pacific University v. Ferguson, 104

F.4th 50 (9th Cir. 2024). In that case, we observed that “[a]

religious employer is not given carte blanche with respect to

all employees, ministerial and non-ministerial alike.” Id. at

58. But that was in the context of deciding whether a request

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 27

for a religious institution’s employment records constituted

an injury in fact. Id. at 57. We concluded that the request

itself wasn’t an injury—otherwise, it would effectively

immunize religious employers from any secular law. Id. at

58. We said nothing about the scope of the church autonomy

doctrine in hiring non-ministerial employees. In fact, in the

very next sentence, we recognized that the church autonomy

doctrine more generally protects “internal management

decisions that are essential to the institution’s central

mission.” Id. (quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at

746).

Next, the State observes that Puri v. Khalsa framed the

ministerial exception as applicable “to any state law cause of

action that would otherwise impinge on the church’s

prerogative to choose its ministers or to exercise its religious

beliefs in the context of employing its ministers.” 844 F.3d

1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017). But that single statement in Puri

was not aimed at narrowing the church autonomy doctrine’s

broader scope. Instead, Puri recognized that the church

autonomy doctrine more widely bars courts from deciding

“matters of religious doctrine and administration.” Id. at

1154. It then deemed the doctrine inapplicable because the

defendants didn’t assert a “religious justification” for

denying plaintiffs a seat on a religious entity’s board. Id. at

1167 (simplified). As stated above, the church autonomy

doctrine applies precisely where a “religious justification” is

at the heart of a disputed hiring policy, as here.

Nor does EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d

1362 (9th Cir. 1986), carve out the hiring of non-ministers

from the protection of the church autonomy doctrine. In that

case, we held that the Free Exercise Clause didn’t prevent

the applicability of anti-discrimination laws when the laws

had “no significant impact” on the religious employer’s

28 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

religious beliefs or doctrines. Id. at 1368. In considering the

Establishment Clause, Fremont Christian School only

considered whether the ministerial exception applied under

the now-defunct Lemon test to determine whether there was

excessive entanglement. See id. at 1370 (“[T]he duties of

the teachers at Fremont Christian School do not fulfill the

function of a minister.”). That case didn’t resolve the scope

of free exercise when a law significantly impacts religious

beliefs, the reach of the church autonomy doctrine, or

whether the doctrine has salience outside the ministerial

exception. Thus, it doesn’t answer the question here—

whether the church autonomy doctrine has anything to say

about the hiring of non-ministerial employees at religious

organizations.

So too with the State’s reliance on EEOC v. Pacific Press

Publishing Association, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir.

1982). Like Fremont Christian School, Pacific Press found

“no significant impact” on the religious organization’s

beliefs under the Free Exercise Clause and that an employee

at a religious publisher didn’t qualify as a “minister” under

the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1279, 1278. Pacific Press,

however, still considered the church autonomy doctrine. Id.

at 1281. It seemingly applied a balancing test to the

doctrine—allowing the suit to go forward because of the

“compelling public interest” in anti-discrimination laws

despite their conflict with the publisher’s religious doctrine.

Id.; but see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“[T]he First

Amendment has struck the balance for us.”). Even so,

Pacific Press shows that the church autonomy doctrine

applies outside the ministerial context. If the State is correct

that the doctrine only protects the hiring of ministers, then

Pacific Press could have easily rejected the applicability of

the church autonomy doctrine with the finding that the

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 29

employee was not a minister. It didn’t do that. That Pacific

Press analyzed the doctrine on the merits shows it sweeps

more broadly than the State claims.

Finally, Bollard v. California Province of the Society of

Jesus doesn’t withdraw First Amendment protections for

employment decisions involving “lay employees.” 196 F.3d

940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Markel, 124

F.4th at 810 n.6. Bollard starts with a syllogism—that the

ministerial exception “does not apply to lay employees of a

religious institution if they are not serving the function of

ministers.” Id. That’s because, unlike with ministers, “[i]n

the case of lay employees, the particularly strong religious

interests surrounding a church’s choice of its representative

are missing.” Id. And in that particular case, even though

the employee filled a ministerial role, because the religious

organization offered no “religious justification” for its

challenged conduct, Bollard considered the “danger” of

“interfere[nce] with [the organization’s] religious faith or

doctrine . . . particularly low.” Id. at 948; but see Markel,

124 F.4th at 808. So Bollard is confined to cases devoid of

any “religious justification.” See Werft v. Desert Sw. Ann.

Conf. of United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1101–02

(9th Cir. 2004) (holding Bollard inapplicable when claims

“would require a civil court to inquire into religious

justifications for personnel decisions”). But rather than

announce a categorical rule limiting church autonomy to

ministerial claims, Bollard suggested that courts conduct a

“balancing test” to determine whether a lay employee’s

employment claim violates the First Amendment. 196 F.3d

at 948. So if anything, Bollard supports a broader church

autonomy doctrine. Id. If the First Amendment

categorically excludes any protection of employment

30 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

decisions involving “lay employees,” then it would be

unnecessary to engage in any balancing whatsoever. Id.

