The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3000-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RAHJIV SMITH, a/k/a
RAJI SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued October 22, 2025 – Decided January 6, 2026
Before Judges Smith and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 04-
02-0153.
Peter T. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti,
Public Defender, attorney; Peter T. Blum, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex
County Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy A. Hulett, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Rahjiv Smith was convicted of murder and weapons offenses
at the age of nineteen. He was sentenced to a fifty-year prison term.
Defendant served twenty-two years of that sentence. He appeals from an order
denying his motion for resentencing. On appeal, defendant argues we should
extend the reasoning in State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359 (2022), which granted
certain juvenile offenders the right to resentencing. However, we decline to
extend Comer to late adolescent offenders like defendant, and we affirm.
On December 16, 2003, defendant, believing Troy Brown intended to
rob him or his friend, Jose Nunez, was involved in an altercation with Brown
at defendant's residence in New Brunswick. Later that night, after consuming
alcohol and PCP, defendant, Nunez, and Brown walked together outside
Smith's home. While Nunez and Brown walked ahead, a single gunshot was
fired, and Brown fell to the ground. The medical examiner concluded Brown
was shot at point blank range with the muzzle of the weapon in direct contact
with his clothing and no evidence of a struggle.
The subsequent investigation led police to defendant's home where his
grandfather consented to searches. Nunez informed police that defendant hid
the weapon, which was later recovered from a spare bedroom closet. The
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firearm matched the one used in the homicide. Defendant ultimately admitted
to the shooting but claimed Nunez handed him the weapon and directed him to
shoot.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and second-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. He was sentenced to fifty
years with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier. We affirmed his
convictions and sentence. State v. Smith, No. A-1485-05 (App. Div. Sept. 27,
2007) (slip op. at 24). In April 2014, we reversed the denial of defendant's
post-conviction relief (PCR) application and remanded for a hearing. State v.
Smith, No. A-5236-11 (App. Div. April 4, 2014). After the hearing, the PCR
court denied the relief requested and we affirmed. State v. Smith, No. A-1261-
14 (App. Div. July 1, 2016).
In 2022, defendant moved for resentencing and was assigned counsel.
Defendant argued individuals aged eighteen to twenty-one are still within late
adolescence and share characteristics with younger teens. Defendant
supported his contentions with an expert report authored by Tarika Daftary -
Kapur, Ph.D, a forensic psychologist. Dr. Daftary-Kapur opined there is a
scientific basis for the hypothesis that juvenile offenders who are age twenty
and younger should be considered late adolescents and the factors articulated
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in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012), 1 should be considered when
they are sentenced.
In a written opinion, the trial court denied the motion, concluding:
[D]efendant now seeks to apply the holding of Comer
to his own case, even though he was an adult at the
time of the murder. In the Comer decision, the
Supreme Court does not question the sentencing
framework for murder as applied to adults or imply
that defendants up to twenty years old should be
eligible for resentencing. To the contrary, the Court's
holding states: "[W]e therefore hold under the State
Constitution that juveniles may petition the court to
review their sentence after [twenty] years." Comer,
249 N.J. at 390 (emphasis added). The Court is
explicit in the age that is covered by its holding.
....
Similarly, our Supreme Court has not extended its
holdings under the State Constitution to require a
sentencing court's application of the Miller youth
factors to adult offenders. See, e.g., State v. Zuber,
227 N.J. 442, 451 (2017) ("we hold that sentencing
judges should evaluate the Miller factors at [the time
of sentencing] to 'take into account how children are
different, and how those differences counsel against
1
In Miller, , the Court articulated five factors to be considered by judges in
sentencing juvenile offenders in order to avoid subjecting them to cruel and
unusual punishment: (1) the juvenile's chronological age and developmental
characteristics; (2) the juvenile's family and home environment; (3) the
circumstances of the offense and any relevant external pressures; (4) the
procedural disadvantages due to youth; and (5) the rehabilitation potential.
567 U.S. at 477-78.
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irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.'"
(citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 480) (emphasis added)).
Although the Court in Comer cited to scientific
articles explaining why many youths do not reach
maturity for years after their eighteenth birthdays, the
Court's holding was plainly limited to juveniles.
....
In summary, no reasonable interpretation of Comer
leads to the conclusion reached by the defendant here
that the Court meant to extend the holding of Comer
to anyone other than juvenile defendants. Since the
defendant falls outside of the delineated age for relief,
and this court is bound to follow the ruling of Comer,
[d]efendant's request for re-sentencing is denied.
Defendant frames this sole issue for our consideration:
A RESENTENCING SHOULD OCCUR BECAUSE
THE COMER DECISION - WHICH REQUIRES A
RESENTENCING AFTER AN ADOLESCENT
OFFENDER UNDER AGE EIGHTEEN SERVES
TWENTY YEARS - SHOULD EXTEND TO
ADOLESCENTS AGED EIGHTEEN, LIKE SMITH.
U.S. CONST. AMENDS. VIII, XIV; N.J. CONST.
ART. I, ¶12.
Legal Background: Adolescents Under Eighteen
Receive Constitutional Protection Against Lengthy
Sentences Because of Their Immaturity and
Likelihood of Reform, Characteristics Described by
the Miller Factors.
Eighteen-Year-Old Adolescents Should Receive the
Same Constitutional Protection Against Lengthy
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Sentences Because the Miller Factors Apply Equally
to Them.
The Issue of Extending Comer is Open, and a Prior
Appellate Division Panel was Incorrect to Decide
Otherwise.
We have considered defendant's contentions in view of our most recent
decision set forth in State v. Jones, 478 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2024),
certif. denied, 259 N.J. 314 and 259 N.J. 315 (2024), and conclude they lack
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
In support of his argument that the Miller factors should be extended to
young adult offenders aged between eighteen and twenty years, defendant
contends scientific evidence demonstrates that "late adolescents" share the
same pertinent characteristics of juveniles. These would include "transient
rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences," that lessen
the "moral culpability" of juvenile offenders and thus a juvenile's youth is a
"central consideration" to the sentencing process. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472-74
(quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
Our courts have adopted the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in
Miller. Our Supreme Court noted "'children are different' when it comes to
sentencing, and 'youth and its attendant characteristics' must be considered at
the time a juvenile is sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
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parole." State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 429 (2017) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at
465). However, despite this predicate, the Court expressly declined to "extend
Miller's protections to defendants sentenced for crimes committed when those
defendants were over the age of eighteen." State v. Ryan, 249 N.J. 581, 596
(2022).
Most recently, in Jones, the defendants, who committed their offenses as
"late adolescents," requested resentencing on similar scientific grounds as
those raised by defendant here. We explained "'[t]he Legislature has chosen
eighteen as the threshold age for adulthood in criminal sentencing. Although
this choice may seem arbitrary, 'a line must be drawn,' and '[t]he age of
[eighteen] is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between
childhood and adulthood.'" Jones, 478 N.J. Super. at 550-51 (quoting Ryan,
249 N.J. at 600 n.10 (second alteration in original)).
Here, Smith was nineteen years old when he committed his crimes, it
follows that he fell within the range specifically contemplated and rejected
under Jones, 478 N.J. Super. at 549. We are satisfied the judge correctly
denied defendant's motion.
Affirmed.
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