And none of the out-of-circuit cases cited by the State

support its view that the church autonomy doctrine is

confined only to ministers. In fact, they suggest the

opposite. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day

Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985) (observing

generally that “employment decisions may be subject to

Title VII scrutiny, where the decision does not involve the

church’s spiritual functions,” which doesn’t preclude the

hiring of non-ministerial positions from involving a spiritual

function); EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485–86 (5th

Cir. 1980) (holding that a religious institution must be

allowed to engage in “discrimination on the basis of

religion” to avoid a conflict with the “rights guaranteed by

the religion clauses of the first amendment” and remanding

to determine whether an employment decision involving a

non-ministerial psychology professor was motivated by

religious preference).

Several circuits also recognize the First Amendment

concerns raised by interfering with a religious institution’s

hiring of non-ministerial employees. In Bryce, a fired

church employee alleged that statements made by other

church officials about her sexuality and same-sex marriage

constituted sex discrimination under Title VII. 289 F.3d at

651–53. Rather than resolve the claims on the “ministerial

exception,” the Tenth Circuit avoided deciding whether the

employee was a “minister” and instead relied on the

“broader church autonomy doctrine.” Id. at 658 n.2. To the

Tenth Circuit, the doctrine protects a church when it “makes

a personnel decision based on religious doctrine”—even

decisions involving non-ministers. Id. at 660. Thus, the

church’s actions fell “squarely within the areas of church

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 31

governance and doctrine protected by the First

Amendment.” Id. at 658. See also Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d

944, 945, 947–49 (3rd Cir. 1991) (observing that applying

Title VII to a Catholic school’s hiring of a teacher would “be

constitutionally suspect because it would arguably violate

both the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of

the first amendment”); Kennedy v. St. Joseph’s Ministries,

Inc., 657 F.3d 189, 191 n.6 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting the

potential “First Amendment implications” of deciding a

nurse’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims

against a Catholic nursing-care facility); Hall v. Baptist

Mem. Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 622, 626–28 (6th

Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that the “First Amendment does

not permit federal courts to dictate to religious institutions

how to carry out their religious missions or how to enforce

their religious practices” in a case denying a discrimination

claim by a fired services specialist at a church-affiliated

hospital); Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 200–01

(11th Cir. 1997) (concluding, without invoking the

ministerial exception, that Title VII doesn’t protect a divinity

school professor fired because “his religious beliefs . . .

differ[ed] from those of the school’s dean,” which “avoid[s]

the First Amendment concerns which always tower over us

when we face a case that is about religion”).

***

In sum, the church autonomy doctrine encompasses

more than just the ministerial exception. The church

autonomy doctrine forbids interference with “an internal

church decision that affects the faith and mission of the

church itself.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. So in cases

involving the hiring of non-ministerial employees, a

religious institution may enjoy its protection when a

challenged hiring decision is rooted in a sincerely held

32 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

religious belief. That is, under the church autonomy

doctrine, religious organizations may decide to hire co-

religionists to further their religious missions.

ii.

Application of Church Autonomy Doctrine

Union Gospel is a religious organization, as the State

concedes. Under its articles of incorporation, Union

Gospel’s mission is to “spread the Gospel of the Lord Jesus

Christ.” It fulfills its mission by offering services to the

homeless, the hungry, the sick, and the addicted. It operates

shelters, health clinics, soup kitchens, and faith-based

recovery services. Union Gospel’s religious beliefs guide

everything it does. It shares the Gospel with all whom it

serves and encourages everyone to develop a relationship

with Jesus Christ. At the heart of its mission, Union Gospel

believes that “spiritual welfare” is more important than any

“physical assistance” it can provide. As part of its religious

faith, Union Gospel has specific views about marriage and

sexuality. According to Union Gospel, sexual expression is

only proper between one man and one woman in the context

of marriage.

Union Gospel accomplishes its religious mission

through its employees. As the organization emphasizes, its

employees are its “hands, feet, and mouthpiece.” It expects

its employees to participate in the group’s evangelism and

be an example to others of what Union Gospel believes it

means to be a Christian. Union Gospel teaches that

Christians should encourage one another in their faith and

engage in personal fellowship. Besides exemplifying a

Christian life, this fellowship means helping other Christians

grow in their faith and praying for each other. Consistent

with this religious mission, Union Gospel seeks to maintain

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 33

a community within the organization of shared faith to

facilitate “Christian fellowship, mentoring, and

discipleship.”

Based on its religious views, Union Gospel only employs

those who share its Christian beliefs and practices. Union

Gospel requires its employees to agree with and live out

those beliefs and practices, including abstaining from sexual

conduct outside of marriage between a man and a woman.

Applicants to Union Gospel are informed about its co-

religionist policy both before and during the hiring process.

It screens out any application that expresses disagreement

with these religious views. On receiving an offer of

employment, all employees must sign and agree to Union

Gospel’s statement of faith, core values, and job duties and

requirements.

As a matter of faith, Union Gospel believes that only co-

religionists advance its religious mission. And the State

doesn’t challenge the sincerity of these beliefs. Union

Gospel believes its employees create an internal “faith

community” that contributes to its outward ministry. As

mentioned earlier, all its employees, even the “inward”

facing ones, must undertake the religious responsibility of

supporting each other’s faith journey, praying with and for

one another, sharing scripture and devotionals, and setting

an example on how to live a Christian life as Union Gospel

believes. According to Union Gospel, this “spiritually

supportive environment” facilitates Union Gospel’s social

service mission. Union Gospel understands that its mission

to spread the Gospel through its social welfare work can be

achieved only by those who “seek to advance the same goals

with the same spirit.” Thus, the group says that only those

who share its Christian views can build this essential

environment.

34 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

Union Gospel also believes that fostering a “community

of likeminded believers” ensures that it presents a “united,

correct, and consistent Christian message to the people it

cares for and to the world.” Its message, Union Gospel says,

would be undermined if its own employees openly disagree

with that message. At the very least, hiring only fellow

believers shields its employees and the people it serves from

what it thinks are “sinful habits, behaviors, and temptations.”

Thus, employing staff whose actions or beliefs go against its

teachings would hamper its ability to achieve its religious

goals.

Finally, Union Gospel believes hiring only likeminded

believers maintains its very identity. See Amos, 483 U.S. at

342 (Brennan, J., concurring) (employing co-religionists is

one way “a religious community defines itself”); Hosanna-

Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200–01 (Alito, J., joined by Kagan, J.,

concurring) (“messenger matters” to religious

organizations). If forced to hire those who are hostile to its

Christian teachings, Union Gospel fears it will lose its

unique and important Christian message.

Together, these reasons show that Union Gospel’s co-

religionist hiring policy constitutes an “internal management

decision[] that [is] essential to the institution’s central

mission.” Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 746.

In sum, the State doesn’t contest three things: (1) that

Union Gospel is a religious institution, (2) that Union Gospel

has a sincerely held religious belief that only co-religionists

may advance its religious mission, and (3) that Union

Gospel’s co-religionist hiring policy is based on that

religious belief. Given all three, Union Gospel is likely to

succeed on the merits of its claim that enforcing WLAD

against it for hiring only co-religionists violates the church

UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN 35

autonomy doctrine. The alternative would mean that the

State could interfere with a religious mission and drive it

from the public sphere. Such a result is contrary to the First

Amendment’s principles.

B.

Irreparable Harm and Balance of Interests

The remaining preliminary injunction factors don’t merit

lengthy discussion—they easily favor Union Gospel.

Union Gospel satisfies the irreparable harm requirement

because it has “demonstrate[d] the existence of a colorable

First Amendment claim.” Fellowship of Christian Athletes,

82 F.4th at 694–95. “It is axiomatic that ‘the loss of First

Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Id. at 694

(quoting Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592

U.S. 14, 19 (2020)) (simplified). And if Union Gospel is

unable to fill the more than 50 positions required under its

hiring policy, its operations would suffer irreparable harm.

Union Gospel has likewise established that the public

interest and balance of the equities “tips sharply” in its favor.

“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation

of a party’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 695. And for over

70 years, WLAD has exempted non-profit religious

organizations, like Union Gospel, from its scope. The

protections Union Gospel receives here are what it

previously enjoyed before the Washington Supreme Court

narrowly construed the WLAD’s exception for religious

employers, and what Union Gospel otherwise would receive

under Title VII and various state analogs.

36 UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WA V. BROWN

IV.

Conclusion

Union Gospel has shown it is likely to succeed on the

merits of its claims based on the church autonomy doctrine.

If a religious organization’s hiring of co-religionists for non-

ministerial positions rests on its sincerely held religious

beliefs, then the church autonomy doctrine forbids

government interference with that hiring decision. And

recognizing the limits of employment law breaks no new

ground. Congress has long exempted religious employers

from federal employment laws that interfere with their

ability “to define and carry out their religious missions.”

Amos, 483 U.S. at 329, 339 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

1). Other States within the Ninth Circuit have similar

exemptions in their state analogs. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 41-1462; Cal. Gov. Code § 12926(d); Haw. Rev. Stat.

§ 378-3(5); Idaho Code § 67-5910(1); Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 659A.006(5)(c); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-101(11); Nev.

Rev. Stat. § 613.320(1)(b). Even Washington’s Legislature

understood the importance of religious freedom in

exempting religious organizations from WLAD’s scope—an

exemption that stood for over 70 years. See Wash. Rev.

Code § 49.60.040(11). This tension with the First

Amendment arises only from Washington courts’ recent

reading of WLAD. Given that interpretation’s outlier status,

adhering to the church autonomy doctrine here is unlikely to

have broader impact. We affirm the preliminary injunction.

AFFIRMED.